Ad quintum dicendum quod de facto Traiani hoc modo potest probabiliter aestimari: quod precibus beati Gregorii ad vitam fuerit revocatus, et ita gratiam consecutus sit, per quam remissionem peccatorum habuit, et per consequens immunitatem a poena; sicut etiam apparet in omnibus illis qui fuerunt miraculose a mortuis suscitati, quorum plures constat idololatras et damnatos fuisse. De omnibus enim similiter dici oportet quod non erant in inferno finaliter deputati, sed secundum praesentem iustitiam propriorum meritorum. Secundum autem superiores causas, quibus praevidebantur ad vitam revocandi, erat aliter de eis disponendum. Reply Obj. 5: Concerning the incident of Trajan it may be supposed with probability that he was recalled to life at the prayers of blessed Gregory, and thus obtained the grace whereby he received the pardon of his sins and in consequence was freed from punishment. The same applies to all those who were miraculously raised from the dead, many of whom were evidently idolaters and damned. For we must say likewise of all such persons that they were consigned to hell, not finally, but as was actually due to their own merits according to justice: and that according to higher causes, in view of which it was foreseen that they would be recalled to life, they were to be disposed of otherwise. Vel dicendum, secundum quosdam, quod anima Traiani non fuit simpliciter a reatu poenae aeternae absoluta, sed eius poena fuit suspensa ad tempus, scilicet usque ad diem iudicii. Nec tamen oportet quod hoc fiat communiter per suffragia: quia alia sunt quae lege communi accidunt, et alia quae singulariter ex privilegio aliquibus conceduntur; sicut alii sunt humanarum limites rerum, alia divinarum signa virtutum, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Cura pro mortuis agenda. Or we may say with some that Trajan’s soul was not simply freed from the debt of eternal punishment, but that his punishment was suspended for a time, that is, until the judgment day. Nor does it follow that this is the general result of suffrages, because things happen differently in accordance with the general law from that which is permitted in particular cases and by privilege. Even so the bounds of human affairs differ from those of the miracles of the divine power, as Augustine says (On the Care of the Dead 16). Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum suffragia prosint existentibus in purgatorio Whether suffrages profit those who are in purgatory? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nec etiam existentibus in purgatorio. Quia purgatorium pars quaedam inferni est. Sed in inferno nulla est redemptio: Et Psalmus [6, 6] dicit: in inferno autem quis confitebitur tibi? Ergo suffragia his qui sunt in purgatorio non prosunt. Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages do not profit even those who are in purgatory. For purgatory is a part of hell. Now there is no redemption in hell (Office of the Dead, Resp. vii), and it is written, who shall confess to thee in hell? (Ps 6:6). Therefore, suffrages do not profit those who are in purgatory. Praeterea, poena purgatorii est poena finita. Si ergo per suffragia aliquid de poena dimittitur, tantum poterunt multiplicari suffragia quod tota tolletur. Et ita peccatum remanebit totaliter impunitum. Quod videtur divinae iustiae repugnare. Obj. 2: Further, the punishment of purgatory is finite. Therefore, if some of the punishment is abated by suffrages, it would be possible to have such a great number of suffrages that the punishment would be entirely remitted, and consequently the sin entirely unpunished: and this would seem incompatible with divine justice. Praeterea, ad hoc animae in purgatorio detinentur ut, ibi purgatae, purae ad regnum perveniant. Sed nihil potest purgari nisi aliquid circa ipsum fiat. Ergo suffragia facta per vivos poenam purgatorii non diminuunt. Obj. 3: Further, souls are in purgatory in order that they may be purified there, and being pure may come to the kingdom. Now nothing can be purified unless something be done to it. Therefore, suffrages offered by the living do not diminish the punishment of purgatory. Praeterea, si suffragia existentibus in purgatorio valerent, maxime ea viderentur valere quae sunt ad imperium eorum facta. Sed haec non semper valent. Sicut si aliquis decedens disponat tot suffragia pro se fieri, quae, si