Quaestio 77 Question 77 De accidentibus remanentibus in hoc sacramento The Accidents Which Remain in This Sacrament Deinde considerandum est de accidentibus remanentibus in hoc sacramento. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. We must now consider the accidents which remain in this sacrament; under which head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum accidentia quae remanent, sint sine subiecto. (1) Whether the accidents which remain are without a subject? Secundo, utrum quantitas dimensiva sit subiectum aliorum accidentium. (2) Whether dimensive quantity is the subject of the other accidents? Tertio, utrum huiusmodi accidentia possint immutare aliquod corpus extrinsecum. (3) Whether such accidents can affect an extrinsic body? Quarto, utrum possint corrumpi. (4) Whether they can be corrupted? Quinto, utrum ex eis possit aliquid generari. (5) Whether anything can be generated from them? Sexto, utrum possint nutrire. (6) Whether they can nourish? Septimo, de fractione panis consecrati. (7) Of the breaking of the consecrated bread? Octavo, utrum vino consecrato possit aliquid admisceri. (8) Whether anything can be mixed with the consecrated wine? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum accidentia remaneant in hoc sacramento sine subiecto Whether the accidents remain in this sacrament without a subject? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod accidentia non remaneant in hoc sacramento sine subiecto. Nihil enim inordinatum aut fallax debet esse in hoc sacramento veritatis. Sed accidentia esse sine subiecto est contra rerum ordinem, quem Deus naturae indidit. Videtur etiam ad quandam fallaciam pertinere, cum accidentia sint signa naturae subiecti. Ergo in hoc sacramento non sunt accidentia sine subiecto. Objection 1: It seems that the accidents do not remain in this sacrament without a subject, because there ought not to be anything disorderly or deceitful in this sacrament of truth. But for accidents to be without a subject is contrary to the order which God established in nature; and furthermore it seems to savor of deceit, since accidents are naturally the signs of the nature of the subject. Therefore the accidents are not without a subject in this sacrament. Praeterea, fieri non potest, etiam miraculose, quod definitio rei ab ea separetur; vel quod uni rei conveniat definitio alterius, puta quod homo, manens homo, sit animal irrationale. Ad hoc enim sequeretur contradictoria esse simul, hoc enim quod significat nomen rei, est definitio, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys. Sed ad definitionem accidentis pertinet quod sit in subiecto, ad definitionem vero substantiae, quod per se subsistat non in subiecto. Non potest ergo miraculose fieri quod in hoc sacramento sint accidentia sine subiecto. Obj. 2: Further, not even by miracle can the definition of a thing be severed from it, or the definition of another thing be applied to it; for instance, that, while man remains a man, he can be an irrational animal. For it would follow that contradictories can exist at the one time: for the definition of a thing is what its name expresses, as is said in Metaph. iv. But it belongs to the definition of an accident for it to be in a subject, while the definition of substance is that it must subsist of itself, and not in another. Therefore it cannot come to pass, even by miracle, that the accidents exist without a subject in this sacrament. Praeterea, accidens individuatur ex subiecto. Si ergo accidentia remanent in hoc sacramento sine subiecto, non erunt individua, sed universalia. Quod patet esse falsum, quia sic non essent sensibilia, sed intelligibilia tantum. Obj. 3: Further, an accident is individuated by its subject. If therefore the accidents remain in this sacrament without a subject, they will not be individual, but general, which is clearly false, because thus they would not be sensible, but merely intelligible. Praeterea, accidentia per consecrationem huius sacramenti non adipiscuntur aliquam compositionem. Sed ante consecrationem non erant composita neque ex materia et forma, neque ex quo est et quod est. Ergo etiam post consecrationem non sunt composita altero horum modorum. Quod est inconveniens, quia sic essent simpliciora quam Angeli; cum tamen haec accidentia sint sensibilia. Non ergo accidentia remanent in hoc sacramento sine subiecto. Obj. 4: Further, the accidents after the consecration of this sacrament do not obtain any composition. But before the consecration they were not composed either of matter and form, nor of existence (quo est) and essence (quod est). Therefore, even after consecration they are not composite in either of these ways. But this is unreasonable, for thus they would be simpler than angels, whereas at the same time these accidents are perceptible to the senses. Therefore, in this sacrament the accidents do not remain without a subject. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in homilia paschali, quod species sacramentales sunt illarum rerum vocabula quae ante fuerunt, scilicet panis et vini. Et ita, cum non remaneat substantia panis et vini, videtur quod huiusmodi species sint sine subiecto. On the contrary, Gregory says in an Easter Homily (Lanfranc, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xx) that the sacramental species are the names of those things which were there before, namely, of the bread and wine. Therefore since the substance of the bread and the wine does not remain, it seems that these species remain without a subject. Respondeo dicendum quod accidentia panis et vini, quae sensu deprehenduntur in hoc sacramento remanere post consecrationem, non sunt sicut in subiecto in substantia panis et vini, quae non remanet, ut supra habitum est. Neque etiam in forma substantiali, quae non manet; et, si remaneret, subiectum esse non posset, ut patet per Boetium, in libro de Trin. Manifestum est etiam quod huiusmodi accidentia non sunt in substantia corporis et sanguinis Christi sicut in subiecto, quia substantia humani corporis nullo modo potest his accidentibus affici; neque etiam est possibile quod corpus Christi, gloriosum et impassibile existens, alteretur ad suscipiendas huiusmodi qualitates. I answer that, The species of the bread and wine, which are perceived by our senses to remain in this sacrament after consecration, are not subjected in the substance of the bread and wine, for that does not remain, as stated above (Q. 75, A. 2); nor in the substantial form, for that does not remain (Q. 75, A. 6), and if it did remain, it could not be a subject, as Boethius declares (De Trin. i). Furthermore it is manifest that these accidents are not subjected in the substance of Christ’s body and blood, because the substance of the human body cannot in any way be affected by such accidents; nor is it possible for Christ’s glorious and impassible body to be altered so as to receive these qualities. Dicunt autem quidam quod sunt, sicut in subiecto, in aere circumstante. Sed nec hoc esse potest. Primo quidem, quia aer non est huiusmodi accidentium susceptivus. Secundo, quia huiusmodi accidentia non sunt ubi est aer. Quinimmo ad motum harum specierum aer depellitur. Tertio, quia accidentia non transeunt de subiecto in subiectum, ut scilicet idem accidens numero quod primo fuit in uno subiecto, postmodum fiat in alio. Accidens enim numerum accipit a subiecto. Unde non potest esse quod, idem numero manens, sit quandoque in hoc, quandoque in alio subiecto. Quarto quia, cum aer non spolietur accidentibus propriis, simul haberet accidentia propria et aliena. Nec potest dici quod hoc fiat miraculose virtute consecrationis, quia verba consecrationis hoc non significant; quae tamen non efficiunt nisi significatum. Now there are some who say that they are in the surrounding atmosphere as in a subject. But even this cannot be: in the first place, because atmosphere is not susceptive of such accidents. Second, because these accidents are not where the atmosphere is, nay more, the atmosphere is displaced by the motion of these species. Third, because accidents do not pass from subject to subject, so that the same identical accident which was first in one subject be afterwards in another; because an accident is individuated by the subject; hence it cannot come to pass for an accident remaining identically the same to be at one time in one subject, and at another time in another. Fourth, since the atmosphere is not deprived of its own accidents, it would have at the one time its own accidents and others foreign to it. Nor can it be maintained that this is done miraculously in virtue of the consecration, because the words of consecration do not signify this, and they effect only what they signify. Et ideo relinquitur quod accidentia in hoc sacramento manent sine subiecto. Quod quidem virtute divina fieri potest. Cum enim effectus magis dependeat a causa prima quam a causa secunda, potest Deus, qui est prima causa substantiae et accidentis, per suam infinitam virtutem conservare in esse accidens subtracta substantia, per quam conservabatur in esse sicut per propriam causam, sicut etiam alios effectus naturalium causarum potest producere sine naturalibus causis; sicut corpus humanum formavit in utero virginis sine virili semine. Therefore it follows that the accidents continue in this sacrament without a subject. This can be done by Divine power: for since an effect depends more upon the first cause than on the second, God Who is the first cause both of substance and accident, can by His unlimited power preserve an accident in existence when the substance is withdrawn whereby it was preserved in existence as by its proper cause, just as without natural causes He can produce other effects of natural causes, even as He formed a human body in the Virgin’s womb, without the seed of man (Hymn for Christmas, First Vespers). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse ordinatum secundum communem legem naturae, cuius tamen contrarium est ordinatum secundum speciale privilegium gratiae, ut patet in resuscitatione mortuorum, et in illuminatione caecorum, prout etiam in rebus humanis quaedam aliquibus conceduntur ex speciali privilegio praeter communem legem. Et ita, licet sit secundum communem naturae ordinem quod accidens sit in subiecto, ex speciali tamen ratione, secundum ordinem gratiae, accidentia sunt in hoc sacramento sine subiecto, propter rationes supra inductas. Reply Obj. 1: There is nothing to hinder the common law of nature from ordaining a thing, the contrary of which is nevertheless ordained by a special privilege of grace, as is evident in the raising of the dead, and in the restoring of sight to the blind: even thus in human affairs, to some individuals some things are granted by special privilege which are outside the common law. And so, even though it be according to the common law of nature for an accident to be in a subject, still for a special reason, according to the order of grace, the accidents exist in this sacrament without a subject, on account of the reasons given above (Q. 75, A. 5). Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum ens non sit genus, hoc ipsum quod est esse, non potest esse essentia vel substantiae vel accidentis. Non ergo definitio substantiae est ens per se sine subiecto, nec definitio accidentis ens in subiecto sed quidditati seu essentiae substantiae competit habere esse non in subiecto; quidditati autem sive essentiae accidentis competit habere esse in subiecto. In hoc autem sacramento non datur accidentibus quod ex vi suae essentiae sint sine subiecto, sed ex divina virtute sustentante. Et ideo non desinunt esse accidentia, quia nec separatur ab eis definitio accidentis, nec competit eis definitio substantiae. Reply Obj. 2: Since being is not a genus, then being cannot be of itself the essence of either substance or accident. Consequently, the definition of substance is not—a being of itself without a subject, nor is the definition of accident—a being in a subject; but it belongs to the quiddity or essence of substance to have existence not in a subject; while it belongs to the quiddity or essence of accident to have existence in a subject. But in this sacrament it is not in virtue of their essence that accidents are not in a subject, but through the Divine power sustaining them; and consequently they do not cease to be accidents, because neither is the definition of accident withdrawn from them, nor does the definition of substance apply to them. Ad tertium dicendum quod huiusmodi accidentia acquisierunt esse individuum in substantia panis et vini, qua conversa in corpus et sanguinem Christi, remanent virtute divina accidentia in illo esse individuato quod prius habebant. Unde sunt singularia et sensibilia. Reply Obj. 3: These accidents acquired individual being in the substance of the bread and wine; and when this substance is changed into the body and blood of Christ, they remain in that individuated being which they possessed before, hence they are individual and sensible. Ad quartum dicendum quod accidentia huiusmodi, manente substantia panis et vini, non habebant ipsa esse nec alia accidentia, sed substantia eorum habebat huiusmodi esse per ea; sicut nix est alba per albedinem. Sed post consecrationem ipsa accidentia quae remanent, habent esse. Unde sunt composita ex esse et quod est, sicut in prima parte de Angelis dictum est. Et cum hoc, habent compositionem partium quantitativarum. Reply Obj. 4: These accidents had no being of their own nor other accidents, so long as the substance of the bread and wine remained; but their subjects had such being through them, just as snow is white through whiteness. But after the consecration the accidents which remain have being; hence they are compounded of existence and essence, as was said of the angels, in the First Part (Q. 50, A. 2, ad 3); and besides they have composition of quantitative parts. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum in hoc sacramento quantitas dimensiva panis vel vini sit aliorum accidentium subiectum Whether in this sacrament the dimensive quantity of the bread or wine is the subject of the other accidents? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in hoc sacramento quantitas dimensiva panis vel vini non sit aliorum accidentium subiectum. Accidentis enim non est accidens, nulla enim forma potest esse subiectum, cum subiici pertineat ad proprietatem materiae. Sed quantitas dimensiva est quoddam accidens. Ergo quantitas dimensiva non potest esse subiectum aliorum accidentium. Objection 1: It seems that in this sacrament the dimensive quantity of the bread or wine is not the subject of the other accidents. For accident is not the subject of accident; because no form can be a subject, since to be a subject is a property of matter. But dimensive quantity is an accident. Therefore dimensive quantity cannot be the subject of the other accidents. Praeterea, sicut quantitas