Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur esse naturale dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut ex principiis naturae ex necessitate causatum: ut moveri sursum est naturale igni, etc. Et sic matrimonium non est naturale: nec aliquid eorum quae mediante libero arbitrio complentur. I answer that, A thing is said to be natural in two ways. First, as resulting of necessity from the principles of nature; thus upward movement is natural to fire. In this way matrimony is not natural, nor are any of those things that come to pass at the intervention or motion of the free-will. Alio modo dicitur naturale ad quod natura inclinat, sed mediante libero arbitrio completur: sicut actus virtutum dicuntur naturales. Et hoc modo matrimonium est naturale: quia ratio naturalis ad ipsum inclinat dupliciter. Primo, quantum ad principalem eius finem, qui est bonum prolis. Non enim intendit natura solum generationem prolis, sed traductionem et promotionem usque ad perfectum statum hominis inquantum homo est, qui est status virtutis. Unde, secundum Philosophum, tria a parentibus habemus: scilicet esse, nutrimentum et disciplinam. Filius autem a parente educari et instrui non posset nisi determinatos et certos parentes haberet. Quod non esset nisi esset aliqua obligatio viri ad mulierem determinatam, quae matrimonium facit. Second, that is said to be natural to which nature inclines, although it comes to pass through the intervention of the free-will; thus acts of virtue and the virtues themselves are called natural. And in this way matrimony is natural, because natural reason inclines to it in two ways. First, in relation to the principal end of matrimony, namely, the good of the offspring. For nature intends not only the begetting of offspring, but also its education and development until it reach the perfect state of man as man, and that is the state of virtue. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethics 8.11–12), we derive three things from our parents, namely, existence, nourishment, and education. Now a child cannot be brought up and instructed unless it have certain and definite parents, and this would not be the case unless there were a tie between the man and a definite woman, and it is in this that matrimony consists. Secundo, quantum ad secundarium finem matrimonii, qui est mutuum obsequium sibi a coniugibus in rebus domesticis impensum. Sicut enim naturalis ratio dictat ut homines simul cohabitent, quia unus non sufficit sibi in omnibus quae ad vitam pertinent, ratione cuius dicitur homo naturaliter politicus; ita etiam eorum quibus indigetur ad humanam vitam, quaedam opera sunt competentia viris, quaedam mulieribus. Unde natura monet ut sit quaedam associatio viri ad mulierem, in qua est matrimonium. Et has duas causas ponit Philosophus in VIII Ethicorum. Second, in relation to the secondary end of matrimony, which is the mutual services which married persons render one another in household matters. For just as natural reason dictates that men should live together, since one is not self-sufficient in all things concerning life, for which reason man is described as being naturally inclined to political society, so too among those works that are necessary for human life some are becoming to men, others to women. Wherefore nature inculcates that society of man and woman which consists in matrimony. These two reasons are given by the Philosopher (Ethics 8.11–12). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod natura hominis ad aliquid inclinat dupliciter. Uno modo, quia est conveniens naturae generis: et hoc est commune omnibus animalibus. Alio modo, quod est conveniens naturae differentiae, qua species humana abundat a genere, inquantum est rationalis: sicut est prudentiae actus vel temperantiae. Et sicut natura generis, quamvis sit una in omnibus animalibus, non tamen est eodem modo in omnibus, ita etiam non inclinat eodem modo in omnibus, sed secundum quod unicuique competit. Reply Obj. 1: Man’s nature inclines to a thing in two ways. In one way, because that thing is becoming to the nature of the genus, and this is common to all animals; in another way because it is becoming to the nature of the difference, whereby the human species insofar as it is rational overflows the genus; such is an act of prudence or temperance. And just as the nature of the genus, though one in all animals, yet is not in all in the same way, so neither does it incline in the same way in all, but in a way befitting each one. Ad matrimonium, ergo inclinat natura hominis ex parte differentiae, quantum ad rationem secundam assignatam. Unde Philosophus hanc rationem assignant hominibus supra alia animalia. Sed quantum ad rationem primam inclinat ex parte generis. Unde dicit quod filiorum procreatio communis est omnibus animalibus. Tamen ad hoc non inclinat