Respondeo dicendum quod caritas, quae est vinculum Ecclesiae membra uniens, non solum ad vivos se extendit, sed etiam ad mortuos qui in caritate decedunt: caritas enim vita corporis non finitur, I Cor. 13, [8]: caritas nunquam excidit: Similiter etiam mortui in memoriis hominum, viventium vivunt: et ideo intentio viventium ad eos dirigi potest. Et sic suffragia vivorum mortuis dupliciter prosunt, sicut et vivis: et propter caritatis unionem; et propter intentionem ad eos directam. I answer that, Charity, which is the bond uniting the members of the Church, extends not only to the living, but also to the dead who die in charity. For charity, which is the life of the soul even as the soul is the life of the body, has no end: charity never falls away (1 Cor 12:8). Moreover, the dead live in the memory of the living: wherefore the intention of the living can be directed to them. Hence the suffrages of the living profit the dead in two ways even as they profit the living, both on account of the bond of charity and on account of the intention being directed to them. Non tamen sic eis valere credenda sunt vivorum suffragia ut status eorum mutetur de miseria ad felicitatem vel e converso. Sed valet ad diminutionem poenae, vel aliquid huiusmodi quod statum mortui non transmutat. Nevertheless, we must not believe that the suffrages of the living profit them so as to change their state from unhappiness to happiness or vice versa; but they avail for the diminution of punishment, or something of the kind, that involves no change in the state of the dead. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo, dum in corpore vixit, meruit ut haec ei valerent post mortem. Et ideo, si post hanc vitam eis iuvatur, nihilominus hoc procedit ex his quae in corpore gessit. Reply Obj. 1: Man, while living in the body, merited that such things should avail him after death. Wherefore if he is assisted thereby after this life, this is, nevertheless, the result of the things he has done in the body. Vel dicendum, secundum Ioannem Damascenum, in sermone praedicto, quod hoc est intelligendum quantum ad retributionem quae fiet in finali iudicio, quae erit aeternae gloriae vel aeternae miseriae, in qua quilibet recipiet solum, secundum quod ipse in corpore gessit. Interim, autem iuvari possunt vivorum suffragiis. Or we may reply, according to John Damascene in the sermon quoted above, that these words refer to the retribution which will be made at the final judgment of eternal glory or eternal unhappiness: for then each one will receive only according as he himself has done in the body. Meanwhile, however, he can be assisted by the suffrages of the living. Ad secundum dicendum quod auctoritas illa expresse loquitur de sequela aeternae retributionis: quod patet ex hoc quod praemittitur, beati mortui, etc. Reply Obj. 2: The words quoted refer expressly to the sequel of eternal retribution as is clear from the opening words: blessed are the dead, etc. Vel dicendum quod opera pro eis. facta sunt etiam quodammodo eorum, ut dictum est. Or we may reply that deeds done on their behalf are somewhat their own, as stated above. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis animae post mortem non sint simpliciter in statu viae, sed quantum ad aliquid adhuc sunt in statu viae: inquantum scilicet eorum progressus adhuc retardatur ab ultima retributione. Et ideo simpliciter eorum via est circumsepta, ut non possint ulterius per aliqua opera transmutari secundum statum felicitatis et miseriae. Sed quantum ad hoc non est circumsepta, quin, quantum ad hoc quod detinentur ab ultima retributione, possint ab aliis iuvari: quia secundum hoc adhuc sunt in via. Reply Obj. 3: Although, strictly speaking, after death souls are not in the state of the way, yet in a certain respect they are still on the way insofar as they are delayed awhile in their advance towards their final award. Wherefore, strictly speaking, their way is hedged in round about, so that they can no more be changed by any works in respect of the state of happiness or unhappiness. Yet their way is not so hedged around that they cannot be helped by others in the matter of their being delayed from receiving their final award, because in this respect they are still wayfarers. Ad quartum dicendum quod, quamvis communicatio civilium operum, de qua Philosophus loquitur, non possit esse mortuorum ad vivos, quia mortui extra vitam civilem sunt; potest tamen eorum communicatio esse quantum ad opera vitae spiritualis, quae est per caritatem ad Deum, cui mortuorum spiritus vivunt. Reply Obj. 4: Although the communion of civic deeds whereof the Philosopher speaks is impossible between the dead and the living, because the dead are outside civic life, the communication of the spiritual life is possible between them, for that life is founded on charity towards God, to whom the spirits of the dead live. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum suffragia facta per peccatores mortuis prosint Whether suffrages performed by sinners profit the dead? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod suffragia per peccatores facta mortuis non prosint. Quia, ut dicitur Ioan. 9, [31], peccatores Deus non audit. Sed, si orationes eorum prodessent illis pro quibus orant, a Deo exaudirentur. Ergo suffragia per eos facta mortuis non prosunt. Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages performed by sinners do not profit the dead. For John 9:31 says, God does not hear sinners. Now if their prayers were to profit those for whom they pray, they would be heard by God. Therefore, the suffrages performed by them do not profit the dead. Praeterea, Gregorius, in Pastorali, dicit quod, cum is qui displicet ad interpellandum mittitur, irati animus ad deteriora provocatur. Sed quilibet peccator Deo displicet. Ergo per peccatorum suffragia Deus ad misericordiam non flectitur. Et ideo talia suffragia non prosunt. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Book of Pastoral Rule) that when an offensive person is sent to intercede, the wrath of the angered party is provoked to harsher measures. Now every sinner is offensive to God. Therefore, God is not inclined to mercy by the suffrages of sinners, and consequently their suffrages are of no avail. Praeterea, opus alicuius magis videtur esse fructuosum facienti quam alteri. Sed peccator per opera nihil meretur sibi. Ergo multo minus potest alteri mereri. Obj. 3: Further, a person’s deed would seem to be more fruitful to the doer than to another. But a sinner merits nothing for himself by his deeds. Much less, therefore, can he merit for another. Praeterea, omne opus meritorium oportet esse vivificatum, idest caritate informatum. Sed opera per peccatores facta sunt mortua. Ergo non possunt per ea mortui iuvari pro quibus fiunt. Obj. 4: Further, every meritorious work must be a living work, that is to say, informed by charity. Now works done by sinners are dead. Therefore, the dead for whom they are done cannot be assisted thereby. Sed contra: Est quod nullus potest scire de altero pro certo utrum sit in statu culpae vel gratiae. Si ergo tantum illa suffragia prodessent quae fiunt per eos qui sunt in gratia, non posset homo scire per quos suffragia conquireret suis defunctis. Et ita multi a suffragiis procurandis retraherentur. Obj. 5: On the contrary, no man can know for certain whether another man be in a state of sin or of grace. If, therefore, only those suffrages were profitable that are done by those who are in a state of grace, a man could not know of whom to ask suffrages for his dead, and consequently many would be deterred from obtaining suffrages. Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, in littera, secundum hoc iuvatur aliquis mortuus ex suffragiis, secundum quod, dum viveret, meruit ut iuvaretur post mortem. Ergo valor suffragiorum mensuratur secundum conditionem eius pro quo fiunt. Non ergo differt utrum per bonos vel malos fiant. Obj. 6: Further, according to Augustine (Handbook on Faith, Hope, and Charity 109), as quoted in the text (Sentences IV, D. 45), the dead are assisted by suffrages according as while living they merited to be assisted after death. Therefore, the worth of suffrages is measured according to the disposition of the person for whom they are performed. Therefore, it would appear that it differs not whether they be performed by good or by wicked persons. Respondeo dicendum quod in suffragiis quae per malos fiunt, duo possunt considerari. Primo, ipsum opus operatum: sicut Sacrificium Altaris. Et quia nostra sacramenta ex seipsis efficaciam habent absque opere operantis, quam aequaliter explent per quoscumque fiant, quantum ad hoc suffragia per malos facta defunctis prosunt. I answer that, Two things may be considered in the suffrages performed by the wicked. First, the deed done, for instance, the Sacrifice of the Altar. And since our sacraments have their efficacy from themselves independently of the deed of the doer, and are equally efficacious by whomsoever they are performed, in this respect the suffrages of the wicked profit the departed. Alio modo, quantum ad opus operans. Et sic distinguendum est. Quia operatio peccatoris suffragia facientis potest uno modo considerari prout: est eius. Et sic nullo modo meritoria esse potest nec sibi nec alii. Alio modo, inquantum est alterius. Quod dupliciter contingit. Uno modo, inquantum peccator suffragia faciens gerit personam totius Ecclesiae: sicut sacerdos dum dicit in ecclesia exequias, mortuorum. Et quia ille intelligitur facere cuius nomine vel vice fit, ut patet per Dionysium, in 13 cap. Cael. Hier., inde est quod suffragia, talis sacerdotis, quamvis sit peccator, defunctis prosunt. Alio modo, quando agit ut instrumentum alterius. Opus enim instrumenti est magis principalis agentis. Unde, quamvis ille qui agit ut instrumentum alterius, non sit in statu merendi, actio tamen eius potest esse meritoria ratione principalis agentis: sicut si servus in peccato existens quodcumque opus misericordiae facit ex praecepto domini sui caritatem habentis. Unde, si aliquis in caritate decedens praecipiat sibi suffragia fieri, vel alius praecipiat caritatem habens, illa suffragia valent defuncto, quamvis illi per quos fiunt in peccato existant. Magis tamen valerent si essent in caritate: quia tunc ex duabus partibus opera illa meritoria essent. Second, we may consider the deed of the doer, and then we must draw a distinction, because the deed of a sinner who offers suffrage may be considered in one way insofar as it is his own deed, and thus it