Ad quartum dicendum quod lepra solvit sponsalia, sed non matrimonium. Unde uxor etiam viro leproso tenetur reddere debitum. Non tamen tenetur ei cohabitare: quia non ita cito inficitur ex coitu sicut ex frequenti cohabitatione. Et quamvis generetur infirma proles, tamen melius est ei sic esse quam penitus non esse. Reply Obj. 4: Leprosy voids a betrothal but not a marriage. Wherefore a wife is bound to pay the debt even to a leprous husband. But she is not bound to cohabit with him, because she is not so liable to infection from marital intercourse as from continual cohabitation; and although a sickly child may be generated, nevertheless it is better for it to exist so diseased than not to be at all. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum vir teneatur debitum reddere uxori non petenti Whether a husband is bound to pay the debt if his wife does not ask for it? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vir non teneatur reddere debitum uxori non petenti. Praeceptum enim affirmativum non obligat nisi ad tempus determinatum. Sed tempus determinatum solutionis debiti non potest esse nisi quando petitur. Ergo alias solvere non tenetur. Objection 1: It would seem that the husband is not bound to pay the marriage debt if his wife does not ask for it. For an affirmative precept is binding only at a certain time. But the time fixed for the payment of the debt can only be when it is asked for. Therefore, he is not bound to payment otherwise. Praeterea, de quolibet debemus praesumere meliora. Sed melius est etiam coniugibus continere quam matrimonio uti, Ergo, nisi expresse debitum petat, debet vir praesumere quod ei placeat continere. Et sic non tenetur debitum ei reddere. Obj. 2: Further, we ought to presume the better things of everyone. Now, even for married people it is better to be continent than to make use of marriage. Therefore, unless she ask expressly for the debt, the husband should presume that it pleases her to be continent, and so he is not bound to pay her the debt. Praeterea, sicut uxor habet potestatem in virum, ita dominus in servum. Sed domino non tenetur servus servire nisi quando sibi ab ipso imperatur. Nec ergo vir tenetur uxori reddere debitum nisi quando ab ea exigitur. Obj. 3: Further, as the wife has power over her husband, so has a master over his slave. Now a slave is not bound to serve his master save when the latter commands him. Therefore, neither is a husband bound to pay the debt to his wife except when she demands it. Praeterea, vir potest aliquando uxorem exigentem precibus a vertere ne exigat. Ergo multo magis potest non reddere si non exigat. Obj. 4: Further, the husband can sometimes request his wife not to exact the debt when she asks for it. Much more, therefore, may he not pay it when he is not asked. Sed contra: Per redditionem debiti medicamentum praestatur contra uxoris concupiscentiam. Sed medicus cui infirmus est commissus, tenetur morbo eius subvenire etiam si ipse non petat. Ergo vir uxori non petenti tenetur debitum reddere. On the contrary, By the payment of the debt a remedy is afforded against the wife’s concupiscence. Now a physician who has the care of a sick person is bound to remedy the disease without being asked. Therefore, the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife, although she ask not for it. Praeterea, praelatus tenetur correctionis remedium contra peccata subditorum adhibere etiam eis contradicentibus. Sed redditio debiti in viro est ordinata contra peccata uxoris. Ergo tenetur vir debitum reddere quandoque etiam non petenti. Further, A superior is bound to apply a remedy for the sins of his subjects even though they rebel against it. But the payment of the debt on the husband’s part is directed against the sins of his wife. Therefore, sometimes the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife even though she ask it not of him. Respondeo dicendum quod petere debitum est dupliciter. Uno modo, expresse: ut quando verbis invicem petunt. Alio modo est petitio debiti interpretativa: quando scilicet vir percipit per aliqua signa quod uxor vellet sibi debitum reddi, sed propter verecundiam tacet. Et ita; etiam si non expresse verbis debitum petat, tamen vir tenetur reddere quando expressa signa in uxore apparent voluntatis reddendi debiti. I answer that, The debt may be demanded in two ways. First, explicitly, as when they ask one another by words; second, implicitly, as when the husband knows by certain signs that the wife would wish him to pay the debt, but is silent through shame. And so, even though she does not ask for the debt explicitly in words, the husband is bound to pay it whenever his wife shows signs of wishing him to do so. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tempus determinatum non est quando petitur, sed quando timetur ex aliquibus signis periculum ad quod vitandum ordinatur debiti redditio, nisi tunc reddatur. Reply Obj. 1: The appointed time is not only when it is demanded but also when on account of certain signs there is fear of danger (to avoid which is the purpose of the payment of the debt) unless it be paid then. Ad secundum dicendum quod vir potest talem praesumptionem habere de uxore quando in ea contraria signa non videt. Sed quando videt, esset stulta praesumptio. Reply Obj. 2: The husband may presume this of his wife when he perceives in her no signs of the contrary; but it would be foolish of him to admit this presumption if he does see such signs. Ad tertium dicendum quod dominus non ita verecundatur a servo petere debitum servitutis sicut uxor a viro debitum coniugii. Si tamen dominus non peteret, vel propter ignorantiam vel alia de causa, nihilominus servus teneretur implere si periculum immineret. Hoc enim est non ad oculum servire, quod Apostolus servis mandat. Reply Obj. 3: The master is not ashamed to demand of his slave the duty of his service, as a wife is to ask the marriage debt of her husband. Yet if the master were not to demand it either through ignorance or some other cause, the slave would nevertheless be bound to fulfill his duty if some danger were threatening. For this is what is meant by not serving to the eye (Eph 6:6), which is the Apostle’s command to servants. Ad quartum dicendum quod non debet vir uxorem avertere ne petat debitum nisi propter aliquam rationabilem causam. Et tunc etiam non debet cum magna instantia averti, propter pericula imminentia. Reply Obj. 4: A husband should not dissuade his wife from asking for the debt except for a reasonable cause; and even then he should not be too insistent, on account of the besetting danger. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum liceat mulieri menstruatae debitum a conjugale petere Whether it is licit for a menstruating woman to request the marriage debt? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod liceat mulieri menstruatae conjugale debitum petere. Sicut enim in lege mulier menstruata erat immunda, ita et vir fluxum seminis patiens. Sed vir seminifluus potest debitum petere. Ergo pari ratione et mulier menstruata. Objection 1: In addition, it seems that it is licit for a menstruating woman to request the debt from her spouse. For under the old law, just as a menstruating woman was unclean, so also was a man suffering an outflowing of semen. But a man suffering in this way can request the debt. Therefore, by the same reasoning, a woman in menstruation can also. Praeterea, major infirmitas est lepra quam passio menstruorum; et majorem, ut videtur, corruptionem causat in prole. Sed leprosa potest debitum petere. Ergo, etc. Obj. 2: Likewise, leprosy is a greater infirmity than suffering a menstrual period. And it causes, so it seems, a greater corruption in children. But a leper may request the debt. Therefore, etc. Praeterea, si menstruatae non licet petere debitum, hoc non est nisi ratione defectus qui timetur in prole. Sed si mulier sit sterilis, non timetur talis defectus. Ergo videtur quod saltem sterilis menstruata possit petere. Obj 3: Further, if a menstruating woman is not permitted to request the debt, this is only because of a defect which is feared in the children. But if the woman were barren, such a defect would not be feared. Therefore, it seems that at least a barren woman may request the debt during menstruation. Sed contra, Levit. 18, 19: ad mulierem quae patitur menstruum, non accedes: ubi Augustinus: cum sufficienter prohibuisset, hic etiam repetit, ne forte in superioribus videretur figurative accipiendum. On the contrary, Leviticus 18:19 says: you shall not approach the woman who undergoes menstruation. To which Augustine adds, although he had sufficiently prohibited it, here again he repeats, so that it would not perhaps seem to be taken figuratively in higher things. Praeterea, Isa. 64, 6: omnes justitiae vestrae quasi pannus menstruatae; ubi Hieronymus: tunc viri abstinere debent a mulieribus, quoniam concipiuntur membris damnati, caeci, claudi, leprosi; ut quia parentes non erubuerunt in conclavi commisceri, eorum peccata pateant cunctis, et apertius redarguantur in parvulis. Et sic idem quod prius. Further, According to Isaiah 64:6: all of your justices are like the rags of a menstruous woman. About which Jerome says: At that time men must abstain from their wives, since those damaged in their members are conceived—blind, lame, leprous—so that because the parents were not ashamed to commingle in their chamber, their sins might be evident to all, and more openly are they rebuked in their little ones. And thus the same conclusion as above. Respondeo