Respondeo dicendum quod sicut, considerata natura individui, debetur diversa quantitas diversis hominibus, ita, considerata natura individui, debetur diversus sexus diversis hominibus. Et haec etiam diversitas competit perfectioni speciei, cuius diversi gradus implentur per dictam diversitatem sexus vel quantitatis. Et ideo, sicut resurgent homines in diversis staturis, ita in diversis sexibus. Et quamvis sit differentia sexuum, deerit tamen confusio mutuae visionis: quia aberit libido incitans ad turpes actus, ex quibus confusio causatur. I answer that, Just as considering the nature of the individual, a different quantity is due to different men, so also, considering the nature of the individual, a different sex is due to different men. Moreover, this same diversity is becoming to the perfection of the species, the different degrees whereof are filled by this very difference of sex and quantity. Wherefore just as men will rise again of various stature, so will they rise again of different sex. And though there be difference of sex, there will be no shame in seeing one another, since there will no lust to invite them to base deeds, which are the cause of shame. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dicuntur omnes Christo occurrere in virum perfectum, non propter sexum virilem, sed propter virtutem animi, quae erit in omnibus et viris et mulieribus. Reply Obj. 1: When it is said that we shall all meet Christ unto a perfect man, this refers not to the male sex but to the strength of soul which will be in all, both men and women. Ad secundum dicendum quod mulier subditur viro propter imbecillitatem naturae et quantum ad vigorem animi, et quantum ad robur corporis. Sed post resurrectionem non erit differentia in his secundum diversitatem sexuum sed magis secundum diversitatem meritorum. Et ideo ratio non procedit. Reply Obj. 2: Woman is subject to man on account of the frailty of nature as regards both vigor of soul and strength of body. After the resurrection, however, the difference in those points will be not on account of the difference of sex, but by reason of the difference of merits. Hence the conclusion does not follow. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis feminae generatio sit praeter intentionem naturae particularis, est tamen de intentione naturae universalis, quae ad perfectionem humanae speciei utrumque sexum requirit. Nec ex sexu erit ibi aliquis defectus, ut ex dictis patet. Reply Obj. 3: Although the begetting of a woman is beside the intention of a particular nature, it is in the intention of universal nature, which requires both sexes for the perfection of the human species. Nor will any defect result from sex, as stated above (ad 2). Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum resurrecturi sint in vita animali, ut scilicet utantur actu nutritivae et generativae Whether all will rise again to animal life so as to exercise the functions of nutrition and generation? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod resurgent in vita animali, ut scilicet utantur actu nutritivae et generativae. Quia resurrectio nostra erit conformis resurrectioni Christi. Sed Christus post resurrectionem legitur comedisse: ut patet Ioan. 21, [12 sqq.] et Luc. 24, [43]. Ergo et homines post resurrectionem comedent. Et eadem ratione generabunt. Objection 1: It would seem that they will rise again to the animal life, or, in other words, that they will make use of the acts of the nutritive and generative powers. For our resurrection will be conformed to Christ’s. But Christ is said to have eaten after his resurrection (John 21; Luke 24). Therefore, after the resurrection men will eat, and in like manner beget. Praeterea, distinctio sexuum ad generationem ordinatur: et similiter instrumenta quae deserviunt virtuti nutritivae, ordinantur ad comestionem. Sed homo cum omnibus huiusmodi resurget. Ergo utetur actibus virtutis generativae et nutritivae. Obj. 2: Further, the distinction of sexes is directed to generation; and in like manner the instruments which serve the nutritive power are directed to eating. Now man will rise again with all these. Therefore, he will exercise the acts of the generative and nutritive powers. Praeterea, totus homo beatificatur et secundum animam et secundum corpus. Sed beatitudo sive felicitas, secundum Philosophum, in perfecta operatione consistit. Ergo oportet quod omnes potentiae animae et omnia membra sint in suis actibus in beatis post resurrectionem. Et sic idem quod prius. Obj. 3: Further, the whole man will be beatified both in soul and in body. Now beatitude or happiness, according to the Philosopher (Ethics 1.7), consists in a perfect operation. Therefore, it must be that all the powers of the soul and all the members should have their respective acts after the resurrection. And so the same conclusion follows as above. Praeterea, in beatis post resurrectionem erit perfecta et beata iucunditas. Sed talis iucunditas omnes delectationes includit: quia beatitudo est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus; et perfectum est cui nihil deest. Cum ergo in actu virtutis generativae et nutritivae sit magna delectatio, videtur quod tales actus ad vitam animalem pertinentes in beatis erunt. Et multo fortius in aliis, qui minus spiritualia corpora habebunt. Obj. 4: Further, after the resurrection there will be perfect joy in the blessed. Now such a joy includes all pleasures, since, according to Boethius, happiness is a state rendered perfect by the accumulation of all goods (Consolation of Philosophy 3), and the perfect is that which lacks nothing. Since, then, there is much pleasure in the act of the generative and nutritive powers, it would seem that such acts belonging to animal life will be in the blessed, and much more in others, who will have less spiritual bodies. Sed contra: Est quod dicitur Matth. 