Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum debeant tot receptacula distingui Whether so many abodes should be distinguished? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non debeant tot receptacula distingui. Sicut enim receptacula debentur animabus pro peccato post mortem, ita et pro merito. Sed ratione meriti non debetur nisi unum tantum receptaculum, scilicet paradisus. Ergo nec ratione peccatorum debetur nisi unum receptaculum. Objection 1: It would seem that we should not distinguish so many abodes. For after death, just as abodes are due to souls on account of sin, so are they due on account of merit. Now there is only one abode due on account of merit, namely paradise. Therefore, neither should there be more than one abode due on account of sin. Praeterea, receptacula assignantur animabus post mortem ratione meritorum vel demeritorum. Sed unus est locus in quo merentur vel demerentur. Ergo unum tantum receptaculum deberet eis assignari post mortem. Obj. 2: Further, abodes are appointed to souls after death on account of merits or demerits. Now there is one place where they merit or demerit. Therefore, only one abode should be assigned to them after death. Praeterea, loca poenalia debent respondere ipsis culpis. Sed non sunt nisi tria genera culparum: scilicet originalis, venialis et mortalis. Ergo non debent esse nisi tria receptacula poenalia. Obj. 3: Further, the places of punishment should correspond to the sins. Now there are only three kinds of sin: original, venial, and mortal. Therefore, there should only be three penal abodes. Sed contra: Videtur quod debeant esse multo plura quam assignentur. Aer enim iste caliginosus est daemonum carcer, ut patet II Petri 2, [4]. Nec tamen computatur inter quinque receptacula quae a quibusdam assignantur. Ergo sunt plura receptacula quam quinque. Obj. 4: On the other hand, it would seem that there should be many more than those assigned. For this darkened air is the prison house of the demons (2 Pet 2:17), and yet it is not reckoned among the five abodes which are mentioned by certain authors. Therefore, there are more than five abodes. Praeterea, alius est paradisus terrestris, et alius paradisus caelestis. Sed quidam post statum huius vitae ad paradisum terrestrem sunt translati: sicut de Henoch et de Elia dicitur. Cum ergo paradisus terrestris inter quinque receptacula non computetur, videtur quod sint plura quam quinque. Obj. 5: Further, the earthly paradise is distinct from the heavenly paradise. Now some were borne away to the earthly paradise after this state of life, as is related of Enoch and Elijah. Since, then, the earthly paradise is not counted among the five abodes, it would seem that there are more than five. Praeterea, cuilibet statui peccantium debet aliquis locus poenalis respondere. Sed si ponatur aliquis in originali decedere cum solo veniali peccato, nullum receptaculorum assignatorum ei competeret. Constat enim quod in paradiso non esset: cum gratia careret. Et eadem ratione nec in limbo patrum. Similiter etiam nec in limbo puerorum: cum in ipso non sit poena sensibilis, quae tali debetur ratione venialis peccati. Similiter nec in purgatorio: quia ibi non est nisi poena temporalis, huic autem debetur poena perpetua. Similiter autem nec in inferno damnatorum: quia mortali peccato caret. Ergo Oportet sextum receptaculum assignare. Obj. 6: Further, some penal place should correspond to each state of sinners. Now if we suppose a person to die in original sin who has committed only venial sins, none of the assigned abodes will be befitting to him. For it is clear that he would not be in heaven, since he would be without grace, and for the same reason neither would he be in the limbo of the fathers; nor again would he be in the limbo of children, since there is no sensible punishment there, which is due to such a person by reason of venial sin; nor would he be in purgatory, where there is none but temporal punishment, whereas everlasting punishment is due to him; nor would he be in the hell of the damned, since he is not guilty of actual mortal sin. Therefore, a sixth abode should be assigned. Praeterea, diversae sunt quantitates praemiorum et poenarum secundum differentias culparum et meritorum. Sed infiniti sunt gradus meritorum et culparum. Ergo infinita debent distingui receptacula, in quibus puniantur vel praemientur post mortem. Obj. 7: Further, rewards and punishments vary in quantity according to the differences of sins and merits. Now the degrees of merit and sin are infinite. Therefore, we should distinguish an infinite number of abodes, in which souls are punished or rewarded after death. Praeterea, animae quandoque puniuntur in locis in quibus peccaverunt: ut per Gregorium patet, IV Dialog. Sed peccaverunt in loco iri quo nos habitamus. Ergo