Utrum agilitate sua aliquando usura sint ita quod moveantur
Whether the saints will use their agility for the purpose of movement?
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod agilitate sua nunquam utentur ita quod moveantur. Quia secundum Philosophum, motus est actus imperfecti. Sed in illis corporibus nulla erit imperfectio. Ergo nec aliquis motus.
Objection 1: It would seem that the saints will never use their agility for the purpose of movement. For, according to the Philosopher (Physics 3.2), movement is the act of the imperfect. But there will be no imperfection in glorified bodies. Neither, therefore, will there be any movement.
Praeterea, omnis motus est propter indigentiam: quia omne quod movetur, movetur propter adeptionem alicuius finis. Sed corpora gloriosa non habebunt aliquam indigentiam: quia, ut Augustinus dicit, ibi erit quidquid voles, non erit quidquid noles. Ergo non movebuntur.
Obj. 2: Further, all movement is on account of some need, because whatever is in motion is moved for the sake of obtaining some end. But glorified bodies will have no need, since as Augustine says (De Spiritu et Anima, lxiii; Cf. Q. 70, A. 2), whatever you want will be there, and nothing that you do not want. Therefore, they will not move.
Praeterea, secundum Philosophum, in II Caeli et Mundi, quod participat divinam bonitatem sine motu, nobilius participat illam quam quod participat illam cum motu. Sed corpus gloriosum nobilius participat divinam bonitatem quam aliud corpus. Cum ergo quaedam alia corpora omnino sine motu remaneant, sicut corpora caelestia, videtur quod multo fortius corpora humana.
Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (On Heaven and Earth 2), that which shares the divine goodness without movement shares it more excellently than that which shares it with movement. Now the glorified body shares the divine goodness more excellently than any other body. Since, then, certain bodies, like the heavenly bodies, will remain altogether without movement, it seems that much more will human bodies remain so.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit quod anima stabilita in Deo, stabiliet et corpus suum consequenter. Sed anima ita erit in Deo stabilita quod nullo modo ab eo movebitur. Ergo nec in corpore erit aliquis motus ab anima.
Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (On True Religion 12) that the soul, being established in God, will in consequence establish its body. Now the soul will be so established in God that in no way will it move away from him. Therefore, in the body there will be no movement caused by the soul.
Praeterea, quanto corpus est nobilius, tanto debetur ei locus nobilior: unde corpus Christi, quod est nobilissimum, habet locum eminentiorem inter cetera loca, ut patet Heb. 7, , excelsior caelis factus; Glossa, loco et dignitate. Et similiter unumquodque corpus gloriosum habebit, eadem ratione, locum sibi convenientem secundum mensuram suae dignitatis. Sed locus conveniens est de pertinentibus ad gloriam. Cum ergo post resurrectionem gloria sanctorum nunquam varietur neque in plus neque in minus, quia tunc erunt omnino in termino; videtur quod corpora eorum nunquam de loco sibi determinato recedent. Et ita non movebuntur.
Obj. 5: Further, the more noble a body is, the more noble a place is due to it: wherefore Christ’s body, which is the most exalted of all, has the highest place of all, as is seen in Hebrews 7:26: made higher than the heavens, on which the Gloss comments, in place and dignity. And again each glorified body will, in like manner, have a place befitting it according to the measure of its dignity. Now a fitting place is one of the conditions pertaining to glory. Since, then, after the resurrection the glory of the saints will never vary, neither by increase nor by decrease, because they will then have reached the final term of all, it would seem that their bodies will never leave the place assigned to them, and consequently will not be moved.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae 40, : current et non laborabunt, volabunt et non deficient; et Sap. 3, : tanquam scintillae in arundineto discurrent. Ergo erit aliquis motus corporum gloriosorum.
On the contrary, Isaiah 40:31 says that they shall run and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint; and Wisdom 3:7 says that the just shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds. Therefore, there will be some movement in glorified bodies.
Respondeo dicendum quod corpora gloriosa aliquando moveri necessarium est ponere: quia et ipsum corpus Christi motum est in ascensione; et similiter corpora sanctorum, quae de terra resurgent, ad caelum empyreum ascendent. Sed etiam postquam caelos conscenderint, verisimile est quod aliquando moveantur pro suae libito voluntatis: ut, illud quod habent in virtute actu exercentes, divinam sapientiam commendabilem ostendant; et ut visus eorum reficiatur pulchritudine creaturarum diversarum, in quibus Dei sapientia eminenter relucebit; sensus enim non potest esse nisi praesentium quamvis magis a longinquo possint sentire corpora gloriosa quam non gloriosa. Nec tamen per motum aliquid deperiet eorum beatitudini, quae consistit in visione Dei, quem ubique praesentem habebunt: sicut et de angelis dicit Gregorius quod intra Deum currunt quocumque mittantur.
