Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum pueri non baptizati afflictionem spiritualem in anima sentiant Whether unbaptized children feel spiritual affliction in the soul? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pueri non baptizati afflictionem spiritualem in anima sentiant. Quia, sicut dicit Chrysostomus, in damnatis gravior erit poena quod Dei visione carebunt, quam quod igne inferni cremabuntur. Sed pueri visione divina carebunt. Ergo afflictionem spiritualem ex hoc sentient. Obj. 1: It appears that unbaptized children feel spiritual affliction in the soul, because as Chrysostom says, the punishment of God in that they will be deprived of seeing God will be more painful than their being burned in the fire of hell (Hom. xxiii in Matth.). Now these children will be deprived of seeing God. Therefore, they will suffer spiritual affliction thereby. Praeterea, carere illo quod quis vult habere, sine afflictione esse non potest. Sed pueri vellent visionem divinam habere: alias voluntas eorum actualiter perversa esset. Ergo, cum ea careant, videtur quod ex hoc afflictionem sentiant. Obj. 2: Further, one cannot, without suffering, lack what one wishes to have. But these children would wish to have the divine vision, else their will would be actually perverse. Therefore, since they are deprived of it, seemingly they also suffer. Si dicatur quod non affliguntur quia sciunt se non culpa propria ea esse privatos: contra. Immunitas a culpa dolorem poenae non minuit, sed auget: non enim, si aliquis non propria culpa exheredatur vel mutilatur, propter hoc minus dolet. Ergo etiam, quamvis pueri non propria culpa tanto bono priventur, ex hoc eorum dolor non tollitur. If it be said that they do not suffer, because they know that through no fault of theirs they are deprived thereof, on the contrary. Freedom from fault does not lessen but increases the pain of punishment: for a man does not grieve less for that he is disinherited or deprived of a limb through no fault of his. Therefore, these children likewise, although deprived of so great a good through no fault of theirs, suffer none the less. Praeterea, sicut pueri baptizati se habent ad meritum Christi, ita non baptizati ad demeritum Adae. Sed pueri baptizati ex merito Christi consequuntur praemium vitae aeternae. Ergo et non baptizati dolorem sustinent ex hoc quod per demeritum Adae aeterna vita privantur. Obj. 3: Further, as baptized children are in relation to the merit of Christ, so are unbaptized children to the demerit of Adam. But baptized children receive the reward of eternal life by virtue of Christ’s merit. Therefore, the unbaptized suffer pain through being deprived of eternal life on account of Adam’s demerit. Praeterea, absentari a re amata non potest esse sine dolore. Sed pueri naturalem cognitionem de Deo habebunt, et eadem ratione naturaliter eum diligent. Ergo, cum ab eo sint in perpetuum separati, videtur quod hoc sine dolore pati non possint. Obj. 4: Further, separation from what we love cannot be without pain. But these children will have natural knowledge of God, and for that very reason will love Him naturally. Therefore, since they are separated from Him for ever, seemingly they cannot undergo this separation without pain. Contra, Si pueri non baptizati post mortem dolorem interiorem habeant, aut dolebunt de culpa, aut de poena. Si de culpa, cum a culpa illa ulterius emundari non possint, dolor ille erit in desperationem inducens. Sed talis dolor in damnatis est vermis conscientiae. Ergo pueri vermem conscientiae habebunt. Et sic non esset eorum poena mitissima, ut in littera dicitur. Si autem de poena dolerent, ergo, cum poena eorum iuste a Deo sit, voluntas eorum divinae iustitiae obviaret. Et sic actualiter deformis esset. Quod non conceditur. Ergo nullum dolorem interiorem sentient. On the contrary, If unbaptized children have interior sorrow after death, they will grieve either for their sin or for their punishment. If for their sin, since they cannot be further cleansed from that sin, their sorrow will lead them to despair. Now sorrow of this kind in the damned is the worm of conscience. Therefore, these children will have the worm of conscience, and consequently theirs would not be the mildest punishment, as Augustine says it is. If, on the other hand, they grieve for their punishment, it follows, since their punishment is justly inflicted by God, that their will opposes itself to divine justice, and thus would be actually inordinate, which is not to be granted. Therefore, they will feel no sorrow. Praeterea, ratio recta non patitur ut aliquis perturbetur de eo quod in ipso non fuit ut vitaretur: propter quod Seneca probat quod perturbatio in sapientem non cadit. Sed in pueris est ratio recta nullo actuali peccato obliquata. Ergo non turbabuntur de hoc quod talem poenam sustinent, quam vitare nullo modo potuerunt. Further, Right reason does not allow one to be disturbed on account of what one was unable to avoid; hence Seneca proves that a wise man is not disturbed. Now in these children there is right reason deflected by no actual sin. Therefore, they will not be disturbed because they undergo this punishment which they could in no way avoid. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc est triplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt quod pueri nullum dolorem sustinebunt, quia in eis adeo ratio obtenebrata erit ut non cognoscant se amisisse quod amiserunt. Quod probabile non videtur: ut anima ab onere corporis absoluta ea non cognoscat quae saltem ratione investigari possint, et etiam multo plura. I answer that, On this question there are three opinions. Some say that these children will suffer no pain, because their reason will be so much in the dark that they will not know that they lack what they have lost. It, however, seems improbable that the soul freed from its bodily burden should ignore things which, to say the least, reason is able to explore, and many more besides. Et ideo alii dicunt quod in eis est perfecta cognitio eorum quae naturali cognitioni subiacent, et cognoscunt Deum, et se eius visione privatos esse, et ex hoc aliquem dolorem sentient: tamen mitigabitur eorum dolor, inquantum non propria voluntate culpam incurrerunt pro qua damnati sunt. Hoc etiam probabile non videtur. Quia talis dolor parvus esse non potest de tanti boni amissione, et praecipue sine spe recuperationis. Unde poena eorum non esset mitissima. Praeterea, omnino eadem ratione qua dolore sensibili et exterius affligente non punientur, etiam dolorem interiorem non sentient. Quia dolor poenae delectationi culpae respondet. Unde, delectatione remota a culpa originali, omnis dolor ab eius poena excluditur. Hence others say that they have perfect knowledge of things subject to natural reason, and know God, and that they are deprived of seeing Him, and that they feel some kind of sorrow on this account, but that their sorrow will be mitigated insofar as it was not by their will that they incurred the sin for which they are condemned. Yet this again would seem improbable, because this sorrow cannot be little for the loss of so great a good, especially without the hope of recovery: wherefore their punishment would not be the mildest. Moreover, the very same reason that impugns their being punished with pain of sense, as afflicting them from without, argues against their feeling sorrow within, because the pain of punishment corresponds to the pleasure of sin; wherefore, since original sin is void of pleasure, its punishment is free of all pain. Et ideo alii dicunt quod cognitionem perfectam habebunt eorum quae naturali cognitioni subiacent, et vita aeterna se privatos esse cognoscent, et causam quare ab ea exclusi sunt, nec tamen ex hoc aliquo modo affligentur. Quod qualiter esse posset, videndum est. Consequently others say that they will know perfectly things subject to natural knowledge, and both the fact of their being deprived of eternal life and the reason for this privation, and that nevertheless this knowledge will not cause any sorrow in them. How this may be possible we must explore. Sciendum ergo quod ex hoc quod caret aliquis eo quod suam proportionem excedit, non affligitur, si sit rectae rationis, sed tantum ex hoc quod caret eo ad quod aliquo modo proportionatus fuit: sicut nullus sapiens homo affligitur de hoc quod non potest volare sicut avis, vel quia non est rex vel imperator, cum sibi non sit debitum; affligeretur autem si privaretur eo ad quod habendum aliquo modo aptitudinem habuit. Dico ergo quod omnis homo usum liberi arbitrii habens proportionatus est ad vitam aeternam consequendam: quia potest se ad gratiam praeparare, per quam vitam aeternam merebitur. Et ideo, si ab hoc deficiant, maximus erit dolor eis, quia amittunt illud quod suum esse possibile fuit. Pueri autem nunquam fuerunt proportionati ad hoc quod vitam aeternam haberent: quia nec eis debebatur ex principii naturae, cum omnem facultatem naturae excedat; nec actus proprios habere potuerunt, quibus tantum bonum consequerentur. Et ideo nihil omnino dolebunt de carentia visionis divinae: immo magis gaudebunt de hoc quod participabunt multum de divina bonitate et perfectionibus naturalibus. Accordingly, it must be observed that if one is guided by right reason, one does not grieve through being deprived of what is beyond one’s power to obtain, but only through lack of that which, in some way, one is capable of obtaining. Thus no wise man grieves for being unable to fly like a bird, or for that he is not a king or an emperor, since these things