Quaestio 88 Question 88 De reditu peccatorum post poenitentiam dimissorum The Return of Sins Which Have Been Taken Away by Penance Deinde considerandum est de reditu peccatorum post poenitentiam dimissorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. We must now consider the return of sins which have been taken away by penance: under which head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum peccata per poenitentiam dimissa redeant simpliciter per sequens peccatum. (1) Whether sins which have been taken away by penance return simply through a subsequent sin? Secundo, utrum aliquo modo per ingratitudinem redeant specialius secundum quaedam peccata. (2) Whether more specially as regards certain sins they return, in a way, on account of ingratitude? Tertio, utrum redeant in aequali reatu. (3) Whether the debt of punishment remains the same for sins thus returned? Quarto, utrum illa ingratitudo per quam redeunt, sit speciale peccatum. (4) Whether this ingratitude, on account of which sins return, is a special sin? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum peccata dimissa redeant per sequens peccatum Whether sins once forgiven return through a subsequent sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata dimissa redeant per sequens peccatum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro I de Baptismo, redire dimissa peccata ubi fraterna caritas non est, apertissime dominus in Evangelio docet in illo servo a quo dimissum debitum dominus petiit eo quod ille conservo suo debitum nollet dimittere. Sed fraterna caritas tollitur per quodlibet peccatum mortale. Ergo per quodlibet sequens mortale peccatum redeunt peccata prius per poenitentiam dimissa. Objection 1: It would seem that sins once forgiven return through a subsequent sin. For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. i, 12): Our Lord teaches most explicitly in the Gospel that sins which have been forgiven return, when fraternal charity ceases, in the example of the servant from whom his master exacted the payment of the debt already forgiven, because he had refused to forgive the debt of his fellow-servant. Now fraternal charity is destroyed through each mortal sin. Therefore sins already taken away through penance, return through each subsequent mortal sin. Praeterea, super illud Luc. XI, revertar in domum meam unde exivi, dicit Beda, timendus est ille versiculus, non exponendus, ne culpa quam in nobis extinctam credebamus, per incuriam nos vacantes opprimat. Hoc autem non esset nisi rediret. Ergo culpa per poenitentiam dimissa redit. Obj. 2: Further, on Luke 11:24, I will return into my house, whence I came out, Bede says: This verse should make us tremble, we should not endeavor to explain it away lest through carelessness we give place to the sin which we thought to have been taken away, and become its slave once more. Now this would not be so unless it returned. Therefore a sin returns after once being taken away by penance. Praeterea, Ezech. XVIII dominus dicit, si averterit se iustus a iustitia sua et fecerit iniquitatem, omnes iustitiae eius quas fecerat, non recordabuntur amplius. Sed inter alias iustitias quas fecit, etiam praecedens poenitentia concurrit, cum supra dictum sit poenitentiam esse partem iustitiae. Ergo, postquam poenitens peccat, non imputatur ei praecedens poenitentia, per quam consecutus est veniam peccatorum. Redeunt ergo illa peccata. Obj. 3: Further, the Lord said (Ezek 18:24): If the just man turn himself away from his justice, and do iniquity . . . all his justices which he hath done, shall not be remembered. Now among the other justices which he had done, is also his previous penance, since it was said above (Q. 85, A. 3) that penance is a part of justice. Therefore when one who has done penance, sins, his previous penance, whereby he received forgiveness of his sins, is not imputed to him. Therefore his sins return. Praeterea, peccata praeterita per gratiam teguntur, ut patet per apostolum, Rom. IV, inducentem illud Psalmi, beati quorum remissae sunt iniquitates et quorum tecta sunt peccata. Sed per peccatum mortale sequens gratia tollitur. Ergo peccata quae fuerant prius commissa, remanent detecta. Et ita videtur quod redeant. Obj. 4: Further, past sins are covered by grace, as the Apostle declares (Rom 4:7) where he quotes Ps. 31:1: Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered. But a subsequent mortal sin takes away grace. Therefore the sins committed previously, become uncovered: and so, seemingly, they return. