Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum vir et mulier sint in actu matrimoniali aequales Whether husband and wife are equals in the marriage act? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vir et mulier non sint in actu matrimonii aequales. Agens enim est nobilius patiente: ut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad litt. Sed in actu coniugali vir se habet ut agens, et femina ut patiens. Ergo non sunt in actu illo aequales. Objection 1: It would seem that husband and wife are not equals in the marriage act. For, according to Augustine, the agent is more noble than the patient (On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 12). But in the marriage act the husband is as agent and the wife as patient. Therefore, they are not equal in that act. Praeterea, uxor non tenetur viro debitum reddere nisi petat. Vir autem tenetur uxori, ut dictum est. Ergo non sunt pares in actu matrimonii. Obj. 2: Further, the wife is not bound to pay her husband the debt without being asked; whereas he is so bound, as stated above (A. 1–2). Therefore, they are not equal in the marriage act. Praeterea, in matrimonio mulier propter virum facta est, ut patet Gen. 2: faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi. Sed illud propter quod est alterum, semper est principalius. Ergo, etc. Obj. 3: Further, the woman was made on the man’s account in reference to marriage, according to Genesis 2:18: let us make him a help like unto himself. But that on account of which another thing is, is always the principal. Therefore, etc. Praeterea, matrimonium principaliter ordinatur ad actum coniugalem. Sed in matrimonio vir est caput mulieris, ut patet I Cor. 11. Ergo non sunt aequales in actu praedicto. Obj. 4: Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the marriage act. But in marriage the husband is the head of the wife (Eph 5:22). Therefore, they are not equal in the aforesaid act. Sed contra: Est quod dicitur I Cor. 7: vir non habet potestatem sui corporis; et simile dicit de uxore. Ergo sunt aequales in actu matrimonii. On the contrary, It is written: the husband does not have power of his own body (1 Cor 7:4), and the same is said of the wife. Therefore, they are equal in the marriage act. Praeterea, matrimonium est relatio aequiparentiae: cum sit coniunctio, ut dictum est. Ergo vir et uxor sunt aequales in actu matrimonii. Further, Marriage is a relation of equiparence, since it is a kind of union, as stated above (Q. 44, A. 1, 3). Therefore, husband and wife are equal in the marriage act. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est aequalitas: scilicet quantitatis, et proportionis. Aequalitas quidem quantitatis est quae attenditur inter duas quantitates eiusdem mensurae, sicut bicubiti ad bicubitum. Sed aequalitas proportionis est quae attenditur inter duas proportiones eiusdem speciei, sicut dupli ad duplum. Loquendo ergo de prima aequalitate, vir et uxor non sunt aequales in matrimonio: neque quantum ad actum coniugalem, in quo id quod nobilius est viro debetur; neque quantum ad dispensationem domus, in qua uxor regitur et vir regit. Sed quantum ad secundam aequalitatem sunt aequales in utroque: quia sicut tenetur vir uxori in actu coniugali et dispensatione domus ad id quod viri est, ita uxor viro ad id quod uxoris est. Et secundum hoc dicitur in littera quod sunt aequales in reddendo et petendo debitum. I answer that, Equality is twofold: of quantity and of proportion. Equality of quantity is that which is observed between two quantities of the same measure, for instance, a thing two cubits long and another two cubits long. But equality of proportion is that which is observed between two proportions of the same kind, as double to double. Accordingly, speaking of the first equality, husband and wife are not equal in marriage: neither as regards the marriage act, wherein the more noble part is due to the husband, nor as regards the household management, wherein the wife is ruled and the husband rules. But with reference to the second kind of equality, they are equal in both matters, because just as in both the marriage act and in the management of the household the husband is bound to the wife in all things pertaining to the husband, so is the wife bound to the husband in all things pertaining to the wife. It is in this sense that it is stated in the text (Sentences IV, D. 32) that they are equal in paying and demanding the debt. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis agere sit nobilius quam pati, tamen eadem est proportio patientis ad patiendum et agentis ad agendum. Et secundum hoc est ibi; aequalitas proportionis. Reply Obj. 1: Although it is more noble to be active than passive, there is the same proportion between patient and passivity as between agent and activity; and accordingly there is equality of proportion between them. Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc est per accidens. Vir enim, quia nobiliorem partem habet in actu coniugali, naturaliter habet quod non ita erubescat petere debitum sicut uxor. Et inde est quod non ita uxor tenetur reddere debitum non petenti viro sicut vir uxori. Reply Obj. 2: This is accidental. For since the husband has the more noble part in the marriage act, it is natural that he should be less ashamed than the wife to ask for the debt. Hence it is that the wife is not bound to pay the debt to her husband without being asked, whereas the husband is bound to pay it to the wife. Ad tertium dicendum quod ex hoc ostenditur quod non sunt aequales absolute: non autem quod non sint aequales secundum proportionem. Reply Obj. 3: This proves that they are not equal absolutely, but not that they are not equal in proportion. Ad quartum dicendum quod, quamvis caput sit principalius membrum, tamen, sicut membra tenentur capiti in officio suo, ita caput membris in suo. Et sic est ibi aequalitas proportionis. Reply Obj. 4: Although the head is the principal member, yet just as the members are bound to the head in their own respective capacities, so is the head in its own capacity bound to the members: and thus there is equality of proportion between them. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum vir et uxor possint votum emittere contra debitum matrimonii sine mutuo consensu Whether husband and wife can take a vow contrary to the marriage debt without their mutual consent? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vir et uxor possint votum emittere contra debitum matrimonii sine mutuo consensu. Vir enim et uxor aequaliter obligantur ad debiti solutionem, ut dictum est. Sed licitum est viro, etiam uxore prohibente, accipere crucem in subsidium Terrae Sanctae. Ergo etiam hoc licitum est uxori. Et ideo, cum per hoc votum redditio debiti impediatur, potest alter coniugum sine consensu alterius votum praedictum emittere. Objection 1: It would seem that husband and wife may take a vow contrary to the marriage debt without their mutual consent. For husband and wife are equally bound to pay the debt, as stated above (A. 5). Now it is lawful for the husband, even if his wife be unwilling, to take the cross in defense of the Holy Land: and consequently this is also lawful to the wife. Therefore, since this prevents the payment of the debt, either husband or wife may without the other’s consent take the aforesaid vow. Praeterea, non est expectandus in aliquo voto consensus alicuius qui non potest sine peccato dissentire. Sed unus coniugum non potest sine peccato dissentire quin alter continentiam voveat, vel simpliciter vel ad tempus: quia impedire profectum spiritualem est peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum. Ergo unus potest votum continentiae simpliciter vel ad tempus sine consensu alterius vovere. Obj. 2: Further, in taking a vow one should not await the consent of another who cannot dissent without sin. Now the husband or wife cannot without sin refuse their consent to the other’s taking a vow of continence, whether absolutely or for a time; because to prevent a person’s spiritual progress is a sin against the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the one can take a vow of continence, either absolutely or for a time, without the other’s consent. Praeterea, sicut in actu matrimoniali requiritur debiti redditio, ita debiti petitio. Sed unus potest sine consensu alterius vovere quod debitum non petat: cum in hoc sit suae potestatis. Ergo, pari ratione, quod debitum non reddat. Obj. 3: Further, in the marriage act, the debt has to be demanded just as it has to be paid. Now the one can, without the other’s consent, vow not to demand the debt, since in this he is within his own rights. Therefore, he can equally take a vow not to pay the debt. Praeterea, nullus potest ex praecepto superioris cogi ad id quod non liceret sibi simpliciter vovere et facere: quia in illicitis non est obediendum. Sed praelatus superior posset praecipere viro ut uxori ad tempus debitum non redderet, occupando eum in aliquo servitio. Ergo hoc etiam ipse posset per se facere et vovere per quod a debiti redditione impediretur. Obj. 4: Further, no one can be bound by the command of