Respondeo dicendum quod satisfactio debet esse talis per quam aliquid nobis subtrahamus ad honorem Dei. Nos autem non habemus nisi tria bona: scilicet bona animae, et bona corporis, et bona fortunae, scilicet exteriora. Ex bonis quidem fortunae subtrahimus nobis aliquid per eleemosynam: sed ex bonis corporalibus per ieiunium. Ex bonis autem animae non oportet quod aliquid subtrahamus nobis quantum ad essentiam vel quantum ad diminutionem ipsorum, quia per ea efficimur Deo accepti: sed per hoc quod ea submittimus Deo totaliter. Et hoc fit per orationem. I answer that, Satisfaction should be of such a nature as to involve something taken away from us for the honor of God. Now we have but three kinds of goods: bodily, spiritual, and goods of fortune, or external goods. By almsgiving we deprive ourselves of some goods of fortune, and by fasting we retrench goods of the body. As to goods of the soul, there is no need to deprive ourselves of any of them, either in whole or in part, since thereby we become acceptable to God, but we should submit them entirely to God, which is done by prayer. Competit etiam iste numerus ex parte illa qua satisfactio peccatorum causas excidit. Quia radices peccatorum tres ponuntur, I Ioan. 2: scilicet concupiscentia carnism et concupiscentia oculorum, et superbia vitae. Et contra concupiscentiam carnis ordinatur ieiunium; contra concupiscentiam oculorum ordinatur eleemosyna; contra superbiam vitae ordinatur oratio; ut Augustinus dicit, super Matthaeum. This number is shown to be suitable insofar as satisfaction uproots the causes of sin, for these are reckoned to be three (1 John 2:16), namely, concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life. Fasting is directed against concupiscence of the flesh, almsgiving against concupiscence of the eyes, and prayer against pride of life, as Augustine says (Expositions of the Psalms 42). Competit etiam quantum ad hoc quod satisfactio peccatorum est suggestionibus aditum non indulgere; Quia omne peccatum vel in Deum committimus: et contra hoc ordinatur oratio. Vel in proximum: et contra hoc eleemosyna. Vel in nos ipsos: et contra hoc ordinatur ieiunium. This number is also shown to be suitable insofar as satisfaction does not open a way to the suggestions of sin, because every sin is committed either against God, and this is prevented by prayer, or against our neighbor, and this is remedied by almsgiving, or against ourselves, and this is forestalled by fasting. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum quosdam, duplex est oratio. Quaedam quae est contemplativorum, quorum conversatio in caelis est. Et talis, quia totaliter est delectabilis, non est satisfactoria. Alia est quae pro peccatis gemitus fundit. Et talis habet poenam; et est satisfactionis pars. Reply Obj. 1: According to some, prayer is twofold. There is the prayer of contemplatives whose conversation is in heaven: and this, since it is altogether delightful, is not a work of satisfaction. The other is a prayer which pours forth sighs for sin; this is penal and a part of satisfaction. Vel dicendum melius quod quaelibet oratio habet rationem satisfactionis, quia, quamvis habeat suavitatem spiritus, habet tamen afflictionem carnis: quia, ut dicit Gregorius, super Ezech., dum crescit in nobis fortitudo amoris intimi, infirmamur procul dubio fortitudine carnis. Unde etiam nervus femoris Iacob ex lucta angeli emarcuisse legitur in Genesi. It may also be replied, and better, that every prayer has the character of satisfaction, for though it be sweet to the soul it is painful to the body, since, as Gregory says (Homilies on Ezekiel, Hom. 14), doubtless, when our soul’s love is strengthened, our body’s strength is weakened; hence we read that the sinew of Jacob’s thigh shrank through his wrestling with the angel (Gen 32:24–25). Ad secundum dicendum quod peccatum carnale dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, quod in ipsa delectatione carnis completur: ut gula et luxuria. Alio modo, quod completur in his quae ad carnem ordinantur, quamvis non in delectatione carnis, sed in delectatione animae magis: ut avaritia. Unde talia peccata sunt quasi media inter spiritualia et carnalia. Et ideo oportet quod eis etiam aliqua satisfactio respondeat propria, scilicet eleemosyna. Reply Obj. 2: Carnal sin is twofold: one which is completed in carnal delectation, as gluttony and lust, and another which is completed in things relating to the flesh though it be completed in the delectation of the soul rather than of the flesh, as covetousness. Hence such like sins are between spiritual and carnal sins, so that they need a satisfaction proper to them, viz. almsgiving. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis singula istorum per quandam convenientiam singulis peccatis approprientur, quia congruum est ut in quo quis peccaverit, in hoc puniatur, et quod peccati commissi per satisfactionem radix abscindatur; tamen quodlibet horum pro quolibet peccato satisfacere potest. Unde ei qui non potest unum ex his perficere, iniungatur aliud. Et praecipue eleemosyna aliorum vices supplere potest: inquantum alia satisfactionis opera per eleemosynam quisque sibi mercatur quodammodo in illis quibus eleemosynam tribuit. Unde non oportet quod, si eleemosyna omnia mundat peccata, quod propter hoc aliae satisfactiones superfluant. Reply Obj. 3: Although each of these three, by a kind of likeness, is appropriated to some particular kind of sin because it is reasonable that whereby a man sins, in that he should be punished, and that