I answer that, It is necessary to suppose that the glorified bodies are moved sometimes, since even Christ’s body was moved in his ascension, and likewise the bodies of the saints, which will arise from the earth, will ascend to the empyrean. But even after they have climbed the heavens, it is likely that they will sometimes move according as it pleases them; so that by actually putting into practice that which is in their power, they may show forth the excellence of divine wisdom, and that furthermore their vision may be refreshed by the beauty of the variety of creatures, in which God’s wisdom will shine forth with great evidence: for sense can only perceive that which is present, although glorified bodies can perceive from a greater distance than non-glorified bodies. And yet movement will in no way diminish their happiness which consists in seeing God, for he will be everywhere present to them; thus Gregory says of the angels (Homilies on the Gospels 34) that wherever they are sent, their course lies in God.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod motus localis non variat aliquid eorum quae sunt intranea rei, sed est secundum id quod est extra rem, scilicet locum. Unde illud quod movetur motu locali, est perfectum quantum ad ea quae sunt intra rem, ut dicitur in VIII Physic.: quamvis habeat imperfectionem respectu loci, quia, dum est in uno loco est in potentia ad alium locum, quia non potest esse actu in pluribus locis simul; hoc enim solius Dei est. Hic autem defectus non repugnat perfectioni gloriae: sicut nec defectus quod creatura est ex nihilo. Et ideo manebunt defectus huiusmodi in corporibus gloriosis.
Reply Obj. 1: Local movement changes nothing that is intrinsic to a thing, but only that which is without, namely place. Hence that which is moved locally is perfect as to those things which are within (Physics 8.7), although it has an imperfection as to place, because while it is in one place, it is in potentiality with regard to another place, since it cannot be in several places at the same time, for this belongs to God alone. But this defect is not inconsistent with the perfection of glory, as neither is the defect whereby a creature is formed from nothing. Hence such defects will remain in glorified bodies.
Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquis dicitur indigere aliquo simpliciter, et secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem indiget aliquis eo sine quo non potest conservari in esse vel in sua perfectione. Et sic motus in corporibus gloriosis non erit propter aliquam indigentiam: quia ad haec omnia sufficiet eis sua beatitudo. Sed secundum quid indiget quis illo sine quo non potest aliquem finem intentum habere, vel non ita bene, vel tali modo. Et sic motus erit in beatis propter indigentiam: non enim poterunt manifestare virtutem motivam in seipsis experimento nisi moveantur. Huiusmodi enim indigentias nihil prohibet in corporibus gloriosis esse.
Reply Obj. 2: A person is said to need a thing in two ways, namely, absolutely and relatively. One needs absolutely that without which one cannot retain one’s being or one’s perfection: and thus movement in glorified bodies will not be on account of a need, because their happiness will suffice them for all such things. But we need a thing relatively when without it some end we have in view cannot be obtained by us, or not so well, or not in some particular way. It is thus that movement will be in the blessed on account of need, for they will be unable to show forth their motive power practically, unless they be in motion, since nothing prevents a need of this kind being in glorified bodies.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procederet si corpus gloriosum non posset etiam sine motu participare divinam bonitatem multo altius quam corpora caelestia: quod falsum est. Unde corpora gloriosa non movebuntur ad consequendam perfectam divinae bonitatis participationem, hanc enim habent per gloriam: sed ad demonstrandam virtutem animae. Per motum autem corporum caelestium non posset demonstrari virtus eorum nisi quam habent in movendo corpora inferiora ad generationem et corruptionem: quod non competit illi statui. Et ideo ratio non procedit.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument would proceed if the glorified body were unable even without movement to share the divine goodness much more perfectly than the heavenly bodies, which is untrue. Hence glorified bodies will be moved, not in order to gain a perfect participation in the divine goodness (since they have this through glory), but in order to show the soul’s power. On the other hand, the movement of the heavenly bodies could not show their power, except the power they have in moving lower bodies to generation and corruption, which is not becoming to that state. Hence the argument does not prove.