dicendum quod accedere ad menstruatam in lege prohibitum erat duplici ratione: tum propter immunditiam; tum propter nocumentum quod in prole ex hujusmodi commixtione frequenter sequebatur. Et quo ad primum, praeceptum erat caeremoniale, sed quantum ad secundum erat morale: quia cum matrimonium sit ad bonum prolis principaliter ordinatum, ordinatus est omnis matrimonii usus quo bonum prolis impenditur; et ideo hoc praeceptum obligat etiam in nova lege propter secundam rationem, etsi non propter primam. I answer that, It should be said that to approach a menstruating woman was prohibited under the law for two reasons: both because of uncleanness as well as because of the harm which frequently resulted in the children from this kind of commingling. And so as to the first, this precept was ceremonial, but as to the second, it was moral; for since matrimony is principally ordered to the good of offspring, the use of matrimony is ordered by what is employed for the good of offspring: and therefore this precept also obliges under the new law because of the second reason, even if not for the first. Fluxus tamen menstruorum potest esse naturalis et innaturalis. Naturalis quidem, quando scilicet mulieres patiuntur temporibus determinatis, quando sunt sanae. Innaturalis autem quando inordinate et quasi continue ex aliqua infirmitate fluxum sanguinis patiuntur. In fluxu ergo menstruorum innaturali non est prohibitum ad mulierem menstruatam accedere in lege nova: tum propter infirmitatem, quia mulier in tali statu concipere non potest; tum quia talis fluxus est perpetuus et diuturnus; unde oporteret quod vir perpetuo abstineret. Sed quando naturaliter mulier patitur fluxus menstruorum, potest concipere; et iterum talis fluxus non durat nisi ad modicum tempus. Unde prohibitum est ad talem accedere. Et similiter prohibitum est mulieri in tali fluxu debitum petere. The menstrual flow can, however, be natural or unnatural. It is natural when women suffer it at the determined times, when they are healthy. However, it is unnatural when they suffer a flow of blood inordinately and almost incessantly because of some infirmity. Therefore, in an unnatural menstrual flow it is not prohibited to approach the menstruating woman under the new law: both because of the infirmity, since a woman cannot conceive in such a state, and also since such an issue of blood is perpetual and long-lasting, whence it would be necessary for her husband to abstain perpetually. But when the woman naturally undergoes the menstrual flow, she can conceive; and again such a period does not last but a little time. Whence it is prohibited to approach such a one, and likewise it is prohibited for the woman in such a period to request the debt. Ad primum dicendum, quod fluxus seminis in viro ex infirmitate procedit, nec semen sic fluens est aptum ad generationem; et praeterea talis passio est diuturna vel perpetua, sicut lepra. Unde non est similis ratio. Reply Obj. 1: The flow of semen in a man proceeds from an infirmity, and semen flowing like that is not suitable for generation. Furthermore, such a condition is long-lasting or perpetual, like leprosy; whence there is no similar argument. Et per hoc solvitur etiam secundum. Reply Obj. 2: And by this answer the second objection is also resolved. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamdiu mulier menstrua patitur, non potest esse certum eam esse sterilem. Quaedam enim in juventute sunt steriles, quae processu temporis sunt fecundae, et e converso, ut dicitur in 10 de Animalibus. Reply Obj. 3: As long as a woman undergoes menstruation, one cannot be certain that she is barren. Certain women are barren in their youth who become fertile by the process of time, and vice versa, as is stated in Book 10 of the History of Animals. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum debeat sive licite possit mulier menstruata viro poscenti debitum conjugale reddere Whether a menstruating woman ought to render the debt to a husband who asks? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mulier menstruata non debeat reddere debitum petenti. Levit. 