facta essent, sufficerent ad totam poenam abolendam: posito ergo quod huiusmodi suffragia differantur quousque ille poenam evaserit, illa suffragia nihil ei proderunt: non enim potest dici quod ei prosint antequam fiant; postquam autem sunt facta, eis non indiget, quia iam poenas evasit. Ergo suffragia existentibus in purgatorio non valent. Obj. 4: Further, if suffrages availed those who are in purgatory, those especially would seem to avail them which are offered at their behest. Yet these do not always avail: for instance, if a person, before dying, were to provide for so many suffrages to be offered for him that if they were offered they would suffice for the remission of his entire punishment. Now, supposing these suffrages to be delayed until he is released from punishment, they will profit him nothing. For it cannot be said that they profit him before they are discharged; and after they are fulfilled, he no longer needs them, since he is already released. Therefore, suffrages do not avail those who are in purgatory. Sed contra: Est quod dicitur in littera ex verbis Augustini, quod suffragia prosunt his qui sunt mediocriter boni vel mali. Sed tales sunt qui in purgatorio detinentur. Ergo, etc. On the contrary, As quoted in the text (Sentences IV, D. 45), Augustine says (Handbook on Faith, Hope, and Charity 110): suffrages profit those who are not very good or not very bad. Now such are those who are detained in purgatory. Therefore, etc. Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, 7 cap. Eccles. Hier., quod divinus sacerdos, pro mortuis orans, pro illis orat qui sancte vixerunt et tamen aliquas maculas habuerunt ex infirmitate humana contractas. Sed tales in purgatorio detinentur. Ergo, etc. Further, Dionysius says (On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchies 7) that the divine priest, in praying for the departed, prays for those who lived a holy life and yet contracted certain stains through human frailty. Now such persons are detained in purgatory. Therefore, etc. Respondeo dicendum quod poena purgatorii est in supplementum satisfactionis quae non fuerat plene in corpore consummata. Et ideo, quia, sicut ex dictis patet, opera unius possunt valere alteri ad satisfactionem, sive vivis sive mortuis, non est dubium quin suffragia per vivos facta existentibus in purgatorio prosint. I answer that, The punishment of purgatory is intended to supplement the satisfaction which was not fully completed in the body. Consequently, since, as stated above (A. 1–2; Q. 13, A. 2), the works of one person can avail for another’s satisfaction, whether the latter be living or dead, the suffrages of the living without any doubt profit those who are in purgatory. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de inferno damnatorum, in quo nulla est redemptio quantum ad illos qui sunt finaliter tali poenae deputati. Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted refer to those who are in the hell of the damned, where there is no redemption for those who are finally consigned to that punishment. Vel dicendum, secundum Damascenum, in Sermone de Dormientibus, quod huiusmodi auctoritates sunt exponendae secundum causas inferiores, idest secundum exigentiam meritorum eorum qui poenis deputantur. Sed secundum divinam misericordiam, quae vincit humana merita, ad preces iustorum aliquando aliter disponitur quam sententia praedictarum auctoritatum contineat. Deus autem mutat sententiam, sed non consilium, ut dicit Gregorius. Unde et Damascenus ponit ad hoc exempla de Ninivitis, Achab et Ezechia, in quibus apparet quod sententia contra eos lata divinitus fuit per divinam misericordiam commutata. We may also reply with Damascene that such statements are to be explained with reference to the lower causes, that is, according to the demands of the merits of those who are consigned to those punishments. But according to the divine mercy, which transcends human merits, it happens otherwise through the prayers of the righteous than is implied by the expressions quoted in the aforesaid authorities. Now God changes his sentence but not his counsel, as Gregory says (Morals on Job 20): wherefore the Damascene quotes as instances of this the Ninevites, Ahab, and Hezekiah, in whom it is apparent that the sentence pronounced against them by God was commuted by the divine mercy (Cf. I, Q. 19, A. 7). Ad secundum