22, [30]: in resurrectione neque nubent neque nubentur. On the contrary, Matthew 22:30 says: in the resurrection they shall neither marry nor be married. Praeterea, generatio ordinatur ad subveniendum defectui qui per mortem accidit, ad multiplicationem humani generis; et comestio ad restaurationem deperditi et ad augmentum quantitatis. Sed in statu resurrectionis iam humanum genus habebit totam multitudinem individuorum a Deo praefinitam: quia usque ad hoc generatio deferetur. Similiter etiam quilibet homo resurget in debita quantitate. Nec erit ultra mors, aut aliqua deperditio fiet a partibus hominis. Ergo frustra esset actus generativae et nutritivae virtutis. Further, Generation is directed to supplying the defect resulting from death, and to the multiplication of the human race: and eating is directed to restoring what is lost, and to increasing quantity. But in the state of the resurrection the human race will already have the number of individuals preordained by God, since generation will continue up to that point. In like manner, each man will rise again in due quantity: neither will death be any more, nor any waste affect the parts of man. Therefore, the acts of the generative and nutritive powers would be void of purpose. Respondeo dicendum quod resurrectio non erit necessaria homini propter primam perfectionem ipsius, quae consistit in integritate eorum quae ad naturam spectant: quia ad hoc homo pervenire potest in statu praesentis vitae per actionem causarum naturalium. Sed necessitas resurrectionis est ad consequendam ultimam perfectionem, quae consistit in perventione ad ultimum finem. Et ideo illae operationes naturales quae ordinantur ad primam perfectionem humanae naturae vel causandam vel conservandam, non erunt in resurrectione. Et huiusmodi sunt actiones animalis vitae in homine, et actiones mutuae in elementis, et motus caeli. Et ideo haec cessabunt in resurrectione. Et quia comedere, bibere et dormire et generare ad animalem vitam pertinent, cum sint ad primam perfectionem naturae ordinata, in resurrectione talia non erunt. I answer that, The resurrection will not be necessary to man on account of his primary perfection, which consists in the integrity of those things that belong to his nature, since man can attain to this in his present state of life by the action of natural causes; but the necessity of the resurrection regards the attainment of his ultimate perfection, which consists in his reaching his ultimate end. Consequently, those natural operations which are directed to cause or preserve the primary perfection of human nature will not be in the resurrection: such are the actions of the animal life in man, the action of the elements on one another, and the movement of the heavens; wherefore all these will cease at the resurrection. And since to eat, drink, sleep, and beget pertain to the animal life, being directed to the primary perfection of nature, it follows that they will not be in the resurrection. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa comestio qua Christus comedit, non fuit necessitatis, quasi cibis indigeret humana natura post resurrectionem: sed fuit potestatis, ut ostenderet se veram naturam humanam resumpsisse, quam prius habuerat in statu illo quando cum discipulis comederat et biberat. Haec autem Ostensio non erit in resurrectione communi: quia omnibus notum erit. Et ideo dicitur dispensative Christus manducasse, eo modo loquendi quo iuristae dicunt, dispensatio est communis iuris relaxatio: quia Christus intermisit hoc quod est communiter resurgentium, scilicet non uti cibis, propter causam praedictam. Et propter hoc ratio non sequitur. Reply Obj. 1: When Christ partook of that meal, his eating was an act, not of necessity (as though human nature needed food after the resurrection), but of power, so as to prove that he had resumed the true human nature which he had in that state wherein he ate and drank with his disciples. There will be no need of such proof at the general resurrection, since it will be evident to all. Hence Christ is said to have ate by dispensation in the sense in which lawyers say that a dispensation is a relaxation of the general law: because Christ made an exception to that which is common to those who rise again (namely, not to partake of food) for the aforesaid motive. Hence the argument does not follow. Ad secundum dicendum quod differentia sexuum et membrorum varietas erit ad naturae humanae perfectionem reintegrandam et in specie, et in individuo. Unde non sequitur quod sint frustra, quamvis