eodem modo in omnibus. Quia quaedam animalia sunt quorum filii, statim nati, possunt sufficienter sibi victum quaerere, vel ad quorum sustentationem mater sufficit: et in his non est aliqua maris ad feminam determinatio. In illis autem quorum filii indigent utriusque sustentatione, sed ad parvum tempus, invenitur aliqua determinatio quantum ad tempus illud: sicut in avibus quibusdam patet. Sed in homine, quia indiget filius cura parentum usque ad magnum tempus, est maxima determinatio masculi ad feminam, ad quam etiam natura generis inclinat. Accordingly, man’s nature inclines to matrimony on the part of the difference, as regards the second reason given above; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethics 8.11–12; Politics 1) gives this reason in men over other animals; but as regards the first reason it inclines on the part of the genus; wherefore he says that the begetting of offspring is common to all animals. Yet nature does not incline thereto in the same way in all animals; since there are animals whose offspring are able to seek food immediately after birth, or are sufficiently fed by their mother; and in these there is no tie between male and female; whereas in those whose offspring needs the support of both parents, although for a short time, there is a certain tie, as may be seen in certain birds. In man, however, since the child needs the parents’ care for a long time, there is a very great tie between male and female, to which tie even the generic nature inclines. Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Tullii potest esse verum quantum ad aliquam gentem (si tamen accipiatur principium proximum illius gentis, per quod ab aliis gentibus est distincta): quia in omnibus producitur ad effectum hoc ad quod naturalis ratio inclinat. Non autem est verum universaliter: quia a principio humani generis sacra Scriptura recitat fuisse coniugia. Reply Obj. 2: The assertion of Cicero may be true of some particular nation, provided we understand it as referring to the proximate beginning of that nation when it became a nation distinct from others; for that to which natural reason inclines is not realized in all things. But this statement is not universally true, since Sacred Scripture states that there has been matrimony from the beginning of the human race. Ad tertium dicendum quod, secundum Philosophum, in VII Ethic., natura humana non est immobilis, sicut divina. Et ideo diversificantur ea quae sunt de iure naturali secundum diversos status et conditiones hominum: quamvis ea quae sunt in rebus divinis naturaliter nullo modo varientur. Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethics 7), human nature is not unchangeable as the divine nature is. Hence things that are of natural law vary according to the various states and conditions of men; although those which naturally pertain to things divine in no way vary. Ad quartum dicendum quod natura non tantum intendit esse in prole, sed esse perfectum. Ad quod exigitur matrimonium, ut ex dictis patet. Reply Obj. 4: Nature intends not only being in the offspring, but also perfect being, for which matrimony is necessary, as shown above. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum matrimonium adhuc maneat sub praecepto Whether matrimony still comes under a precept? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod matrimonium adhuc maneat sub praecepto. Quia praeceptum obligat quandiu non revocatur. Sed prima institutio matrimonii fuit sub praecepto, ut in littera dicitur: nec unquam hoc praeceptum legitur revocatum; immo confirmatum, Matth. 19: quod Deus coniunxit homo non separet. Ergo adhuc est matrimonium sub praecepto. Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony still comes under a precept. For a precept is binding so long as it is not recalled. But the primary institution of matrimony came under a precept, as stated in the text (Sentences IV, D. 26); nor do we read anywhere that this precept was recalled, but rather that it was confirmed: what God has joined together let no man put asunder (Matt 19:6). Therefore, matrimony still comes under a precept. Praeterea, praecepta iuris naturalis secum dum omne tempus obligant. Sed matrimonium est de iure naturali, ut dictum est. Ergo, etc. Obj. 2: Further, the precepts of natural law are binding in respect of all time. Now matrimony is of natural law, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore, etc. Praeterea, bonum speciei est melius quam bonum individui: quia bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis, ut dicitur I Ethic. Sed praeceptum primo homini datum ad conservationem individui per actum nutritivae, adhuc obligat. Ergo multo magis praeceptum de matrimonio, quod pertinet ad conservationem speciei. Obj. 3: Further, the good of the species is better than the good of the individual, for