Summa Theologiae
Supplementum Summa Theologiae
Supplement Poenitentia Penance Quaestio 1 Question 1 De contritione Contrition Deinde considerandum est de singulis partibus poenitentiae: et primo, de contritione; secundo, de confessione; tertio, de satisfactione. We must now consider each single part of penance: (1) Contrition; (2) Confession; (3) Satisfaction. De contritione autem consideranda sunt quinque: primo, quid sit; secundo, de quo esse debeat; tertio, quanta esse debeat; quarto, de duratione ipsius; quinto, de effectu ipsius. The consideration about contrition will be fivefold: (1) What it is; (2) What it should be about; (3) How great it should be; (4) Of its duration; (5) Of its effect. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: Primo: utrum convenienter definiatur. (1) Whether contrition is suitably defined? Secundo: utrum contritio sit actus virtutis. (2) Whether it is an act of virtue? Tertio: utrum attritio possit fieri contritio. (3) Whether attrition can become contrition? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum contritio sit dolor pro peccatis assumptus cum proposito confitendi et satisfaciendi Whether contrition is an assumed sorrow for sins with the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod contritio non sit dolor pro peccatis assumptus cum proposito confitendi et satisfaciendi, ut quidam definiunt. Quia, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Civ. Dei, dolor est de his quae nobis nolentibus accidunt. Sed peccata non sunt huiusmodi. Ergo contritio non est dolor pro peccatis. Objection 1: It would seem that contrition is not an assumed sorrow for sins, together with the purpose of confessing them and of making satisfaction for them, as some define it. For, as Augustine states (The City of God 14.6), sorrow is for those things that happen against our will. But this does not apply to sin. Therefore, contrition is not sorrow for sins. Praeterea, contritio nobis a Deo datur. Sed quod datur, non assumitur. Ergo contritio non est dolor assumptus. Obj. 2: Further, contrition is given us by God. But what is given is not assumed. Therefore, contrition is not an assumed sorrow. Praeterea, satisfactio et confessio sunt necessaria ad hoc quod poena remittatur quae in contritione remissa non fuit. Sed quandoque tota poena in contritione remittitur. Ergo non est necessarium semper quod contritus habeat propositum confitendi et satisfaciendi. Obj. 3: Further, satisfaction and confession are necessary for the remission of the punishment which was not remitted by contrition. But sometimes the whole punishment is remitted in contrition. Therefore, it is not always necessary for the contrite person to have the purpose of confessing and of making satisfaction. Sed contra est ipsa definitio. On the contrary, There is the definition itself. Respondeo dicendum quod initium omnis peccati est superbia, per quam homo, sensui suo inhaerens, a mandatis divinis recedit. Et ideo oportet quod illud quod destruit peccatum, hominem a proprio sensu discedere faciat. Ille autem qui in suo sensu perseverat, rigidus et durus per similitudinem vocatur: unde et frangi dicitur aliquis quando a suo sensu divellitur. Sed inter fractionem et comminutionem sive contritionem in rebus materialibus, unde haec nomina ad spiritualia transferuntur, hoc interest, ut dicitur in IV Meteor., quod frangi dicuntur aliqua quando in magnas partes dividuntur, sed comminui vel conteri quando ad partes minimas reducitur hoc quod in se solidum erat. Et quia ad dimissionem peccati requiritur quod homo totaliter affectum peccati dimittat, per quem quandam continuitatem et soliditatem in sensu suo habebat, ideo actus ille quo peccatum dimittitur contritio dicitur per similitudinem. I answer that, As stated in Sirach 10:15, pride is the beginning of all sin, because thereby man clings to his own judgment, and strays from the divine commandments. Consequently, that which destroys sin must make man give up his own judgment. Now, he that persists in his own judgment is called metaphorically rigid and hard: wherefore anyone is said to be broken when he is torn from his own judgment. But in material things, whence these expressions are transferred to spiritual things, there is a difference between breaking and crushing or contrition, as stated in Meteorology 4, in that we speak of breaking when a thing is sundered into large parts, but of crushing or contrition when that which was in itself solid is reduced to minute particles. And since, for the remission of sin, it is necessary that man should put aside entirely his attachment to sin, which implies a certain state of continuity and solidity in his mind, therefore it is that the act through which sin is cast aside is called contrition metaphorically. In qua quidem contritione plura possunt considerari: scilicet ipsa substantia actus, modus agendi, principium, et effectus. Et secundum hoc, de contritione inveniuntur diversae definitiones traditae. In this contrition several things are to be observed: namely, the very substance of the act, the way of acting, its origin, and its effect. In respect of this, we find that contrition has been defined in various ways. Quantum enim ad ipsam substantiam actus, datur praedicta definitio. Et quia actus contritionis est actus virtutis; et est pars poenitentiae sacramenti: ideo manifestatur in praedicta definitione, inquantum est actus virtutis, in hoc quod ponitur genus ipsius, scilicet dolor, et obiectum, in hoc quod dicit pro peccatis: et electio, quae requiritur ad actum virtutis, in hoc quod dicit assumptus. Sed inquantum est pars