Quaestio 86 Question 86 De effectu poenitentiae quantum ad remissionem peccatorum mortalium The Effect of Penance, as Regards the Pardon of Mortal Sin Deinde considerandum est de effectu poenitentiae. Et primo, quantum ad remissionem peccatorum mortalium; secundo, quantum ad remissionem peccatorum venialium; tertio, quantum ad reditum peccatorum dimissorum; quarto, quantum ad restitutionem virtutum. We must now consider the effect of penance; and (1) as regards the pardon of mortal sins; (2) as regards the pardon of venial sins; (3) as regards the return of sins which have been pardoned; (4) as regards the recovery of the virtues. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum peccata mortalia per poenitentiam auferantur. (1) Whether all mortal sins are taken away by penance? Secundo, utrum possint sine poenitentia tolli. (2) Whether they can be taken away without penance? Tertio, utrum possit remitti unum sine alio. (3) Whether one can be taken away without the other? Quarto, utrum poenitentia auferat culpam remanente reatu. (4) Whether penance takes away the guilt while the debt remains? Quinto, utrum remaneant reliquiae peccatorum. (5) Whether any remnants of sin remain? Sexto, utrum auferre peccatum sit effectus poenitentiae inquantum est virtus, vel inquantum est sacramentum. (6) Whether the removal of sin is the effect of penance as a virtue, or as a sacrament? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum per poenitentiam removeantur omnia peccata Whether all sins are taken away by penance? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod per poenitentiam non removeantur omnia peccata. Dicit enim apostolus, Heb. XII, quod Esau non invenit locum poenitentiae, quamvis cum lacrimis inquisisset eam, Glossa, idest, non invenit locum veniae et benedictionis per poenitentiam. Et II Machab. IX dicitur de Antiocho, orabat scelestus ille dominum, a quo non erat misericordiam consecuturus. Non ergo videtur quod per poenitentiam omnia peccata tollantur. Objection 1: It would seem that not all sins are taken away by penance. For the Apostle says (Heb 12:17) that Esau found no place of repentance, although with tears he had sought it, which a gloss explains as meaning that he found no place of pardon and blessing through penance: and it is related (2 Macc 9:13) of Antiochus, that this wicked man prayed to the Lord, of Whom he was not to obtain mercy. Therefore it does not seem that all sins are taken away by penance. Praeterea, dicit Augustinus, in libro de sermone Dom. in monte, quod tanta est labes illius peccati (scilicet, cum post agnitionem Dei per gratiam Christi, oppugnat aliquis fraternitatem, et adversus ipsam gratiam invidiae facibus agitatur), ut deprecandi humilitatem subire non possit, etiam si peccatum suum mala conscientia agnoscere et annuntiare cogatur. Non ergo omne peccatum potest per poenitentiam tolli. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i) that so great is the stain of that sin (namely, when a man, after coming to the knowledge of God through the grace of Christ, resists fraternal charity, and by the brands of envy combats grace itself) that he is unable to humble himself in prayer, although he is forced by his wicked conscience to acknowledge and confess his sin. Therefore not every sin can be taken away by penance. Praeterea, dominus dicit, Matth. XII, qui dixerit contra spiritum sanctum verbum, non remittetur ei neque in hoc saeculo neque in futuro. Non ergo omne peccatum remitti potest per poenitentiam. Obj. 3: Further, our Lord said (Matt 12:32): He that shall speak against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in the world to come. Therefore not every sin can be pardoned through penance. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ezech. XVIII, omnium iniquitatum eius quas operatus est, non recordabor amplius. On the contrary, It is written (Ezek 18:22): I will not remember any more all his iniquities that he hath done. Respondeo dicendum quod hoc quod aliquod peccatum per poenitentiam tolli non possit, posset contingere dupliciter, uno modo, quia aliquis de peccato poenitere non posset; alio modo, quia poenitentia non posset delere peccatum. Et primo quidem modo, non possunt deleri peccata Daemonum, et etiam hominum damnatorum, quia affectus eorum sunt in malo confirmati, ita quod non potest eis displicere peccatum inquantum est culpa, sed solum displicet eis inquantum est poena quam patiuntur; ratione cuius aliquam poenitentiam, sed infructuosam habent, secundum illud Sap. V, poenitentiam agentes, et prae angustia spiritus gementes. Unde talis poenitentia non est cum spe veniae, sed cum desperatione. Tale autem non potest esse peccatum aliquod hominis viatoris, cuius liberum arbitrium flexibile est ad bonum et ad malum. Unde dicere quod aliquod peccatum sit in hac vita