hic locus debet computari inter receptacula: et praecipue cum aliqui in hoc mundo pro peccatis suis puniantur, ut supra Magister dixit. Obj. 8: Further, souls are sometimes punished in the places where they sinned, as Gregory states (Dialogues 4.55). But they sinned in the place which we inhabit. Therefore, this place should be reckoned among the abodes, especially since some are punished for their sins in this world, as the Master said above (Sentences IV, D. 21). Praeterea, sicut aliqui in gratia decedentes habent aliqua pro quibus digni sunt poena, ita aliqui in peccato mortali decedentes habent aliqua bona pro quibus essent digni praemio. Sed decedentibus in gratia cum peccatis venialibus assignatur aliquod receptaculum in quo puniuntur antequam praemia consequantur, scilicet purgatorium. Ergo, eadem ratione, e converso debet esse de illis qui in mortali decedunt cum aliquibus bonis operibus. Obj. 9: Further, just as some die in a state of grace and have some venial sins for which they deserve punishment, so some die in mortal sin and have some good for which they would deserve a reward. Now to those who die in grace with venial sins, an abode is assigned (namely, purgatory) where they are punished before they receive their reward. Therefore, on the other hand, there should be equally an abode for those who die in mortal sin together with some good works. Praeterea, sicut patres retardabantur a plena gloria animae ante Christi adventum, ita et nunc a gloria corporis. Ergo, sicut distinguitur receptaculum sanctorum ante Christi adventum ab eo in quo nunc recipiuntur, ita debet receptaculum nunc distingui ab eo in quo recipientur post resurrectionem. Objection 10: Further, just as the fathers were delayed from obtaining full glory of the soul before Christ’s coming, so are they now detained from receiving the glory of the body. Therefore, as we distinguish an abode of the saints before the coming of Christ from the one where they are received now, so ought we to distinguish the one in which they are received now from the one where they will be received after the resurrection. Respondeo dicendum quod receptacula animarum distinguuntur secundum diversos status garum. Anima autem coniuncta mortali corpori habet statum merendi: sed exuta corpore est in statu recipiendi pro meritis bonum vel malum. Ergo post mortem vel est in. statu recipiendi finale praemium, vel est in statu quo impeditur ab illo. Si autem est in statu recipiendi finalem retributionem, hoc est dupliciter: vel quantum ad bonum, et sic est paradisus; vel quantum ad malum, et sic ratione actualis culpae est infernus, ratione autem originalis est limbus puerorum. Si vero est in statu quo impeditur a finali retributione consequenda, vel hoc est propter defectum personae, et sic est purgatorium, in quo detinentur animae ne statim praemia consequantur, propter peccata quae commiserunt; vel propter defectum naturae, et sic est limbus patrum, in quo detinebantur patres a consecutione gloriae propter reatum humanae naturae, quae nondum poterat expiari. I answer that, The abodes of souls are distinguished according to the souls’ various states. Now the soul united to a mortal body is in the state of meriting, while the soul separated from the body is in the state of receiving good or evil for its merits; so that after death it is either in the state of receiving its final reward, or in the state of being hindered from receiving it. If it is in the state of receiving its final retribution, this happens in two ways: either as to good, and then it is paradise; or as to evil, and thus as regards actual sin it is hell, and as regards original sin it is the limbo of children. On the other hand, if it be in the state where it is hindered from receiving its final reward, this is either on account of a defect of the person, and thus we have purgatory, where souls are detained from receiving their reward at once on account of the sins they have committed, or else it is on account of a defect of nature, and thus we have the limbo of the fathers, where the fathers were detained from obtaining glory on account of the guilt of human nature, which could not yet be expiated. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum contingit uno modo, sed malum multifarie: ut patet per Dionysium, 4 cap. de Div. Nom., et per Philosophum, in II Ethic. Et propter hoc non est inconveniens si locus beatae retributionis est unus, loca vero poenarum sunt plura. Reply Obj. 1: Good happens in one way, but evil in many ways, according to Dionysius (On the Divine Names 4) and the Philosopher (Ethics 2.6): wherefore it is not unfitting if there be one place of blissful reward and several places of punishment. Ad secundum dicendum quod status merendi et demerendi est unus status: cum eiusdem sit posse mereri et demereri. Et ideo convenienter debetur omnibus unus locus. Sed eorum qui recipiuiit pro meritis, sunt status diversi. Et ideo non est simile. Reply Obj. 2: The state of meriting and demeriting is one state, since the same person is able to merit and demerit; wherefore it is fitting that one place should be assigned to all. But of those who receive according to their merits there are various states, and consequently the comparison fails. Ad tertium dicendum quod pro culpa originali potest aliquis puniri dupliciter, ut ex dictis patet: vel ratione personae, vel ratione naturae tantum. Et ideo illi culpae respondet duplex limbus. Reply Obj. 3: One may be punished in two ways for original sin, as stated above: either in reference to the person or in reference to nature only. Consequently, there is a twofold limbo corresponding to that sin. Ad quartum dicendum quod aer iste caliginosus non assignatur daemonibus quasi locus in quo recipiant retributionem pro meritis, sed quasi competens officio eorum inquantum deputantur nobis ad exercitium. Et ideo inter receptacula de quibus nunc agitur, non computatur: primo enim eis deputatur ignis inferni, ut patet Matth. 25, [41]. Reply Obj. 4: This darkened air is assigned to the demons not as the place where they receive retribution for their merits, but as a place befitting their office, insofar as they are appointed to try us. Hence it is not reckoned among the abodes of which we are treating now: since the fire of hell is assigned to them in the first place (Matt 25). Ad quintum dicendum quod paradisus terrestris pertinet magis ad statum viatoris quam ad statum recipientis pro meritis. Et ideo inter receptacula de quibus nunc agitur, non computatur. Reply Obj. 5: The earthly paradise belongs to the state of the wayfarer rather than to the state of those who receive for their merits; and consequently it is not reckoned among the abodes whereof we are treating now. Ad sextum dicendum quod illa positio est impossibilis. Si tamen esset possibilis, talis in inferno puniretur in aeternum. Quod enim veniale peccatum in purgatorio temporaliter puniatur, accidit ei inquantum gratiam habet adiunctam. Unde, si adiungitur mortali, quod est sine gratia, poena aeterna in inferno punietur. Et quia iste qui cum originali peccato decedit, habet veniale sine gratia, non est inconveniens si ponitur aeternaliter puniri. Reply Obj. 6: This supposition is impossible. If, however, it were possible, such a one would be punished in hell eternally: for it is accidental to venial sin that it be punished temporally in purgatory, through its having grace annexed to it: wherefore if it be annexed to a mortal sin, which is without grace, it will be punished eternally in hell. And since this one who dies in original sin has a venial sin without grace, it is not unfitting to suppose that he be punished eternally. Ad septimum dicendum quod diversitas graduum in poenis vel praemiis non diversificat statum, secundum cuius diversitatem receptacula distinguuntur. Et ideo ratio non sequitur. Reply Obj. 7: Diversity of degrees in punishments or rewards does not diversify the state, and it is according to the diversity of state that we distinguish various abodes. Hence the argument does not follow. Ad octavum dicendum quod hoc quod animae separatae aliquando in loco nostrae habitationis puniuntur, non est propter hoc quod locus iste sit proprius locus poenarum: sed hoc fit ad nostram instructionem, ut, eorum poenas videntes, retrahamur a culpis. Reply Obj. 8: Although separated souls are sometimes punished in the place where we dwell, it does not follow that this is their proper place of punishment: but this is done for our instruction, that seeing their punishment we may be deterred from sin. Quod autem animae existentes in carne hic puniuntur pro peccatis, non pertinet ad propositum. Quia talis poena non trahit hominem extra statum merentis vel demerentis: nunc autem agimus de receptaculis quae debentur animae post statum meriti vel demeriti. That souls while yet in the flesh are punished here for their sins has nothing to do with the question, because a punishment of this kind does not place a man outside the state of meriting or demeriting: whereas we are treating now of the abodes to which souls are assigned after the state of merit or demerit. Ad nonum dicendum quod malum non potest esse purum absque commixtione boni, sicut bonum summum est absque omni commixtione mali. Et ideo illi qui ad beatitudinem, quae summum bonum est, transferendi sunt, debent etiam ab omni malo purgari. Et propter hoc oportet esse locum in quo tales purgentur, si hinc non omnino purgati exeant. Sed illi qui in inferno detrudentur, non erunt immunes ab omni bono. Et ideo non est simile: quia ibi in inferno existentes praemium bonorum suorum recipere possunt inquantum