Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum corporum resurrectio sit futura Whether there is to be a resurrection of the body? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corporum resurrectio non sit futura. Iob 14, [12]: homo, cum dormierit, non resurget, donec atteratur caelum. Sed caelum nunquam atteretur: quia terra, de qua minus videtur, in aeternum stat, ut patet Eccle. 1, [4]. Ergo homo mortuus nunquam resurget. Objection 1: It would seem that there is not to be a resurrection of the body, for Job 14:12 says: man, when he is fallen asleep, shall not rise again till the heavens be broken. But the heavens shall never be broken, since the earth, to which seemingly this is still less applicable, stands forever (Eccl 1:4). Therefore, the dead man will never rise again. Praeterea, Dominus, Matth. 22, [31–32], probat resurrectionem per auctoritatem illam, Ego sum Deus Abraham et Deus Isaac et Deus Iacob, quia non est Deus mortuorum, sed viventium. Sed constat quod, quando verba illa dicebantur, Abraham, Isaac et Iacob non vivebant corpore, sed solum anima. Ergo resurrectio non erit corporum, sed solum animarum. Obj. 2: Further, our Lord proves the resurrection by quoting the words: I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. He is not the God of the dead but of the living (Matt 22:32). But it is clear that when those words were uttered, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob lived not in body, but only in the soul. Therefore, there will be no resurrection of bodies but only of souls. Praeterea, Apostolus, I Cor. 15, [19, 30 sqq.], videtur probare resurrectionem ex remuneratione laborum quos in hac vita sustinent sancti, qui, si in hac vita tantum confidentes essent, miserabiliores essent omnibus hominibus. Sed sufficiens remuneratio omnium laborum hominis potest, esse in anima tantum: non enim oportet quod instrumentum simul cum operante remuneretur; corpus autem instrumentum animae est. Unde etiam in purgatorio, ubi animae punientur pro his quae gesserunt in corpore, anima sine corpore punitur. Ergo non oportet ponere resurrectionem corporum, sed sufficit ponere resurrectionem animarum: quae est dum transferuntur de morte culpae et miseriae in vitam gratiae et gloriae. Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle (1 Cor 15) seemingly proves the resurrection from the reward for labors endured by the saints in this life. For if they trusted in this life alone, they would be the most unhappy of all men. Now there can be sufficient reward for labor in the soul alone: since it is not necessary for the instrument to be repaid together with the worker, and the body is the soul’s instrument. Wherefore even in purgatory, where souls will be punished for what they did in the body, the soul is punished without the body. Therefore, there is no need to hold a resurrection of the body, but it is enough to hold a resurrection of souls, which consists in their being taken from the death of sin and unhappiness to the life of grace and glory. Praeterea, ultimum rei est perfectissimum in re: quia per illud attingit finem suum. Sed perfectissimus status animae est ut sit a corpore separata: quia in hoc statu conformior est Deo et angelis; et magis pura, quasi separata ab omni extranea natura. Ergo separatio a corpore est ultimus status eius. Et ita ex hoc statu non redit ad corpus: sicut nec ex viro fit puer. Obj. 4: Further, the last state of a thing is the most perfect, since thereby it attains its end. Now the most perfect state of the soul is to be separated from the body, since in that state it is more conformed to God and the angels, and is more pure, as being separated from any extraneous nature. Therefore, separation from the body is its final state, and consequently it does not return from this state to the body, as neither does a man end in becoming a boy. Praeterea, mors corporalis in poenam hominis est inducta pro prima praevaricatione, ut patet Genes. 2, [17]: sicut et mors spiritualis, quae est separatio animae a Deo, est inflicta homini pro peccato mortali. Sed de morte spirituali nunquam redeunt ad vitam post sententiam damnationis acceptam. Ergo nec de morte corporali ad vitam corporalem erit regressus. Et sic resurrectio non erit. Obj. 5: Further, bodily death is the punishment inflicted on man for his own transgression, as appears from Genesis 2, even as spiritual death, which is the separation of the soul from God, is inflicted on man for mortal sin. Now man never returns to life from spiritual death after receiving the sentence of his damnation. Therefore, neither will there be any return from bodily death to bodily life, and so there will be no resurrection. Sed contra: Est quod dicitur 19, [25–26]: scio, quod Redemptor meus vivit, et in novissimo die de terra surrecturus sum, et rursus circumdabor pelle mea. Ergo resurrectio erit etiam corporum. On the contrary, It is written: I know that my Redeemer lives, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth, and I shall be clothed again with my skin (Job 19:25–26). Therefore, there will be a resurrection of the body. Praeterea, donum Christi est maius quam peccatum Adae, ut patet Rom. 5, [15 sqq.]