de quo aliquis poenitere non possit, est erroneum. Primo quidem, quia per hoc tolleretur libertas arbitrii. Secundo, quia derogaretur virtuti gratiae, per quam moveri potest cor cuiuscumque peccatoris ad poenitendum, secundum illud Proverb. XXI cor regis in manu Dei, et quocumque voluerit vertet illud. I answer that, The fact that a sin cannot be taken away by penance may happen in two ways: first, because of the impossibility of repenting of sin; second, because of penance being unable to blot out a sin. In the first way the sins of the demons and of men who are lost, cannot be blotted out by penance, because their will is confirmed in evil, so that sin cannot displease them as to its guilt, but only as to the punishment which they suffer, by reason of which they have a kind of repentance, which yet is fruitless, according to Wis. 5:3: Repenting, and groaning for anguish of spirit. Consequently such penance brings no hope of pardon, but only despair. Nevertheless no sin of a wayfarer can be such as that, because his will is flexible to good and evil. Wherefore to say that in this life there is any sin of which one cannot repent, is erroneous, first, because this would destroy free-will, second, because this would be derogatory to the power of grace, whereby the heart of any sinner whatsoever can be moved to repent, according to Prov. 21:1: The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever He will He shall turn it. Quod autem secundo modo non possit per veram poenitentiam aliquod peccatum remitti, est etiam erroneum. Primo quidem, quia repugnat divinae misericordiae, de qua dicitur, Ioel II, quod benignus et misericors est, et multae misericordiae, et praestabilis super malitia. Vinceretur quodammodo enim Deus ab homine, si homo peccatum vellet deleri, quod Deus delere non vellet. Secundo, quia hoc derogaret virtuti passionis Christi, per quam poenitentia operatur, sicut et cetera sacramenta, cum scriptum sit, I Ioan. II, ipse est propitiatio pro peccatis nostris, non solum nostris, sed etiam totius mundi. It is also erroneous to say that any sin cannot be pardoned through true penance. First, because this is contrary to Divine mercy, of which it is written (Joel 2:13) that God is gracious and merciful, patient, and rich in mercy, and ready to repent of the evil; for, in a manner, God would be overcome by man, if man wished a sin to be blotted out, which God were unwilling to blot out. Second, because this would be derogatory to the power of Christ’s Passion, through which penance produces its effect, as do the other sacraments, since it is written (1 John 2:2): He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world. Unde simpliciter dicendum est quod omne peccatum in hac vita per poenitentiam deleri potest. Therefore we must say simply that, in this life, every sin can be blotted out by true penance. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Esau non vere poenituit. Quod patet ex hoc quod dixit, venient dies luctus patris mei, et occidam Iacob fratrem meum. Similiter etiam nec Antiochus vere poenituit. Dolebat enim de culpa praeterita non propter offensam Dei, sed propter infirmitatem corporalem quam patiebatur. Reply Obj. 1: Esau did not truly repent. This is evident from his saying (Gen 27:41): The days will come of the mourning of my father, and I will kill my brother Jacob. Likewise neither did Antiochus repent truly; since he grieved for his past sin, not because he had offended God thereby, but on account of the sickness which he suffered in his body. Ad secundum dicendum quod illud verbum Augustini sic est intelligendum, tanta est labes illius peccati ut deprecandi humilitatem subire non possit, scilicet, de facili, secundum quod dicitur ille non posse sanari qui non potest de facili sanari. Potest tamen hoc fieri per virtutem divinae gratiae, quae etiam interdum in profundum maris convertit, ut dicitur in Psalmo. Reply Obj. 2: These words of Augustine should be understood thus: So great is the stain of that sin, that man is unable to humble himself in prayer, i.e., it is not easy for him to do so; in which sense we say that a man cannot be healed, when it is difficult to heal him. Yet this is possible by the power of God’s grace, which sometimes turns men even into the depths of the sea (Ps 67:23). Ad tertium dicendum quod illud verbum vel blasphemia contra spiritum sanctum est finalis impoenitentia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis domini, quae penitus irremissibilis est, quia post finem huius vitae non est remissio peccatorum. Vel, si intelligatur per blasphemiam spiritus sancti peccatum quod fit ex certa malitia, vel etiam ipsa blasphemia spiritus sancti, dicitur non remitti, scilicet de facili, quia tale non habet in se causam excusationis; vel quia pro tali peccato punitur aliquis et in hoc