bona praeterita eis valent ad mitigationem poenae. Reply Obj. 9: It is impossible for evil to be pure without the admixture of good in the same way that the supreme good is without any admixture of evil. Consequently, those who are to be conveyed to beatitude, which is a supreme good, must be cleansed of all evil. Therefore, there must be a place where such persons are cleansed if they go hence without being perfectly clean. But those who will be thrust into hell will not be free from all good: and consequently the comparison fails, since those who are in hell can receive the reward of their goods, insofar as their past goods avail for the mitigation of their punishment. Ad decimum dicendum quod in gloria animae consistit praemium essentiale: sed gloria corporis, cum redundet ex anima, tota consistit in anima quasi originaliter. Et ideo carentia gloriae animae diversificat statum, non autem carentia gloriae corporis. Et propter hoc etiam idem locus, scilicet caelum empyreum, debetur animabus sanctis exutis a corpore, et coniunctis corporibus gloriosis. Non autem idem locus debetur animabus patrum ante perceptionem gloriae animae, et post perceptionem ipsius. Reply Obj. 10: The essential reward consists in the glory of the soul, but the body’s glory, since it overflows from the soul, is entirely founded, as it were, on the soul: and consequently lack of the soul’s glory causes a difference of state, whereas lack of the body’s glory does not. For this reason, too, the same place, namely, the empyrean, is assigned to the holy souls separated from their bodies and united to glorious bodies: whereas the same place was not assigned to the souls of the fathers both before and after the glorification of souls. Quaestio 70 Question 70 De qualitate animae existentis a corpore separatae, et poena ei inflicta ab igne corporeo The Separated Soul’s Quality and Its Punishment by Material Fire Deinde considerandum est de qualitate animae exeuntis a corpore, et poena ei ab igne corporeo inflicta. We must next consider the general quality of the soul after leaving the body, and the punishment inflicted on it by material fire. Circa quod quaeruntur tria. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: Primo: utrum in. anima separata remaneant potentiae sensitivae. (1) Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul? Secundo: utrum remaneant in ea actus dictarum potentiarum. (2) Whether the acts of the aforesaid powers remain in the soul? Tertio: utrum anima separata possit pati ab igne corporeo. (3) Whether the separated soul can suffer from a material fire? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum in anima separata remaneant potentiae sensitivae Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in anima separata remaneant potentiae sensitivae. Augustinus enim, in libro de Spiritu et anima, sic dicit: recedit anima a corpore secum trahens omnia: sensum scilicet, imaginationem, rationem, intellectum, intelligentiam, concupiscibilitatem et irascibilitatem. Sed sensus et imaginatio, et vis irascibilis et concupiscibilis, sunt vires sensitivae. Ergo in anima separata vires sensitivae remanent. Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive powers remain in the sensitive soul. For Augustine says: the soul withdraws from the body taking all with itself, sense and imagination, reason, understanding and intelligence, the concupiscible and irascible powers (Alcher of Clairvaux, The Spirit and the Soul 15). Now sense, imagination, concupiscible and irascible are sensitive powers. Therefore, the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Ecclesiasticis dogmat. 2: solum hominem credimus animam habere substantivam, quae exuta a corpore vivit, et sensus suos atque ingenia vivaciter tenet. Ergo anima exuta a corpore vivit et habet potentias sensitivas. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Gennadius, Book of Ecclesiastical Dogmas 16): we believe that man alone has a substantial soul, which lives though separated from the body, and clings keenly to its senses and wits. Therefore, the soul retains its senses after being separated from the body. Praeterea, potentiae animae vel essentialiter ei insunt, ut quidam dicunt: vel ad minus sunt naturales proprietates ipsius. Sed id quod essentialiter inest alicui, non potest ab eo separari: neque subiectum aliquod deseritur a naturalibus proprietatibus. Ergo impossibile est quod anima separata a corpore aliquas potentias amittat. Obj. 3: Further, the soul’s powers are either its essential parts as some maintain, or at least are its natural properties. Now that which is in a thing essentially cannot be separated from it, nor is a subject severed from its natural properties. Therefore, it is impossible for the soul to lose any of its powers after being separated from the body.