Respondeo dicendum quod, cum mulier habeat potestatem in corpore viri quantum ad actum generationis spectat, et e converso, tenetur unus alteri debitum reddere quocumque tempore et quacumque hora, salva debita honestate quae in talibus exigitur; quia non oportet quod statim in publico reddat debitum. I answer that, Since the wife has power of her husband’s body, and vice versa, with regard to the act of procreation, the one is bound to pay the debt to the other at any season or hour, with due regard to the decorum required in such matters, for this must not be done at once in public. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iste, quantum in se est, non consentit, sed id quod ab eo exigitur invitus et Cum dolore reddit. Et ideo non peccat. Hoc enim est propter lubricum carnis divinitus ordinatum, ut semper petenti debitum reddatur, ne aliqua occasio peccati detur. Reply Obj. 1: As far as he is concerned, he does not consent, but grants unwillingly and with grief that which is exacted of him; and consequently he does not sin. For it is ordained by God, on account of the weakness of the flesh, that the debt must always be paid to the one who asks, lest he be afforded an occasion of sin. Ad secundum dicendum quod non est aliqua hora ita determinata ad orandum quin possit postea recompensari in aliis horis. Et ideo obiectio non cogit. Reply Obj. 2: No hour is fixed for praying, but that compensation can be made at some other hour; wherefore the argument is not cogent. Articulus 10 Article 10 Utrum nuptiae certis quibusdam temporibus interdici debeant Whether marriage is forbidden during certain periods? Ad decem sic proceditur. Videtur quod nuptiae non sint interdicendae temporibus. Quia matrimonium sacramentum est. Sed in illis temporibus non interdicitur celebratio aliorum sacramentorum. Ergo nec celebratio matrimonii. Objection 1: Again, it seems that weddings are not forbidden during certain periods. For matrimony is a sacrament. But in those times the celebration of the other sacraments is not forbidden. Therefore, neither should the celebration of matrimony. Praeterea, magis incompetens est diebus festis petitio debiti quam celebratio nuptiarum. Sed in diebus illis potest debitum peti. Ergo et nuptiae celebrari. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the requesting of the debt is more unfitting for holy days than wedding celebrations. But in those days the marital debt can be requested. Therefore, so can weddings be celebrated. Praeterea, matrimonia quae fiunt contra statutum Ecclesiae, debent separari. Sed non separantur, si fiant nuptiae in talibus temporibus. Ergo non debet esse prohibitum per Ecclesiae statuta. Obj. 3: Furthermore, marriages which happen against the statutes of the Church should be dissolved. But they are not dissolved if the wedding happens during such periods. Therefore, neither should they be prohibited by the statutes of the Church. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccles. 3, 5: tempus amplexandi, et tempus longe fieri ab amplexibus. On the contrary, There is what Ecclesiastes 3:5 says: a time to embrace, and a time to be far from embraces. Respondeo dicendum quod quando novae sponsae traduntur, animus conjugum magis ex ipsa novitate ad curam carnalium occupatur et ideo in nuptiis consueverunt signa multa laetitiae dissolutae ostendi; et propter hoc illis temporibus in quibus homines praecipue debent se ad spiritualia elevare, prohibitum est nuptias celebrari. Hoc autem est ab Adventu usque ad Epiphaniam propter communionem, quae secundum antiquos canones in nativitate fieri convenienter solet; et a septuagesima usque ad octavas Paschae, propter communionem Paschalem; et a tribus diebus ante Ascensionem usque ad octavas Pentecostes, propter praeparationem ad communionem illo tempore sumendam. I answer that, When new brides are given to their husbands, the souls of the spouses are more greatly occupied by the concern for carnal things in this very newness, and therefore in weddings many signs of wild rejoicing are wont to be shown; and because of this, in those times in which men should particularly elevate themselves to spiritual things, it is prohibited for weddings to be celebrated. Now this is from Advent until Epiphany because of the reception of communion, which, according to the ancient canons, is usually to be made appropriately during the period of the Nativity; and from Septuagesima until the octave of Easter, because of the Easter communion; and from three days before the Ascension until the octave of Pentecost, because of preparation for consuming communion at that time. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod celebratio matrimonii habet aliquam mundanam laetitiam et carnalem adjunctam, quod non est de aliis sacramentis. Et ideo non est simile. Reply Obj. 1: The celebration of matrimony has something of worldly and carnal rejoicing joined to it, which is not in the other sacraments. Therefore, it is not similar. Ad secundum dicendum, quod non fit tanta distractio animorum in redditione vel petitione debiti, sicut in celebratione nuptiarum. Et ideo non est simile. Reply Obj. 2: Such great distraction of souls does not occur in the rendering or requesting of the debt as in the celebration of a wedding, and therefore it is not similar. Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum tempus non sit de essentia matrimonii, si in tempore indebito contrahatur, nihilominus verum est sacramentum; nec separatur matrimonium simpliciter, sed ad tempus, ut poenitentiam agant de hoc quod statutum Ecclesiae sunt transgressi; et sic est intelligendum quod Magister dicit Littera, IV Sentent., dist. xxxiii. Reply Obj. 3: Since time is not of the essence of matrimony, if it is contracted at an improper time, nevertheless it is a valid sacrament; nor are the contractants separated simply, but for a time, that they may do penance for having transgressed the statutes of the Church; and in this way what the Master says is to be understood (Sentences IV, Dist. 33). Quaestio 65 Question 65 De bigamis Bigamy Deinde considerandum est de pluralitate uxorum. We must now consider the plurality of wives. Circa quod quaeruntur quinque. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: Primo: utrum habere plures uxores sit contra legem naturae. (1) Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives? Secundo: utrum aliquando fuerit licitum. (2) Whether this was ever lawful? Tertio: utrum habere concubinam sit contra legem naturae. (3) Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine? Quarto: utrum accedere ad concubinam sit peccatum mortale. (4) Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine? Quinto: utrum aliquando licitum fuerit habere concubinam. (5) Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum habere plures uxores sit contra legem naturae Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod habere plures uxores non sit contra legem naturae. Consuetudo enim legi naturali non praeiudicat. Sed habere plures uxores peccatum non erat quando mos erat, ut ab Augustino habetur in littera. Ergo habere plures uxores non est contra legem naturae. Objection 1: It would seem that it is not against the natural law to have several wives. For custom does not prejudice the law of nature. But to have several wives was not a sin when this was the custom, according to Augustine as quoted in the text (On the Good of Marriage 15; Sentences IV, D. 33). Therefore, it is not contrary to the natural law to have several wives. Praeterea, quicumque facit contra legem naturae, facit contra praeceptum: quia sicut lex scripta habet sua praecepta, ita et lex naturae. Sed Augustinus dicit quod habere plures uxores non erat contra praeceptum, quia nulla lege erat prohibitum. Ergo habere plures uxores non est contra legem naturae. Obj. 2: Further, whoever acts in opposition to the natural law disobeys a commandment, for the law of nature has its commandments even as the written law has. Now Augustine says that it was not contrary to a commandment to have several wives, because by no law was it forbidden (On the Good of Marriage 15; The City of God 15.38). Therefore, it is not against the natural law to have several wives. Praeterea, matrimonium principaliter ordinatur ad prolis procreationem. Sed unus potest ex pluribus prolem accipere, plures fecundando; Ergo non est contra legem naturae habere plures uxores. Obj. 3: Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the begetting of offspring. But one man may get children of several women by causing them to be pregnant. Therefore, it is not against the natural law to have several wives. Praeterea, ius naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit, ut in principio Digestorum dicitur. Sed natura non docuit hoc omnia animalia, quod sit una unius: cum unus mas in multis animalibus pluribus feminis coniungatur. Ergo non est contra legem naturae habere plures uxores. Obj. 4: Further, natural right is that which nature has taught all animals, as stated at the beginning of the Digests. Now nature has not taught all animals that one male should be united to but one female, since with many animals the one male is united to several females. Therefore, it is not against the natural law to have several wives. