Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum claves in Ecclesia esse debeant Whether there should be keys in the Church? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod claves in Ecclesia esse non debeant. Non enim requiruntur claves ad intrandum domum cuius ostium est apertum. Sed Apoc. 4 dicitur: vidi, et ecce in caelo ostium apertum: quod Christus est, qui de seipso dicit: ego sum ostium. Ergo ad introitum caeli Ecclesia clavibus non indiget. Objection 1: It seems that the power of the keys should not exist in the Church. For keys are not required for entering a home whose door is open. But Revelation 4:1 says, I saw and behold in heaven a door was open; which is Christ, who says of himself, I am the door (John 10:7). Therefore, the Church does not need keys for entering heaven. Praeterea, clavis est ad aperiendum et claudendum. Sed hoc solius Christi est, qui aperit et nemo claudit, claudit et nemo aperit, Apoc. 3. Ergo Ecclesia in ministris suis claves non habet. Obj. 2: Further, a key is needed for opening and shutting. But this belongs to Christ alone, who opens and no man shuts, who shuts and no man opens (Rev 3:7). Therefore, the Church has no keys in the hands of her ministers. Praeterea, cuicumque clauditur caelum, aperitur infernus, et e contrario. Ergo quicumque habet claves caeli, habet claves inferni. Sed Ecclesia non dicitur habere claves inferni. Ergo nec claves caeli habet. Obj. 3: Further, hell is opened to whomever heaven is closed, and vice versa. Therefore, whoever has the keys of heaven has the keys of hell. But the Church is not said to have the keys of hell. Therefore, neither has she the keys of heaven. Sed contra: Est quod dicitur Matth. 16: tibi dabo claves, regni caelorum. On the contrary, It is written: To you will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven (Matt 16:19). Praeterea, omnis dispensator debet habere claves eorum quae dispensat. Sed ministri Ecclesiae sunt dispensatores divinorum mysteriorum, ut patet I Cor. 4. Ergo debent habere claves. Further, Every dispenser should have the keys of the things that he dispenses. But the ministers of the Church are the dispensers of the divine mysteries, as appears from 1 Corinthians 4:1. Therefore, they ought to have the keys. Respondeo dicendum quod in corporalibus dicitur clavis instrumentum quo ostium aperitur. Regni autem ostium nobis per peccatum clauditur, et quantum ad maculam, et quantum ad reatum poenae. Et ideo, potestas qua tale obstaculum Regni removetur, dicitur clavis. I answer that, In material things a key is an instrument for opening a door. Now the door of the kingdom is closed to us through sin both as to the stain and as to the debt of punishment. Wherefore the power of removing this obstacle is called a key. Haec autem potestas est in divina Trinitate per auctoritatem. Et ideo dicitur a quibusdam quod habet clavem auctoritatis. Now this power is in the divine Trinity by authority; hence some say that God has the key of authority. Sed in Christo homine fuit haec potestas ad removendum praedictum obstaculum per meritum passionis, quae etiam dicitur ianuam aperire. Et ideo dicitur habere, secundum quosdam, claves excellentiae. But in Christ as man this power existed for removing the aforesaid obstacle by the merit of his Passion, which is also said to open the door; hence some say that he has the keys of excellence. Sed quia ex latere dormientis in cruce sacramenta fluxerunt, quibus Ecclesia fabricatur, ideo in sacramentis Ecclesiae efficacia passionis manet. Et propter hoc etiam ministris Ecclesiae, qui sunt dispensatores sacramentorum, potestas aliqua ad praedictum obstaculum removendum est collata, non propria, sed virtute divina et passionis Christi. Et haec potestas metaphorice clavis Ecclesiae dicitur, quae est clavis ministerii. And since the sacraments of which the Church is built flowed from the side of Christ while he lay asleep on the cross (Augustine, Expositions of the Psalms 138) the efficacy of the Passion abides in the sacraments of the Church. Therefore, a certain power for the removal of the aforesaid obstacle is bestowed on the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments, not by their own, but by a divine, power, and by the Passion of Christ. This power is called metaphorically the Church’s key, and is the key of ministry. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ostium caeli, quantum est de se, semper est apertum: sed alicui clausum dicitur propter impedimentum intrandi in caelum quod in ipso est. Impedimentum autem totius humanae naturae, ex peccato primi hominis consecutum, per passionem Christi amotum est. Et ideo Ioannes post passionem vidit in caelo ostium apertum. Sed adhuc quotidie alicui manet clausum propter peccatum originale, quod contrahit vel actuale, quod committit. Et propter hoc indigemus sacramentis et clavibus Ecclesiae. Reply Obj. 1: The door of heaven, considered in itself, is ever open, but it is said to be closed to someone on account of some obstacle against entering therein, which is in himself. The obstacle which the entire human nature inherited from the sin of the first man was removed by Christ’s Passion; hence, after the Passion, John saw a door opened in heaven. Yet that door still remains closed to this or that man on account of the original sin which he has contracted, or the actual sin which he has committed: hence we need the sacraments and the keys of the Church. Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc intelligitur de clausione qua limbum clausit, ne aliquis ultra in illum descendat; et de apertione qua paradisum aperuit, remoto impedimento naturae per suam passionem. Reply Obj. 2: This refers to his closing limbo, so that thenceforth no one should go there, and to his opening of paradise, the obstacle of nature being removed by his Passion. Ad tertium dicendum quod clavis inferni, qua aperitur et clauditur, est potestas gratiam conferendi, per quam homini aperitur infernus, ut de peccato educatur, quod est inferni porta; et clauditur, ne ultra homo in peccatum labatur, gratia sustentatus. Gratiam autem conferre solius Dei est. Et ideo clavem inferni sibi soli retinuit. Sed clavis regni est potestas etiam dimittendi reatum poenae, per quem homo a regno prohibetur. Et ideo magis potest dari homini clavis regni quam clavis inferni: non enim idem sunt, ut ex dictis patet. Aliquis enim de inferno educitur per remissionem aeternae poenae, qui non in instanti in regnum introducitur, propter reatum temporalis poenae, qui manet. Reply Obj. 3: The key whereby hell is opened and closed is the power of bestowing grace, whereby hell is opened to man, so that he is taken out from sin which is the door of hell, and closed, so that by the help of grace man should no more fall into sin. Now the power of bestowing grace belongs to God alone, wherefore he kept this key to himself. But the key of the kingdom is also the power to remit the debt of temporal punishment, which debt prevents man from entering the kingdom. Consequently, the key of the kingdom can be given to man rather than the key of hell, for they are not the same, as is clear from what has been said. For a man may be set free from hell by the remission of the debt of eternal punishment, without being at once admitted to the kingdom on account of his yet owing a debt of temporal punishment. Vel dicendum est, ut quidam dicunt, quod eadem est clavis inferni et caeli, quia ex hoc ipso quod alicui aperitur unum, clauditur alterum: sed denominatur a digniori. It may also be replied, as some state, that the key of heaven is also the key of hell, since if one is opened to a man, the other, for that very reason, is closed to him, but it takes its name from the better of the two. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum clavis sit potestas ligandi et solvendi Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod clavis non sit potestas ligandi et solvendi, qua ecclesiasticus iudex dignos recipere, indignos excludere debet a regno: ut ex littera habetur, et ex Glossa Hieronymi, Matth. 16. Potestas enim spiritualis in sacramento collata est idem quod character. Sed clavis et character non videntur idem esse: quia per characterem homo Deo comparatur, per claves autem ad subditos. Ergo clavis non est potestas. Objection 1: It would seem that the key is not the power of binding and loosing, whereby the ecclesiastical judge has to admit the worthy to the kingdom and exclude the unworthy, as stated in the text (Sentences IV, D. 16). For the spiritual power conferred in a sacrament is the same as the character. But the key and the character do not seem to be the same, since by the character man is referred to God, whereas by the key he is referred to his subjects. Therefore, the key is not a power. Praeterea, iudex ecclesiasticus non dicitur nisi ille qui habet iurisdictionem: quae simul cum ordine non datur. Sed claves in ordinis susceptione conferuntur. Ergo non debuit de ecclesiastico iudice in definitione clavium mentio fieri. Obj. 2: Further, an ecclesiastical judge is only