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. XI, sine poenitentia sunt dona Dei, et vocatio. Sed peccata poenitentis sunt remissa per donum Dei. Ergo per peccatum sequens non redeunt dimissa peccata, quasi Deus de dono remissionis poeniteat. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom 11:29): The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance. Now the penitent’s sins are taken away by a gift of God. Therefore the sins which have been taken away do not return through a subsequent sin, as though God repented His gift of forgiveness. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro responsionum prosperi, qui recedit a Christo et alienatus a gratia finit hanc vitam, quid nisi in perditionem vadit? Sed non in id quod dimissum est recidit, nec pro originali peccato damnabitur. Moreover, Augustine says (Lib. Resp. Prosperi i): When he that turns away from Christ, comes to the end of this life a stranger to grace, whither does he go, except to perdition? Yet he does not fall back into that which had been forgiven, nor will he be condemned for original sin. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in peccato mortali sunt duo, scilicet aversio a Deo, et conversio ad bonum creatum. Quidquid autem est aversionis in peccato mortali secundum se consideratum, est commune omnibus peccatis mortalibus, quia per quodlibet peccatum mortale homo avertitur a Deo. Unde et per consequens macula, quae est per privationem gratiae, et reatus poenae aeternae, communia sunt omnibus peccatis mortalibus. Et secundum hoc intelligitur id quod dicitur Iac. II, qui offendit in uno, factus est omnium reus. Sed ex parte conversionis, peccata mortalia sunt diversa, et interdum contraria. Unde manifestum est quod ex parte conversionis peccatum mortale sequens non facit redire peccata mortalia prius abolita. Alioquin sequeretur quod homo per peccatum prodigalitatis reduceretur in habitum vel dispositionem avaritiae prius abolitae et sic contrarium esset causa sui contrarii, quod est impossibile. Sed considerando in peccatis mortalibus id quod est ex parte aversionis absolute, per peccatum mortale sequens homo privatur gratia et fit reus poenae aeternae, sicut et prius erat. Verum, quia aversio in peccato mortali ex conversione quodammodo diversitatem induit per comparationem ad diversas conversiones sicut ad diversas causas, ita quod sit alia aversio et alia macula et alius reatus prout consurgit ex alio actu peccati mortalis, hoc ergo in quaestionem vertitur, utrum macula et reatus poenae aeternae, secundum quod causabantur ex actibus peccatorum prius dimissorum, redeant per peccatum mortale sequens. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 86, A. 4), mortal sin contains two things, aversion from God and adherence to a created good. Now, in mortal sin, whatever attaches to the aversion, is, considered in itself, common to all mortal sins, since man turns away from God by every mortal sin, so that, in consequence, the stain resulting from the privation of grace, and the debt of everlasting punishment are common to all mortal sins. This is what is meant by what is written (Jas 2:10): Whosoever . . . shall offend in one point, is become guilty of all. On the other hand, as regards their adherence they are different from, and sometimes contrary to one another. Hence it is evident, that on the part of the adherence, a subsequent mortal sin does not cause the return of mortal sins previously dispelled, else it would follow that by a sin of wastefulness a man would be brought back to the habit or disposition of avarice previously dispelled, so that one contrary would be the cause of another, which is impossible. But if in mortal sins we consider that which attaches to the aversion absolutely, then a subsequent mortal sin deprives man of grace, and makes him deserving of everlasting punishment, just as he was before. Nevertheless, since the aversion of mortal sin is diversified somewhat in relation to various adherences, as it were to various causes, so that there will be a different aversion, a different stain, a different debt of punishment, according to the different acts of mortal sin from which they arise; hence the question is moved whether the stain and the debt of eternal punishment, as caused by acts of sins previously pardoned, return through a subsequent mortal sin. Quibusdam igitur visum est quod simpliciter hoc modo redeant. Sed hoc non potest