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum, XV de Animalibus, in generatione prolis mas se habet ad feminam sicut agens ad patiens et artifex ad materiam. Sed non est contra ordinem naturae quod unum agens in plura patientia agat, aut unus artifex ex diversis materiis operetur. Ergo nec est contra legem naturae quod unus mas plures uxores habeat. Obj. 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (On the Generation of Animals 1.20), in the begetting of offspring the male is to the female as agent to patient, and as the craftsman is to his material. But it is not against the order of nature for one agent to act on several patients, or for one craftsman to work in several materials. Therefore, neither is it contrary to the law of nature for one husband to have many wives. Sed contra: Illud praecipue videtur esse de iure naturali quod homini in sua institutione inditum est. Sed quod sit una unius in ipsa institutione humanae naturae est ei inditum, ut patet Gen: 2: erunt duo in carne una. Ergo est die lege naturae. On the contrary, That which was instilled into man at the formation of human nature would seem especially to belong to the natural law. Now it was instilled into him at the very formation of human nature that one man should have one wife, according to Genesis 2:24: they shall be two in one flesh. Therefore, it is of natural law. Praeterea, contra legem naturae est quod homo se ad impossibile obliget, et ut quod uni datum est alteri detur. Sed homo contrahens cum una uxore sui corporis potestatem sibi tradidit, ut necesse sit reddere debitum cum petierit. Ergo contra legem est si postea alteri potestatem sui corporis tradat; quia nemo posset simul utrique reddere debitum, si simul peterent. Further, It is contrary to the law of nature that man should bind himself to the impossible, and that what is given to one should be given to another. Now when a man contracts with a wife, he gives her the power of his body so that he is bound to pay her the debt when she asks. Therefore, it is against the law of nature that he should afterwards give the power of his body to another, because it would be impossible for him to pay both were both to ask at the same time. Praeterea, de lege naturae est, quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri ne feceris. Sed vir nullo modo vellet quod uxor alium virum haberet. Ergo contra legem naturae faceret si uxorem aliam superinduceret. Further, Do not to another what you would not were done to yourself (Tobias 4:16) is a precept of the natural law. But a husband would by no means be willing for his wife to have another husband. Therefore, he would be acting against the law of nature were he to have another wife in addition. Praeterea, quidquid est contra naturale desiderium, est contra legem naturae. Sed zelus viri ad uxorem, et uxoris ad virum, naturalis est: quia in omnibus invenitur. Ergo, cum zelus sit amor non patiens consortium in amato, videtur quod contra legem naturae sit quod plures uxores habeant unum virum. Further, Whatever is against the natural desire is contrary to the natural law. Now a husband’s jealousy of his wife and the wife’s jealousy of her husband are natural, for they are found in all. Therefore, since jealousy is love impatient of sharing the beloved, it would seem to be contrary to the natural law that several wives should share one husband. Respondeo dicendum quod omnibus rebus naturalibus insunt quaedam principia quibus non solum operationes proprias efficere possunt, sed quibus etiam eas convenientes fini suo reddant: sive sint actiones quae consequantur rem aliquam ex natura sui generis, sive consequantur ex natura speciei; ut magneti competit ferri deorsum ex natura sui generis, et attrahere ferrum ex natura speciei. Sicut autem in rebus agentibus ex necessitate naturae sunt principia actionum ipsae formae, a quibus operationes propriae prodeunt convenientes fini; ita in his quae cognitionem participant, principia agendi sunt cognitio et appetitus. Unde oportet quod in vi cognitiva sit naturalis conceptio, et in vi appetitiva naturalis inclinatio, quibus operatio conveniens generi sive speciei reddatur competens fini. Sed quia homo inter cetera animalia rationem finis cognoscit et proportionem operationis ad finem, ideo naturalis conceptio ei indita qua dirigitur ad operandum, convenienter lex naturalis vel ius naturale dicitur. In ceteris autem aestimatio naturalis vocatur: bruta enim ex vi naturae impelluntur ad operandum convenientes actiones, magis quam regulentur, quasi proprio arbitrio agentia. I answer that, All natural things are imbued with certain