Ad quartum dicendum quod motus localis nihil diminuit de stabilitate ab anima stabilita in Deo: cum non sit secundum aliquid instrinsecum rei, ut dictum est.
Reply Obj. 4: Local movement takes nothing away from the stability of the soul that is established in God, since it does not affect that which is intrinsic to a thing, as stated above (ad 1).
Ad quintum quod locus congruus unicuique glorioso corpori deputatus secundum gradum suae dignitatis, pertinet ad praemium accidentale. Non tamen oportet quod diminuatur aliquid de praemio quandocumque est extra locum suum: quia locus ille non pertinet ad praemium secundum quod actu continet corpus locatum, cum nihil influat in corpus gloriosum, sed magis recipiat splendorem ab eo; sed secundum quod est debitus pro meritis. Unde gaudium de tali loco manet etiam ei qui est extra locum illum.
Reply Obj. 5: The fitting place assigned to each glorified body according to the degree of its dignity belongs to the accidental reward. Nor does it follow that this reward is diminished whenever the body is outside its place; because that place pertains to reward not as actually containing the body located therein (since nothing flows therefrom into the glorified body, but rather does it receive splendor therefrom), but as being due to merits. Wherefore, though out of that place, they will still continue to rejoice in it.
Utrum moveantur in instanti
Whether the movement of the saints will be instantaneous?
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod moveantur in instanti. Augustinus enim dicit quod, ubicumque voluerit spiritus, ibi erit et corpus. Sed motus voluntatis, secundum quem spiritus vult alicubi esse, est in instanti. Ergo et motus corporis erit in instanti.
Objection 1: It would seem that movement of the saints will be instantaneous. For Augustine says (The City of God 22.30) that wherever the spirit wishes, there will the body be. Now the movement of the will, whereby the spirit wishes to be anywhere, is instantaneous. Therefore, the body’s movement will be instantaneous.
Praeterea, Philosophus, in IV Physic., probat quod, si fieret motus per vacuum, quod oporteret aliquid moveri in instanti, quia vacuum non resistit aliquo modo mobili, resistit autem plenum, et sic nulla proportio esset motus qui fit in vacuo ad motum qui fit in pleno, in velocitate, cum proportio motuum in velocitate sit secundum proportionem resistentiae quae est in medio; omnium autem duorum motuum qui fiunt in tempore, oportet esse proportionales velocitates, quia omne tempus omni tempori proportionale est. Sed similiter nullum spatium plenum potest resistere corpori glorioso quod potest esse cum alio corpore in eodem loco, quocumque modo fiat: sicut nec vacuum alteri corpori. Ergo, si movetur, in instanti movebitur.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Physics 4.8) proves that there is no movement through a vacuum, because it would follow that something moves instantaneously, since a vacuum offers no resistance whatever to a thing that is in motion, whereas the plenum offers resistance; and so there would be no proportion between the velocity of movement in a vacuum and that of movement in a plenum, since the ratio of movements in point of velocity is as the ratio of the resistance offered by the medium. Now the velocities of any two movements that take place in time must be proportional, since any one space of time is proportional to any other. But in like manner no full place can resist a glorified body, since this can be in the same place with another body, no matter how this may occur; even as neither can a vacuum resist a body. Therefore, if it moves at all, it moves instantaneously.
Praeterea, virtus animae glorificatae quasi improportionaliter excedit virtutem animae non glorificatae. Sed anima non glorificata movet corpus in tempore. Ergo anima glorificata movet corpus in instanti.
Obj. 3: Further, the power of a glorified soul surpasses the power of a non-glorified soul, out of all proportion so to speak. Now the non-glorified soul moves the body in time. Therefore, the glorified soul moves the body instantaneously.
Praeterea, omne quod movetur aequaliter cito ad propinquum et distans, movetur in instanti. Sed motus corporis gloriosi est talis: quia ad quantumcumque distans spatium movetur in tempore imperceptibili; unde Augustinus dicit, in Quaestionibus de Resurrectione, quod corpus gloriosum utraque intervalla pari celeritate pertingit, ut radius solis. Ergo corpus gloriosum movetur in instanti.
Obj. 4: Further, whatever is moved equally soon to what is near and what is distant, is moved instantaneously. Now such is the movement of a glorified body, for however distant the space to which it is moved, the time it takes to be moved is imperceptible: wherefore Augustine says (Questions on the Resurrection, Epistle 102.1) that the glorified body reaches equally soon to any distance, like the sun’s ray. Therefore, the glorified body is moved instantaneously.