. Sed mors per peccatum introducta est [v. 12]: quia, si peccatum non fuisset, mors nulla esset. Ergo per donum Christi a morte reparabitur ad vitam. Further, The gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as appears from Romans 5:15. Now death was brought in by sin, for if sin had not been, there had been no death. Therefore, by the gift of Christ man will be restored from death to life. Praeterea, membra debent esse capiti conformia. Sed caput nostrum vivit, et in aeternum vivet, in corpore et anima: quia resurgens ex mortuis iam non moritur, ut patet Rom. 6, [9]. Ergo et homines qui sunt eius membra, vivent in corpore et anima. Et sic oportet carnis resurrectionem esse. Further, The members should be conformed to the head. Now our Head lives and will live eternally in body and soul, since Christ, rising again from the dead, dies now no more (Rom 6:8). Therefore, men who are his members will live in body and soul; and consequently there must be a resurrection of the body. Respondeo dicendum quod secundum diversas sententias de ultimo fine hominis diversificatae sunt sententiae ponentium vel negantium resurrectionem. Ultimus enim finis hominis, quem omnes homines naturaliter desiderant, est beatitudo. Quam quidam homini posse provenire in hac vita posuerunt. Unde non cogebantur ponere aliam vitam post istam, in qua homo ultimam sui perfectionem consequeretur. Et sic resurrectionem negabant. I answer that, According to the various opinions about man’s last end, there have been various opinions holding or denying the resurrection. For man’s last end, which all men desire naturally, is happiness. Some have held that man is able to attain this end in this life; wherefore they had no need to admit another life after this in which man would be able to attain to his perfection: and so they denied the resurrection. Et hanc opinionem satis probabiliter excludit varietas fortunae, et infirmitas humani corporis, scientiae et virtutis imperfectio, et instabilitas, quibus omnibus beatitudinis perfectio impeditur, ut Augustinus prosequitur in fine de Civitate Dei. This opinion is confuted with sufficient probability by the changeableness of fortune, the weakness of the human body, and the imperfection and instability of knowledge and virtue, all of which are hindrances to the perfection of happiness, as Augustine argues at the end of The City of God (22.22). Et ideo alii posuerunt aliam vitam esse post hanc, in qua homo tantum secundum animam vivebat post mortem: et hanc vitam ponebant sufficere ad naturale desiderium implendum de beatitudine consequenda. Unde Porphyrius dicebat, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Civ. Dei, quod animae, ad hoc quod beata sit, omne corpus fugiendum est. Unde tales resurrectionem non ponebant. Hence others maintained that after this there is another life wherein, after death, man lives according to the soul only, and they held that such a life sufficed to satisfy the natural desire to obtain happiness: wherefore Porphyrius said, as Augustine states (The City of God 22.26): the soul, to be happy, must avoid all bodies. Consequently, these did not hold the resurrection. Huius autem opinionis apud diversos diversa erant falsa fundamenta. Quidam enim haeretici posuerunt omnia corporalia esse a malo principio, spiritualia vero a bono. Et secundum hoc oportebat quod anima summe perfecta non esset nisi a corpore separata, per quod a suo principio distrahitur, cuius participatio ipsam beatam facit. Et ideo omnes haereticorum sectae quae ponunt a diabolo corporalia esse creata vel formata, negant corporum resurrectionem. Huius autem fundamenti falsitas in Secundi Libri principio ostensa est. This opinion was based by various people on various false foundations. For certain heretics asserted that all bodily things are from the evil principle, but that spiritual things are from the good principle: and from this it follows that the soul cannot reach the height of its perfection unless it be separated from the body, since the latter withdraws it from its principle, the participation of which makes it happy. Hence all those heretical sects that hold corporeal things to have been created or fashioned by the devil deny the resurrection of the body. The falsehood of this principle has been shown at the beginning of the Second Book. Quidam vero posuerunt totam hominis naturam in anima constare, ita ut anima corpore uteretur sicut instrumento, aut sicut nauta navi. Unde secundum hanc opinionem sequitur quod, sola anima beatificata, homo naturali desiderio beatitudinis non frustraretur. Et sic non oportet ponere resurrectionem. Sed hoc fundamentum sufficienter Philosophus, in II de Anima, destruit, ostendens animam corpori sicut formam materiae uniri. Others said that the entire nature of man is seated in the soul, so that the soul makes use of the body as an instrument, or as a sailor uses his ship: wherefore according to this opinion, it follows that if happiness is attained by the soul alone, man would not be frustrated in his natural desire for happiness, and so there is no need to hold the resurrection. But the Philosopher sufficiently destroys this foundation (On the Soul 2.2), where he shows that the soul is united to the body as form to matter. Et sic patet quod, si in hac vita homo non potest esse beatus, necesse est resurrectionem ponere. Hence it is clear that if man cannot be happy in this life, we must of necessity hold the resurrection. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caelum nunquam atteretur quantum ad substantiam: sed atteretur quantum ad effectum virtutis per quam movet ad generationem et corruptionem inferiorum; ratione cuius dicit Apostolus, I Cor. 7, [31]: praeterit figura huius mundi. Reply Obj. 1: The heavens will never be broken as to their substance, but as to the effect of their power whereby their movement is the cause of generation and corruption of lower things: for this reason the Apostle says: the fashion of this world passes away (1 Cor 7:31). Ad secundum dicendum quod anima Abrahae non est, proprie loquendo, ipse Abraham, sed est pars eius: et sic de aliis. Unde vita animae Abrahae non sufficeret ad hoc quod Abraham sit vivens, vel quod Deus Abraham sit Deus viventis: sed exigitur vita totius coniuncti, scilicet animae et corporis. Quae quidem vita, quamvis non esset actu quando verba proponebantur, erat tamen in ordine utriusque partis ad resurrectionem. Unde Dominus per verba illa subtilissime et efficaciter probat resurrectionem. Reply Obj. 2: Abraham’s soul, properly speaking, is not Abraham himself, but a part of him (and the same as regards the others). Hence life in Abraham’s soul does not suffice to make Abraham a living being, or to make the God of Abraham the God of a living man. But there needs to be life in the whole composite, i.e., the soul and body: and although this life were not actually when these words were uttered, it was in each part as ordained to the resurrection. Wherefore our Lord proves the resurrection with the greatest subtlety and efficacy. Ad tertium dicendum quod anima non comparatur ad corpus solum ut operans ad instrumentum quo operatur, sed etiam ut forma ad materiam. Unde operatio est coniuncti, et non tantum animae: ut patet per Philosophum, in I de Anima. Et quia operanti debetur operis merces, oportet quod ipse homo, compositus ex anima et corpore, operis sui mercedem accipiat. Venialia autem sicut dicuntur peccata quasi dispositiones ad peccandum, non quod simpliciter habeant rationem peccati; ita poena quae eis redditur in purgatorio non est simpliciter retributio, sed magis purgatio quaedam; quae seorsum fit in corpore per mortem et incinerationem, et in anima per purgatorium ignem. Reply Obj. 3: The soul is compared to the body not only as a worker to the instrument with which he works, but also as form to matter: wherefore the work belongs to the composite and not to the soul alone, as the Philosopher shows (On the Soul 1.4). And since to the worker is due the reward of the work, man himself, who is composed of soul and body, ought to receive the reward of his work. Now as venial offenses are called sins as being dispositions to sin, and not as having simply and perfectly the character of sin, so the punishment which is awarded to them in purgatory is not a retribution simply, but rather a cleansing, which is wrought separately in the body (by death and by its being reduced to ashes) and in the soul (by the fire of purgatory). Ad quartum dicendum quod, ceteris paribus, perfectior est status animae in corpore quam extra corpus, quia est pars totius compositi, et omnis pars integralis materialis est respectu totius: quamvis sit Deo conformior secundum quid. Tunc enim, simpliciter loquendo, est aliquid maxime Deo conforme quando habet quidquid conditio suae naturae requirit: quia tunc perfectionem divinam maxime imitatur. Unde cor animalis magis est conforme Deo immobili quando movetur, quam quando quiescit: quia perfectio cordis est in moveri, et eius quies est eius destructio. Reply Obj. 4: Other things being equal, the state of the soul in the body is more perfect than outside the body, because it is a part of the whole composite, and every integral part is material in comparison to the whole: and though it were conformed to God in one respect, it is not simply. Because, strictly speaking, a thing is more conformed to God when it has all that the condition of its nature requires, since then most of all it imitates the divine perfection. Hence the heart of an animal is more conformed to an immovable God when it is in movement than when it is at rest, because the perfection of the heart is in its movement, and its rest is its destruction. Ad quintum dicendum quod mors corporalis est introducta per peccatum Adae, quod est morte Christi deletum. Unde poena illa non manet in perpetuum. Sed peccatum quod mortem aeternam per impoenitentiam inducit, ultra non expiabitur. Et ideo mors illa aeterna erit. Reply Obj. 5: Bodily death was brought about by Adam’s sin, which was blotted out by Christ’s death; hence its punishment does not last forever. But mortal sin, which causes everlasting death, through impenitence will not be expiated hereafter. Hence that death will be everlasting. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum resurrectio sit futura omnium generaliter Whether the resurrection will be for all without exception? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod resurrectio non erit omnium generaliter. In Psalmo [1, 5] enim dicitur: non resurgent impii in iudicio. Sed resurrectio non erit hominum nisi tempore iudicii universalis. Ergo impii nullo modo resurgent. Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection will not be for all without exception. For it is written: the wicked shall not rise again in judgment (Ps 1:5). Now men will not rise again except at the time of the general judgment. Therefore, the wicked shall in no way rise again. Praeterea, Dan. 12, [2] dicitur: multi de his qui dormiunt in pulvere, evigilabunt. Sed haec locutio quandam particulationem importat. Ergo non omnes resurgent. Obj. 2: Further, it is written: many of those that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake (Dan 12:2). But these words imply a restriction. Therefore, not all will rise again. Praeterea, per resurrectionem homines conformantur Christo resurgenti: unde I Cor. 15, [20 sqq.] concludit Apostolus quod, si Christus resurrexit, et nos resurgemus. Sed illi soli debent Christo resurgenti conformari qui ipsius imaginem portaverunt [v. 49]: quod est solum bonorum. Ergo ipsi soli resurgent. Obj. 3: Further, by the resurrection men are conformed to Christ rising again; wherefore the Apostle argues (1 Cor 15:12) that if Christ rose again, we also shall rise again. Now those alone should be conformed to Christ rising again who have borne his image, and this belongs to the good alone. Therefore, they alone shall rise again. Praeterea, poena non dimittitur nisi ablata culpa. Sed mors corporalis est poena peccati originalis. Ergo, cum non omnibus sit dimissum originale peccatum, non omnes resurgent. Obj. 4: Further, punishment is not remitted unless the fault is taken away. Now bodily death is the punishment of original sin. Therefore, as original sin is not forgiven to all, not all will rise again. Praeterea, sicut per gratiam Christi renascimur, ita per gratiam eius resurgemus. Sed illi qui in maternis uteris moriuntur nunquam poterunt renasci. Ergo nec resurgere poterunt. Et sic non omnes resurgent. Obj. 5: Further, as we are born again by the grace of Christ, even so shall we rise again by his grace. Now those who die in their mother’s womb can never be born again: therefore, neither can they rise again, and consequently not all will rise again. Sed contra: Est quod dicitur Ioan. 5, [25, 28]: omnes qui in monumentis sunt audient vocem Filii Dei, etc. qui audierint vivent. Ergo omnes mortui resurgent. On the contrary, It is said: all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God (John 5:28), and they that hear shall live (John 5:25). Therefore, the dead shall all rise again. Praeterea, I Cor. 15, [51] dicitur: omnes quidem resurgemus, etc. Further, It is written: we shall all indeed rise again (1 Cor 15:51). Praeterea, resurrectio ad hoc necessaria est ut resurgentes recipiant pro meritis poenam vel praemium. Sed omnibus debetur vel poena vel praemium: pro merito proprio, sicut, adultis; vel alieno, sicut parvulis. Ergo omnes resurgent. Further, The resurrection is necessary in order that those who rise again may receive punishment or reward according to their merits. Now either punishment or reward is due to all, either for their own merits, as to adults, or for others’, as to children. Therefore, all will rise again. Respondeo dicendum quod ea quorum ratio sumitur ex natura speciei, oportet similiter inveniri in omnibus quae sunt eiusdem speciei. Talis autem est resurrectio: haec enim est eius ratio, ut ex dictis patet, quod anima in perfectione ultima speciei humanae esse non potest a corpore separata. Unde nulla anima in perpetuum remanebit a corpore separata. Et ideo necesse est, sicut unum, ita et omnes resurgere. I answer that, Those things, the reason of which comes from the nature of a species, must be found likewise in all the members of that same species. Now such is the resurrection: because the reason thereof, as stated above (A. 1), is that the soul cannot have the final perfection of the human species so long as it is separated from the body. Hence no soul will remain forever separated from the body. Therefore, it is necessary for all, as well as for one, to rise again. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Psalmus loquitur de spirituali resurrectione, qua impii non resurgent in iudicio discussionis conscientiae, ut Glossa exponit. Reply Obj. 1: As a Gloss expounds these words, they refer to the spiritual resurrection whereby the wicked shall not rise again in the particular judgment. Vel loquitur de impiis qui sunt omnino infideles, qui non resurgent ut iudicentur: iam enim iudicati sunt. Or else they refer to the wicked who are altogether unbelievers, who will not rise again to be judged, since they are already judged (John 3:18). Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus exponit multi, idest omnes. Et hic modus loquendi frequenter invenitur in sacra Scriptura. Reply Obj. 2: Augustine (The City of God 20.23) explains many as meaning all: in fact, this way of speaking is often met with in Sacred Scripture. Vel particulatio potest intelligi quantum ad pueros damnatos in limbo, qui, quamvis resurgent, non proprie dicuntur evigilare, cum nec sensum poenae nec gloriae habituri sint: vigilia enim est solutio sensus. Or else the restriction may refer to the children consigned to limbo who, although they shall rise again, are not properly said to awake, since they will have no sense either of pain or of glory, and waking is the unchaining of the senses.