saeculo et in futuro; ut in secunda parte expositum est. Reply Obj. 3: The word or blasphemy spoken against the Holy Spirit is final impenitence, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xi), which is altogether unpardonable, because after this life is ended, there is no pardon of sins. Or, if by the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, we understand sin committed through certain malice, this means either that the blasphemy itself against the Holy Spirit is unpardonable, i.e., not easily pardonable, or that such a sin does not contain in itself any motive for pardon, or that for such a sin a man is punished both in this and in the next world, as we explained in the Second Part (III, Q. 14, A. 3). Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum sine poenitentia peccatum remitti possit Whether sin can be pardoned without penance? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sine poenitentia peccatum remitti possit. Non enim est minor virtus Dei circa adultos quam circa pueros. Sed pueris peccata dimittit sine poenitentia. Ergo etiam et adultis. Objection 1: It would seem that sin can be pardoned without penance. For the power of God is no less with regard to adults than with regard to children. But He pardons the sins of children without penance. Therefore He also pardons adults without penance. Praeterea, Deus virtutem suam sacramentis non alligavit. Sed poenitentia est quoddam sacramentum. Ergo virtute divina possunt peccata sine poenitentia dimitti. Obj. 2: Further, God did not bind His power to the sacraments. But penance is a sacrament. Therefore by God’s power sin can be pardoned without penance. Praeterea, maior est misericordia Dei quam misericordia hominis. Sed homo interdum remittit offensam suam homini etiam non poenitenti, unde et ipse dominus mandat, Matth. V, diligite inimicos vestros, benefacite his qui oderunt vos. Ergo multo magis Deus dimittit offensam suam hominibus non poenitentibus. Obj. 3: Further, God’s mercy is greater than man’s. Now man sometimes forgives another for offending him, without his repenting: wherefore our Lord commanded us (Matt 5:44): Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you. Much more, therefore, does God pardon men for offending him, without their repenting. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Ierem. XVIII, si poenitentiam egerit gens illa a malo quod fecit, agam et ego poenitentiam a malo quod cogitavi ut facerem ei. Et sic e converso videtur quod, si homo poenitentiam non agat, quod Deus ei non remittat offensam. On the contrary, The Lord said (Jer 18:8): If that nation . . . shall repent of their evil which they have done, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do them, so that, on the other hand, if man do not penance, it seems that God will not pardon him his sin. Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est peccatum actuale mortale sine poenitentia remitti, loquendo de poenitentia quae est virtus. Cum enim peccatum sit Dei offensa, eo modo Deus peccatum remittit quo remittit offensam in se commissam. Offensa autem directe opponitur gratiae, ex hoc enim dicitur aliquis alteri esse offensus, quod repellit eum a gratia sua. Sicut autem habitum est in secunda parte, hoc interest inter gratiam Dei et gratiam hominis, quod gratia hominis non causat, sed praesupponit bonitatem, veram vel apparentem, in homine grato, sed gratia Dei causat bonitatem in homine grato, eo quod bona voluntas Dei, quae in nomine gratiae intelligitur, est causa boni creati. Unde potest contingere quod homo remittat offensam qua offensus est alicui, absque aliqua immutatione voluntatis eius, non autem potest contingere quod Deus remittat offensam alicui absque immutatione voluntatis eius. Offensa autem peccati mortalis procedit ex hoc quod voluntas hominis est aversa a Deo per conversionem ad aliquod bonum commutabile. Unde requiritur ad remissionem divinae offensae quod voluntas hominis sic immutetur quod convertatur ad Deum, cum detestatione praedictae conversionis et proposito emendae. Quod pertinet ad rationem poenitentiae secundum quod est virtus. Et ideo impossibile est quod peccatum alicui remittatur sine poenitentia secundum quod est virtus. I answer that, It is impossible for a mortal actual sin to be pardoned without penance, if we speak of penance as a virtue. For, as sin is an offense against God, He pardons sin in the same way as he pardons an offense committed against Him. Now an offense is directly opposed to grace, since one man is said to be offended with another, because he excludes him from his grace. Now, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 110, A. 1), the difference between the grace of God and the grace of man, is that the latter does not cause, but presupposes true or apparent goodness in him who is graced, whereas