a superior to do what he cannot lawfully vow or do simply, since one must not obey in what is unlawful. Now the superior authority might command the husband not to pay the debt to his wife for a time by occupying him in some service. Therefore, he might of his own accord do or vow that which would hinder him from paying the debt. Sed contra: Est quod dicitur I Cor. 7: ne fraudetis vos invicem, nisi ex communi consensu ad tempus, ut vacetis orationi. On the contrary, 1 Corinthians 7:5 says: defraud not one another, except by consent, for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer. Praeterea, nullus potest facere votum de alieno. Sed vir non habet potestatem sui corporis, sed uxor. Ergo sine eius consensu non potest votum continentiae facere, vel simpliciter vel ad tempus. Further, No one can vow that which belongs to another. Now the husband does not have power of his own body, but the wife (1 Cor 7:4). Therefore, without her consent, the husband cannot take a vow of continence whether absolutely or for a time. Respondeo dicendum quod vovere voluntatis est: ut etiam ipsum nomen ostendit. Unde de illis tantum bonis potest esse votum quae nostrae subiacent voluntati. Qualia non sunt ea in quibus unus alteri tenetur. Et ideo in talibus non potest aliquis votum emittere sine consensu eius cui tenetur. Unde, cum coniuges sibi invicem teneantur in redditione debiti, per quam continentia impeditur, non potest unus absque consensu alterius continentiam vovere. Et si voverit, peccat: nec debet servare votum, sed agere poenitentiam de malo voto facto. I answer that, A vow is a voluntary act, as its very name implies: and consequently a vow can only be about those goods which are subject to our will, and those in which one person is bound to another do not come under this head. Therefore, in matters of this kind one person cannot take a vow without the consent of the one to whom he is bound. Consequently, since husband and wife are mutually bound as regards the payment of the debt, which is an obstacle to continence, the one cannot vow continence without the other’s consent; and if he take the vow he sins, and must not keep the vow, but must do penance for an ill-taken vow (Q. 53, A. 1,4; Q. 61, A. 1). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod satis probabile est quod uxor debeat velle continere ad tempus pro subveniendo necessitati Ecclesiae generalis. Et ideo in favorem negotii pro quo crux sibi datur, institutum est quod vir possit absque consensu uxoris crucem accipere: sicut etiam posset domino suo terreno, a quo feudum tenet, absque eius consensu militare. Nec tamen in hoc omnino subtrahitur uxori ius suum: quia uxor potest eum sequi. Nec est simile de uxore ad virum. Quia, cum vir debeat regere uxorem et non e converso, magis tenetur uxor sequi virum quam e converso. Et praeterea uxor cum maiori periculo castitatis discurreret per terras quam vir, et cum minori Ecclesiae utilitate. Et ideo uxor non potest huiusmodi votum facere sine viri consensu. Reply Obj. 1: It is sufficiently probable that the wife ought to be willing to remain continent for a time, in order to succor the need of the universal Church. Hence in favor of the business for which the cross is given to him, it is laid down that the husband may take the cross without his wife’s consent, even as he might go fighting without the consent of his landlord whose land he has leased. And yet the wife is not entirely deprived of her right, since she can follow him. Nor is there a parallel between wife and husband: because, since the husband has to rule the wife and not vice versa, the wife is bound to follow her husband rather than the husband the wife. Moreover, there would be more danger to the wife’s chastity as a result of wandering from country to country than to the husband’s, and less profit to the Church. Wherefore the wife cannot take this vow without her husband’s consent. Ad secundum dicendum quod alter coniugum dissentiens voto continentiae alterius non peccat: quia non dissentit ut bonum illius impediat, sed ne sibi praeiudicium generetur. Reply Obj. 2: The one spouse, by refusing to consent to the other’s vow of continence, does not sin, because the object of his dissent is to hinder not the other’s good, but the harm to himself. Ad tertium dicendum quod circa hoc est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt quod unus absque consensu alterius potest vovere quod non petat debitum, non autem quod non reddat: quia in primo uterque est sui iuris, sed non in secundo. Sed quia, si alter nunquam peteret