one who has jurisdiction, which is not given at the same time as holy orders. But the keys are given in the conferring of holy orders. Therefore, there should have been no mention of the ecclesiastical judge in the definition of the keys. Praeterea, ad id quod aliquis habet ex seipso, non indiget aliqua potestate activa per quam inducatur ad actum. Sed eo ipso quod aliquis est dignus, ad regnum admittitur. Ergo non pertinet ad potestatem clavium dignos ad regnum admittere. Obj. 3: Further, when a man has something of himself, he needs not to be reduced to act by some active power. Now a man is admitted to the kingdom from the very fact that he is worthy. Therefore, it does not concern the power of the keys to admit the worthy to the kingdom. Praeterea, peccatores indigni sunt regno. Sed Ecclesia pro peccatoribus orat ut ad regnum perveniant. Ergo non excludit indignos, sed magis admittit, quantum in se est. Obj. 4: Further, sinners are unworthy of the kingdom. But the Church prays for sinners that they may go to heaven. Therefore, she does not exclude the unworthy, but admits them, so far as she is concerned. Praeterea, in omnibus agentibus ordinatis ultimus finis pertinet ad principale agens, non ad agens instrumentale. Sed principale agens ad salutem hominis est Deus. Ergo ad eum pertinet ad regnum admittere, quod est ultimus finis; et non ad habentem claves, qui est sicut instrumentum vel minister. Obj. 5: Further, in every ordered series of agents, the last end belongs to the principal and not to the instrumental agent. But the principal agent in view of man’s salvation is God. Therefore, admission to the kingdom, which is the last end, belongs to him, and not to those who have the keys, who are as instrumental or ministerial agents. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum Philosophum, in II de Anima, potentiae per actus definiuntur. Unde, cum clavis sit potentia quaedam, oportet quod per actum vel per usum suum definiatur; et quod in actu obiectum exprimatur, a quo speciem recipit actus et modus agendi, ex quo apparet potentia ordinata. Actus autem potestatis spiritualis non est ut caelum aperiat absolute, quia iam apertum est, ut dictum est: sed ut quantum ad hunc aperiat. Quod quidem ordinate fieri non potest nisi idoneitate eius cui aperiendum est caelum pensata. Et ideo in praedicta definitione clavis ponitur genus, scilicet potestas; et subiectum potestatis, scilicet iudex ecclesiasticus; et actus, scilicet excludere et recipere, secundum duos actus materialis clavis, aperire et claudere; cuius obiectum tangit in hoc quod dicit a regno; modum autem in hoc quod dignitas et indignitas in illis in quos actus exercetur pensatur. I answer that, According to the Philosopher (On the Soul 2), powers are defined from their acts. Wherefore, since the key is a kind of power, it should be defined from its act or use, and reference to the act should include its object from which it takes its species, and the mode of acting whereby the power is shown to be well-ordered. Now the act of the spiritual power is to open heaven not absolutely, since it is already open, as stated above, but for this or that man; and this cannot be done in an orderly manner without due consideration of the worthiness of the one to be admitted to heaven. Hence the aforesaid definition of the key gives the genus, namely, power; the subject of the power, namely, the ecclesiastical judge; and the act, of excluding or admitting, corresponding to the two acts of a material key which are to open and shut. The object of which act is referred to in the words from the kingdom, and the mode in the words worthy and unworthy, because account is taken of the worthiness or unworthiness of those on whom the act is exercised. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad duo quorum unum est causa alterius, una potestas ordinatur: sicut in igne calor ad calefaciendum et dissolvendum. Et quia omnis gratia et remissio in corpore mystico ex capite suo provenit, ideo eadem potestas videtur esse per essentiam qua sacerdos conficere potest, et qua potest solvere et ligare si iurisdictio adsit: nec differt nisi ratione, secundum quod ad diversos effectus comparatur; sicut etiam ignis dicitur secundum aliam rationem calefactivus, et liquefactivus. Et quia nihil est aliud character ordinis sacerdotalis quam potestas exercendi illud ad quod principaliter ordo sacerdotii ordinatur (sustinendo quod sit idem quod spiritualis potestas), ideo character et potestas conficiendi et potestas clavium est unum et