the grace of God causes goodness in the man who is graced, because the good-will of God, which is denoted by the word grace, is the cause of all created good. Hence it is possible for a man to pardon an offense, for which he is offended with someone, without any change in the latter’s will; but it is impossible that God pardon a man for an offense, without his will being changed. Now the offense of mortal sin is due to man’s will being turned away from God, through being turned to some mutable good. Consequently, for the pardon of this offense against God, it is necessary for man’s will to be so changed as to turn to God and to renounce having turned to something else in the aforesaid manner, together with a purpose of amendment; all of which belongs to the nature of penance as a virtue. Therefore it is impossible for a sin to be pardoned anyone without penance as a virtue. Sacramentum autem poenitentiae, sicut supra dictum est, perficitur per officium sacerdotis ligantis et solventis. Sine quo potest Deus peccatum remittere, sicut remisit Christus mulieri adulterae, ut legitur Ioan. VIII, et peccatrici, ut legitur Luc. VII. Quibus tamen non remisit peccata sine virtute poenitentiae; nam, sicut Gregorius dicit, in homilia, per gratiam traxit intus, scilicet ad poenitentiam, quam per misericordiam suscepit foris. But the sacrament of penance, as stated above (Q. 88, A. 3), is perfected by the priestly office of binding and loosing, without which God can forgive sins, even as Christ pardoned the adulterous woman, as related in John 8, and the woman that was a sinner, as related in Luke vii, whose sins, however, He did not forgive without the virtue of penance: for as Gregory states (Hom. xxxiii in Evang.), He drew inwardly by grace, i.e., by penance, her whom He received outwardly by His mercy. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in pueris non est nisi peccatum originale, quod non consistit in actuali deordinatione voluntatis, sed in quadam habituali deordinatione naturae, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Et ideo remittitur eis peccatum cum habituali immutatione per infusionem gratiae et virtutum, non autem cum actuali. Sed adulto in quo sunt actualia peccata, quae consistunt in deordinatione actuali voluntatis, non remittuntur peccata, etiam in Baptismo, sine actuali immutatione voluntatis, quod fit per poenitentiam. Reply Obj. 1: In children there is none but original sin, which consists, not in an actual disorder of the will, but in a habitual disorder of nature, as explained in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 82, A. 1), and so in them the forgiveness of sin is accompanied by a habitual change resulting from the infusion of grace and virtues, but not by an actual change. On the other hand, in the case of an adult, in whom there are actual sins, which consist in an actual disorder of the will, there is no remission of sins, even in Baptism, without an actual change of the will, which is the effect of penance. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de poenitentia secundum quod est sacramentum. Reply Obj. 2: This argument takes penance as a sacrament. Ad tertium dicendum quod misericordia Dei est maioris virtutis quam misericordia hominis in hoc, quod immutat voluntatem hominis ad poenitendum, quod misericordia hominis facere non potest. Reply Obj. 3: God’s mercy is more powerful than man’s, in that it moves man’s will to repent, which man’s mercy cannot do. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum possit per poenitentiam unum peccatum sine alio remitti Whether by penance one sin can be pardoned without another? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod possit per poenitentiam unum peccatum sine alio remitti. Dicitur enim Amos IV, plui super unam civitatem, et super alteram non plui, pars una compluta est, et pars super quam non plui, aruit. Quod exponens Gregorius, super Ezech., dicit, cum ille qui proximum odit ab aliis vitiis se corrigit, una et eadem civitas ex parte compluitur, et ex parte arida manet, quia sunt qui, cum quaedam vitia resecant, in aliis graviter perdurant. Ergo potest unum peccatum per poenitentiam remitti sine alio. Objection 1: It would seem that by penance one sin can be pardoned without another. For it is written (Amos 4:7): I caused it to rain upon one city, and caused it not to rain upon another city; one piece was rained upon: and the piece whereupon I rained not, withered. These words are expounded by Gregory, who says (Hom. x super Ezech.): When a man who hates his neighbor, breaks himself of other vices, rain falls on one part of the city, leaving the other part withered, for there are some men who, when they prune some vices, become much more rooted in others. Therefore one sin can be forgiven by penance, without another.