Quaestio 89 Question 89 De recuperatione virtutum per poenitentiam The Recovery of Virtue by Means of Penance Deinde considerandum est de recuperatione virtutum per poenitentiam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. We must now consider the recovery of virtues by means of penance, under which head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum per poenitentiam restituantur virtutes. (1) Whether virtues are restored through penance? Secundo, utrum restituantur in aequali quantitate. (2) Whether they are restored in equal measure? Tertio, utrum restituatur poenitenti aequalis dignitas. (3) Whether equal dignity is restored to the penitent? Quarto, utrum opera virtutum per peccatum mortificentur. (4) Whether works of virtue are deadened by subsequent sin? Quinto, utrum opera mortificata per peccatum per poenitentiam reviviscant. (5) Whether works deadened by sin revive through penance? Sexto, utrum opera mortua, idest absque caritate facta, per poenitentiam vivificentur. (6) Whether dead works, i.e., works that are done without charity, are quickened by penance? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum per poenitentiam virtutes restituantur Whether the virtues are restored through penance? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod per poenitentiam virtutes non restituantur. Non enim possent virtutes amissae per poenitentiam restitui nisi poenitentia virtutes causaret. Sed poenitentia, cum sit virtus, non potest esse causa omnium virtutum, praesertim cum quaedam virtutes sint naturaliter priores poenitentia, ut supra dictum est. Ergo per poenitentiam non restituuntur. Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues are not restored through penance. Because lost virtue cannot be restored by penance, unless penance be the cause of virtue. But, since penance is itself a virtue, it cannot be the cause of all the virtues, and all the more, since some virtues naturally precede penance, viz., faith, hope, and charity, as stated above (Q. 85, A. 6). Therefore the virtues are not restored through penance. Praeterea, poenitentia in quibusdam actibus poenitentis consistit. Sed virtutes gratuitae non causantur ex actibus nostris, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Lib. Arbit., quod virtutes Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Ergo videtur quod per poenitentiam non restituantur virtutes. Obj. 2: Further, penance consists in certain acts of the penitent. But the gratuitous virtues are not caused through any act of ours: for Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18: In Ps. 118) that God forms the virtues in us without us. Therefore it seems that the virtues are not restored through penance. Praeterea, habens virtutem sine difficultate et delectabiliter actus virtutum operatur, unde philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod non est iustus qui non gaudet iusta operatione. Sed multi poenitentes adhuc difficultatem patiuntur in operando actus virtutum. Non ergo per poenitentiam restituuntur virtutes. Obj. 3: Further, he that has virtue performs works of virtue with ease and pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that a man is not just if he does not rejoice in just deeds. Now many penitents find difficulty in performing deeds of virtue. Therefore the virtues are not restored through penance. Sed contra est quod, Luc. XV, pater mandavit quod filius poenitens indueretur stola prima, quae, secundum Ambrosium, est amictus sapientiae, quam simul consequuntur omnes virtutes, secundum illud Sap. VIII, sobrietatem et iustitiam docet, prudentiam et virtutem, quibus in vita nihil est utilius hominibus. Ergo per poenitentiam omnes virtutes restituuntur. On the contrary, We read (Luke 15:22) that the father commanded his penitent son to be clothed in the first robe, which, according to Ambrose (Expos. in Luc. vii), is the mantle of wisdom, from which all the virtues flow together, according to Wis. 8:7: She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life. Therefore all the virtues are restored through penance. Respondeo dicendum quod per poenitentiam, sicut dictum est supra, remittuntur peccata. Remissio autem peccatorum non potest esse nisi per infusionem gratiae. Unde relinquitur quod per poenitentiam gratia homini infundatur. Ex gratia autem consequuntur omnes virtutes gratuitae, sicut ex essentia animae fluunt omnes potentiae, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Unde relinquitur quod per poenitentiam omnes virtutes restituantur. I answer that, Sins are pardoned through penance, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 1). But there can be no remission of sins except through the infusion of grace. Wherefore it follows that grace is infused into man through penance. Now all the gratuitous virtues flow from grace, even as all the powers result from the essence of the soul; as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 110, A. 4, ad 1). Therefore all the virtues are restored through penance. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod eodem modo poenitentia restituit virtutes per quem modum est causa gratiae, ut iam dictum est. Est autem causa gratiae inquantum est sacramentum, nam inquantum est virtus, est magis gratiae effectus. Et ideo non oportet quod poenitentia, secundum quod est virtus, sit causa omnium aliarum virtutum, sed quod habitus poenitentiae simul cum habitibus aliarum virtutum per sacramentum causetur. Reply Obj. 1: Penance restores the virtues in the same way as it causes grace, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 1). Now it is a cause of grace, in so far as it is a sacrament, because, in so far as it is a virtue, it is rather an effect of grace. Consequently it does not follow that penance, as a virtue, needs to be the cause of all the other virtues, but that the habit of penance together with the habits of the other virtues is caused through the sacrament of penance. Ad secundum dicendum quod in sacramento poenitentiae actus humani se habent materialiter, sed formalis vis huius sacramenti dependet ex virtute clavium. Et ideo virtus clavium effective causat gratiam et virtutes, instrumentaliter tamen. Sed actus primus poenitentis se habet ut ultima dispositio ad gratiam consequendam, scilicet contritio, alii vero sequentes actus poenitentiae procedunt iam ex gratia et virtutibus. Reply Obj. 2: In the sacrament of penance human acts stand as matter, while the formal power of this sacrament is derived from the power of the keys. Consequently the power of the keys causes grace and virtue effectively indeed, but instrumentally; and the first act of the penitent, viz., contrition, stands as ultimate disposition to the reception of grace, while the subsequent acts of penance proceed from the grace and virtues which are already there. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quandoque post primum actum poenitentiae, qui est contritio, remanent quaedam reliquiae peccatorum, scilicet dispositiones ex prioribus actibus peccatorum causatae, ex quibus praestatur difficultas quaedam poenitenti ad operandum opera virtutum, sed quantum est ex ipsa inclinatione caritatis et aliarum virtutum, poenitens opera virtutum delectabiliter et sine difficultate operatur; sicut si virtuosus per accidens difficultatem pateretur in executione actus virtutis propter somnum aut aliquam corporis dispositionem. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 86, A. 5), sometimes after the first act of penance, which is contrition, certain remnants of sin remain, viz. dispositions caused by previous acts, the result being that the penitent finds difficulty in doing deeds of virtue. Nevertheless, so far as the inclination itself of charity and of the other virtues is concerned, the penitent performs works of virtue with pleasure and ease, even as a virtuous man may accidentally find it hard to do an act of virtue, on account of sleepiness or some indisposition of the body. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum post poenitentiam resurgat homo in aequali virtute Whether, after penance, man rises again to equal virtue? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod post poenitentiam resurgat homo in aequali virtute. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VIII, diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum, ubi dicit Glossa Augustini quod hoc adeo verum est ut, si qui horum devient et exorbitent, hoc ipsum Deus faciat eis in bonum proficere. Sed hoc non esset si homo resurgeret in minori virtute. Objection 1: It would seem that, after penance, man rises again to equal virtue. For the Apostle says (Rom 8:28): To them that love God all things work together unto good, whereupon a gloss of Augustine says that this is so true that, if any such man goes astray and wanders from the path, God makes even this conduce to his good. But this would not be true if he rose again to lesser virtue. Therefore it seems that a penitent never rises again to lesser virtue. Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit quod poenitentia optima res est, quae omnes defectus revocat ad perfectum. Sed hoc non esset nisi virtutes in aequali quantitate recuperarentur. Ergo per poenitentiam semper recuperatur aequalis virtus. Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says that penance is a very good thing, for it restores every defect to a state of perfection. But this would not be true unless virtues were recovered in equal measure. Therefore equal virtue is always recovered through penance. Praeterea, super illud Genes. I, factum est vespere et mane dies unus, dicit Glossa, vespertina lux est a qua quis cecidit, matutina in qua resurgit. Sed lux matutina est maior quam vespertina. Ergo aliquis resurgit in maiori gratia vel caritate quam prius habuerat. Quod etiam videtur per id quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, ubi abundavit delictum, superabundavit et gratia. Obj. 3: Further, on Gen. 1:5: There was evening and morning, one day, a gloss says: The evening light is that from which we fall; the morning light is that to which we rise again. Now the morning light is greater than the evening light. Therefore a man rises to greater grace or charity than that which he had before; which is confirmed by the Apostle’s words (Rom 5:20): Where sin abounded, grace did more abound. Sed contra, caritas proficiens vel perfecta maior est quam caritas incipiens. Sed quandoque aliquis cadit a caritate proficiente, resurgit autem in caritate incipiente. Ergo semper resurgit homo in minori etiam virtute. On the contrary, Charity whether proficient or perfect is greater than incipient charity. But sometimes a man falls from proficient charity, and rises again to incipient charity. Therefore man always rises again to less virtue. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, motus liberi arbitrii qui est in iustificatione impii, est ultima dispositio ad gratiam, unde in eodem instanti est gratiae infusio cum praedicto motu liberi arbitrii, ut in secunda parte habitum est. In quo quidem motu comprehenditur actus poenitentiae, ut supra dictum est. Manifestum est autem quod formae quae possunt recipere magis et minus, intenduntur et remittuntur secundum diversam dispositionem subiecti, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Et inde est quod, secundum quod motus liberi arbitrii in poenitentia est intensior vel remissior, secundum hoc poenitens consequitur maiorem vel minorem gratiam. Contingit autem intensionem motus poenitentis quandoque proportionatam esse maiori gratiae quam illa a qua cecidit per peccatum; quandoque vero aequali; quandoque vero minori. Et ideo poenitens quandoque resurgit in maiori gratia quam prius habuerat; quandoque autem in aequali; quandoque etiam in minori. Et eadem ratio est de virtutibus, quae ex gratia consequuntur. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 86, A. 6, ad 3; Q. 89, A. 1, ad 2), the movement of the free-will, in the justification of the ungodly, is the ultimate disposition to grace; so that in the same instant there is infusion of grace together with the aforesaid movement of the free-will, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 113, AA. 5, 7), which movement includes an act of penance, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 2). But it is evident that forms which admit of being more or less, become intense or remiss, according to the different dispositions of the subject, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 52, AA. 1, 2; Q. 66, A. 1). Hence it is that, in penance, according to the degree of intensity or remissness in the movement of the free-will, the penitent receives greater or lesser grace. Now the intensity of the penitent’s movement may be proportionate sometimes to a greater grace than that from which man fell by sinning, sometimes to an equal grace, sometimes to a lesser. Wherefore the penitent sometimes arises to a greater grace than that which he had before, sometimes to an equal, sometimes to a lesser grace: and the same applies to the virtues, which flow from grace. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non omnibus diligentibus Deum cooperatur in bonum hoc ipsum quod per peccatum a Dei amore cadunt, quod patet in his qui cadunt et nunquam resurgunt, vel qui resurgunt iterum casuri, sed in his qui secundum propositum vocati sunt sancti, scilicet praedestinatis, qui, quotiescumque cadunt, finaliter tamen resurgunt. Cedit igitur eis in bonum hoc quod cadunt, non quia semper in maiori gratia resurgant, sed quia resurgunt in permanentiori gratia, non quidem ex parte ipsius gratiae, quia, quanto gratia est maior, tanto de se est permanentior; sed ex parte hominis, qui tanto stabilius in gratia permanet quanto est cautior et humilior. Unde et Glossa ibidem subdit quod ideo proficit eis in bonum quod cadunt, quia humiliores redeunt, et quia doctiores fiunt. Reply Obj. 1: The very fact of falling away from the love of God by sin, does not work unto the good of all those who love God, which is evident in the case of those who fall and never rise again, or who rise and fall yet again; but only to the good of such as according to His purpose are called to be saints, viz. the predestined, who, however often they may fall, yet rise again finally. Consequently good comes of their falling, not that they always rise again to greater grace, but that they rise to more abiding grace, not indeed on the part of grace itself, because the greater the grace, the more abiding it is, but on the part of man, who, the more careful and humble he is, abides the more steadfastly in grace. Hence the same gloss adds that their fall conduces to their good, because they rise more humble and more enlightened. Ad secundum dicendum quod poenitentia, quantum est de se, habet virtutem reparandi omnes defectus ad perfectum, et etiam promovendi in ulteriorem statum, sed hoc quandoque impeditur ex parte hominis, qui remissius movetur in Deum et in detestationem peccati. Sicut etiam in Baptismo aliqui adulti consequuntur maiorem vel minorem gratiam, secundum quod diversimode se disponunt. Reply Obj. 2: Penance, considered in itself, has the power to bring all defects back to perfection, and even to advance man to a higher state; but this is sometimes hindered on the part of man, whose movement towards God and in detestation of sin is too remiss, just as in Baptism adults receive a greater or a lesser grace, according to the various ways in which they prepare themselves. Ad tertium dicendum quod illa assimilatio utriusque gratiae ad lucem vespertinam et matutinam fit propter similitudinem ordinis, quia post lucem vespertinam sequuntur tenebrae noctis, post lucem autem matutinam sequitur lux diei, non autem propter maiorem vel minorem similitudinem quantitatis. Illud etiam verbum apostoli intelligitur de gratia, quae exsuperat omnem abundantiam humanorum peccatorum. Non autem hoc est verum in omnibus, quod quanto abundantius peccavit, tanto abundantiorem gratiam consequatur, pensata quantitate habitualis gratiae. Est tamen superabundans gratia quantum ad ipsam gratiae rationem, quia magis gratis beneficium remissionis magis peccatori confertur. Quamvis quandoque abundanter peccantes abundanter dolent, et sic abundantiorem habitum gratiae et virtutum consequuntur, sicut patet in Magdalena. Reply Obj. 3: This comparison of the two graces to the evening and morning