sacramenti, per hoc quod tangitur ordo ipsius ad alias partes, cum dicit, cum proposito confitendi etc. For as regards the substance of the act, we have the definition given above. And since the act of contrition is both an act of virtue, and a part of the sacrament of penance, its nature as an act of virtue is explained in this definition by mentioning its genus, viz. sorrow; its object, by the words for sins; and the act of choice which is necessary for an act of virtue, by the word assumed: while, as a part of the sacrament, it is made manifest by pointing out its relation to the other parts in the words, together with the purpose of confessing and of making satisfaction. Alia etiam definitio invenitur quae definit contritionem secundum quod est actus virtutis tantum: sed additur ad praedictam definitionem differentia contrahens ipsam ad specialem virtutem, scilicet poenitentiam. Dicit enim quod poenitentia est dolor voluntarius pro peccato puniens quod dolet se commisisse. In hoc enim quod additur punitio, ad specialem virtutem contrahitur. There is another definition which defines contrition only as an act of virtue; but at the same time including the difference which confines it to a special virtue, viz. penance, for it is thus expressed: contrition is voluntary sorrow for sin whereby man punishes in himself that which he grieves to have done, because the addition of the word punishes confines the definition to a special virtue. Alia autem definitio invenitur Isidori, quae talis est: contritio est compunctio et humilitas mentis, cum lacrimis, veniens de recordatione peccati et timore iudicii. Et haec quidem tangit rationem hominis, in hoc quod dicit humilitas mentis: quia, sicut per superbiam aliquis in suo sensu redditur rigidus, ita per hoc quod a suo sensu contritus recedit, humiliatur. Tangit etiam modum exteriorem, in hoc quod dicit cum lacrimis; et principium contritionis, in hoc quod dicit, veniens de recordatione peccati, etc. Another definition is given by Isidore (On the Highest Good 2.12) as follows: contrition is a tearful sorrow and humility of mind, arising from remembrance of sin and fear of the judgment. Here we have an allusion to the derivation of the word when it is said that it is humility of the mind, because, as pride makes the mind rigid, so is a man humbled when contrition leads him to give up his mind. Also, the external manner is indicated by the word tearful, and the origin of contrition by the words, arising from remembrance of sin, etc. Alia sumitur ex verbis Augustini, qui tangit effectum contritionis, quae est: contritio est dolor remittens peccatum. Another definition is taken from the words of Augustine (Expositions of the Psalms), and indicates the effect of contrition. It runs thus: contrition is the sorrow which takes away sin. Alia sumitur ex verbis Gregorii, quae talis est: contritio est humilitas spiritus, annihilans peccatum, inter spem et timorem. Et haec tangit rationem nominis, in hoc quod dicit quod contritio est humilitas spiritus; et effectus eius, in hoc quod dicit, annihilans peccatum; et originem, in hoc quod dicit, inter spem et timorem. Nec solum ponit causam principalem, quae est timor: sed etiam quae est spes, sine qua timor desperationem facere posset. Yet another is gathered from the words of Gregory as follows: contrition is humility of the soul, crushing sin between hope and fear (Morals on Job 33.11). Here the derivation is indicated by saying that contrition is humility of the soul; the effect, by the words crushing sin; and the origin, by the words, between hope and fear. Indeed, it includes not only the principal cause, which is fear, but also its joint cause, which is hope, without which fear might lead to despair. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis peccata, quando acciderunt, voluntaria fuerunt; tamen, quando de eis conterimur, voluntaria non sunt. Et ideo nobis nolentibus acciderunt, non quidem secundum voluntatem quam tunc habuimus cum ea volebamus, sed secundum illam quam nunc habemus, qua vellemus quod nunquam fuissent. Reply Obj. 1: Although sins, when committed, were voluntary, yet when we are contrite for them, they are no longer voluntary, so that they occur against our will; not indeed in respect of the will that we had when we consented to them, but in respect of that which we have now, so as to wish they had never been. Ad secundum dicendum quod contritio est a Deo solo quantum ad formam qua informatur: sed quantum ad substantiam actus, ex libero arbitrio et a Deo, qui operatur in omnibus operibus et naturae et voluntatis. Reply Obj. 2: Contrition is from God alone as to the form that informs it, but as to the substance of the act, it is from the free-will and from God, who operates in all works both of nature and of will. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis tota poena possit per contritionem dimitti, tamen adhuc necessaria est confessio et satisfactio. Tum quia homo non potest esse certus de sua contritione quod fuerit ad totum tollendum sufficiens. Tum etiam quia confessio et satisfactio sunt in praecepto. Unde transgressor constitueretur si non confiteretur et non satisfaceret. Reply Obj. 3: Although the entire punishment may be remitted by contrition, yet confession and satisfaction are still necessary, both because man cannot be sure that his contrition was sufficient to take away all, and because confession and satisfaction are a matter of precept: wherefore he becomes a transgressor who confesses not and makes not satisfaction. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum contritio sit actus virtutis Whether contrition is an act of virtue? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod contritio non sit actus virtutis. Passiones enim non sunt actus virtutum: quia eis non laudamur nec vituperamur, ut dicitur II Ethic. Sed dolor est passio. Cum ergo contritio sit dolor, videtur quod non sit actus virtutis. Objection 1: It would seem that contrition is not an act of virtue. For passions are not acts of virtue, since they bring us neither praise nor blame (Ethics 2.5). But sorrow is a passion. Therefore, as contrition is sorrow, it seems that it is not an act of virtue. Praeterea, sicut contritio dicitur a terendo, ita et attritio. Sed attritio non est actus virtutis: ut ab omnibus dicitur. Ergo neque contritio. Obj. 2: Further, as contrition is so called from its being a crushing, so is attrition. Now all agree in saying that attrition is not an act of virtue. Neither, therefore, is contrition an act of virtue. Sed contra, nihil est meritorium nisi actus virtutis. Sed contritio est actus quidam meritorius. Ergo est actus virtutis. On the contrary, Nothing but an act of virtue is meritorious. But contrition is a meritorious act. Therefore, it is an act of virtue. Respondeo dicendum quod contritio secundum proprietatem nominis sui non significat actum virtutis, sed potius quandam corporalem passionem: sed hic non quaeritur sic de contritione, sed de eo ad quod significandum hoc nomen per similitudinem adaptatur. Sicut enim inflatio propriae voluntatis ad malum faciendum importat, quantum est de se, malum ex genere; ita illius voluntatis annihilatio et comminutio quaedam de se importat bonum ex genere, quia hoc est detestari propriam voluntatem qua peccatum est commissum. Et ideo contritio, quae hoc significat, importat aliquam rectitudinem voluntatis. Et propter hoc est actus virtutis: illius scilicet cuius est peccatum praeteritum detestari et destruere, scilicet poenitentiae, ut patet ex his quae in 14 distinctione dicta sunt. I answer that, Contrition as to the literal signification of the word does not denote an act of virtue, but a corporeal passion. But the question in point does not refer to contrition in this sense, but to that which the word is employed to signify by way of metaphor. For just as the inflation of one’s own will unto wrong-doing implies, in itself, a generic evil, so the utter undoing and crushing of that same will implies something generically good, for this is to detest one’s own will whereby sin was committed. Wherefore contrition, which signifies this, implies rectitude of the will; and so it is the act of that virtue to which it belongs to detest and destroy past sins, the act, namely, of penance, as is evident from what was said above (Sentences IV, D. 14, Q. 1: Q. 85, A. 2–3). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in contritione est duplex dolor de peccato. Unus in parte sensitiva, qui passio est. Et hic non est essentialiter contritio, prout est actus virtutis, sed magis effectus eius. Sicut enim poenitentiae virtus exteriorem poenam suo corpori infligit ad recompensandam offensam quae in Deum commissa est officio membrorum; ita etiam et ipsi concupiscibili poenam infert doloris peccati, quia ipsa etiam ad peccata cooperabatur. Sed tamen hic dolor potest pertinere ad contritionem inquantum est pars sacramenti: quia sacramenta non solum in interioribus actibus, sed etiam in exterioribus et in rebus sensibilibus nata sunt esse. Reply Obj. 1: Contrition includes a twofold sorrow for sin. One is in the sensitive part, and is a passion. This does not belong essentially to contrition as an act of virtue, but is rather its effect. For just as the virtue of penance inflicts outward punishment on the body, in order to compensate for the offense done to God through the instrumentality of the bodily members, so does it inflict on the concupiscible part of the soul a punishment, viz. the aforesaid sorrow, because the concupiscible also cooperated in the sinful deeds. Nevertheless, this sorrow may belong to contrition taken as part of the sacrament, since the nature of a sacrament is such that it consists not only of internal but also of external acts and sensible things. Alius dolor est in voluntate, qui nihil aliud est quam displicentia alicuius mali: secundum quod affectus voluntatis nominantur per nomina passionum, ut in Tertio, distinctione 26, dictum est. Et sic contritio est dolor per essentiam, et est actus virtutis poenitentiae. The other sorrow is in the will, and is nothing else save displeasure for some evil, for the emotions of the will are named after the passions, as stated above (Sentences III, D. 26, Q. 1, A. 5; I, Q. 22, A. 3). Accordingly, contrition is essentially a kind of sorrow, and is an act of the virtue of penance. Ad secundum dicendum quod attritio dicit accessum ad perfectam contritionem: Unde in corporalibus dicuntur attrita quae aliquo modo diminuta sunt, sed non perfecte; sed contritio dicitur quando omnes partes tritae sunt simul per divisionem ad minima. Et ideo significat attritio in spiritualibus quandam displicentiam de peccatis commissis, sed non perfectam: contritio autem perfectam. Reply Obj. 2: Attrition denotes approach to perfect contrition, wherefore in corporeal matters, things are said to be attrite, when they are worn away to a certain extent, but not altogether crushed to pieces; while they are said to be contrite, when all the parts are crushed minutely. Wherefore, in spiritual matters, attrition signifies a certain but not a perfect displeasure for sins committed, whereas contrition denotes perfect displeasure. Articulus 3 Article 3