Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in illis ad quae natura inclinat, non exigitur tantus vigor rationis ad deliberandum sicut in aliis. Et ideo ante potest sufficienter deliberans in matrimonium consentire quam possit in contractibus aliis res suas sine tutore pertractare. Reply Obj. 1: In matters to which nature inclines there is not required such a development of reason in order to deliberate, as in other matters: and therefore it is possible after deliberation to consent to marriage before one is able to manage one’s own affairs in other matters without a guardian. Et similiter est dicendum ad secundum. Quia votum religionis est eorum quae sunt supra inclinationem naturae, quae maiorem difficultatem habent quam matrimonium. Reply Obj. 2: The same answer applies, since the religious vow is about matters outside the inclination of nature, and which offer greater difficulty than marriage. Ad tertium dicendum quod mulier citius ad tempus pubertatis pervenit quam vir, ut dicitur in IX de Animalibus. Et ideo non est simile de utroque. Reply Obj. 3: It is said that woman comes to the age of puberty sooner than man does (On the Generation of Animals IX); hence there is no parallel between the two. Ad quartum dicendum quod ex parte ista non solum est impedimentum propter impotentiam coeundi sed propter defectum rationis, quae adhuc non sufficit ad consensum illum rite faciendum qui perpetuo durare debet. Reply Obj. 4: In this case there is an impediment not only as to inability to copulate, but also on account of the defect of the reason, which is not yet qualified to give rightly that consent which is to endure in perpetuity. Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut impedimentum quod est ex furia, reducitur ad impedimentum erroris, ita etiam impedimentum quod est ex defectu aetatis: quia homo nondum habet plenum usum liberi arbitrii. Reply Obj. 5: The impediment arising from defective age, like that which arises from madness, is reducible to the impediment of error; because a man has not yet the full use of his free-will. Quaestio 59 Question 59 De disparitate cultus quae matrimonium impediat Disparity of Worship as an Impediment to Matrimony Deinde considerandum, est de disparitate cultus, quae matrimonium impedit. We must now consider disparity of worship as an impediment to marriage. Circa quod quaeruntur sex. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: Primo: utrum fidelis possit contrahere matrimonium cum infideli. (1) Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever? Secundo: utrum inter infideles sit matrimonium. (2) Whether there is marriage between unbelievers? Tertio: utrum coniux conversus ad fidem possit commanere cum infideli nolente converti. (3) Whether a husband, being converted to the faith, can remain with his wife if she be unwilling to be converted? Quarto: utrum possit uxorem infidelem relinquere. (4) Whether he may leave his unbelieving wife? Quinto: utrum, ea dimissa, possit aliam ducere. (5) Whether after putting her away he may take another wife? Sexto: utrum propter alia peccata vir possit dimittere uxorem, sicut propter infidelitatem. (6) Whether a husband may put aside his wife on account of other sins as he may for unbelief? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum fidelis possit matrimonium cum infideli contrahere Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fidelis possit matrimonium cum infideli contrahere. Quia Ioseph contraxit cum Aegyptia, et Esther cum Assuero. In utroque autem matrimonio fuit disparitas cultus: quia alter erat fidelis et alter infidelis. Ergo disparitas cultus praecedens matrimonium ipsum non impedit. Objection 1: It would seem that a believer can marry an unbeliever. For Joseph married an Egyptian woman, and Esther married Ahasuerus: and in both marriages there was disparity of worship, since one was an unbeliever and the other a believer. Therefore, disparity of worship previous to marriage is not an impediment to it. Praeterea, eadem est fides quam docet vetus et nova lex. Sed secundum veterem legem poterat esse matrimonium inter fidelem et infidelem, ut patet Deut. 21: si, egressus ad pugnam, videris mulierem pulchram in medio captivorum et adamaveris eam, introeas ad eam dormiens cum ea, et erit tibi uxor. Ergo et in nova lege licet. Obj. 2: Further, the old law teaches the same faith as the new. But according to the old law there could be marriage between a believer and an unbeliever, as evidenced by Deuteronomy 21:10: if you go out to the fight and see in the number of the captives a beautiful woman and love her, and will have her to wife, you shall go in unto her, and shall sleep with her, and she shall be your wife. Therefore, it is lawful also under the new law. Praeterea, sponsalia ad matrimonium ordinantur. Sed inter fidelem et infidelem possunt in aliquo casu contrahi sponsalia, cum conditione futurae