the good of the State is more divine than the good of one man (Ethics 1.2). Now the precept given to the first man concerning the preservation of the good of the individual by the act of the nutritive power is still in force. Much more, therefore, does the precept concerning matrimony still hold, since it refers to the preservation of the species. Praeterea, ubi manet eadem ratio obligans, eadem obligatio manere debet. Sed propter hoc obligabantur homines ad matrimonium antiquo tempore, ne multiplicatio humani generis cessaret. Cum ergo hoc idem sequatur si quilibet libere potest a matrimonio abstinere, videtur quod matrimonium sit in praecepto. Obj. 4: Further, where the reason of an obligation remains the same, the obligation must remain the same. Now the reason why men were bound to marry in olden times was lest the human race should cease to multiply. Since, then, the result would be the same if each one were free to abstain from marriage, it would seem that matrimony comes under a precept. Sed contra: Est quod dicitur I Cor. 7: qui non iungit matrimonio virginem suam, melius facit, scilicet quam qui iungit. Ergo contractus matrimonii nunc non est sub praecepto. On the contrary, It is written: he that does not give his virgin in marriage does better (1 Cor 7:38), namely, than he that gives her in marriage. Therefore, the contract of marriage is not now a matter of precept. Praeterea, nulli debetur praemium pro transgressione praecepti. Sed virginibus debetur speciale praemium, scilicet aureola. Ergo matrimonium non est sub praecepto. Further, No one deserves a reward for breaking a precept. Now a special reward, namely, the aureole, is due to virgins (Q. 96, A. 5). Therefore, matrimony does not come under a precept. Respondeo dicendum quod natura inclinat ad aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut ad id quod est necessarium ad perfectionem unius. Et talis inclinatio quemlibet obligat: quia naturales perfectiones omnibus sunt communes. Alio modo: inclinat ad aliquid quod est necessarium multitudini. Et cum multa sint huiusmodi, quorum unum impedit aliud, ex tali obligatione non obligatur quilibet homo per modum praecepti, alias quilibet homo obligaretur ad agriculturam et ad aedificatoriam et ad huiusmodi officia, quae sunt necessaria communitati humanae: sed inclinationi naturae satisfit cum per diversos diversa complentur de praedictis. I answer that, Nature inclines to a thing in two ways. In one way as to that which is necessary for the perfection of the individual, and such an obligation is binding on each one, since natural perfections are common to all. In another way, it inclines to that which is necessary for the perfection of the community; and since there are many things of this kind, one of which hinders another, such an inclination does not bind each man by way of precept; else each man would be bound to agriculture and building and other such offices as are necessary to the human community; but the inclination of nature is satisfied by the accomplishment of those various offices by various individuals. Cum ergo ad perfectionem humanae multitudinis sit necessarium aliquos contemplativae vitae inservire, quae maxime per matrimonium impeditur; inclinatio naturae ad matrimonium non obligat per modum praecepti, etiam secundum philosophos. Unde Theophrastus probat quod sapienti non expedit nubere. Accordingly, since the perfection of the human community requires that some should devote themselves to the contemplative life, to which marriage is a very great obstacle, the natural inclination to marriage is not binding by way of precept, even according to the philosophers. Hence Theophrastus proves that it is not advisable for a wise man to marry, as Jerome relates (Against Jovinian 1). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praeceptum illud non est revocatum. Nec tamen obligat unumquemque, ratione iam dicta: nisi illo tempore quo paucitas hominum exigebat ut quilibet generationi vacaret. Reply Obj. 1: This precept has not been recalled, and yet it is not binding on each individual, for the reason given above, except at that time when the paucity of men required each one to betake himself to the begetting of children. Ad secundum et tertium patet responsio ex dictis. The replies to objections 2 and 3 are clear from what has been said. Ad quartum dicendum quod natura humana communiter ad diversa officia et actus inclinat, ut dictum est: sed quia est diversimode in diversis, secundum quod individuatur in hoc vel in illo, unum magis inclinat ad unum illorum officiorum, alium ad aliud. Et ex hac diversitate, simul cum divina providentia, quae omnia moderatur, contingit quod unus eligat unum officium, ut agriculturam, alius aliud. Et sic etiam contingit quod quidam eligunt matrimonialem vitam, et quidam contemplativam. Unde nullum periculum imminet. Reply Obj. 4: Human nature has a general inclination to various offices and acts, as already stated. But since it is variously in various subjects, as individualized in this or that one, it inclines one subject more to one of those offices, and another subject more to another, according to the difference of temperament of various individuals. And it is owing to this difference, as well as to divine providence which governs all, that one person chooses one office such as husbandry, and another person another. And so it is too that some choose the married life and some the contemplative. Therefore, no danger threatens. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum actus matrimonialis semper sit peccatum Whether the marriage act is always sinful? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus matrimonialis, semper sit peccatum. I Cor. 7: qui nubunt, sint tanquam non nubentes. Sed non nubentes non habent actum matrimonialem. Ergo etiam nubentes peccant in actu illo. Objection 1: It would seem that the marriage act is always sinful. For it is written: let they who have wives be as if they had none (1 Cor 7:29). But those who are not married do not perform the marriage act. Therefore, even those who are married sin in that act. Praeterea, Isaiae 59: iniquitates nostrae diviserunt inter nos et Deum nostrum. Sed actus matrimonialis dividit hominem a Deo: unde Exodi 19 praecipitur populo qui debebat Deum videre, quod non accederent ad uxores suas; et Hieronymus dicit quod in actu matrimoniali Spiritus Sanctus prophetarum corda non tangit. Ergo est iniquitas. Obj. 2: Further, your iniquities have divided between you and your God (Isa 59:2). Now the marriage act divides man from God; wherefore the people who were to see God were commanded not to go near their wives (Exod 19:11, 20). And Jerome says that in the marriage act the Holy Spirit touches not the hearts of the prophets (Epistle to Ageruchia; Against Jovinian 18). Therefore, it is sinful. Praeterea, illud quod secundum se est turpe, nullo modo potest bene fieri. Sed actus matrimonialis habet concupiscentiam adiunctam, quae semper est turpis. Ergo semper est peccatum. Obj. 3: Further, that which is shameful in itself can by no means be well done. Now the marriage act is always connected with concupiscence, which is always shameful. Therefore, it is always sinful. Praeterea, nihil excusatur nisi peccatum. Sed actus matrimonialis indiget excusari per bona matrimonii, ut Magister dicit. Ergo est peccatum. Obj. 4: Further, nothing is the object of excuse save sin. Now the marriage act needs to be excused by the marriage blessings, as the Master says (Sentences IV, D. 26). Therefore, it is a sin. Praeterea, de similibus specie idem est iudicium. Sed concubitus matrimonialis est eiusdem speciei cum actu adulterii: quia ad idem terminantur, scilicet speciem humanam. Ergo, cum actus adulterii sit peccatum, et actus matrimonii. Obj. 5: Further, things alike in species are judged alike. But marriage intercourse is of the same species as the act of adultery, since its end is the same, namely, the human species. Therefore, since the act of adultery is a sin, the marriage act is likewise. Praeterea, superfluitas in passionibus corrumpit virtutem. Sed semper in actu matrimoniali est superfluitas delectationis: adeo quod absorbet rationem, quae est principale hominis bonum; unde Philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod impossibile est hominem aliquid in ipsa intelligere. Ergo actus matrimonialis semper est peccatum. Obj. 6: Further, excess in the passions corrupts virtue. Now there is always excess of pleasure in the marriage act, so much so that it absorbs the reason, which is man’s principal good; thus the Philosopher says that in that act it is impossible to understand anything (Ethics 7.11). Therefore, the marriage act is always a sin. Sed contra: I Cor. 7 dicitur: virgo, si nubat, non peccat; et I Tim. 5: volo iuvenculas nubere, procreare filios. Sed procreatio filiorum non potest esse sine carnali coniunctione. Ergo actus matrimonialis non est peccatum: alias Apostolus non voluisset illud. On the contrary, 1 Corinthians 7:28 says that if a virgin marry she has not sinned, and 1 Timothy 5:14 that I will that the young should marry and bear children (1 Tim 5:14). But there can be no bearing of children without carnal union. Therefore, the marriage act is not a sin; else the Apostle would not have approved of it. Praeterea, nullum peccatum est in praecepto. Sed actus matrimonialis est in praecepto: I Cor. 7, uxori vir debitum reddat. Ergo non est peccatum. Further, No sin is a matter of precept. But the marriage act is a matter of precept: let the husband render the debt to his wife (1 Cor 7:3). Therefore, it is not a sin. Respondeo dicendum quod, supposito quod natura corporalis