dicendum quod non est inconveniens si, multiplicatis suffragiis, poena existentium in purgatorio annihiletur. Non enim sequitur quod peccata remaneant impunita: quia poena unius pro altero suscepta alteri computatur. Reply Obj. 2: It is not unreasonable that the punishment of those who are in purgatory be entirely done away with by the multiplicity of suffrages. But it does not follow that the sins remain unpunished, because the punishment of one undertaken in lieu of another is credited to that other. Ad tertium dicendum quod purgatio animae per poenas purgatorii non est aliud quam expiatio reatus impedientis a perceptione gloriae. Et quia per poenam quam unus sustinet pro alio, potest reatus alterius expiari, ut dictum est, non est inconveniens si per unius satisfactionem alius purgetur. Reply Obj. 3: The purifying of the soul by the punishment of purgatory is nothing else than the expiation of the guilt that hinders it from obtaining glory. And since, as stated above (Q. 13, A. 2), the guilt of one person can be expiated by the punishment which another undergoes in his stead, it is not unreasonable that one person be purified by another satisfying for him. Ad quartum dicendum quod suffragia ex duobus valent: scilicet ex opere operante, et ex opere operato. Et dico opus operatum non solum Ecclesiae sacramentum, sed effectum accidentem ex operatione: sicut ex collatione eleemosynarum consequitur pauperum relevatio, et eorum oratio pro defuncto ad Deum. Similiter opus operans potest accipi vel ex parte principalis agendis; vel ex parte exequentis. Reply Obj. 4: Suffrages avail on two counts, namely, the action of the agent and the action done. By action done I mean not only the sacrament of the Church, but the effect incidental to that action—thus from the giving of alms there follow the relief of the poor and their prayer to God for the deceased. In like manner, the action of the agent may be considered in relation either to the principal agent or to the executor. Dico ergo quod, quam cito moriens disponit aliena suffragia sibi fieri, praemium suffragiorum plene consequitur, ante etiam quam fiant, quantum ad efficaciam suffragii quae erat ex opere operante principalis agentis. Sed quantum ad efficaciam suffragiorum quae est ex opere operato, vel ex opere operante exequentis, non consequitur fructum antequam suffragia fiant. Et si prius contingat ipsum a poena purgari, quantum ad hoc fraudabitur suffragiorum fructu: quod redundabit in illos, quorum culpa defraudatur. Non enim est inconveniens quod aliquis defraudetur per culpam alterius in temporalibus, poena autem purgatorii temporalis est: quamvis quantum ad aeternam retributionem nullus defraudari possit nisi per propriam culpam. I say, then, that the dying person, as soon as he provides for certain suffrages to be offered for him, receives the full merit of those suffrages, even before they are discharged, as regards the efficacy of the suffrages that results from the action as proceeding from the principal agent. But as regards the efficacy of the suffrages arising from the action done or from the action as proceeding from the executor, he does not receive the fruit before the suffrages are discharged. And if, before this, he happens to be released from his punishment, he will in this respect be deprived of the fruit of the suffrages, and this will fall back upon those by whose fault he was then defrauded. For it is not unreasonable that a person be defrauded in temporal matters by another’s fault—and the punishment of purgatory is temporal—although as regards the eternal retribution none can be defrauded save by his own fault. Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum suffragia valeant pueris in limbo existentibus Whether suffrages avail the children who are in limbo? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod suffragia valeant pueris in limbo existentibus. Quia illi, non detinentur nisi pro peccato alieno. Ergo maxime decens est ut ipsi iuventur suffragiis alienis. Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages avail the children who are in limbo. For they are not detained there except for another’s sin. Therefore, it is most becoming that they should be assisted by the suffrages of others. Praeterea, in littera habetur ex verbis Augustini quod suffragia Ecclesiae pro non valde malis propitiationes sunt. Sed pueri non computantur inter valde malos: cum sit mitissima eorum poena. Ergo suffragia Ecclesiae eos iuvant. Obj. 2: Further, in the text (Sentences IV, D. 45) the words of Augustine (Handbook on Faith, Hope, and Charity 110) are quoted: the suffrages of the Church obtain forgiveness for those who are not very bad. Now children are not reckoned among those who are very bad, since their punishment is very light. Therefore, the suffrages of the Church avail them. Sed contra est quod habetur in littera ab Augustino, quod suffragia non prosunt illis qui sine fide operante per dilectionem hinc exierunt. Ergo suffragia eis non prosunt. On the contrary, The text (Sentences IV, D. 45) quotes Augustine as saying (On the Words of the Apostle 32) that suffrages avail not those who have departed hence without the faith that works by love. Now the children departed thus. Therefore, suffrages avail them not. Respondeo dicendum quod pueri non baptizati non detinentur in limbo nisi quia deficiunt a statu gratiae. Unde, cum per opera vivorum mortuorum status mutari non possit, maxime quantum ad meritum essentialis praemii vel poenae, suffragia vivorum pueris existentibus in limbo prodesse non possunt. I answer that, Unbaptized children are not detained in limbo save because they lack the state of grace. Hence, since the state of the dead cannot be changed by the works of the living, especially as regards the merit of the essential reward or punishment, the suffrages of the living cannot profit the children in limbo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis peccatum originale sit huiusmodi quod pro eo possit aliquis ab alio iuvari, tamen animae puerorum in limbo existentes sunt in tali statu quod iuvari non possunt: quia post hanc vitam non est tempus gratiam acquirendi. Reply Obj. 1: Although original sin is such that one person can be assisted by another on its account, nevertheless the souls of the children in limbo are in such a state that they cannot be assisted, because after this life there is no time for obtaining grace. Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de non valde malis qui tamen baptizati sunt. Quod patet ex hoc quod praemittitur: cum ergo sacrificia, sive altaris sive quarumcumque eleemosynarum, pro baptizatis omnibus offeruntur, etc. Reply Obj. 2: Augustine is speaking of those who are not very bad, but have been baptized. This is clear from what precedes: since these sacrifices, whether of the altar or of any alms whatsoever are offered for those who have been baptized, etc. Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum suffragia aliquo modo prosint sanctis existentibus in patria Whether suffrages profit the saints in heaven? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquo modo prosint sanctis existentibus in patria: per hoc quod habetur in collecta Missae: sicut Sanctis tuis prosunt ad gloriam, scilicet sacramenta, ita nobis proficiant ad medelam. Sed inter alia suffragia praecipuum est Sacramentum Altaris. Ergo suffragia prosunt his qui sunt in patria. Objection 1: It would seem that in some way suffrages profit the saints in heaven on account of the words of the Collect in the Mass: even as they (i.e., the sacraments) avail thy saints unto glory, so may they profit us unto healing (Postcommunion, Feast of St. Andrew, Apostle). Now foremost among all suffrages is the Sacrifice of the Altar. Therefore, suffrages profit the saints in heaven. Praeterea, sacramenta efficiunt quod figurant. Sed tertia pars hostiae, scilicet in calicem Missa, significat eos qui beatam vitam in patria ducunt. Ergo suffragia Ecclesiae prosunt etiam existentibus in patria. Obj. 2: Further, the sacraments cause what they signify. Now the third part of the host, namely, that which is dropped into the chalice, signifies those who lead a happy life in heaven. Therefore, the suffrages of the Church profit those who are in heaven. Praeterea, sancti non solum gaudent de propriis bonis, sed etiam de bonis aliorum: unde Luc. 15, [10] dicitur: gaudium est angelis Dei super uno peccatore poenitentiam agente. Ergo ex bonis operibus viventium sanctorum qui sunt in patria gaudium crescit. Et ita etiam eis nostra suffragia prosunt. Obj. 3: Further, the saints rejoice in heaven not only in their own goods, but also in the goods of others; hence it is written: there is joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance (Luke 15:10). Therefore, the joy of the saints in heaven increases on account of the good works of the living: and consequently our suffrages also profit them. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in Sermone de Dormientibus, inducens verba Chrysostomi: si enim gentiles, inquit, cum his qui abierunt sua comburunt, quanto magis te fidelem mittere convenit cum fideli ipsius propria: non ut favilla fiant et haec velut illa; sed ut maiorem hinc circumponas gloriam; et, si quidem peccator fuerit qui mortuus est, ut peccamina solvas; si autem iustus, ut appositio fiat mercedis et retributionis. Et sic idem quod prius. Obj. 4: Further, the Damascene says, quoting the words of Chrysostom: for if the heathens, he says, burn the dead together with what has belonged to them, how much more should you, a believer, send forth a believer together with what has belonged to him, not that they also may be brought to ashes like him, but that you may surround him with greater glory by so doing; and if he be a sinner who has died, that you may loose him from his sins, and if he be righteous, that you may add to his merit and reward. And thus the same conclusion follows. Sed contra: Est quod in littera habetur ex verbis Augustini: iniuria est in Ecclesia pro martyre orare, cuius nos debemus orationibus commendari. On the contrary, As quoted in the text (Sentences IV, D.15), Augustine says (On the Words of the Apostle 17): it is insulting to pray for a martyr in church, since we ought to commend ourselves to his prayers. Praeterea, eius est iuvari cuius est indigere. Sed sancti in patria sunt absque omni indigentia. Ergo per suffragia Ecclesiae non iuvantur. Further, To be assisted belongs to one who is in need. But the saints in heaven are without any need whatever. Therefore, they are not assisted by the suffrages of the Church. Respondeo dicendum quod suffragium de sui ratione importat quandam auxiliationem. Quae non competit ei qui defectum non patitur: nulli enim iuvari competit nisi in eo quo indigens est. Unde, cum sancti qui sunt in patria sint ab omni indigentia immunes, inebriati ab ubertate Domus Dei, eis iuvari per suffragia non competit. I answer that, Suffrage by its very nature implies the giving of some assistance, which does not apply to one who suffers no default: since no one is competent to be assisted except he who is in need. Hence, as the saints in heaven are free from all need, being inebriated with the plenty of God’s house (Ps 35:10), they are not competent to be assisted by suffrages. Ad primum ergo, dicendum quod huiusmodi locutiones non sunt sic intelligendae quasi sancti in gloria proficiant quantum ad se quod eorum festa recolimus: sed quia nobis proficit, qui eorum gloriam solemnius celebramus. Sicut ex hoc quod Deum cognoscimus vel laudamus, et sic quodammodo eius gloria in nobis crescit, nihil Deo, sed nobis accrescit. Reply Obj. 1: Such expressions do not mean that the saints receive an increase of glory in themselves through our observing their feasts, but that we profit thereby in celebrating their glory with greater solemnity. Thus, through our knowing or praising God, and through his glory thus increasing somewhat in us, there accrues something, not to God, but to us. Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis sacramenta efficiant quod figurant, non tamen illum effectum suum ponunt circa omne id quod figuratur: alias, cum figurent Christum, in ipso Christo aliquid efficerent, quod est absurdum. Sed efficiunt circa suscipientem sacramentum ex virtute eius quod per sacramentum significatur. Et sic non sequitur quod sacrificia, pro fidelibus defunctis oblata sanctis prosint: sed quia ex meritis sanctorum, quae recoluntur vel significantur in sacramento, prosunt aliis, pro quibus offeruntur. Reply Obj. 2: Although the sacraments cause what thy signify, they do not produce this effect in respect of everything that they signify: else, since they signify Christ, they would produce something in Christ (which is absurd). But they produce their effect on the recipient of the sacrament in virtue of that which is signified by the sacrament. Thus it does not follow that the sacrifices offered for the faithful departed profit the saints, but that by the merits of the saints which we commemorate, or which are signified in the sacrament, they profit others for whom they are offered.