Sed contra: Est quod dicitur I Cor. 7: ne fraudetis vos invicem, nisi ex communi consensu ad tempus, ut vacetis orationi. On the contrary, 1 Corinthians 7:5 says: defraud not one another, except by consent, for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer. Praeterea, nullus potest facere votum de alieno. Sed vir non habet potestatem sui corporis, sed uxor. Ergo sine eius consensu non potest votum continentiae facere, vel simpliciter vel ad tempus. Further, No one can vow that which belongs to another. Now the husband does not have power of his own body, but the wife (1 Cor 7:4). Therefore, without her consent, the husband cannot take a vow of continence whether absolutely or for a time. Respondeo dicendum quod vovere voluntatis est: ut etiam ipsum nomen ostendit. Unde de illis tantum bonis potest esse votum quae nostrae subiacent voluntati. Qualia non sunt ea in quibus unus alteri tenetur. Et ideo in talibus non potest aliquis votum emittere sine consensu eius cui tenetur. Unde, cum coniuges sibi invicem teneantur in redditione debiti, per quam continentia impeditur, non potest unus absque consensu alterius continentiam vovere. Et si voverit, peccat: nec debet servare votum, sed agere poenitentiam de malo voto facto. I answer that, A vow is a voluntary act, as its very name implies: and consequently a vow can only be about those goods which are subject to our will, and those in which one person is bound to another do not come under this head. Therefore, in matters of this kind one person cannot take a vow without the consent of the one to whom he is bound. Consequently, since husband and wife are mutually bound as regards the payment of the debt, which is an obstacle to continence, the one cannot vow continence without the other’s consent; and if he take the vow he sins, and must not keep the vow, but must do penance for an ill-taken vow (Q. 53, A. 1,4; Q. 61, A. 1). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod satis probabile est quod uxor debeat velle continere ad tempus pro subveniendo necessitati Ecclesiae generalis. Et ideo in favorem negotii pro quo crux sibi datur, institutum est quod vir possit absque consensu uxoris crucem accipere: sicut etiam posset domino suo terreno, a quo feudum tenet, absque eius consensu militare. Nec tamen in hoc omnino subtrahitur uxori ius suum: quia uxor potest eum sequi. Nec est simile de uxore ad virum. Quia, cum vir debeat regere uxorem et non e converso, magis tenetur uxor sequi virum quam e converso. Et praeterea uxor cum maiori periculo castitatis discurreret per terras quam vir, et cum minori Ecclesiae utilitate. Et ideo uxor non potest huiusmodi votum facere sine viri consensu. Reply Obj. 1: It is sufficiently probable that the wife ought to be willing to remain continent for a time, in order to succor the need of the universal Church. Hence in favor of the business for which the cross is given to him, it is laid down that the husband may take the cross without his wife’s consent, even as he might go fighting without the consent of his landlord whose land he has leased. And yet the wife is not entirely deprived of her right, since she can follow him. Nor is there a parallel between wife and husband: because, since the husband has to rule the wife and not vice versa, the wife is bound to follow her husband rather than the husband the wife. Moreover, there would be more danger to the wife’s chastity as a result of wandering from country to country than to the husband’s, and less profit to the Church. Wherefore the wife cannot take this vow without her husband’s consent. Ad secundum dicendum quod alter coniugum dissentiens voto continentiae alterius non peccat: quia non dissentit ut bonum illius impediat, sed ne sibi praeiudicium generetur. Reply Obj. 2: The one spouse, by refusing to consent to the other’s vow of continence, does not sin, because the object of his dissent is to hinder not the other’s good, but the harm to himself. Ad tertium dicendum quod circa hoc est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt quod unus absque consensu alterius potest vovere quod non petat debitum, non autem quod non reddat: quia in primo uterque est sui iuris, sed non in secundo. Sed quia, si alter nunquam peteret debitum, ex hoc alteri matrimonium onerosum redderetur, dum oporteret unum semper confusionem debiti petendi subire; ideo alii probabilius dicunt quod neutrum potest unus sine consensu alterius vovere. Reply Obj. 3: There are two opinions on this point. For some say that one can vow not to demand the debt without the other’s consent, not, however, not to pay it, because in the former case they are both within their own rights, but not in the second. Seeing, however, that if one were never to ask for the debt, marriage would become too burdensome to the other who would always have to undergo the shame of asking for the debt, others assert with greater probability that neither vow can be lawfully taken by one spouse without the other’s consent. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut mulier accipit potestatem in corpore viri salvo hoc in quo vir tenetur corpori suo, ita etiam salvo hoc in quo tenetur alii domino. Et ideo, sicut uxor non potest debitum petere a viro contra salutem sui corporis, ita nec ad impediendum hoc in quo domino tenetur; sed praeter hoc non potest dominus prohibere quin debitum reddat. Reply Obj. 4: Just as the wife receives power over her husband’s body without prejudice to the husband’s duty to his own body, so also is it without prejudice to his duty to his master. Hence just as a wife cannot ask her husband for the debt to the detriment of his bodily health, so neither can she do this so as to hinder him in his duty to his master. And yet the master cannot for this reason prevent her from paying the debt. Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum temporibus sacris debeat aliquis impediri quin debitum petat Whether it is forbidden to demand the debt on holy days? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod temporibus sacris non debeat aliquis impediri quin debitum petat. Tunc enim est subveniendum morbo quando invalescit: Sed possibile est quod in die festo invalescat concupiscentia. Ergo tunc debet ei subveniri per debiti petitionem. Objection 1: It would seem that a person ought not to be forbidden to ask for the debt on holy days. For the remedy should be applied when the disease gains strength. Now concupiscence may possibly gain strength on a feast day. Therefore, the remedy should be applied then by asking for the debt. Praeterea, non est alia ratio quare non sit petendum debitum in diebus festivis nisi quia sunt orationi deputati. Sed in illis diebus sunt horae determinatae orationi. Ergo aliis horis liceret debitum petere. Obj. 2: Further, the only reason why the debt should not be demanded on feast days is because they are devoted to prayer. Yet on those days certain hours are appointed for prayer. Therefore, one may ask for the debt at some other time. Sed contra, sicut aliqua loca sunt sacra quiri deputata sunt sacris, ita aliqua tempora sunt sacra propter eandem rationem. Sed in loco sacro non licet petere debitum. Ergo nec in tempore, sacro. On the contrary, Just as certain places are holy because they are devoted to holy things, so are certain times holy for the same reason. But it is not lawful to demand the debt in a holy place. Therefore, neither is it lawful at a holy time. Respondeo dicendum quod actus matrimonialis, quamvis culpa careat, tamen quia rationem deprimit propter carnalem delectationem, hominem reddit ineptum ad spiritualia. Et ideo iri diebus in quibus spiritualibus praecipue est vacandum, non licet petere debitum. I answer that, Although the marriage act is void of sin, nevertheless since it oppresses the reason on account of the carnal pleasure, it renders man unfit for spiritual things. Therefore, on those days when one ought especially to give one’s time to spiritual things, it is not lawful to ask for the debt. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tempore illo possunt alia; adhiberi ad concupiscentiam reprimendam: sicut oratio et multa huiusmodi, quae etiam illi adhibent qui perpetuo continent. Reply Obj. 1: At such a time other means may be employed for the repression of concupiscence: for instance, prayer and many similar things, to which those who observe perpetual continence also have recourse. Ad primum dicendum quod, quamvis non teneatur omnibus horis orare, tamen tenetur tota die se conservare idoneum ad orandum. Reply Obj. 2: Although one is not bound to pray at all hours, one is bound throughout the day to keep oneself fit for prayer. Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum petens in tempore sacro mortaliter peccet Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod petens in tempore sacro mortaliter peccet. Gregorius enim dicit, in I Dial., quod mulier quae in nocte cognita est a viro, mane ad processionem veniens a diabolo est arrepta. Sed hoc non esset nisi mortaliter peccasset. Ergo, etc. Objection 1: It would seem that it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time. For Gregory says (Dialogues 1) that the devil took possession of a woman who had intercourse with her husband at night and came in the morning to the procession. But this would not have happened had she not sinned mortally. Therefore, etc. Praeterea, quicumque facit contra praeceptum divinum, mortaliter peccat. Sed Dominus praecepit, Exodi 19, nolite appropinquare uxoribus vestris: quando scilicet erant legem accepturi. Ergo multo magis peccant mortaliter si tempore quo sacramentis novae legis intendendum est, cum uxoribus viri commisceantur. Obj. 2: Further, whoever disobeys a divine command commits a mortal sin. Now the Lord commanded: come not near your wives (Exod 19:15), namely, when they were about to receive the law. Much more, therefore, do husbands sin mortally if they have intercourse with their wives at a time when they should be intent on the sacred observances of the new law. Sed contra, nulla circumstantia aggravat in infinitum. Sed indebitum tempus est circumstantia quaedam. Ergo non aggravat in infinitum, ut faciat mortale quod alias esset veniale. On the contrary, No circumstance aggravates infinitely. But undue time is a circumstance. Therefore, it does not aggravate a sin infinitely, so as to make mortal what was otherwise venial. Respondeo dicendum quod debitum petere in die festivo non est circumstantia trahens in aliam speciem peccati. Unde non potest in infinitum aggravare. Et ideo non peccat mortaliter uxor vel vir si in die festo debitum petat. Sed tamen gravius est peccatum si sola delectationis causa petatur, quam si propter timorem quo quis sibi timet de lubrico carnis, debitum petat. I answer that, To ask for the debt on a feast day is not a circumstance drawing a sin into another species; wherefore it cannot aggravate infinitely. Consequently, a wife or husband does not sin mortally by asking for the debt on a feast day. It is, however, a more grievous sin to ask for the sake of mere pleasure than through fear of the weakness of the flesh. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non fuit punita mulier illa propter hoc quod debitum reddidit: sed quia postmodum se temere ad divina ingessit contra conscientiam. Reply Obj. 1: This woman was punished not because she paid the debt, but because afterwards she rashly intruded into the divine service against her conscience. Ad secundum dicendum quod ex auctoritate illa non potest probari quod esset peccatum mortale, sed quod sit incongruum. Multa enim ad munditiam carnis pertinentia exigebantur de necessitate praecepti in veteri lege, quae carnalibus dabatur, quae in nova lege non exiguntur, quae est lex spiritus. Reply Obj. 2: The authority quoted shows not that it is a mortal sin but that it is unbecoming. For under the old law which was given to a carnal people, many things were required under an obligation of precept for the sake of bodily cleanness which are not required in the new law, which is the law of the spirit. Articulus 9 Article 9 Utrum teneatur reddere tempore festivo Whether one is bound to pay the debt at a festal time? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non teneatur reddere tempore festivo. Quia peccantes et consentientes pariter puniuntur, ut patet Rom. 1. Sed ille qui reddit debitum, consentit petenti, qui peccat. Ergo et ipse peccat. Objection 1: It would seem that neither are they bound to pay the debt at a festal time. For those who commit a sin as well as those who consent to it are equally punished (Rom 1:32). But the one who pays the debt consents with the one that asks, who sins. Therefore, he sins also. Praeterea, ex praecepto affirmativo obligamur ad orandum, et ita ad aliquod tempus determinatum. Ergo pro tempore illo in quo quis orare tenetur, debitum reddere non debet: sicut nec eo tempore quo tenetur temporali domino ad speciale obsequium. Obj. 2: Further, it is an affirmative precept that binds us to pray, and therefore we are bound to do so at a fixed time. Therefore, one ought not to pay the debt at a time when one is bound to pray, as neither ought one at a time when one is bound to fulfill a special duty towards a temporal master. Sed contra est quod dicitur 1 Cor. 7: nolite fraudari invicem, nisi communi consensu ad tempus, etc. Ergo, quando petit, reddendum est ei. On the contrary, It is written: defraud not one another, except by consent, for a time (1 Cor 7:5). Therefore, when one spouse asks, the other must pay. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum mulier habeat potestatem in corpore viri quantum ad actum generationis spectat, et e converso, tenetur unus alteri debitum reddere quocumque tempore et quacumque hora, salva debita honestate quae in talibus exigitur; quia non oportet quod statim in publico reddat debitum. I answer that, Since the wife has power of her husband’s body, and vice versa, with regard to the act of procreation, the one is bound to pay the debt to the other at any season or hour, with due regard to the decorum required in such matters, for this must not be done at once in public. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iste, quantum in se est, non consentit, sed id quod ab eo exigitur invitus et Cum dolore reddit. Et ideo non peccat. Hoc enim est propter lubricum carnis divinitus ordinatum, ut semper petenti debitum reddatur, ne aliqua occasio peccati detur. Reply Obj. 1: As far as he is concerned, he does not consent, but grants unwillingly and with grief that which is exacted of him; and consequently he does not sin. For it is ordained by God, on account of the weakness of the flesh, that the debt must always be paid to the one who asks, lest he be afforded an occasion of sin. Ad secundum dicendum quod non est aliqua hora ita determinata ad orandum quin possit postea recompensari in aliis horis. Et ideo obiectio non cogit. Reply Obj. 2: No hour is fixed for praying, but that compensation can be made at some other hour; wherefore the argument is not cogent. Articulus 10 Article 10 Utrum nuptiae certis quibusdam temporibus interdici debeant Whether marriage is forbidden during certain periods? Ad decem sic proceditur. Videtur quod nuptiae non sint interdicendae temporibus. Quia matrimonium sacramentum est. Sed in illis temporibus non interdicitur celebratio aliorum sacramentorum. Ergo nec celebratio matrimonii. Objection 1: Again, it seems that weddings are not forbidden during certain periods. For matrimony is a sacrament. But in those times the celebration of the other sacraments is not forbidden. Therefore, neither should the celebration of matrimony. Praeterea, magis incompetens est diebus festis petitio debiti quam celebratio nuptiarum. Sed in diebus illis potest debitum peti. Ergo et nuptiae celebrari. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the requesting of the debt is more unfitting for holy days than wedding celebrations. But in those days the marital debt can be requested. Therefore, so can weddings be celebrated. Praeterea, matrimonia quae fiunt contra statutum Ecclesiae, debent separari. Sed non separantur, si fiant nuptiae in talibus temporibus. Ergo non debet esse prohibitum per Ecclesiae statuta. Obj. 3: Furthermore, marriages which happen against the statutes of the Church should be dissolved. But they are not dissolved if the wedding happens during such periods. Therefore, neither should they be prohibited by the statutes of the Church.