satisfaction should cut out the very root of the sin committed, yet each of them can satisfy for any kind of sin. Hence if a man is unable to perform one of the above, another is imposed upon him, chiefly almsgiving which can take the place of the others, insofar as in those to whom a man gives alms he purchases other works of satisfaction thereby. Consequently, even if almsgiving washes all sins away, it does not follow that other works are in excess. Ad quartum dicendum quod, quamvis sint multa peccata in specie, tamen omnia ad illas tres radices, vel ad illa tria peccatorum genera quibus diximus dictas satisfactiones respondere, reducuntur. Reply Obj. 4: Though there are many kinds of sins, all are reduced to those three roots or to those three kinds of sin, to which, as we have said, the aforesaid works of satisfaction correspond. Ad quintum dicendum quod quidquid ad afflictionem corporis pertinet, totum ad ieiunium refertur; et quidquid in proximi utilitate expenditur, totum eleemosynae rationem habet; et similiter quaecumque latria exhibeatur Deo, orationis accipit rationem. Et ideo etiam unum opus potest habere plures rationes satisfaciendi. Reply Obj. 5: Whatever relates to affliction of the body is all referred to fasting, and whatever is spent for the benefit of one’s neighbor is a kind of alms, and whatever act of worship is given to God becomes a kind of prayer, so that even one work can be satisfactory in several ways. Quaestio 16 Question 16 De suscipientibus hoc sacramentum The Recipients of Penance Deinde considerandum est de suscipientibus hoc sacramentum. We must now consider the recipients of the sacrament of penance. Circa quod tria quaeruntur. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: Primo: utrum poenitentia possit esse in innocentibus. (1) Whether penance can be in the innocent? Secundo: utrum in sanctis qui sunt in gloria. (2) Whether it can be in the saints in glory? Tertio: utrum in angelis bonis seu malis. (3) Whether in the good or bad angels? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum in innocentibus poenitentia esse possit Whether penance can be in the innocent? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in innocentibus poenitentia esse non possit. Quia poenitentia est commissa mala plangere. Sed innocentes nullum malum commiserunt. Ergo in eis poenitentia non est. Objection 1: It would seem that penance cannot be in the innocent. For penance consists in bewailing one’s evil deeds: whereas the innocent have done no evil. Therefore, penance cannot be in them. Praeterea, poenitentia ex suo nomine importat poenam. Sed innocentibus non debetur poena. Ergo non est in eis poenitentia. Obj. 2: Further, the very name of penance implies punishment. But the innocent do not deserve punishment. Therefore, penance is not in them. Praeterea, poenitentia in idem coincidit cum vindicativa iustitia. Sed, omnibus existentibus innocentibus, vindicativa iustitia locum non haberet. Ergo nec poenitentia. Et ita non est in innocentibus. Obj. 3: Further, penance coincides with vindictive justice. But if all were innocent, there would be no room for vindictive justice. Therefore, there would be no penance. Thus there is none in the innocent. Sed contra: Omnes virtutes simul infunduntur. Sed poenitentia est virtus. Curn ergo iri baptismo innocentibus infundantur aliae virtutes, infunditur etiam poenitentia. On the contrary, All the virtues are infused together. But penance is a virtue. Since, therefore, other virtues are infused into the innocent at baptism, penance is infused with them. Praeterea, ille qui nunquam fuit infirmus corporaliter, dicitur sanabilis. Ergo et similiter qui nunquam fuit infirmus spiritualiter. Sed, sicut sanatio in actu a vulnere peccati non est nisi per actum poenitentiae, ita nec sanabilitas nisi per habitum. Ergo ille qui nunquam habuit infirmitatem peccati, habet habitum poenitentiae. Further, A man is said to be curable though he has never been sick in body: and it is therefore similar with one who has never been sick spiritually. Now, even as there can be no actual cure from the wound of sin without an act of penance, so is there no possibility of cure without the habit of penance. Therefore, one who has never had the disease of sin has the habit of penance. Respondeo dicendum quod habitus medius est inter potentiam et actum. Et quia, remoto priori removetur posterius, non autem e converso; ideo, remota potentia ad actum, removetur habitus, non autem remoto actu. Et quia subtractio materiae tollit actum, propter hoc quod actus non potest esse sine materia in quam transit; ideo habitus alicuius virtutis competit alicui cui non suppetit materia, propter hoc quod suppetere potest, et ita in actum exire: sicut pauper homo potest habere habitum magnificentiae, sed non actum, quia non habet magnitudinem divitiarum, quae sunt materia magnificentiae; sed potest habere habitum. Et ideo, cum innocentes in statu innocentiae non habeant peccata commissa, quae sunt materia poenitentiae, sed possunt habere, actus poenitentiae in eis esse non potest, sed habitus potest. Et hoc si gratiam habeant, cum qua omnes virtutes infunduntur. I answer that, Habit comes between power and act: and since the removal of what precedes entails the removal of what follows, but not conversely, the removal of the habit ensues from the removal of the power to act, but not from the removal of the act. And because removal of the matter entails the removal of the act, since there can be no act without the matter into which it passes, hence the habit of a virtue is possible in one for whom the matter is not available, for the reason that it can be available, so that the habit can proceed to its act—thus a poor man can have the habit of magnificence, but not the act, because he is not possessed of great wealth which is the matter of magnificence, but he can be possessed thereof. And so, since the innocent in the state of innocence do not have sins that they have committed, which are the matter of repentance, but they could have had them, the act of repentance cannot exist in them, but the habit can. And it does if they have grace, with which all the virtues are infused. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis non commiserint, possunt tamen committere. Et ideo eis habitum poenitentiae habere competit. Sed tamen habitus iste nunquam in actum exire potest, nisi forte respectu venialium peccatorum: quia peccata mortalia tollunt ipsum. Nec tamen est frustra: quia est perfectio potentiae naturalis. Reply Obj. 1: Although the innocent have committed no sin, nevertheless they can, so that they are competent to have the habit of penance. Yet this habit can never proceed to its act, except perhaps with regard to their venial sins, because mortal sins destroy the habit. Nevertheless it is not without its purpose, because it is a perfection of the natural power. Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis non sit eis debita poena actu, tamen in eis est possibile esse aliquid pro quo eis poena debeatur. Reply Obj. 2: Although they deserve no punishment actually, yet it is possible for something to be in them for which they would deserve to be punished. Ad tertium dicendum quod, remanente potentia ad peccandum, adhuc haberet locum vindicativa iustitia secundum habitum: quamvis non secundum actum, si peccata actu non essent. Reply Obj. 3: So long as the power to sin remains, there would be room for vindictive justice as to the habit, though not as to the act, if there were no actual sins. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum sancti homines qui sunt in gloria, habeant poenitentiam Whether the saints in glory have penance? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sancti homines qui sunt in gloria, non habeant poenitentiam. Quia, sicut dicit Gregorius, in Moralia: beati peccatorum recordantur sicut nos sani sine dolore dolorum memoramur. Sed poenitentia est dolor cordis. Ergo sancti in patria non habent poenitentiam. Objection 1: It would seem that the saints in glory have not penance. For, as Gregory says (Morals on Job, 4), the blessed remember their sins, even as we, without grief, remember our griefs after we have been healed. But penance is grief of the heart. Therefore, the saints in heaven have not penance. Praeterea, sancti in patria sunt Christo conformes. Sed in Christo non fuit poenitentia: quia nec fides, quae est principium poenitentiae. Ergo nec sanctis in patria erit poenitentia. Obj. 2: Further, the saints in heaven are conformed to Christ. But there was no penance in Christ, since there was no faith which is the principle of penance. Therefore, there will be no penance in the saints in heaven. Praeterea, frustra est habitus qui ad actum non reducitur. Sed sancti in patria non poenitebunt actu: quia sic eis esset aliquid contra votum. Ergo non est in eis habitus poenitentiae. Obj. 3: Further, a habit is useless if it is not reduced to its act. But the saints in heaven will not repent actually, because, if they did, there would be something in them against their wish. Therefore, the habit of penance will not be in them. Sed contra: Poenitentia est pars iustitiae. Sed iustitia est perpetua et immortalis, et in patria remanebit. Ergo et poenitentia. Obj. 4: On the other hand, penance is a part of justice. But justice is perpetual and immortal (Wis 1:15), and will remain in heaven. Therefore, penance will also. Praeterea, in Vitis Patrum legitur a quodam patre dictum quod etiam Abraham poenitebit de hoc quod non plura bona fecit. Sed magis debet homo poenitere de malo commisso quam de bono omisso ad quod non tenebatur (quia de bono tali loquitur). Ergo erit ibi poenitentia de malis commissis. Obj. 5: Further, we read in the Lives of the Fathers that one of them said that even Abraham will repent of not having done more good. But one ought to repent of evil done more than of good left undone, and which one was not bound to do, for such is the good in question. Therefore, repentance will be there of evil done. Respondeo dicendum quod virtutes cardinales remanebunt in patria, sed secundum actus quos habent in fine suo. Et ideo, cum poenitentia virtus sit pars iustitiae, quae est habitus cardinalis, quicumque habet habitum poenitentiae in hac vita, habebit in futura. Sed non habebit eundem actum quem nunc habet, sed alium: scilicet gratias agere Deo pro misericordia relaxante peccata. I answer that, The cardinal virtues will remain in heaven, but only as regards the acts which they exercise in respect of their end. Wherefore, since the virtue of penance is a part of justice which is a cardinal virtue, whoever has the habit of penance in this life will have it in the life to come. But he will not have the same act as now, but another, namely, thanksgiving to God for his mercy in pardoning his sins. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa auctoritas probat quod non habent eundem actum quem hic habet poenitentia. Et hoc concedimus. Reply Obj. 1: This argument proves that they do not have the same act as penance has now; and we grant this.