idem per essentiam, sed differt ratione. Reply Obj. 1: The same power is directed to two things, of which one is the cause of the other, as heat, in fire, is directed to make a thing hot and to melt it. And since every grace and remission in a mystical body comes to it from its head, it seems that it is essentially the same power whereby a priest can consecrate, and whereby he can loose and bind, if he has jurisdiction, and that there is only a logical difference, according as it is referred to different effects, even as fire in one respect is said to have the power of heating, and in another, the power of melting. And because the character of the priestly order is nothing else than the power of exercising that act to which the priestly order is chiefly ordained (if we maintain that it is the same as a spiritual power), therefore the character, the power of consecrating, and the power of the keys are one and the same essentially, but differ logically. Ad secundum dicendum quod omnis potestas spiritualis datur cum aliqua consecratione. Et ideo clavis cum ordine datur. Sed executio clavis indiget materia debita, quae est plebs subdita per iurisdictionem. Et ideo, antequam iurisdictionem habeat, habet claves, sed non habet actum clavium. Et quia clavis per actum definitur, ideo in definitione clavis ponitur aliquid ad iurisdictionem pertinens. Reply Obj. 2: All spiritual power is conferred by some kind of consecration. Therefore, the key is given together with the order: yet the use of the key requires due matter, i.e., a people subject through jurisdiction, so that until he has jurisdiction, the priest has the keys but he cannot exercise the act of the keys. And since the key is defined from its act, its definition contains a reference to jurisdiction. Ad tertium dicendum quod aliquis potest esse dignus aliquo dupliciter. Aut ita quod ipsum habendi ius habeat. Et sic quilibet dignus iam habet caelum apertum. Aut ita quod insit ei congruitas ad hoc quod ei detur. Et sic dignos quibus nondum totaliter apertum est caelum, potestas clavium respicit. Reply Obj. 3: A person may be worthy to have something in two ways, either so as to have a right to possess it, and thus whoever is worthy has heaven already opened to him—or so that it is fitting that he should receive it, and thus the power of the keys admits those who are worthy, but to whom heaven is not yet fully opened. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Deus non obdurat impertiendo malitiam, sed non conferendo gratiam, ita sacerdos dicitur excludere, non quod impedimentum ad intrandum ponat, sed quia impedimentum positum non amovet, quia ipse amovere non potest nisi prius Deus amoverit. Et ideo rogatur Deus ut ipse absolvat, ut sic sacerdotis absolutio locum habeat. Reply Obj. 4: Even as God hardens not by imparting malice but by withholding grace, so a priest is said to exclude not as though he placed an obstacle to entrance, but because he does not remove an obstacle which is there, since he cannot remove it unless God has already removed it. And so God is asked to absolve, so that the priest’s absolution may take place. Ad quintum dicendum quod actus sacerdotis non est immediate super regnum, sed super sacramenta, quibus homo ad regnum pervenit. Reply Obj. 5: The priest’s act does not bear immediately on the kingdom, but on the sacraments, by means of which man wins to the kingdom. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum sint duae claves, vel tantum una Whether there are two keys or only one? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint duae claves, sed tantum una. Ad unam enim seram non requiritur nisi una clavis. Sed sera ad quam amovendam ordinantur Ecclesiae claves est peccatum. Ergo contra unum peccatum non indiget Ecclesia duabus clavibus. Objection 1: It would seem that there are not two keys but only one. For one lock requires but one key. Now the lock for the removal of which the keys of the Church are required is sin. Therefore, the Church does not require two keys for one sin. Praeterea, claves in collatione ordinis conferuntur. Sed scientia non est ex infusione semper, sed quandoque ex acquisitione: nec ab omnibus ordinatis habetur, sed a quibusdam non ordinatis. Ergo scientia non est clavis. Et sic est una tantum clavis, scilicet potestas iudicandi. Obj. 2: Further, the keys are given when holy orders are conferred. But knowledge is not always due to infusion, but sometimes is acquired, nor is it possessed by all those who are ordained, and it is possessed by some who