can in no way be meritorious either to himself or to another; in another way, insofar as it is another’s deed, and this happens in two ways. First, when the sinner, offering suffrages, represents the whole Church: for instance, a priest when he performs the burial service in church. And since one in whose name or in whose stead a thing is done is understood to do it himself, as Dionysius asserts (On the Heavenly Hierarchies 13), it follows that the suffrages of that priest, albeit a sinner, profit the departed. Second, when he acts as the instrument of another: for the work of the instrument belongs more to the principal agent. Wherefore, although he who acts as the instrument of another be not in a state of merit, his act may be meritorious on account of the principal agent: for instance, if a servant, being in sin, do any work of mercy at the command of his master who has charity. Hence, if a person dying in charity command suffrages to be offered for him, or if some other person having charity prescribe them, those suffrages avail for the departed, even though the persons by whom they are performed be in sin. Nevertheless, they would avail more if those persons were in charity, because then those works would be meritorious on two counts. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod oratio per peccatorem facta quandoque non est peccatoris, sed alterius, Et ideo secundum hoc digna est ut a Deo exaudiatur. Reply Obj. 1: The prayer offered by a sinner is sometimes not his but another’s, and consequently in this respect is worthy to be heard by God. Tamen etiam quandoque Deus peccatores audit, quando scilicet peccatores petunt aliquid Deo acceptum. Non enim solis iustis, sed etiam peccatoribus Deus bona sua providet, ut patet Matth. 5, [45]: non autem ex eorum meritis, sed ex sua clementia. Et ideo Ioan. 9, super illud [31], Deus peccatores non audit, Glossa dicit quod loquitur ut inunctus, non sicut plene videns. Nevertheless, God sometimes hears sinners, namely, when they ask for something acceptable to God. For God dispenses his goods not only to the righteous but also to sinners (Matt 5:45), not indeed on account of their merits, but of his loving kindness. Hence a Gloss on John 9:31: God does not hear sinners, says that he speaks as one unanointed and as not seeing clearly. Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis ex parte eius qui displicet oratio peccatoris non sit accepta, tamen ratione alterius, cuius vice vel imperio agitur, potest esse Deo accepta. Reply Obj. 2: Although the sinner’s prayer is not acceptable insofar as he is offensive, it may be acceptable to God on account of another in whose stead or at whose command he offers the prayer. Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc quod peccator faciens huiusmodi suffragia nullum reportat commodum, contingit ex hoc quod non est capax talis profectus, propter propriam indispositionem. Et tamen alii, qui non est indispositus, aliquo modo valere potest, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: The reason why the sinner who performs these suffrages gains nothing thereby is because he is not capable of profiting by reason of his own indisposition. Nevertheless, as stated above, it may in some way profit another who is disposed. Ad quartum dicendum quod, quamvis opus peccatoris non sit vivum inquantum est eius, potest tamen esse vivum inquantum est alterius, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 4: Although the sinner’s deed is not living insofar as it is his own, it may be living insofar as it is another’s, as stated above. Sed quia rationes quae sunt in oppositum videntur concludere quod non differat utrum quis suffragia procuret per bonos vel per malos, ideo etiam ad eas est respondendum. Since, however, the arguments in the contrary sense would seem to show that it matters not whether one obtain suffrages from good or from evil persons, we must reply to them also. Ad quintum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis aliquis pro certo scire non possit de altero an sit in statu salutis, potest tamen probabiliter aestimare de his quae exterius de homine videt: ex fructu enim suo arbor cognoscitur, ut dicitur Matth. 7, [16 sqq.]. Reply Obj. 5: Although one cannot know for certain about another whether he be in the state of salvation, one may infer it with probability from what one sees outwardly of a man: for a tree is known by its fruit (Matt 7:16). Ad sextum dicendum quod ad hoc quod suffragium alteri valeat, requiritur et ex parte eius pro quo fit capacitas huius valoris: et hanc homo acquisivit per opera propria quae gessit in vita; et sic Augustinus loquitur. Requiritur nihilominus qualitas operis quod prodesse debet. Et haec non pendet ex eo pro quo fit, sed magis ex eo qui facit, vel exequendo vel imperando. Reply Obj. 6: In order that a suffrage avail another, it is requisite that the one for whom it is performed be capable of availing by it: and a man has become capable of this by his own works which he did in his life-time. This is what Augustine means to say. Nevertheless, those works must be such that they can profit him, and this depends not on the person for whom the suffrage is performed, but rather on the one who offers the suffrages, whether by performing them or by commanding them. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum suffragia quae a vivis pro mortuis fiunt, facientibus prosint Whether suffrages offered by the living for the dead profit those who offer them? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod suffragia quae a vivis pro mortuis fiunt, facientibus non prosint. Quia si aliquis pro altero debitum solveret, secundum humanam iustitiam ipse a debito proprio non absolveretur. Ergo per hoc quod aliquis suffragia faciens debitum solvit pro illo pro quo facit, ex hoc a debito proprio non absolvitur. Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages offered by the living for the dead do not profit those who offer them. For, according to human justice, a man is not absolved from his own debt if he pay a debt for another man. Therefore, a man is not absolved from his own debt for the reason that by offering suffrages he has paid the debt of the one for whom he offered them. Praeterea, unusquisque quod facit, facere debet meliori modo quo potest. Sed melius est iuvare duos quam unum. Si ergo qui per suffragia debitum mortui solvit, a proprio debito liberatur, videtur quod nunquam debet aliquis pro seipso satisfacere, sed semper pro alio. Obj. 2: Further, whatever a man does, he should do it as best he can. Now it is better to assist two than one. Therefore, if one who by suffrages has paid the debt of a dead person is freed from his own debt, it would seem that one ought never to satisfy for oneself, but always for another. Praeterea, si satisfactio alicuius pro alio satisfacientis aequaliter prodesset sibi ut ei pro quo satisfacit, eadem ratione aequaliter valebit et tertio, si pro eodem satisfaciat simul; et similiter quarto, et sic deinceps. Ergo unus una satisfactione posset pro omnibus satisfacere. Quod est absurdum. Obj. 3: Further, if the satisfaction of one who satisfies for another profits him equally with the one for whom he satisfies, it will likewise equally profit a third person if he satisfy for him at the same time, and likewise a fourth and so on. Therefore, he might satisfy for all by one work of satisfaction; which is absurd. Sed contra: Est quod dicitur in Psalmo [34, 13]: oratio mea in sinu meo convertetur. Ergo, eadem ratione, et suffragia quae pro aliis fiunt, satisfacientibus prosunt. On the contrary, It is written: my prayer shall be turned into my bosom (Ps 34:13). Therefore, in like manner, suffrages that are offered for others profit those who satisfy. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in Sermone de His qui in fide dormierunt: quemadmodum unguento vel alio oleo sancto circumlinire volens infirmum, primo ille, scilicet liniens, participat unctionem, deinde sic perungit laborantem; sic et quicumque pro proximi salute agonizat, primum sibi prodest, deinde proximo. Et sic habetur propositum. Further, The Damascene says in the sermon On Those Who Fell Asleep in the Faith: just as when about to anoint a sick man with the ointment or other holy oil, first of all he, namely, the anointer, shares in the anointing and thus proceeds to anoint the patient, so whoever strives for his neighbor’s salvation first of all profits himself and afterwards his neighbor. And thus the question at issue is answered. Respondeo dicendum quod opus suffragii quod pro altero fit, potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, ut est expiativum poenae per modum cuiusdam recompensationis, quae in satisfactione attenditur. Et hoc modo opus suffragii, quod computatur quasi eius pro quo fit, ita absolvit eum a debito poenae quod non absolvit facientem a debito poenae propriae. Quia in tali recompensatione consideratur aequalitas iustitiae. Opus autem illud satisfactorium ita potest adaequari uni reatui quod alteri non adaequetur: reatus enim duorum peccatorum maiorem satisfactionem requirunt quam reatus unius. I answer that, The work of suffrage that is done for another may be considered in two ways. First, as expiating punishment by way of compensation, which is a condition of satisfaction: and in this way the work of suffrage that is counted as belonging to the person for whom it is done, while absolving him from the debt of punishment, does not absolve the performer from his own debt of punishment, because in this compensation we have to consider the equality of justice: and this work of satisfaction can be equal to the one debt without being equal to the other, for the debts of two sinners require a greater satisfaction than the debt of one. Alio modo potest considerari inquantum est meritorium vitae aeternae, quod habet inquantum procedit ex radice caritatis. Et secundum hoc non solum prodest ei pro quo fit, sed facienti magis. Second, it may be considered as meriting eternal life, and this it has as proceeding from its root, which is charity: and in this way it profits not only the person for whom it is done, but also and still more the doer. Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta. Primae enim rationes procedebant de opere suffragii secundum quod est satisfactorium; sed aliae secundum quod est meritorium. This suffices for the replies to the objections: for the first considered the work of suffrage as a work of satisfaction, while the others consider it as meritorious.