Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum debeat sive licite possit mulier menstruata viro poscenti debitum conjugale reddere Whether a menstruating woman ought to render the debt to a husband who asks? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mulier menstruata non debeat reddere debitum petenti. Levit. 20, dicitur quod si aliquis ad menstruatam accesserit, uterque morte est puniendus. Ergo videtur quod tam reddens quam exigens debitum mortaliter peccet. Objection 1: In addition, it seems that a menstruating wife should not render the debt to a husband who asks. In Leviticus 20:18, it says that if someone approaches a menstruating woman, both are to be punished by death. Therefore, it seems that a woman rendering the debt sins mortally as much as the one demanding the debt. Praeterea, Rom. 1, 32: non solum qui faciunt, sed etiam qui consentiunt, digni sunt morte. Sed exigens debitum scienter a menstruata mortaliter peccat. Ergo et mulier consentiens ei in redditione debiti. Obj. 2: Again, Romans 1:32 says: not only they that do them, but also they who consent to them that do them, are worthy of death. But someone who knowingly demands the debt of a menstruating woman sins mortally. Therefore, also the woman consenting to him in the rendering of the debt. Praeterea, furioso non est gladius reddendus, ne se vel alium interficiat. Ergo eadem ratione nec uxor tempore menstruorum debet viro corpus suum exponere, ne spiritualiter occidat. Obj. 3: Again, a sword is not to be handed over to a furious man, lest he might kill himself or another. Therefore, by the same reasoning neither should a woman expose her body to her husband in the time of menstruation, lest he should die spiritually. Sed contra, 1 Corinth. 7, 4: mulier sui corporis potestatem non habet, sed vir. Ergo petenti viro mulier etiam menstruata debet debitum reddere. On the contrary, 1 Corinthians 7:4 says: the woman does not have power over her body, but the man does. Therefore, the woman must render the debt to her husband requesting it even during the time of menstruation. Praeterea, mulier menstruata non debet esse viro peccandi occasio. Sed si viro petenti debitum, debitum ipsa non redderet, etiam tempore menstruorum, esset viro peccandi occasio: quia forte fornicaretur. Ergo, etc. Further, A menstruating woman must not be an occasion of sin for her husband. But if the husband should ask for his rights and she should not render the debt even in the time of her menstruation, she would be an occasion of sin to her husband, for perhaps he would fall into fornication. Therefore, etc. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc dixerunt quidam, quod mulier menstruata sicut non debet petere debitum, ita nec reddere. Sicut enim non tenetur reddere si haberet infirmitatem in propria persona, ex qua periculum ei immineret; ita non tenetur reddere ad vitandum periculum prolis. Sed ista opinio videtur derogare matrimonio, per quod datur omnimoda potestas viro in corpus mulieris quantum ad matrimonialem actum. Nec est simile de infirmitate corporis prolis et periculo proprii corporis; quia si mulier infirmatur, certissimum est quod ex carnali actu periculum ei imminet; non autem ita certum est de prole, quae forte nulla sequetur. I answer that, On this matter certain ones have said that the menstruating woman should not render the debt, just as she should not request it. For just as she is not bound to render it if she has an infirmity in her own person from the fact that danger threatens her, so also she is not bound to render in order to avoid danger to the children. But this opinion detracts from matrimony, by which complete power is given to the man over the body of his wife with respect to the marital act. Nor is the infirmity of the body of the offspring similar to danger to one’s own body, for if the woman is unwell, it is most certain that in the carnal act danger would threaten her; but it is not so certain about the children, who perhaps will not even follow. Et ideo alii dicunt, quod mulieri menstruatae nunquam licet petere debitum. Si tamen vir ejus petat; aut petit scienter, et tunc debet eum avertere precibus et monitis, tamen non ita efficaciter ut possit ei esse occasio in alias damnabiles corruptelas, si ad id pronus credatur: aut ignoranter; et mulier potest aliquam occasionem praetendere, vel infirmitatem allegare, ne debitum reddat, nisi periculum viro timeatur. Tamen finaliter, si vir non desistit a petitione, debet debitum reddere poscenti. Passionem vero suam non est tutum indicare, ne forte vir ex hoc ad eam abominationem concipiat, nisi de viri prudentia praesumatur. And therefore, others say that the menstruating woman is never allowed to request the debt. If, however, her husband should ask, either he asks knowingly, and then she should turn him aside by entreaties and warnings, yet not so categorically that it might be an occasion to him for other condemnable seductions, if he is believed to be prone to that; or else he asks ignorantly, and the woman can give some pretext, or say that she is unwell, so as not to render the debt, unless danger is feared for her husband. However, ultimately, if the man does not cease to request it, she should render the debt when he asks. Indeed, it is not safe for her to indicate her own situation lest perhaps the man should conceive a loathing for her because of it, unless he is presumed a man of prudence. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc intelligendum est quando uterque voluntarie consentit; non autem si mulier involuntaria et quasi coacta debitum reddat. Reply Obj. 1: This is to be understood when both consent voluntarily; not, however, if the woman should render the debt involuntarily, as though compelled. Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum consensus non sit nisi voluntatis, non intelligitur mulier consentire peccato viri nisi voluntarie debitum reddat: quando enim est involuntaria, magis patitur quam consentiat. Reply Obj. 2: Since consent only comes from the will, a woman is not understood to consent to the sin of her husband unless she renders the debt voluntarily: for when it is involuntary, she suffers it rather than consenting. Ad tertium dicendum, quod gladius furioso etiam esset reddendus quando majus periculum timeretur in non reddendo; et similiter est in proposito. Reply Obj. 3: A sword would be given even to a furious man when greater danger would be feared if it were not given; and it is likewise in the case at hand. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum vir et mulier sint in actu matrimoniali aequales Whether husband and wife are equals in the marriage act? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vir et mulier non sint in actu matrimonii aequales. Agens enim est nobilius patiente: ut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad litt. Sed in actu coniugali vir se habet ut agens, et femina ut patiens. Ergo non sunt in actu illo aequales. Objection 1: It would seem that husband and wife are not equals in the marriage act. For, according to Augustine, the agent is more noble than the patient (On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 12). But in the marriage act the husband is as agent and the wife as patient. Therefore, they are not equal in that act. Praeterea, uxor non tenetur viro debitum reddere nisi petat. Vir autem tenetur uxori, ut dictum est. Ergo non sunt pares in actu matrimonii. Obj. 2: Further, the wife is not bound to pay her husband the debt without being asked; whereas he is so bound, as stated above (A. 1–2). Therefore, they are not equal in the marriage act. Praeterea, in matrimonio mulier propter virum facta est, ut patet Gen. 2: faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi. Sed illud propter quod est alterum, semper est principalius. Ergo, etc. Obj. 3: Further, the woman was made on the man’s account in reference to marriage, according to Genesis 2:18: let us make him a help like unto himself. But that on account of which another thing is, is always the principal. Therefore, etc. Praeterea, matrimonium principaliter ordinatur ad actum coniugalem. Sed in matrimonio vir est caput mulieris, ut patet I Cor. 11. Ergo non sunt aequales in actu praedicto. Obj. 4: Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the marriage act. But in marriage the husband is the head of the wife (Eph 5:22). Therefore, they are not equal in the aforesaid act. Sed contra: Est quod dicitur I Cor. 7: vir non habet potestatem sui corporis; et simile dicit de uxore. Ergo sunt aequales in actu matrimonii. On the contrary, It is written: the husband does not have power of his own body (1 Cor 7:4), and the same is said of the wife. Therefore, they are equal in the marriage act. Praeterea, matrimonium est relatio aequiparentiae: cum sit coniunctio, ut dictum est. Ergo vir et uxor sunt aequales in actu matrimonii. Further, Marriage is a relation of equiparence, since it is a kind of union, as stated above (Q. 44, A. 1, 3). Therefore, husband and wife are equal in the marriage act. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est aequalitas: scilicet quantitatis, et proportionis. Aequalitas quidem quantitatis est quae attenditur inter duas quantitates eiusdem mensurae, sicut bicubiti ad bicubitum. Sed aequalitas proportionis est quae attenditur inter duas proportiones eiusdem speciei, sicut dupli ad duplum. Loquendo ergo de prima aequalitate, vir et uxor non sunt aequales in matrimonio: neque quantum ad actum coniugalem, in quo id quod nobilius est viro debetur; neque quantum ad dispensationem domus, in qua uxor regitur et vir regit. Sed quantum ad secundam aequalitatem sunt aequales in utroque: quia sicut tenetur vir uxori in actu coniugali et dispensatione domus ad id quod viri est, ita uxor viro ad id quod uxoris est. Et secundum hoc dicitur in littera quod sunt aequales in reddendo et petendo debitum. I answer that, Equality is twofold: of quantity and