20, dicitur quod si aliquis ad menstruatam accesserit, uterque morte est puniendus. Ergo videtur quod tam reddens quam exigens debitum mortaliter peccet. Objection 1: In addition, it seems that a menstruating wife should not render the debt to a husband who asks. In Leviticus 20:18, it says that if someone approaches a menstruating woman, both are to be punished by death. Therefore, it seems that a woman rendering the debt sins mortally as much as the one demanding the debt. Praeterea, Rom. 1, 32: non solum qui faciunt, sed etiam qui consentiunt, digni sunt morte. Sed exigens debitum scienter a menstruata mortaliter peccat. Ergo et mulier consentiens ei in redditione debiti. Obj. 2: Again, Romans 1:32 says: not only they that do them, but also they who consent to them that do them, are worthy of death. But someone who knowingly demands the debt of a menstruating woman sins mortally. Therefore, also the woman consenting to him in the rendering of the debt. Praeterea, furioso non est gladius reddendus, ne se vel alium interficiat. Ergo eadem ratione nec uxor tempore menstruorum debet viro corpus suum exponere, ne spiritualiter occidat. Obj. 3: Again, a sword is not to be handed over to a furious man, lest he might kill himself or another. Therefore, by the same reasoning neither should a woman expose her body to her husband in the time of menstruation, lest he should die spiritually. Sed contra, 1 Corinth. 7, 4: mulier sui corporis potestatem non habet, sed vir. Ergo petenti viro mulier etiam menstruata debet debitum reddere. On the contrary, 1 Corinthians 7:4 says: the woman does not have power over her body, but the man does. Therefore, the woman must render the debt to her husband requesting it even during the time of menstruation. Praeterea, mulier menstruata non debet esse viro peccandi occasio. Sed si viro petenti debitum, debitum ipsa non redderet, etiam tempore menstruorum, esset viro peccandi occasio: quia forte fornicaretur. Ergo, etc. Further, A menstruating woman must not be an occasion of sin for her husband. But if the husband should ask for his rights and she should not render the debt even in the time of her menstruation, she would be an occasion of sin to her husband, for perhaps he would fall into fornication. Therefore, etc. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc dixerunt quidam, quod mulier menstruata sicut non debet petere debitum, ita nec reddere. Sicut enim non tenetur reddere si haberet infirmitatem in propria persona, ex qua periculum ei immineret; ita non tenetur reddere ad vitandum periculum prolis. Sed ista opinio videtur derogare matrimonio, per quod datur omnimoda potestas viro in corpus mulieris quantum ad matrimonialem actum. Nec est simile de infirmitate corporis prolis et periculo proprii corporis; quia si mulier infirmatur, certissimum est quod ex carnali actu periculum ei imminet; non autem ita certum est de prole, quae forte nulla sequetur. I answer that, On this matter certain ones have said that the menstruating woman should not render the debt, just as she should not request it. For just as she is not bound to render it if she has an infirmity in her own person from the fact that danger threatens her, so also she is not bound to render in order to avoid danger to the children. But this opinion detracts from matrimony, by which complete power is given to the man over the body of his wife with respect to the marital act. Nor is the infirmity of the body of the offspring similar to danger to one’s own body, for if the woman is unwell, it is most certain that in the carnal act danger would threaten her; but it is not so certain about the children, who perhaps will not even follow. Et ideo alii dicunt, quod mulieri menstruatae nunquam licet petere debitum. Si tamen vir ejus petat; aut petit scienter, et tunc debet eum avertere precibus et monitis, tamen non ita efficaciter ut possit ei esse occasio in alias damnabiles corruptelas, si ad id pronus credatur: aut ignoranter; et mulier potest aliquam occasionem praetendere, vel infirmitatem allegare, ne debitum reddat, nisi periculum viro timeatur. Tamen finaliter, si vir non desistit a petitione, debet debitum reddere poscenti. Passionem vero suam non est tutum indicare, ne forte vir ex hoc ad eam abominationem concipiat, nisi de viri prudentia praesumatur. And therefore, others say that the menstruating woman is never allowed to request the debt. If, however, her husband should ask, either he asks knowingly, and then she should turn him aside by entreaties and warnings, yet not so categorically that it might be an occasion to him for other condemnable seductions, if he is believed to be prone to that; or else he asks ignorantly, and the woman can give some pretext, or say that she is unwell, so as not to render the debt, unless danger is feared for her husband. However, ultimately, if the man does not cease to request it, she should render the debt when he asks. Indeed, it is not safe for her to indicate her own situation lest perhaps the man should conceive a loathing for her because of it, unless he is presumed a man of prudence. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc intelligendum est quando uterque voluntarie consentit; non autem si mulier involuntaria et quasi coacta debitum reddat. Reply Obj. 1: This is to be understood when both consent voluntarily; not, however, if the woman should render the debt involuntarily, as though compelled.