animales operationes desint. Reply Obj. 2: The distinction of sexes and the difference of members will be for the restoration of the perfection of human nature both in the species and in the individual. Hence it does not follow that they are without purpose, although they lack their animal operations. Ad tertium dicendum quod praedictae operationes non sunt hominis inquantum est homo, ut etiam Philosophus dicit. Et ideo in eis non consistit beatitudo humani corporis: sed corpus humanum beatificabitur ex redundantia a ratione, a qua homo est homo, inquantum erit ei subditum. Reply Obj. 3: The aforesaid operations do not belong to man as man, as also the Philosopher states (Ethics 10.7), wherefore the happiness of the human body does not consist therein. But the human body will be glorified by an overflow from the reason whereby man is man, inasmuch as the body will be subject to reason. Ad quartum dicendum quod delectationes corporales, sicut dicit Philosophus, in VII et X Ethic., sunt medicinales, quia adhibentur homini ad tollendum fastidium; vel etiam aegritudines, inquantum eis homo inordinate delectatur, ac si essent verae delectationes, sicut homo habens infirmum gustum delectatur in quibusdam quae sanis non sunt delectabilia. Et ideo non oportet quod tales: delectationes sint de perfectione beatitudinis, ut Iudaei et Saraceni ponunt, et quidam haeretici posuerunt, qui vocantur Chiliastae. Qui etiam secundum doctrinam Philosophi non videntur sanum habere affectum; solae enim delectationes spirituales, secundum ipsum, sunt simpliciter delectationes, et propter se quaerendae. Et ideo ipsae solae ad beatitudinem requiruntur. Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethics 7.12, 10.5), the pleasures of the body are medicinal, because they are applied to man for the removal of weariness; or again, they are unhealthy, insofar as man indulges in those pleasures inordinately, as though they were real pleasures: just as a man whose taste is vitiated delights in things which are not delightful to the healthy. Consequently, it does not follow that such pleasures as these belong to the perfection of beatitude, as the Jews and Turks maintain, and certain heretics known as the Chiliasts asserted. These, moreover, according to the Philosopher’s teaching would seem to have an unhealthy appetite, since according to him none but spiritual pleasures are pleasures simply, and to be sought for their own sake: wherefore these alone are requisite for beatitude. Quaestio 82 Question 82 De conditionibus beatorum resurgentium The Impassibility of the Blessed Who Rise Again Deinde considerandum est de conditionibus beatorum resurgentium. Et primo, de eorum corporum impassibilitate; secundo, de subtilitate; tertio, de agilitate; quarto, de claritate. We must now consider the conditions under which the blessed rise again: (1) The impassibility of their bodies; (2) Their subtlety; (3) Their agility; (4) Their clarity. Circa primum, quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo: utrum sancti resurgentes resurgant quoad corpora impassibiles. (1) Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the resurrection? Secundo: utrum aequalis impassibilitas omnibus inerit. (2) Whether all will be equally impassible? Tertio: utrum illa impassibilitas sensum in actu a corporibus gloriosis excludat. (3) Whether this impassibility excludes actual sensation from the glorified bodies? Quarto: utrum sint in eis omnes sensus in actu. (4) Whether in them all the senses are in act? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum corpora sanctorum post resurrectionem futura sint impassibilia Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the resurrection? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora sanctorum post resurrectionem non sint impassibilia. Omne enim mortale est passibile. Sed homo post resurrectionem erit animal rationale mortale: haec enim est definitio hominis, quae nunquam ab eo separabitur. Ergo corpus erit passibile. Objection 1: It seems that the bodies of the saints will not be impassible after the resurrection. For everything mortal is passible. But man, after the resurrection, will be a mortal rational animal, for such is the definition of man, which will never be dissociated from him. Therefore, the body will be passible. Praeterea, omne quod est in potentia ad formam alterius, passibile est ab illo: quia secundum hoc aliquid est passivum ab alio, ut dicitur in I de Generatione. Sed corpora sanctorum post resurrectionem erunt in potentia ad aliam formam. Ergo erunt passibilia. Probatio mediae. Quaecumque communicant in materia, unum eorum est in potentia ad formam alterius: materia enim, secundum quod est sub una forma, non amittit potentiam ad aliam formam. Sed corpora sanctorum post resurrectionem communicabunt cum elementis in materia: quia ex eadem materia reparabuntur ex qua hunc sunt. Ergo erunt in potentia ad aliam formam. Et sic erunt passibilia. Obj. 2: Further, whatever is in potentiality to have the form of another thing is passible in relation to it; for this is what is meant by being passive to another thing (On Generation and Corruption I). Now the bodies of the saints will be in potentiality to the form of another thing after the resurrection, since matter, according as it is under one form, does not lose its potentiality to another form. But the bodies of the saints after the resurrection will have matter in common with the elements, because they will be restored out of the same matter of which they are now composed. Therefore, they will be in potentiality to another form, and thus will be passible. Praeterea, contraria nata sunt agere et pati ad invicem: ut in I de Generatione, dicit Philosophus. Sed corpora sanctorum post resurrectionem erunt ex contrariis composita, sicut et nunc sunt. Ergo erunt passibilia. Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (On Generation and Corruption I), contraries have a natural inclination to be active and passive towards one another. Now the bodies of the saints will be composed of contraries after the resurrection, even as now. Therefore, they will be passible. Praeterea, in corpore humano resurget sanguis et alii humores, ut dictum est. Sed ex pugna humorum ad invicem generantur aegritudines et huiusmodi passiones in corpore. Ergo erunt corpora sanctorum post resurrectionem passibilia. Obj. 4: Further, in the human body the blood and humors will rise again, as stated above (Q. 80, A. 3–4). Now, sickness and such passions arise in the body through the antipathy of the humors. Therefore, the bodies of the saints will be passible after the resurrection. Praeterea, magis repugnat perfectioni defectus in actu quam defectus in potentia, Sed passibilitas importat solum defectum in potentia. Cum ergo in corporibus beatorum sint futuri aliqui defectus in actu, sicut cicatrices vulnerum in martyribus, ut in Christo fuerunt; videtur quod nihil deperibit perfectioni eorum si ponantur habere corpora passibilia. Obj. 5: Further, actual defect is more inconsistent with perfection than potential defect. But passibility denotes merely potential defect. Since, then, there will be certain actual defects in the bodies of the blessed, such as the scars of the wounds in the martyrs, even as they were in Christ, it would seem that their perfections will not suffer, if we grant their bodies to be passible. Sed contra: Omne passibile est corruptibile: quia passio magis facta abiicit a substantia. Sed corpora sanctorum post resurrectionem erunt incorruptibilia, ut dicitur I Cor. 15, [42]: seminatur in corruptione, resurgent in incorruptione. Ergo erunt impassibilia. On the contrary, Everything passible is corruptible, because increase of passion results in loss of substance (Aristotle, Topics 6.1). Now the bodies of the saints will be incorruptible after the resurrection, according to 1 Corinthians 15:42, it is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption. Therefore, they will be impassible. Praeterea, fortius non patitur a debiliori. Sed nullum corpus erit fortius corporibus sanctorum, de quibus dicitur, I Cor. 15, [43]: seminatur in infirmitate, resurget in virtute. Ergo erunt impassibilia, Further, The stronger is not passive to the weaker. But no body will be stronger than the bodies of the saints, of which it is written: it is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power (1 Cor 15:43). Therefore, they will be impassible. Respondeo dicendum quod passio dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, communiter. Et sic omnis receptio passio dicitur: sive illud quod recipitur sit conveniens recipienti et perfectivum ipsius; sive contrarium et corruptivum. Ab huiusmodi passionis remotione corpora gloriosa impassibilia non dicuntur: cum nihil quod est perfectionis eis sit auferendum. I answer that, We speak of a thing being passive in two ways. First, in a broad sense, and thus every reception is called a passion, whether the thing received be fitting to the receiver and perfect it, or contrary to it and corrupt it. The glorious bodies are not said to be impassible by the removal of this kind of passion, since nothing pertaining to perfection is to be removed from them. Alio modo passio dicitur proprie, quam sic definit Damascenus, in II libro: passio est motus praeter naturam. Unde immoderatus motus cordis passio eius dicitur: sed moderatus dicitur eius operatio. Cuius ratio est quia omne quod patitur, trahitur ad terminos agentis, quia agens assimilat sibi patiens: et ideo patiens, inquantum huiusmodi, trahitur extra terminos proprios in quibus erat. Sic ergo proprie accipiendo passionem, non erit in corporibus resurgentium sanctorum potentialitas ad passionem. Et ideo impassibilia dicuntur. In another way we use the word ‘passive’ properly, and thus the Damascene defines passion (On the Orthodox Faith 2.22) as being a movement contrary to nature. Hence an immoderate movement of the heart is called its passion, but a moderate movement is called its operation. The reason of this is that whatever is patient is drawn to the bounds of the agent, since the agent assimilates the patient to itself, so that therefore the patient as such is drawn beyond its own bounds within which it was confined. Accordingly, taking passion in its proper sense, there will be no potentiality to passion in the bodies of the saints after resurrection; wherefore they are said to be impassible.