of proportion. Equality of quantity is that which is observed between two quantities of the same measure, for instance, a thing two cubits long and another two cubits long. But equality of proportion is that which is observed between two proportions of the same kind, as double to double. Accordingly, speaking of the first equality, husband and wife are not equal in marriage: neither as regards the marriage act, wherein the more noble part is due to the husband, nor as regards the household management, wherein the wife is ruled and the husband rules. But with reference to the second kind of equality, they are equal in both matters, because just as in both the marriage act and in the management of the household the husband is bound to the wife in all things pertaining to the husband, so is the wife bound to the husband in all things pertaining to the wife. It is in this sense that it is stated in the text (Sentences IV, D. 32) that they are equal in paying and demanding the debt. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis agere sit nobilius quam pati, tamen eadem est proportio patientis ad patiendum et agentis ad agendum. Et secundum hoc est ibi; aequalitas proportionis. Reply Obj. 1: Although it is more noble to be active than passive, there is the same proportion between patient and passivity as between agent and activity; and accordingly there is equality of proportion between them. Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc est per accidens. Vir enim, quia nobiliorem partem habet in actu coniugali, naturaliter habet quod non ita erubescat petere debitum sicut uxor. Et inde est quod non ita uxor tenetur reddere debitum non petenti viro sicut vir uxori. Reply Obj. 2: This is accidental. For since the husband has the more noble part in the marriage act, it is natural that he should be less ashamed than the wife to ask for the debt. Hence it is that the wife is not bound to pay the debt to her husband without being asked, whereas the husband is bound to pay it to the wife. Ad tertium dicendum quod ex hoc ostenditur quod non sunt aequales absolute: non autem quod non sint aequales secundum proportionem. Reply Obj. 3: This proves that they are not equal absolutely, but not that they are not equal in proportion. Ad quartum dicendum quod, quamvis caput sit principalius membrum, tamen, sicut membra tenentur capiti in officio suo, ita caput membris in suo. Et sic est ibi aequalitas proportionis. Reply Obj. 4: Although the head is the principal member, yet just as the members are bound to the head in their own respective capacities, so is the head in its own capacity bound to the members: and thus there is equality of proportion between them. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum vir et uxor possint votum emittere contra debitum matrimonii sine mutuo consensu Whether husband and wife can take a vow contrary to the marriage debt without their mutual consent? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vir et uxor possint votum emittere contra debitum matrimonii sine mutuo consensu. Vir enim et uxor aequaliter obligantur ad debiti solutionem, ut dictum est. Sed licitum est viro, etiam uxore prohibente, accipere crucem in subsidium Terrae Sanctae. Ergo etiam hoc licitum est uxori. Et ideo, cum per hoc votum redditio debiti impediatur, potest alter coniugum sine consensu alterius votum praedictum emittere. Objection 1: It would seem that husband and wife may take a vow contrary to the marriage debt without their mutual consent. For husband and wife are equally bound to pay the debt, as stated above (A. 5). Now it is lawful for the husband, even if his wife be unwilling, to take the cross in defense of the Holy Land: and consequently this is also lawful to the wife. Therefore, since this prevents the payment of the debt, either husband or wife may without the other’s consent take the aforesaid vow. Praeterea, non est expectandus in aliquo voto consensus alicuius qui non potest sine peccato dissentire. Sed unus coniugum non potest sine peccato dissentire quin alter continentiam voveat, vel simpliciter vel ad tempus: quia impedire profectum spiritualem est peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum. Ergo unus potest votum continentiae simpliciter vel ad tempus sine consensu alterius vovere. Obj. 2: Further, in taking a vow one should not await the consent of another who cannot dissent without sin. Now the husband or wife cannot without sin refuse their consent to the other’s taking a vow of continence, whether absolutely or for a time; because to prevent a person’s spiritual progress is a sin against the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the one can take a vow of continence, either absolutely or for a time, without the other’s consent. Praeterea, sicut in actu matrimoniali requiritur debiti redditio, ita debiti petitio. Sed unus potest sine consensu alterius vovere quod debitum non petat: cum in hoc sit suae potestatis. Ergo, pari ratione, quod