conversionis. Ergo, sub eadem conditione, matrimonium potest contrahi inter eos. Obj. 3: Further, betrothal is directed to marriage. Now there can be a betrothal between a believer and an unbeliever in the case where a condition is made of the latter’s future conversion. Therefore, under the same condition there can be marriage between them. Praeterea, omne impedimentum matrimonii est aliquo modo contra matrimonium. Sed infidelitas non est contraria matrimonio: quia matrimonium est in officium naturae, cuius dictamen fides excedit. Ergo disparitas fidei non impedit matrimonium. Obj. 4: Further, every impediment to marriage is in some way contrary to marriage. But unbelief is not contrary to marriage, since marriage fulfills an office of nature whose dictate faith surpasses. Therefore, disparity of worship is not an impediment to marriage. Praeterea, disparitas fidei etiam quandoque est inter duos baptizatos: sicut quando aliquis post baptismum in haeresim labitur. Et si talis cum aliqua fideli contrahat, nihilominus est verum matrimonium. Ergo disparitas cultus matrimonium non impedit. Obj. 5: Further, there is sometime disparity of worship even between two persons who are baptized, for instance, when a person falls into heresy after baptism. Yet if such a person marry a believer, it is nevertheless a valid marriage. Therefore, disparity of worship is not an impediment to marriage. Sed contra: Est quod dicitur II Cor. 6: quae conventio lucis ad tenebras? Sed maxima conventio est inter virum et uxorem. Ergo ille qui est in luce fidei, non potest contrahere matrimonium cum illa quae est in tenebris infidelitatis. On the contrary, It is written: what concord has light with darkness? (2 Cor 6:14) Now there is the greatest concord between husband and wife. Therefore, one who is in the light of faith cannot marry one who is in the darkness of unbelief. Praeterea, Malach. 2 dicitur: contaminavit ludas sanctificationem Domini, quoniam dilexit et habuit filiam dei alieni. Sed hoc non esset si inter eos posset verum matrimonium contrahi. Ergo disparitas cultus matrimonium impedit. Further, It is written: Judah has profaned the holiness of the Lord, which he loved, and has married the daughter of a strange god (Mal 2:11). But such had not been the case if they could have married validly. Therefore, disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage. Respondeo dicendum quod principalius matrimonii bonum est proles ad cultum Dei educanda. Cum autem educatio fiat communiter inter patrem et matrem, uterque secundum fidem intendit ad cultum Dei prolem educare. Et ideo, si sint diversae fidei, intentio unius alterius intentioni contraria erit. Et ita non potest inter eos esse conveniens matrimonium. Et propter hoc disparitas cultus praecederis impedit ipsum, ne contrahi possit. I answer that, The chief good of marriage is the offspring to be brought up to the worship of God. Now since education is the work of father and mother in common, each of them intends to bring up the child to the worship of God according to their own faith. Consequently, if they be of different faiths, the intention of the one will be contrary to the intention of the other, and therefore there cannot be a fitting marriage between them. For this reason disparity of faith previous to marriage is an impediment to the marriage contract. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in veteri lege de aliquibus infidelibus erat permissum quod cum eis possent inire coniugia, et de aliquibus prohibitum. Specialiter quidem prohibitum erat de infidelibus habitantibus in terra Chanaan: tum quia Dominus praeceperat eos occidi, propter eorum obstinationem; tum quia maius periculum imminebat ne coniuges aut filios ad idololatriam perverterent, quia filii Israel ad ritus et mores eorum proniores erant propter conversationem cum eis. Sed de aliis gentibus permisit: praecipue quia non poterat esse timor pertrahendi ad idololatriam. Et sic Ioseph et Moyses et Esther cum infidelibus matrimonia contraxerunt. Reply Obj. 1: In the old law it was allowable to marry with certain unbelievers, and forbidden with others. It was, however, especially forbidden with regard to inhabitants of the land of Canaan, both because the Lord had commanded them to be slain on account of their obstinacy, and because it was fraught with a greater danger, namely, lest they should pervert to idolatry those whom they married or their children, since the Israelites were more liable to adopt their rites and customs through dwelling among them. But it was permitted in regard to other unbelievers, especially when there could be no fear of their being drawn into idolatry. And thus Joseph, Moses, and Esther married unbelievers. Sed in nova lege, quae per totum orbem diffunditur, similis ratio prohibendi est de omnibus infidelibus. Et ideo disparitas cultus praecedens matrimonium impedit contrahendum et dirimit contractum. But under