individuatur ex substantia, ita etiam et alia accidentia. Si ergo quantitas dimensiva panis aut vini remanet individuata secundum esse prius habitum, in quo conservatur, pari ratione et alia accidentia remanent individuata secundum esse quod prius habebant in substantia. Non ergo sunt in quantitate dimensiva sicut in subiecto, cum omne accidens individuetur per suum subiectum. Obj. 2: Further, just as quantity is individuated by substance, so also are the other accidents. If, then, the dimensive quantity of the bread or wine remains individuated according to the being it had before, in which it is preserved, for like reason the other accidents remain individuated according to the existence which they had before in the substance. Therefore they are not in dimensive quantity as in a subject, since every accident is individuated by its own subject. Praeterea, inter alia accidentia panis et vini quae remanent, deprehenduntur etiam sensu rarum et densum. Quae non possunt esse in quantitate dimensiva praeter materiam existente, quia rarum est quod habet parum de materia sub dimensionibus magnis; densum autem quod habet multum de materia sub dimensionibus parvis, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Ergo videtur quod quantitas dimensiva non possit esse subiectum accidentium quae remanent in hoc sacramento. Obj. 3: Further, among the other accidents that remain, of the bread and wine, the senses perceive also rarity and density, which cannot be in dimensive quantity existing outside matter; because a thing is rare which has little matter under great dimensions, while a thing is dense which has much matter under small dimensions, as is said in Phys. iv. It does not seem, then, that dimensive quantity can be the subject of the accidents which remain in this sacrament. Praeterea, quantitas a subiecto separata videtur esse quantitas mathematica, quae non est subiectum qualitatum sensibilium. Cum ergo accidentia quae remanent in hoc sacramento sint sensibilia, videtur quod non possint esse in hoc sacramento sicut in subiecto in quantitate panis et vini remanente post consecrationem. Obj. 4: Further, quantity abstract from matter seems to be mathematical quantity, which is not the subject of sensible qualities. Since, then, the remaining accidents in this sacrament are sensible, it seems that in this sacrament they cannot be subjected in the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine that remains after consecration. Sed contra est quod qualitates non sunt divisibiles nisi per accidens, scilicet ratione subiecti. Dividuntur autem qualitates remanentes in hoc sacramento per divisionem quantitatis dimensivae, sicut patet ad sensum. Ergo quantitas dimensiva est subiectum accidentium quae remanent in hoc sacramento. On the contrary, Qualities are divisible only accidentally, that is, by reason of the subject. But the qualities remaining in this sacrament are divided by the division of dimensive quantity, as is evident through our senses. Therefore, dimensive quantity is the subject of the accidents which remain in this sacrament. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere accidentia alia quae remanent in hoc sacramento, esse sicut in subiecto in quantitate dimensiva panis vel vini remanente. Primo quidem, per hoc quod ad sensum apparet aliquod quantum esse ibi coloratum et aliis accidentibus affectum, nec in talibus sensus decipitur. Secundo, quia prima dispositio materiae est quantitas dimensiva, unde et Plato posuit primas differentias materiae magnum et parvum. Et quia primum subiectum est materia, consequens est quod omnia alia accidentia referantur ad subiectum mediante quantitate dimensiva, sicut et primum subiectum coloris dicitur superficies esse, ratione cuius quidam posuerunt dimensiones esse substantias corporum, ut dicitur in III Metaphys. Et quia, subtracto subiecto, remanent accidentia secundum esse quod prius habebant, consequens est quod omnia accidentia remanent fundata super quantitatem dimensivam. I answer that, It is necessary to say that the other accidents which remain in this sacrament are subjected in the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine that remains: first of all, because something having quantity and color and affected by other accidents is perceived by the senses; nor is sense deceived in such. Second, because the first disposition of matter is dimensive quantity, hence Plato also assigned great and small as the first differences of matter (Aristotle, Metaph. iv). And because the first subject is matter, the consequence is that all other accidents are related to their subject through the medium of dimensive quantity; just as the first subject of color is said to be the surface, on which account some have maintained that dimensions are the substances of bodies, as is said in Metaph. iii. And since, when the subject is withdrawn, the accidents remain according to the being which they had before, it follows that all accidents remain founded upon dimensive quantity. Tertio quia, cum subiectum sit principium individuationis accidentium, oportet id quod ponitur aliquorum accidentium subiectum esse, aliquo modo esse individuationis principium. Est enim de ratione individui quod non possit in pluribus esse. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quia non est natum in aliquo esse, et hoc modo formae immateriales separatae, per se subsistentes, sunt etiam per seipsas individuae. Alio modo, ex eo quod forma substantialis vel accidentalis est quidem nata in aliquo esse, non tamen in pluribus, sicut haec albedo, quae est in hoc corpore. Quantum igitur ad primum, materia est individuationis principium omnibus formis inhaerentibus, quia, cum huiusmodi formae, quantum est de se, sint natae in aliquo esse sicut in subiecto, ex quo aliqua earum recipitur in materia, quae non est in alio, iam nec ipsa forma sic existens potest in alio esse. Quantum autem ad secundum, dicendum est quod individuationis principium est quantitas dimensiva. Ex hoc enim aliquid est natum esse in uno solo, quod illud est in se indivisum et divisum ab omnibus aliis. Divisio autem accidit substantiae ratione quantitatis, ut dicitur in I Physic. Et ideo ipsa quantitas dimensiva est quoddam individuationis principium huiusmodi formis, inquantum scilicet diversae formae numero sunt in diversis partibus materiae. Unde ipsa quantitas dimensiva secundum se habet quandam individuationem, ita quod possumus imaginari plures lineas eiusdem speciei differentes positione, quae cadit in ratione quantitatis huius; convenit enim dimensioni quod sit quantitas positionem habens. Et ideo potius quantitas dimensiva potest esse subiectum aliorum accidentium quam e converso. Third, because, since the subject is the principle of individuation of the accidents, it is necessary for what is admitted as the subject of some accidents to be somehow the principle of individuation: for it is of the very notion of an individual that it cannot be in several; and this happens in two ways. First, because it is not natural to it to be in any one; and in this way immaterial separated forms, subsisting of themselves, are also individuals of themselves. Second, because a form, be it substantial or accidental, is naturally in someone indeed, not in several, as this whiteness, which is in this body. As to the first, matter is the principle of individuation of all inherent forms, because, since these forms, considered in themselves, are naturally in something as in a subject, from the very fact that one of them is received in matter, which is not in another, it follows that neither can the form itself thus existing be in another. As to the second, it must be maintained that the principle of individuation is dimensive quantity. For that something is naturally in another one solely, is due to the fact that that other is undivided in itself, and distinct from all others. But it is on account of quantity that substance can be divided, as is said in Phys. i. And therefore dimensive quantity itself is a particular principle of individuation in forms of this kind, namely, inasmuch as forms numerically distinct are in different parts of the matter. Hence also dimensive quantity has of itself a kind of individuation, so that we can imagine several lines of the same species, differing in position, which is included in the notion of this quantity; for it belongs to dimension for it to be quantity having position (Aristotle, Categor. iv), and therefore dimensive quantity can be the subject of the other accidents, rather than the other way about. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod accidens per se non potest esse subiectum alterius accidentis, quia non per se est. Secundum vero quod est in alio, unum accidens dicitur esse subiectum alterius, inquantum unum accidens recipitur in subiecto alio mediante, sicut superficies dicitur esse subiectum coloris. Unde, quando accidenti datur divinitus ut per se sit, potest etiam per se alterius accidentis esse subiectum. Reply Obj. 1: One accident cannot of itself be the subject of another, because it does not exist of itself. But inasmuch as an accident is received in another thing, one is said to be the subject of the other, inasmuch as one is received in a subject through another, as the surface is said to be the subject of color. Hence when God makes an accident to exist of itself, it can also be of itself the subject of another. Ad secundum dicendum quod alia accidentia, etiam secundum quod erant in substantia panis, individuabantur mediante quantitate dimensiva, sicut dictum est. Et ideo potius quantitas dimensiva est subiectum aliorum accidentium remanentium in hoc sacramento quam e converso. Reply Obj. 2: The other accidents, even as they were in the substance of the bread, were individuated by means of dimensive quantity, as stated above. And therefore dimensive quantity is the subject of the other accidents remaining in this sacrament, rather than conversely.