sit a Deo bona instituta, impossibile est dicere quod ea quae pertinent ad conservationem naturae corporalis, et ad quae natura inclinat, sint universaliter mala. Et ideo, cum inclinatio sit naturae ad prolis procreationem, per quam natura speciei conservatur, impossibile est dicere quod actus quo procreatur proles sit universaliter illicitus, ut in eo medium virtutis invenire non possit: nisi ponatur, secundum quorundam insaniam, quod res corruptibiles creatae sunt a malo deo. Ex quo forte ista opinio derivatur quae in littera tangitur. Et ideo est pessima haeresis. I answer that, If we suppose the corporeal nature to be created by the good God, we cannot hold that those things which pertain to the preservation of the corporeal nature and to which nature inclines are altogether evil; therefore, since the inclination to beget offspring, whereby the specific nature is preserved, is from nature, it is impossible to maintain that the act of begetting children is altogether unlawful, so that it be impossible to find the mean of virtue therein; unless we suppose, as some are mad enough to assert, that corruptible things were created by an evil god. From this, perhaps, the opinion mentioned in the text is derived (Sentences IV, D. 26); thus this is a most wicked heresy. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Apostolus in verbis illis non prohibuit matrimonii actum, sicut nec rerum possessionem cum dixit, qui utuntur hoc mundo, sint quasi non utentes: sed in utroque fruitionem prohibuit. Quod patet ex ipso modo loquendi. Non enim dixit, sint non utentes, vel non habentes: sed, quasi non utentes vel non habentes. Reply Obj. 1: By these words the Apostle did not forbid the marriage act, as neither did he forbid the possession of things when he said: those who make use of this world, as though not using it (1 Cor 7:31). In each case he forbade resting in the enjoyment, which is clear from the way in which he expresses himself: for he did not say let them not use it, or let them not have them, but let them be as if they used it not and as if they had none. Ad secundum dicendum quod Deo coniungimur et secundum habitum gratiae, et secundum actum contemplationis et amoris. Quod ergo primam coniunctionem separat, semper est peccatum. Non autem quod separat secundam: quia aliqua occupatio licita circa res inferiores animum distrahit, ut actu Deo coniungi non sit idoneus. Et hoc praecipue accidit in carnali coniunctione, in qua detinetur mens propter delectationem intensam. Et propter hoc illis quibus competit divina contemplari aut sacra tractare, indicitur pro tempore; isto abstinentia ab uxoribus. Et secundum hoc etiam dicitur quod Spiritus Sanctus, quantum ad actum revelationis secretorum, non tangebat mentes prophetarum in usu matrimonii. Reply Obj. 2: We are united to God by the habit of grace and by the act of contemplation and love. Therefore, whatever severs the former of these unions is always a sin, but not always that which severs the latter, since a lawful occupation about lower things distracts the mind so that it is not fit for actual union with God; and this is especially the case in carnal intercourse, in which the mind is withheld by the intensity of pleasure. For this reason those who have to contemplate divine things or handle sacred things are enjoined not to have to do with their wives for that particular time; and it is in this sense that the Holy Spirit, as regards the actual revelation of hidden things, did not touch the hearts of the prophets at the time of the marriage act. Ad tertium dicendum quod turpitudo illa concupiscentiae quae actum matrimonialem semper comitatur, non est turpitudo culpae, sed poenae, ex peccato primo proveniens: ut scilicet inferiores vires et membra corporis rationi non obediant. Et propter hoc ratio non sequitur. Reply Obj. 3: The shamefulness of concupiscence that always accompanies the marriage act is a shamefulness not of guilt, but of punishment inflicted for the first sin, inasmuch as the lower powers and the members do not obey reason. Hence the argument does not follow. Ad quartum dicendum quod illud proprie excusari dicitur quod aliquam similitudinem mali habet et tamen non est malum, vel non tantum quantum apparet. Quorum quaedam excusantur a toto, quaedam a tanto. Et quia actus matrimonialis propter corruptionem concupiscentiae habet similitudinem actus inordinati, ideo pro bono matrimonii excusatur a toto, ut non sit peccatum. Reply Obj. 4: Properly speaking, a thing is said to be excused when it has some appearance of evil, and yet is not evil, or not as evil as it seems, because some things excuse wholly, others in part. And since the marriage act, by reason of the corruption of concupiscence, has the appearance of an inordinate act, it is wholly excused by the marriage blessing, so as not to be a sin.