esse. Quia opus Dei per opus hominis irritari non potest. Remissio autem priorum peccatorum est opus divinae misericordiae. Unde non potest irritari per sequens peccatum hominis, secundum illud Rom. III, nunquid incredulitas illorum fidem Dei evacuavit? Accordingly some have maintained that they return simply even in this way. But this is impossible, because what God has done cannot be undone by the work of man. Now the pardon of the previous sins was a work of Divine mercy, so that it cannot be undone by man’s subsequent sin, according to Rom. 3:3: Shall their unbelief make the faith of God without effect? Et ideo alii, ponentes peccata redire, dixerunt quod Deus non remittit peccata poenitenti postmodum peccaturo secundum praescientiam, sed solum secundum praesentem iustitiam. Praescit enim eum pro his peccatis aeternaliter puniendum, et tamen per gratiam facit eum praesentialiter iustum. Sed nec hoc stare potest. Quia, si causa absolute ponatur, et effectus ponitur absolute. Si ergo absolute non fieret peccatorum remissio, sed cum quadam conditione in futurum dependente, per gratiam et gratiae sacramenta, sequeretur quod gratia et gratiae sacramenta non essent sufficiens causa remissionis peccatorum. Quod est erroneum, utpote derogans gratiae Dei. Wherefore others who maintained the possibility of sins returning, said that God pardons the sins of a penitent who will afterwards sin again, not according to His foreknowledge, but only according to His present justice: since He foresees that He will punish such a man eternally for his sins, and yet, by His grace, He makes him righteous for the present. But this cannot stand: because if a cause be placed absolutely, its effect is placed absolutely; so that if the remission of sins were effected by grace and the sacraments of grace, not absolutely but under some condition dependent on some future event, it would follow that grace and the sacraments of grace are not the sufficient causes of the remission of sins, which is erroneous, as being derogatory to God’s grace. Et ideo nullo modo potest esse quod macula et reatus praecedentium peccatorum redeant secundum quod ex talibus actibus causabantur. Contingit autem quod sequens actus peccati virtualiter continet reatum prioris peccati, inquantum scilicet aliquis secundo peccans ex hoc ipso videtur gravius peccare quam prius peccaverat; secundum illud Rom. II, secundum duritiam tuam et cor impoenitens thesaurizas tibi iram in die irae, ex hoc solo scilicet quod contemnitur Dei bonitas, quae ad poenitentiam expectat; multo autem magis contemnitur Dei bonitas si, post remissionem prioris peccati, secundo peccatum iteretur; quanto maius est beneficium peccatum remittere quam sustinere peccatorem. Consequently it is in no way possible for the stain of past sins and the debt of punishment incurred thereby, to return, as caused by those acts. Yet it may happen that a subsequent sinful act virtually contains the debt of punishment due to the previous sin, in so far as when a man sins a second time, for this very reason he seems to sin more grievously than before, as stated in Rom. 2:5: According to thy hardness and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up to thyself wrath against the day of wrath, from the mere fact, namely, that God’s goodness, which waits for us to repent, is despised. And so much the more is God’s goodness despised, if the first sin is committed a second time after having been forgiven, as it is a greater favor for the sin to be forgiven than for the sinner to be endured. Sic igitur per peccatum sequens poenitentiam redit quodammodo reatus peccatorum prius dimissorum, non inquantum causabatur ex illis peccatis prius dimissis, sed inquantum causatur ex peccato ultimo perpetrato, quod aggravatur ex peccatis prioribus. Et hoc non est peccata dimissa redire simpliciter, sed secundum quid, inquantum scilicet virtualiter in peccato sequenti continentur. Accordingly the sin which follows repentance brings back, in a sense, the debt of punishment due to the sins previously forgiven, not as caused by those sins already forgiven but as caused by this last sin being committed, on account of its being aggravated in view of those previous sins. This means that those sins return, not simply, but in a restricted sense, viz., in so far as they are virtually contained in the subsequent sin. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud verbum Augustini videtur esse intelligendum de reditu peccatorum quantum ad reatum poenae aeternae in se consideratum, quia scilicet post poenitentiam peccans incurrit reatum poenae aeternae sicut et prius; non tamen omnino propter eandem rationem. Unde Augustinus, in libro de responsionibus prosperi, cum dixisset quod non in id quod remissum est recidit, nec pro originali peccato damnabitur, subdit, qui tamen ea morte afficitur quae ei propter peccata dimissa debebatur, quia scilicet incurrit mortem aeternam, quam meruerat per peccata praeterita. Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Augustine seems to refer to the return of sins as to the debt of eternal punishment considered in itself, namely, that he who sins after doing penance incurs a debt of eternal punishment, just as before, but not altogether for the same reason. Wherefore Augustine, after saying (Lib. Resp. Prosperi i) that he does not fall back into that which was forgiven, nor will he be condemned for original sin, adds: Nevertheless, for these last sins he will be condemned to the same death, which he deserved to suffer for the former, because he incurs the punishment of eternal death which he deserved for his previous sins. Ad secundum dicendum quod in illis verbis non intendit Beda dicere quod culpa prius dimissa hominem opprimat per reditum praeteriti reatus, sed per iterationem actus. Reply Obj. 2: By these words Bede means that the guilt already forgiven enslaves man, not by the return of his former debt of punishment, but by the repetition of his act. Ad tertium dicendum quod per sequens peccatum iustitiae priores oblivioni traduntur inquantum erant meritoriae vitae aeternae, non tamen inquantum erant impeditivae peccati. Unde, si aliquis peccet mortaliter postquam restituit debitum, non efficitur reus quasi debitum non reddidisset. Et multo minus traditur oblivioni poenitentia prius acta quantum ad remissionem culpae, cum remissio culpae magis sit opus Dei quam hominis. Reply Obj. 3: The effect of a subsequent sin is that the former justices are not remembered, in so far as they were deserving of eternal life, but not in so far as they were a hindrance to sin. Consequently if a man sins mortally after making restitution, he does not become guilty as though he had not paid back what he owed; and much less is penance previously done forgotten as to the pardon of the guilt, since this is the work of God rather than of man. Ad quartum dicendum quod gratia simpliciter tollit maculam et reatum poenae aeternae, tegit autem actus peccati praeteritos, ne scilicet propter eos Deus hominem gratia privet et reum habeat poenae aeternae. Et quod gratia semel facit, perpetuo manet. Reply Obj. 4: Grace removes the stain and the debt of eternal punishment simply; but it covers the past sinful acts, lest, on their account, God deprive man of grace, and judge him deserving of eternal punishment; and what grace has once done, endures for ever. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum peccata dimissa redeant per ingratitudinem quae specialiter est secundum quatuor genera peccatorum Whether sins that have been forgiven, return through ingratitude which is shown especially in four kinds of sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata dimissa non redeant per ingratitudinem quae specialiter est secundum quatuor genera peccatorum, scilicet secundum odium fraternum, apostasiam a fide, contemptum confessionis, et dolorem de poenitentia habita, secundum quod quidam metrice dixerunt, fratres odit, apostata fit, spernitque fateri, poenituisse piget, pristina culpa redit. Objection 1: It would seem that sins do not return through ingratitude, which is shown especially in four kinds of sin, viz., hatred of one’s neighbor, apostasy from faith, contempt of confession and regret for past repentance, and which have been expressed in the following verse: whoever hates his brothers, becomes apostate, scorns confession, regrets repentance: his former sin returns. Tanto enim est maior ingratitudo quanto gravius est peccatum quod quis contra Deum committit post beneficium remissionis peccatorum. Sed quaedam alia peccata sunt his graviora, sicut blasphemia contra Deum, et peccatum in spiritum sanctum. Ergo videtur quod peccata dimissa non redeant magis secundum ingratitudinem commissam secundum haec peccata, quam secundum alia. For the more grievous the sin committed against God after one has received the grace of pardon, the greater the ingratitude. But there are sins more grievous than these, such as blasphemy against