the new law, which is spread throughout the whole world, the prohibition extends with equal reason to all unbelievers. Hence disparity of worship previous to marriage is an impediment to its being contracted and voids the contract. Ad secundum dicendum quod lex illa vel loquitur de aliis nationibus cum quibus licite poterant inire coniugia: vel loquitur quando illa captiva ad fidem et cultum Dei converti volebat. Reply Obj. 2: This law either refers to other nations with whom they could lawfully marry, or to the case when the captive woman was willing to be converted to the faith and worship of God. Ad tertium dicendum quod eadem est habitudo praesentis ad praesens et futuri ad futurum. Unde sicut, quando matrimonium in praesenti contrahitur, requiritur unitas cultus in utroque contrahentium; ita ad sponsalia, quibus fit sponsio futuri matrimonii, sufficit conditio apposita, de futura unitate cultus. Reply Obj. 3: Present is related to present in the same way as future to future. Wherefore just as when marriage is contracted in the present, unity of worship is required in both contracting parties, so in the case of a betrothal, which is a promise of future marriage, it suffices to add the condition of future unity of worship. Ad quartum dicendum quod iam ex dictis patet quod disparitas cultus contraria est matrimonio ratione principalioris boni ipsius, quod est bonum prolis. Reply Obj. 4: It has been made clear that disparity of worship is contrary to marriage in respect of its chief good, which is the good of the offspring. Ad quintum dicendum quod matrimonium est sacramentum: et ideo, quantum pertinet ad necessitatem, sacramenti, requirit paritatem quantum ad sacramentum fidei, scilicet baptismum, magis quam quantum ad interiorem fidem. Unde etiam hoc impedimentum non dicitur disparitas fidei, sed disparitas cultus, qui respicit exterius servitium, ut in III libro dictum est. Et propter hoc, si aliquis fidelis cum haeretica baptizata matrimonium contrahat, verum est matrimonium. Quamvis peccet contrahendo, si scit eam haereticam: sicut peccaret si cum excommunicata contraheret. Non tamen propter hoc matrimonium dirimeretur. Et e converso, si aliquis catechumenus, habens rectam fidem sed nondum baptizatus, cum aliqua fideli baptizata contraheret, non esset verum matrimonium. Reply Obj. 5: Matrimony is a sacrament: and therefore so far as the sacramental essentials are concerned, it requires purity with regard to the sacrament of faith, namely, baptism, rather than with regard to interior faith. For which reason also this impediment is not called disparity of faith, but disparity of worship which concerns outward service, as stated above (Sentences III, D. 9, Q. 1, A. 1, q. 1). Consequently, if a believer marry a baptized heretic, the marriage is valid, although he sins by marrying her if he knows her to be a heretic: even so he would sin were he to marry an excommunicate woman, and yet the marriage would not be void. Whereas on the other hand, if a catechumen, having right faith but not having been baptized, were to marry a baptized believer, the marriage would not be valid. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum inter infideles possit esse matrimonium Whether there can be marriage between unbelievers? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inter infideles non possit esse matrimonium. Matrimonium enim est sacramentum Ecclesiae. Sed baptismus est ianua sacramentorum. Ergo infideles, qui non sunt baptizati, matrimonium contrahere non possunt, sicut nec alia sacramenta suscipere. Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no marriage between unbelievers. For matrimony is a sacrament of the Church. Now baptism is the door of the sacraments. Therefore, unbelievers, since they are not baptized, cannot marry any more than they can receive other sacraments. Praeterea, duo mala sunt magis impeditiva boni quam unum. Sed infidelitas unius tantum impedit bonum matrimonii. Ergo multo fortius infidelitas utriusque. Et ita inter infideles non potest esse matrimonium. Obj. 2: Further, two evils are a greater impediment to good than one. But the unbelief of only one party is an impediment to marriage. Much more, therefore, is the unbelief of both, and consequently there can be no marriage between unbelievers. Praeterea, sicut inter infideles et fideles est disparitas cultus, ita interdum inter duos infideles: ut si unus sit gentilis et alter Iudaeus. Sed disparitas cultus impedit matrimonium, ut dictum est. Ergo ad minus inter infideles qui habent cultum disparem, non potest esse verum matrimonium. Obj. 3: Further, just as there is disparity of worship between believer and unbeliever, so can there be between two unbelievers, for instance, if one be a heathen and the other a Jew. Now disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore, there can be no valid marriage at least between unbelievers of different worship.