are not due to him; whereas he would grieve if he lacked that to which he had some kind of claim. I say, then, that every man who has the use of free-will is adapted to obtain eternal life, because he can prepare himself for grace whereby to merit eternal life; so that if he fail in this, his grief will be very great, since he has lost what he was able to possess. But children were never adapted to possess eternal life, since neither was this due to them by virtue of their natural principles, for it surpasses the entire faculty of nature, nor could they perform acts of their own whereby to obtain so great a good. Hence they will in no way grieve for being deprived of the divine vision; nay, rather will they rejoice for that they will have a large share of God’s goodness and their own natural perfections. Nec potest dici quod fuerunt proportionati ad vitam aeternam consequendam, quamvis non per actionem suam, tamen per actionem aliorum circa eos, quia potuerunt ab aliis baptizari, sicut et multi pueri eiusdem conditionis baptizati vitam aeternam consecuti sunt. Hoc est enim superexcedentis gratiae ut aliquis sine actu proprio praemietur. Unde defectus talis gratiae non magis tristitiam causat in pueris decedentibus non baptizatis, quam in sapientibus hoc quod eis multae gratiae non fiunt quae aliis similibus factae sunt. Nor can it be said that they were adapted to obtain eternal life, not indeed by their own action, but by the actions of others around them, since they could be baptized by others, like other children of the same condition who have been baptized and obtained eternal life: for this is of superabundant grace that one should be rewarded without any act of one’s own. Wherefore the lack of such a grace will not cause sorrow in children who die without baptism any more than the lack of many graces accorded to others of the same condition makes a wise man to grieve. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in damnatis pro culpa actuali, qui usum liberi arbitrii habuerunt, fuit aptitudo ad vitam aeternam consequendam. Non autem in pueris, ut dictum est. Et ideo non est similis ratio de utrisque. Reply Obj. 1: In those who, having the use of free-will, are damned for actual sin, there was aptitude to obtain eternal life, but not in children, as stated above. Consequently there is no parity between the two. Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis voluntas sit possibilium et impossibilium, ut in III Ethic. dicitur, tamen voluntas ordinata et completa non est nisi eorum ad quae quis aliquo modo ordinatus est. Et si in hac voluntate deficiant homines, dolent: non autem si deficiant ab illa voluntate quae impossibilium est. Quae potius velleitas quam voluntas debet dici: non enim aliquis illud vult simpliciter, sed vellet si possibile foret. Reply Obj. 2: Although the will may be directed both to the possible and to the impossible as stated in Ethics III.5, an ordinate and complete will is only of things which in some way are proportionate to our capability; and we grieve if we fail to obtain this will, but not if we fail in the will that is of impossibilities, and which should be called ‘velleity’ rather than ‘will’, for one does not will such things absolutely, but one would if they were possible. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad habendum proprium patrimonium, vel membra corporis sui, quilibet est ordinatus. Et ideo non est mirum si dolet aliquis de eorum amissione, sive pro culpa sua sive aliena eis privetur. Unde patet quod ratio non procedit ex simili. Reply Obj. 3: Everyone has a claim to his own inheritance or bodily members, wherefore it is not strange that he should grieve at their loss, whether this be through his own or another’s fault: hence it is clear that the argument is not based on a true comparison. Ad quartum dicendum quod donum Christi excedit peccatum Adae, ut ad Rom. 5, [15 sqq.] dicitur. Unde non oportet quod pueri non baptizati tantum habeant de malo quantum baptizati habent de bono. Reply Obj. 4: The gift of Christ surpasses the sin of Adam, as stated in Romans 5:15. Hence it does not follow that unbaptized children have as much of evil as the baptized have of good. Ad quintum dicendum quod, quamvis pueri non baptizati sint separati a Deo quantum ad illam coniunctionem quae est per gloriam, non tamen ab eo penitus sunt separati. Immo sibi coniunguntur per participationem naturalium bonorum. Et ita etiam de ipso gaudere poterunt naturali cognitione et dilectione. Reply Obj. 5: Although unbaptized children are separated from God as regards the union of glory, they are not utterly separated from Him: in fact they are united to Him by their share of natural goods, and so will also be able to rejoice in Him by their natural knowledge and love.