debitum, ex hoc alteri matrimonium onerosum redderetur, dum oporteret unum semper confusionem debiti petendi subire; ideo alii probabilius dicunt quod neutrum potest unus sine consensu alterius vovere. Reply Obj. 3: There are two opinions on this point. For some say that one can vow not to demand the debt without the other’s consent, not, however, not to pay it, because in the former case they are both within their own rights, but not in the second. Seeing, however, that if one were never to ask for the debt, marriage would become too burdensome to the other who would always have to undergo the shame of asking for the debt, others assert with greater probability that neither vow can be lawfully taken by one spouse without the other’s consent. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut mulier accipit potestatem in corpore viri salvo hoc in quo vir tenetur corpori suo, ita etiam salvo hoc in quo tenetur alii domino. Et ideo, sicut uxor non potest debitum petere a viro contra salutem sui corporis, ita nec ad impediendum hoc in quo domino tenetur; sed praeter hoc non potest dominus prohibere quin debitum reddat. Reply Obj. 4: Just as the wife receives power over her husband’s body without prejudice to the husband’s duty to his own body, so also is it without prejudice to his duty to his master. Hence just as a wife cannot ask her husband for the debt to the detriment of his bodily health, so neither can she do this so as to hinder him in his duty to his master. And yet the master cannot for this reason prevent her from paying the debt. Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum temporibus sacris debeat aliquis impediri quin debitum petat Whether it is forbidden to demand the debt on holy days? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod temporibus sacris non debeat aliquis impediri quin debitum petat. Tunc enim est subveniendum morbo quando invalescit: Sed possibile est quod in die festo invalescat concupiscentia. Ergo tunc debet ei subveniri per debiti petitionem. Objection 1: It would seem that a person ought not to be forbidden to ask for the debt on holy days. For the remedy should be applied when the disease gains strength. Now concupiscence may possibly gain strength on a feast day. Therefore, the remedy should be applied then by asking for the debt. Praeterea, non est alia ratio quare non sit petendum debitum in diebus festivis nisi quia sunt orationi deputati. Sed in illis diebus sunt horae determinatae orationi. Ergo aliis horis liceret debitum petere. Obj. 2: Further, the only reason why the debt should not be demanded on feast days is because they are devoted to prayer. Yet on those days certain hours are appointed for prayer. Therefore, one may ask for the debt at some other time. Sed contra, sicut aliqua loca sunt sacra quiri deputata sunt sacris, ita aliqua tempora sunt sacra propter eandem rationem. Sed in loco sacro non licet petere debitum. Ergo nec in tempore, sacro. On the contrary, Just as certain places are holy because they are devoted to holy things, so are certain times holy for the same reason. But it is not lawful to demand the debt in a holy place. Therefore, neither is it lawful at a holy time. Respondeo dicendum quod actus matrimonialis, quamvis culpa careat, tamen quia rationem deprimit propter carnalem delectationem, hominem reddit ineptum ad spiritualia. Et ideo iri diebus in quibus spiritualibus praecipue est vacandum, non licet petere debitum. I answer that, Although the marriage act is void of sin, nevertheless since it oppresses the reason on account of the carnal pleasure, it renders man unfit for spiritual things. Therefore, on those days when one ought especially to give one’s time to spiritual things, it is not lawful to ask for the debt. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tempore illo possunt alia; adhiberi ad concupiscentiam reprimendam: sicut oratio et multa huiusmodi, quae etiam illi adhibent qui perpetuo continent. Reply Obj. 1: At such a time other means may be employed for the repression of concupiscence: for instance, prayer and many similar things, to which those who observe perpetual continence also have recourse. Ad primum dicendum quod, quamvis non teneatur omnibus horis orare, tamen tenetur tota die se conservare idoneum ad orandum. Reply Obj. 2: Although one is not bound to pray at all hours, one is bound throughout the day to keep oneself fit for prayer. Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum petens in tempore sacro mortaliter peccet Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time?