light is made on account of a likeness of order, since the darkness of night follows after the evening light, and the light of day after the light of morning, but not on account of a likeness of greater or lesser quantity. Again, this saying of the Apostle refers to the grace of Christ, which abounds more than any number of man’s sins. Nor is it true of all, that the more their sins abound, the more abundant grace they receive, if we measure habitual grace by the quantity. Grace is, however, more abundant, as regards the very notion of grace, because to him who sins more a more gratuitous favor is vouchsafed by his pardon; although sometimes those whose sins abound, abound also in sorrow, so that they receive a more abundant habit of grace and virtue, as was the case with Magdalen. Ad id vero quod in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum quod una et eadem gratia maior est proficiens quam incipiens, sed in diversis hoc non est necesse. Unus enim incipit a maiori gratia quam alius habeat in statu profectus, sicut Gregorius dicit, in II Dialog., praesentes et secuturi omnes cognoscant, Benedictus puer a quanta perfectione conversionis gratiam incoepisset. To the argument advanced in the contrary sense it must be replied that in one and the same man proficient grace is greater than incipient grace, but this is not necessarily the case in different men, for one begins with a greater grace than another has in the state of proficiency: thus Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): Let all, both now and hereafter, acknowledge how perfectly the boy Benedict turned to the life of grace from the very beginning. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum per poenitentiam restituatur homo in pristinam dignitatem Whether, by penance, man is restored to his former dignity? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod per poenitentiam non restituatur homo in pristinam dignitatem. Quia super illud Amos V, virgo Israel cecidit, dicit Glossa, non negat ut resurgat, sed ut resurgere virgo possit, quia semel oberrans ovis, etsi reportetur in humeris pastoris, non habet tantam gloriam quantam quae nunquam erravit. Ergo per poenitentiam non recuperat homo pristinam dignitatem. Objection 1: It would seem that man is not restored by penance to his former dignity: because a gloss on Amos 5:2, The virgin of Israel is cast down, observes: It is not said that she cannot rise up, but that the virgin of Israel shall not rise; because the sheep that has once strayed, although the shepherd bring it back on his shoulder, has not the same glory as if it had never strayed. Therefore man does not, through penance, recover his former dignity. Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit, quicumque dignitatem divini gradus non custodiunt, contenti fiant animam salvare, reverti enim in pristinum gradum difficile est. Et Innocentius Papa dicit quod apud Nicaeam constituti canones poenitentes etiam ab infimis clericorum officiis excludunt. Non ergo per poenitentiam homo recuperat pristinam dignitatem. Obj. 2: Further, Jerome says: Whoever fail to preserve the dignity of the sacred order, must be content with saving their souls; for it is a difficult thing to return to their former degree. Again, Pope Innocent I says (Ep. vi ad Agapit.) that the canons framed at the council of Nicaea exclude penitents from even the lowest orders of clerics. Therefore man does not, through penance, recover his former dignity. Praeterea, ante peccatum potest aliquis ad maiorem gradum ascendere. Non autem hoc post peccatum conceditur poenitenti, dicitur enim Ezech. XLIV, Levitae qui recesserunt a me, nunquam appropinquabunt mihi, ut sacerdotio fungantur. Et, sicut habetur in decretis, dist. l, in Hilerdensi Concilio legitur, hi qui sancto altario deserviunt, si subito flenda debilitate carnis corruerint, et, domino respiciente, poenituerint, officiorum suorum loca recipiant, nec possint ad altiora officia ulterius promoveri. Non ergo poenitentia restituit hominem in pristinam dignitatem. Obj. 3: Further, before sinning a man can advance to a higher sacred order. But this is not permitted to a penitent after his sin, for it is written (Ezek 44:10, 13): The Levites that went away . . . from Me . . . shall never come near to Me, to do the office of priest: and as laid down in the Decretals (Dist. 1, ch. 52), and taken from the council of Lerida: If those who serve at the Holy Altar fall suddenly into some deplorable weakness of the flesh, and by God’s mercy do proper penance, let them return to their duties, yet so as not to receive further promotion. Therefore penance does not restore man to his former dignity. Sed contra est quod, sicut in eadem distinctione legitur, Gregorius, scribens Secundino, dixit, post dignam satisfactionem, credimus hominem posse redire ad suum honorem. Et in Concilio Agathensi legitur, contumaces clerici, prout dignitatis ordo permiserit, ab episcopis corrigantur, ita ut, cum eos poenitentia correxerit, gradum suum dignitatemque recipiant. On the contrary, As we read in the same Distinction, Gregory writing to Secundinus (Regist. vii) says: We consider that when a man has made proper satisfaction, he may return to his honorable position: and moreover we read in the acts of the council of Agde: Contumacious clerics, so far as their position allows, should be corrected by their bishops, so that when penance has reformed them, they may recover their degree and dignity.