are not ordained. Therefore, knowledge is not a key, so that there is but one key, viz. the power of judging. Praeterea, potestas quam habet sacerdos super corpus mysticum, dependet ex potestate quam habet super corpus Christi verum. Sed potestas ad conficiendum corpus Christi verum est una tantum. Ergo clavis, quae est potestas respiciens corpus Christi mysticum, est una tantum. Obj. 3: Further, the power which the priest has over the mystic body of Christ flows from the power which he has over Christ’s true body. Now the power of consecrating Christ’s true body is but one. Therefore, there is only one key that is the power regarding the mystical body of Christ. Sed contra: Videtur quod sint plures quam duae. Quia sicut ad actum hominis requiritur scientia et potentia, ita et voluntas. Sed scientia discernendi ponitur clavis, et similiter potentia iudicandi. Ergo et voluntas absolvendi deberet dici clavis. Obj. 4: On the other hand, it seems that there are more than two keys. For just as knowledge and power are requisite for man to act, so is will. But the knowledge of discretion is reckoned as a key, and so is the power of judging. Therefore, the will to absolve should be counted as a key. Praeterea, tota Trinitas peccatum remittit. Sed sacerdos per claves est minister remissionis peccatorum. Ergo debet habere tres claves, ut Trinitati configuretur. Obj. 5: Further, all three divine Persons remit sins. Now the priest, through the keys, is the minister for the remission of sins. Therefore, he should have three keys, so that he may be conformed to the Trinity. Respondeo dicendum quod in omni actu qui requirit idoneitatem ex parte recipientis, duo sunt necessaria ei qui debet actum illum exercere: scilicet iudicium de idoneitate recipientis; et expletio actus. Et ideo etiam in actu iustitiae per quem redditur alicui hoc quo dignus est, oportet esse iudicium quo discernatur an iste sit dignus, et ipsa redditio. Et ad utrumque horum auctoritas, sive potestas quaedam exigitur: non enim dare possumus nisi quod in potestate nostra habemus; nec iudicium dici potest nisi vim coactivam habeat, eo quod iudicium ad unum iam terminatur; quae quidem determinatio in speculativis fit per virtutem priorum principiorum, quibus resisti non potest, et in rebus practicis per vim imperativam in iudicante existentem. Et quia actus clavis requirit idoneitatem in eo in quem exercetur, quia recipit per clavem iudex ecclesiasticus dignos et excludit indignos, ut ex dicta definitione patet; ideo indiget iudicio discretionis, quo idoneitatem indicat, et ipso receptionis actu, et ad utrumque potestas quaedam sive auctoritas requiritur. Et secundum hoc, sunt duae claves: quarum una pertinet ad iudicium de idoneitate eius qui absolvendus est; et alia ad ipsam absolutionem. Et hae duae claves non distinguuntur in essentia auctoritatis qua utrumque ex officio sibi competit: sed ex comparatione ad actus, quorum unus alium praesupponit. I answer that, Whenever an act requires fitness on the part of the recipient, two things are necessary in the one who has to perform the act, viz. judgment of the fitness of the recipient, and accomplishment of the act. Therefore, in the act of justice, whereby a man is given what he deserves, there needs to be a judgment in order to discern whether he deserves to receive. Again, an authority or power is necessary for both these things, for we cannot give save what we have in our power; nor can there be judgment without the right to enforce it, since judgment is determined to one particular thing, which determination it derives, in speculative matters, from the first principles which cannot be resisted, and in practical matters from the power of command vested in the one who judges. And since the act of the key requires fitness in the person on whom it is exercised—because the ecclesiastical judge, by means of the key, admits the worthy and excludes the unworthy, as may be seen from the definition given above—therefore the judge requires both judgment of discretion whereby he judges a man to be worthy, and also the very act of receiving; and for both these things a certain power or authority is necessary. Accordingly, we may distinguish two keys, the first of which regards the judgment about the worthiness of the person to be absolved, while the other regards the absolution. These two keys are distinct, not in the essence of authority, since both belong to the minister by virtue of his office, but in comparison with their respective acts, one of which presupposes the other.