God, and the sin against the Holy Spirit. Therefore it seems that sins already pardoned do not return through ingratitude as manifested in these sins, any more than as shown in other sins. Praeterea, Rabanus dicit, nequam servum tradidit Deus tortoribus quoadusque redderet universum debitum, quia non solum peccata quae post Baptismum homo egit reputabuntur ei ad poenam, sed originalia, quae ei sunt dimissa in Baptismo. Sed etiam inter debita peccata venialia computantur, pro quibus dicimus, dimitte nobis debita nostra. Ergo ipsa etiam redeunt per ingratitudinem. Et pari ratione videtur quod per peccata venialia redeant peccata prius dimissa, et non solum per praedicta peccata. Obj. 2: Further, Rabanus says: God delivered the wicked servant to the torturers, until he should pay the whole debt, because a man will be deemed punishable not only for the sins he commits after Baptism, but also for original sin which was taken away when he was baptized. Now venial sins are reckoned among our debts, since we pray in their regard: Forgive us our trespasses (debita). Therefore they too return through ingratitude; and, in like manner seemingly, sins already pardoned return through venial sins, and not only through those sins mentioned above. Praeterea, tanto est maior ingratitudo quanto post maius beneficium acceptum aliquis peccat. Sed beneficium Dei est etiam ipsa innocentia, qua peccatum vitamus, dicit enim Augustinus, in II Confess., gratiae tuae deputo quaecumque peccata non feci. Maius autem donum est innocentia quam etiam remissio omnium peccatorum. Ergo non minus est ingratus Deo qui primo peccat post innocentiam, quam qui peccat post poenitentiam. Et ita videtur quod per ingratitudinem quae fit secundum peccata praedicta, non maxime redeant peccata dimissa. Obj. 3: Further, ingratitude is all the greater, according as one sins after receiving a greater favor. Now innocence whereby one avoids sin is a Divine favor, for Augustine says (Confess. ii): Whatever sins I have avoided committing, I owe it to Thy grace. Now innocence is a greater gift, than even the forgiveness of all sins. Therefore the first sin committed after innocence is no less an ingratitude to God, than a sin committed after repentance, so that seemingly ingratitude in respect of the aforesaid sins is not the chief cause of sins returning. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, XVIII Moral., ex dictis evangelicis constat quia, si quod in nos delinquitur ex corde non dimittimus, et illud rursus exigetur quod nobis iam per poenitentiam dimissum fuisse gaudebamus. Et ita propter odium fraternum specialiter peccata dimissa redeunt per ingratitudinem. Et eadem ratio videtur de aliis. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xviii): It is evident from the words of the Gospel that if we do not forgive from our hearts the offenses committed against us, we become once more accountable for what we rejoiced in as forgiven through penance: so that ingratitude implied in the hatred of one’s brother is a special cause of the return of sins already forgiven: and the same seems to apply to the others. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccata dimissa per poenitentiam redire dicuntur inquantum reatus eorum, ratione ingratitudinis, virtualiter continetur in peccato sequenti. Ingratitudo autem potest committi dupliciter. Uno modo, ex eo quod aliquid fit contra beneficium. Et hoc modo per omne peccatum mortale quo Deum offendit, redditur homo ingratus Deo, qui peccata remisit. Et sic per quodlibet peccatum mortale sequens redeunt peccata prius dimissa, ratione ingratitudinis. Alio modo committitur ingratitudo non solum faciendo contra ipsum beneficium, sed etiam faciendo contra formam beneficii praestiti. Quae quidem forma, si attendatur ex parte benefactoris, est remissio debitorum. Unde contra hanc formam facit qui fratri petenti veniam non remittit, sed odium tenet. Si autem attendatur ex parte poenitentis, qui recipit hoc beneficium, invenitur duplex motus liberi arbitrii. Quorum primus est motus liberi arbitrii in Deum, qui est actus fidei formatae, et contra hoc facit homo apostatando a fide, secundus autem, motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum, qui est actus poenitentiae. Ad quam primo pertinet, ut supra dictum est, quod homo detestetur peccata praeterita, et contra hoc facit ille qui dolet se poenituisse. Secundo pertinet ad actum poenitentiae ut poenitens proponat se subiicere clavibus Ecclesiae per confessionem, secundum illud Psalmi, dixi, confitebor adversum me iniustitiam meam domino, et ut remisisti impietatem peccati mei. Et contra hoc facit ille qui contemnit confiteri, secundum quod proposuerat. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), sins pardoned through penance are said to return, in so far as their debt of punishment, by reason of ingratitude, is virtually contained in the subsequent sin. Now one may be guilty of ingratitude in two ways: first by doing something against the favor received, and, in this way, man is ungrateful to God in every mortal sin whereby he offends God Who forgave his sins, so that by every subsequent mortal sin, the sins previously pardoned return, on account of the ingratitude. Second, one is guilty of ingratitude, by doing something not only against the favor itself, but also against the form of the favor received. If this form be considered on the part of the benefactor, it is the remission of something due to him; wherefore he who does not forgive his brother when he asks pardon, and persists in his hatred, acts against this form. If, however, this form be taken in regard to the penitent who receives this favor, we find on his part a twofold movement of the free-will. The first is the movement of the free-will towards God, and is an act of faith quickened by charity; and against this a man acts by apostatizing from the faith. The second is a movement of the free-will against sin, and is the act of penance. This act consists first, as we have stated above (Q. 85, AA. 2, 5) in man’s detestation of his past sins; and against this a man acts when he regrets having done penance. Second, the act of penance consists in the penitent purposing to subject himself to the keys of the Church by confession, according to Ps. 31:5: I said: I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord: and Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin: and against this a man acts when he scorns to confess as he had purposed to do. Et ideo dicitur quod specialiter ingratitudo horum peccatorum facit redire peccata prius dimissa. Accordingly it is said that the ingratitude of sinners is a special cause of the return of sins previously forgiven. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc non dicitur specialiter de istis peccatis quia sint ceteris graviora, sed quia directius opponuntur beneficio remissionis peccatorum. Reply Obj. 1: This is not said of these sins as though they were more grievous than others, but because they are more directly opposed to the favor of the forgiveness of sin. Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam peccata venialia et peccatum originale redeunt modo praedicto, sicut et peccata mortalia, inquantum contemnitur Dei beneficium quo haec peccata sunt remissa. Non tamen per peccatum veniale aliquis incurrit ingratitudinem, quia homo, peccando venialiter, non facit contra Deum, sed praeter ipsum. Et ideo per peccata venialia nullo modo peccata dimissa redeunt. Reply Obj. 2: Even venial sins and original sin return in the way explained above, just as mortal sins do, in so far as the favor conferred by God in forgiving those sins is despised. A man does not, however, incur ingratitude by committing a venial sin, because by sinning venially man does not act against God, but apart from Him, wherefore venial sins nowise cause the return of sins already forgiven. Ad tertium dicendum quod beneficium aliquod habet pensari dupliciter. Uno modo, ex quantitate ipsius beneficii. Et secundum hoc, innocentia est maius Dei beneficium quam poenitentia, quae dicitur secunda tabula post naufragium. Alio modo potest pensari beneficium ex parte recipientis, qui minus est dignus, et sic magis sibi fit gratia. Unde et ipse magis est ingratus si contemnat. Et hoc modo beneficium remissionis culpae est maius, inquantum praestatur totaliter indigno. Et ideo ex hoc sequitur maior ingratitudo. Reply Obj. 3: A favor can be weighed in two ways. First by the quantity of the favor itself, and in this way innocence is a greater favor from God than penance, which is called the second plank after shipwreck (cf. Q. 84, A. 6). Second, a favor may be weighed with regard to the recipient, who is less worthy, wherefore a greater favor is bestowed on him, so that he is the more ungrateful if he scorns it. In this way the favor of the pardon of sins is greater when bestowed on one who is altogether unworthy, so that the ingratitude which follows is all the greater.