debitum non reddat. Obj. 3: Further, in the marriage act, the debt has to be demanded just as it has to be paid. Now the one can, without the other’s consent, vow not to demand the debt, since in this he is within his own rights. Therefore, he can equally take a vow not to pay the debt. Praeterea, nullus potest ex praecepto superioris cogi ad id quod non liceret sibi simpliciter vovere et facere: quia in illicitis non est obediendum. Sed praelatus superior posset praecipere viro ut uxori ad tempus debitum non redderet, occupando eum in aliquo servitio. Ergo hoc etiam ipse posset per se facere et vovere per quod a debiti redditione impediretur. Obj. 4: Further, no one can be bound by the command of a superior to do what he cannot lawfully vow or do simply, since one must not obey in what is unlawful. Now the superior authority might command the husband not to pay the debt to his wife for a time by occupying him in some service. Therefore, he might of his own accord do or vow that which would hinder him from paying the debt. Sed contra: Est quod dicitur I Cor. 7: ne fraudetis vos invicem, nisi ex communi consensu ad tempus, ut vacetis orationi. On the contrary, 1 Corinthians 7:5 says: defraud not one another, except by consent, for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer. Praeterea, nullus potest facere votum de alieno. Sed vir non habet potestatem sui corporis, sed uxor. Ergo sine eius consensu non potest votum continentiae facere, vel simpliciter vel ad tempus. Further, No one can vow that which belongs to another. Now the husband does not have power of his own body, but the wife (1 Cor 7:4). Therefore, without her consent, the husband cannot take a vow of continence whether absolutely or for a time. Respondeo dicendum quod vovere voluntatis est: ut etiam ipsum nomen ostendit. Unde de illis tantum bonis potest esse votum quae nostrae subiacent voluntati. Qualia non sunt ea in quibus unus alteri tenetur. Et ideo in talibus non potest aliquis votum emittere sine consensu eius cui tenetur. Unde, cum coniuges sibi invicem teneantur in redditione debiti, per quam continentia impeditur, non potest unus absque consensu alterius continentiam vovere. Et si voverit, peccat: nec debet servare votum, sed agere poenitentiam de malo voto facto. I answer that, A vow is a voluntary act, as its very name implies: and consequently a vow can only be about those goods which are subject to our will, and those in which one person is bound to another do not come under this head. Therefore, in matters of this kind one person cannot take a vow without the consent of the one to whom he is bound. Consequently, since husband and wife are mutually bound as regards the payment of the debt, which is an obstacle to continence, the one cannot vow continence without the other’s consent; and if he take the vow he sins, and must not keep the vow, but must do penance for an ill-taken vow (Q. 53, A. 1,4; Q. 61, A. 1). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod satis probabile est quod uxor debeat velle continere ad tempus pro subveniendo necessitati Ecclesiae generalis. Et ideo in favorem negotii pro quo crux sibi datur, institutum est quod vir possit absque consensu uxoris crucem accipere: sicut etiam posset domino suo terreno, a quo feudum tenet, absque eius consensu militare. Nec tamen in hoc omnino subtrahitur uxori ius suum: quia uxor potest eum sequi. Nec est simile de uxore ad virum. Quia, cum vir debeat regere uxorem et non e converso, magis tenetur uxor sequi virum quam e converso. Et praeterea uxor cum maiori periculo castitatis discurreret per terras quam vir, et cum minori Ecclesiae utilitate. Et ideo uxor non potest huiusmodi votum facere sine viri consensu. Reply Obj. 1: It is sufficiently probable that the wife ought to be willing to remain continent for a time, in order to succor the need of the universal Church. Hence in favor of the business for which the cross is given to him, it is laid down that the husband may take the cross without his wife’s consent, even as he might go fighting without the consent of his landlord whose land he has leased. And yet the wife is not entirely deprived of her right, since she can follow him. Nor is there a parallel between wife and husband: because, since the husband has to rule the wife and not vice versa, the wife is bound to follow her husband rather than the husband the wife. Moreover, there would be more danger to the wife’s chastity as a result of wandering from country to country than to the husband’s, and less profit to the Church. Wherefore the wife cannot take this vow without her husband’s consent. Ad secundum dicendum quod alter coniugum dissentiens voto continentiae alterius non peccat: quia non dissentit ut bonum illius impediat, sed ne sibi praeiudicium generetur. Reply Obj. 2: The one spouse, by refusing to consent to the other’s vow of continence, does not sin, because the object of his dissent is to hinder not the other’s good, but the harm to himself.