principles whereby they are enabled not only to exercise their proper actions, but also to render those actions proportionate to their end, whether such actions belong to a thing by virtue of its generic nature, or by virtue of its specific nature: thus it belongs to a magnet to be borne downwards by virtue of its generic nature, and to attract iron by virtue of its specific nature. Now, just as in those things which act from natural necessity the principle of action is the form itself, whence their proper actions proceed proportionately to their end, so in things which are endowed with knowledge the principles of action are knowledge and appetite. Hence in the cognitive power there needs to be a natural concept, and in the appetitive power a natural inclination, whereby the action befitting the genus or species is rendered proportionate to the end. Now since man, of all animals, knows the aspect of the end, and the proportion of the action to the end, it follows that he is imbued with a natural concept, whereby he is directed to act in a befitting manner, and this is called the natural law or the natural right, but in other animals the natural instinct. For brutes are impelled by the force of nature to do befitting actions rather than guided to act on their own judgment. Lex ergo naturalis nihil aliud est quam conceptio homini naturaliter indita qua dirigitur ad convenienter agendum in actionibus propriis: sive competant ei ex natura generis, ut generare, comedere, et huiusmodi; sive ex natura speciei, ut ratiocinari et huiusmodi. Omne autem illud quod actionem inconvenientem reddit fini quem natura ex opere aliquo intendit, contra legem naturae esse dicitur. Therefore, the natural law is nothing else than a concept naturally instilled into man whereby he is guided to act in a befitting manner in his proper actions, whether they are competent to him by virtue of his generic nature, as, for instance, to beget, to eat, and so on, or belong to him by virtue of his specific nature, as, for instance, to reason and so forth. Now, whatever renders an action improportionate to the end which nature intends to obtain by a certain work is said to be contrary to the natural law. Potest autem actio non esse conveniens fini vel principali, vel secundario: et, sive sic sive sic, hoc contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, ex aliquo quod omnino impedit finem: ut nimia superfluitas aut defectus comestionis impedit salutem corporis, quasi principalem finem comestionis; et bonam habitudinem in negotiis exercendis, qui est finis secundarius. Alio modo, ex aliquo quod facit difficilem aut minus decentem perventionem ad finem principalem vel secundarium: sicut inordinata comestio quantum ad tempus indebitum. Si ergo sit inconveniens fini quasi omnino prohibens finem principalem, directe per legem naturae prohibetur primis praeceptis legis naturae, quae sunt in operabilibus sicut sunt communes conceptiones in speculativis. Si autem sit incompetens fini secundario quocumque modo, aut etiam principali ut faciens difficilem vel minus congruam perventionem ad ipsum, prohibetur non quidem primis praeceptis legis naturae, sed secundis, quae ex primis derivantur, sicut conclusiones in speculativis ex principiis per se notis fidem habent. Et sic dicta actio contra legem naturae esse dicitur. But an action may be improportionate either to the principal or to the secondary end, and in either case this happens in two ways. First, on account of something which wholly hinders the end; for instance, a very great excess or a very great deficiency in eating hinders both the health of the body, which is the principal end of food, and aptitude for conducting business, which is its secondary end. Second, on account of something that renders the attainment of the principal or secondary end difficult, or less satisfactory, for instance, eating inordinately at an undue time. Accordingly, if an action be improportionate to the end through altogether hindering the principal end directly, it is forbidden by the first precepts of the natural law, which hold the same place in practical matters as the general concepts of the mind in speculative matters. If, however, it be in any way improportionate to the secondary end, or again to the principal end, as rendering its attainment difficult or less satisfactory, it is forbidden, not indeed by the first precepts of the natural law, but by the second, which are derived from the first even as conclusions in speculative matters receive our assent by virtue of self-known principles: and thus the act in question is said to be against the law of nature.