Quaestio 41 Question 41 De matrimonio inquantum est in officium naturae Matrimony as Directed to an Office of Nature Post haec considerandum est de matrimonio. Et primo agendum est de eo inquantum est in officium naturae; secundo, inquantum est sacramentum; tertio, inquantum absolute et secundum se consideratur. In the next place we must consider matrimony. We must treat of it: (1) As directed to an office of nature; (2) As a sacrament; (3) As considered absolutely and in itself. Circa primum quaeruntur quattuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo: utrum sit de iure naturali. (1) Whether it is of natural law? Secundo: utrum nunc sit in praecepto. (2) Whether it is a matter of precept? Tertio: utrum eius actus sit licitus. (3) Whether its act is lawful? Quarto: utrum possit esse meritorius. (4) Whether its act can be meritorious? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum matrimonium sit naturale Whether matrimony is of natural law? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod matrimonium non sit naturale. Quia ius naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit. Sed in aliis animalibus est coniunctio sexuum absque matrimonio. Ergo matrimonium non est de iure naturali. Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony is not natural. Because the natural law is what nature has taught all animals (Digests). But in other animals the sexes are united without matrimony. Therefore, matrimony is not of natural law. Praeterea, id quod est de iure naturali, invenitur in hominibus secundum quemlibet statum eorum. Sed matrimonium non fuit in quolibet statu hominum: quia, sicut dicit Tullius, in I Rhetoric., homines a principio sylvestres erant, et tunc nemo scivit proprios liberos nec certas nuptias, in quibus matrimonium consistit. Ergo non est naturale. Objection 2: Further, that which is of natural law is found in all men with regard to their every state. But matrimony was not in every state of man, for as Cicero says (On Rhetorical Invention), at the beginning men were savages and then no man knew his own children, nor was he bound by any marriage tie, in which matrimony consists. Therefore, it is not natural. Praeterea, naturalia sunt eadem apud omnes. Sed non eodem modo est matrimonium apud omnes: cum pro diversis legibus diversimode matrimonium celebretur. Ergo non est naturale. Obj. 3: Further, natural things are the same among all. But matrimony is not in the same way among all, since its practice varies according to the various laws. Therefore, it is not natural. Praeterea, illa sine quibus potest salvari naturae intentio, non videntur esse naturalia. Sed natura intendit conservationem speciei per generationem, quae potest esse sine matrimonio, ut patet in fornicariis. Ergo matrimonium non est naturale. Obj. 4: Further, those things without which the intention of nature can be maintained would seem not to be natural. But nature intends the preservation of the species by generation, which is possible without matrimony, as in the case of fornicators. Therefore, matrimony is not natural. Sed contra: Est quod in principio Digestorum dicitur: ius naturale est maris et feminae coniunctio, quam nos matrimonium appellamus. On the contrary, At the commencement of the Digests it is stated: the union of male and female, which we call matrimony, is of natural law. Praeterea, Philosophus, VIII Ethic., dicit quod homo est magis naturaliter coniugale animal quam politicum. Sed homo est naturaliter animal politicum et gregale, ut ipse dicit. Ergo est naturaliter coniugale. Et sic coniugium, sive matrimonium, est naturale. Further, The Philosopher (Ethics 8.12) says that man is an animal more inclined by nature to conjugal than political society. But man is naturally a political and gregarious animal, as the same author asserts (Politics 1.2). Therefore, he is naturally inclined to conjugal union, and thus the conjugal union or matrimony is natural. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur esse naturale dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut ex principiis naturae ex necessitate causatum: ut moveri sursum est naturale igni, etc. Et sic matrimonium non est naturale: nec aliquid eorum quae mediante libero arbitrio complentur. I answer that, A thing is said to be natural in two ways. First, as resulting of necessity from the principles of nature; thus upward movement is natural to fire. In this way matrimony is not natural, nor are any of those things that come to pass at the intervention or motion of the free-will. Alio modo dicitur naturale ad quod natura inclinat, sed mediante libero arbitrio completur: sicut actus virtutum dicuntur naturales. Et hoc modo matrimonium est naturale: quia ratio naturalis ad ipsum inclinat dupliciter. Primo, quantum ad principalem eius finem, qui est bonum prolis. Non enim intendit natura solum generationem prolis, sed traductionem et promotionem usque ad perfectum statum hominis inquantum homo est, qui est status virtutis. Unde, secundum Philosophum, tria a parentibus habemus: scilicet esse, nutrimentum et disciplinam. Filius autem a parente educari et instrui non posset nisi determinatos et certos parentes haberet. Quod non esset nisi esset aliqua obligatio viri ad mulierem determinatam, quae matrimonium facit. Second, that is said to be natural to which nature inclines, although it comes to pass through the intervention of the free-will; thus acts of virtue and the virtues themselves are called natural. And in this way matrimony is natural, because natural reason inclines to it in two ways. First, in relation to the principal end of matrimony, namely, the good of the offspring. For nature intends not only the begetting of offspring, but also its education and development until it reach the perfect state of man as man, and that is the state of virtue. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethics 8.11–12), we derive three things from our parents, namely, existence, nourishment, and education. Now a child cannot be brought up and instructed unless it have certain and definite parents, and this would not be the case unless there were a tie between the man and a definite woman, and it is in this that matrimony consists. Secundo, quantum ad secundarium finem matrimonii, qui est mutuum obsequium sibi a coniugibus in rebus domesticis impensum. Sicut enim naturalis ratio dictat ut homines simul cohabitent, quia unus non sufficit sibi in omnibus quae ad vitam pertinent, ratione cuius dicitur homo naturaliter politicus; ita etiam eorum quibus indigetur ad humanam vitam, quaedam opera sunt competentia viris, quaedam mulieribus. Unde natura monet ut sit quaedam associatio viri ad mulierem, in qua est matrimonium. Et has duas causas ponit Philosophus in VIII Ethicorum. Second, in relation to the secondary end of matrimony, which is the mutual services which married persons render one another in household matters. For just as natural reason dictates that men should live together, since one is not self-sufficient in all things concerning life, for which reason man is described as being naturally inclined to political society, so too among those works that are necessary for human life some are becoming to men, others to women. Wherefore nature inculcates that society of man and woman which consists in matrimony. These two reasons are given by the Philosopher (Ethics 8.11–12). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod natura hominis ad aliquid inclinat dupliciter. Uno modo, quia est conveniens naturae generis: et hoc est commune omnibus animalibus. Alio modo, quod est conveniens naturae differentiae, qua species humana abundat a genere, inquantum est rationalis: sicut est prudentiae actus vel temperantiae. Et sicut natura generis, quamvis sit una in omnibus animalibus, non tamen est eodem modo in omnibus, ita etiam non inclinat eodem modo in omnibus, sed secundum quod unicuique competit. Reply Obj. 1: Man’s nature inclines to a thing in two ways. In one way, because that thing is becoming to the nature of the genus, and this is common to all animals; in another way because it is becoming to the nature of the difference, whereby the human species insofar as it is rational overflows the genus; such is an act of prudence or temperance. And just as the nature of the genus, though one in all animals, yet is not in all in the same way, so neither does it incline in the same way in all, but in a way befitting each one. Ad matrimonium, ergo inclinat natura hominis ex parte differentiae, quantum ad rationem secundam assignatam. Unde Philosophus hanc rationem assignant hominibus supra alia animalia. Sed quantum ad rationem primam inclinat ex parte generis. Unde dicit quod filiorum procreatio communis est omnibus animalibus. Tamen ad hoc non inclinat eodem modo in omnibus. Quia quaedam animalia sunt quorum filii, statim nati, possunt sufficienter sibi victum quaerere, vel ad quorum sustentationem mater sufficit: et in his non est aliqua maris ad feminam determinatio. In illis autem quorum filii indigent utriusque sustentatione, sed ad parvum tempus, invenitur aliqua determinatio quantum ad tempus illud: sicut in avibus quibusdam patet. Sed in homine, quia indiget filius cura parentum usque ad magnum tempus, est maxima determinatio masculi ad feminam, ad quam etiam natura generis inclinat. Accordingly, man’s nature inclines to matrimony on the part of the difference, as regards the second reason given above; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethics 8.11–12; Politics 1) gives this reason in men over other animals; but as regards the first reason it inclines on the part of the genus; wherefore he says that the begetting of offspring is common to all animals. Yet nature does not incline thereto in the same way in all animals; since there are animals whose offspring are able to seek food immediately after birth, or are sufficiently fed by their mother; and in these there is no tie between male and female; whereas in those whose offspring needs the support of both parents, although for a short time, there is a certain tie, as may be seen in certain birds. In man, however, since the child needs the parents’ care for a long time, there is a very great tie between male and female, to which tie even the generic nature inclines. Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Tullii potest esse verum quantum ad aliquam gentem (si tamen accipiatur principium proximum illius gentis, per quod ab aliis gentibus est distincta): quia in omnibus producitur ad effectum hoc ad quod naturalis ratio inclinat. Non autem est verum universaliter: quia a principio humani generis sacra Scriptura recitat fuisse coniugia. Reply Obj. 2: The assertion of Cicero may be true of some particular nation, provided we understand it as referring to the proximate beginning of that nation when it became a nation distinct from others; for that to which natural reason inclines is not realized in all things. But this statement is not universally true, since Sacred Scripture states that there has been matrimony from the beginning of the human race. Ad tertium dicendum quod, secundum Philosophum, in VII Ethic., natura humana non est immobilis, sicut divina. Et ideo diversificantur ea quae sunt de iure naturali secundum diversos status et conditiones hominum: quamvis ea quae sunt in rebus divinis naturaliter nullo modo varientur. Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethics 7), human nature is not unchangeable as the divine nature is. Hence things that are of natural law vary according to the various states and conditions of men; although those which naturally pertain to things divine in no way vary. Ad quartum dicendum quod natura non tantum intendit esse in prole, sed esse perfectum. Ad quod exigitur matrimonium, ut ex dictis patet. Reply Obj. 4: Nature intends not only being in the offspring, but also perfect being, for which matrimony is necessary, as shown above. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum matrimonium adhuc maneat sub praecepto Whether matrimony still comes under a precept? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod matrimonium adhuc maneat sub praecepto. Quia praeceptum obligat quandiu non revocatur. Sed prima institutio matrimonii fuit sub praecepto, ut in littera dicitur: nec unquam hoc praeceptum legitur revocatum; immo confirmatum, Matth. 19: quod Deus coniunxit homo non separet. Ergo adhuc est matrimonium sub praecepto. Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony still comes under a precept. For a precept is binding so long as it is not recalled. But the primary institution of matrimony came under a precept, as stated in the text (Sentences IV, D. 26); nor do we read anywhere that this precept was recalled, but rather that it was confirmed: what God has joined together let no man put asunder (Matt 19:6). Therefore, matrimony still comes under a precept. Praeterea, praecepta iuris naturalis secum dum omne tempus obligant. Sed matrimonium est de iure naturali, ut dictum est. Ergo, etc. Obj. 2: Further, the precepts of natural law are binding in respect of all time. Now matrimony is of natural law, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore, etc. Praeterea, bonum speciei est melius quam bonum individui: quia bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis, ut dicitur I Ethic. Sed praeceptum primo homini datum ad conservationem individui per actum nutritivae, adhuc obligat. Ergo multo magis praeceptum de matrimonio, quod pertinet ad conservationem speciei. Obj. 3: Further, the good of the species is better than the good of the individual, for the good of the State is more divine than the good of one man (Ethics 1.2). Now the precept given to the first man concerning the preservation of the good of the individual by the act of the nutritive power is still in force. Much more, therefore, does the precept concerning matrimony still hold, since it refers to the preservation of the species. Praeterea, ubi manet eadem ratio obligans, eadem obligatio manere debet. Sed propter hoc obligabantur homines ad matrimonium antiquo tempore, ne multiplicatio humani generis cessaret. Cum ergo hoc idem sequatur si quilibet libere potest a matrimonio abstinere, videtur quod matrimonium sit in praecepto. Obj. 4: Further, where the reason of an obligation remains the same, the obligation must remain the same. Now the reason why men were bound to marry in olden times was lest the human race should cease to multiply. Since, then, the result would be the same if each one were free to abstain from marriage, it would seem that matrimony comes under a precept. Sed contra: Est quod dicitur I Cor. 7: qui non iungit matrimonio virginem suam, melius facit, scilicet quam qui iungit. Ergo contractus matrimonii nunc non est sub praecepto. On the contrary, It is written: he that does not give his virgin in marriage does better (1 Cor 7:38), namely, than he that gives her in marriage. Therefore, the contract of marriage is not now a matter of precept. Praeterea, nulli debetur praemium pro transgressione praecepti. Sed virginibus debetur speciale praemium, scilicet aureola. Ergo matrimonium non est sub praecepto. Further, No one deserves a reward for breaking a precept. Now a special reward, namely, the aureole, is due to virgins (Q. 96, A. 5). Therefore, matrimony does not come under a precept. Respondeo dicendum quod natura inclinat ad aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut ad id quod est necessarium ad perfectionem unius. Et talis inclinatio quemlibet obligat: quia naturales perfectiones omnibus sunt communes. Alio modo: inclinat ad aliquid quod est necessarium multitudini. Et cum multa sint huiusmodi, quorum unum impedit aliud, ex tali obligatione non obligatur quilibet homo per modum praecepti, alias quilibet homo obligaretur ad agriculturam et ad aedificatoriam et ad huiusmodi officia, quae sunt necessaria communitati humanae: sed inclinationi naturae satisfit cum per diversos diversa complentur de praedictis. I answer that, Nature inclines to a thing in two ways. In one way as to that which is necessary for the perfection of the individual, and such an obligation is binding on each one, since natural perfections are common to all. In another way, it inclines to that which is necessary for the perfection of the community; and since there are many things of this kind, one of which hinders another, such an inclination does not bind each man by way of precept; else each man would be bound to agriculture and building and other such offices as are necessary to the human community; but the inclination of nature is satisfied by the accomplishment of those various offices by various individuals. Cum ergo ad perfectionem humanae multitudinis sit necessarium aliquos contemplativae vitae inservire, quae maxime per matrimonium impeditur; inclinatio naturae ad matrimonium non obligat per modum praecepti, etiam secundum philosophos. Unde Theophrastus probat quod sapienti non expedit nubere. Accordingly, since the perfection of the human community requires that some should devote themselves to the contemplative life, to which marriage is a very great obstacle, the natural inclination to marriage is not binding by way of precept, even according to the philosophers. Hence Theophrastus proves that it is not advisable for a wise man to marry, as Jerome relates (Against Jovinian 1). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praeceptum illud non est revocatum. Nec tamen obligat unumquemque, ratione iam dicta: nisi illo tempore quo paucitas hominum exigebat ut quilibet generationi vacaret. Reply Obj. 1: This precept has not been recalled, and yet it is not binding on each individual, for the reason given above, except at that time when the paucity of men required each one to betake himself to the begetting of children. Ad secundum et tertium patet responsio ex dictis. The replies to objections 2 and 3 are clear from what has been said.