Praeterea, omne quod movetur, vel movetur in tempore vel in instanti. Sed corpus gloriosum post resurrectionem non movebitur in tempore: quia tempus iam non erit, ut dicitur Apoc. 10, . Ergo motus ille, erit in instanti.
Obj. 5: Further, whatever is in motion is moved either in time or in an instant. Now after the resurrection the glorified body will not be moved in time, since time will not be then, according to Revelation 10:6. Therefore, this movement will be instantaneous.
Sed contra: In motu locali spatium et motus et tempus simul dividuntur, ut demonstrative probatur in VI. Physic. Sed spatium quod transit corpus gloriosum per suum motum, est divisibile. Ergo et motus divisibilis, et tempus divisibile. Instans autem non dividitur. Ergo et motus ille non erit in instanti.
On the contrary, In local movement, space, movement, and time are equally divisible, as is demonstrated in Physics 6.4. Now the space traversed by a glorified body in motion is divisible. Therefore, both the movement and the time are divisible. But an instant is indivisible. Therefore, this movement will not be instantaneous.
Praeterea, non potest esse aliquid simul totum in uno loco; et partim in illo, et partim in alio: quia sequeretur quod altera pars esset in duobus locis simul; quod esse non potest. Sed omne quod movetur, partim est in termino a quo, et partim in termino ad quem, ut demonstratum est in 6 Physic. Omne autem quod motum est totum est in termino ad quem est motus. Ergo non potest esse quod simul moveatur et motum sit. Sed omne quod movetur in instanti, simul movetur et motum est. Ergo motus localis corporis gloriosi non poterit esse in instanti.
Further, A thing cannot be at the same time wholly in one place and partly in another place, since it would follow that the remaining part is in two places at the same time, which is impossible. But whatever is in motion is partly in a starting terminus and partly in a ending terminus, as is proved in Physics 6.6: while whatever has been in motion is wholly in the ending terminus to which the movement is directed; and it is impossible at the same time for it to be moved and to have been moved. Now that which is moved instantaneously is being moved and has been moved at the same time. Therefore, the local movement of a glorified body cannot be instantaneous.
Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc est multiplex opinio. Quidam dicunt quod corpus gloriosum transit de uno loco in alium sine hoc quod pertranseat medium, sicut et voluntas de uno loco transfertur ad alium sine hoc quod pertranseat medium. Et propter hoc potest corporis gloriosi motus esse in instanti, sicut et voluntatis.
I answer that, Opinion is much divided on this point. For some say that a glorified body passes from one place to another without passing through the interval, just as the will passes from one place to another without passing through the interval, and that consequently it is possible for the movement of a glorified body, like that of the will, to be instantaneous.
Sed hoc non potest stare. Quia corpus gloriosum nunquam perveniet ad nobilitatem naturae spiritualis: sicut nunquam desinit esse corpus. Et praeterea, voluntas, cum dicitur moveri de uno loco in alium, non transfertur essentialiter de loco in locum, quia neutro locorum illorum essentialiter continetur: sed dirigitur in unum locum postquam fuerat directa per intentionem ad alium, et pro tanto dicitur moveri de loco ad locum.
But this will not hold, because the glorified body will never attain to the dignity of the spiritual nature, just as it will never cease to be a body. Moreover, when the will is said to move from one place to another, it is not essentially transferred from place to place, because in neither place is it contained essentially, but it is directed to one place after being directed by the intention to another: and in this sense it is said to move from one place to another.
Et ideo alii dicunt quod corpus gloriosum habet de proprietate naturae suae, qua corpus est, quod pertranseat medium, et ita quod moveatur in tempore: sed virtute gloriae, qua habet infinitatem quandam supra naturam, habet quod possit non pertransire medium, et sic in instanti moveri.
Hence others say that it is a property of the nature of a glorified body, since it is a body, to pass through the interval and consequently to be moved in time, but that by the power of glory, which raises it to a certain infinitude above the power of nature, it is possible for it not to pass through the interval, and consequently to be moved instantaneously.
Sed hoc non potest esse: quia implicat in se contradictionem. Quod patet sic. Sit aliquod corpus quod moveatur de A in B, et corpus motum sit Z. Constat quod Z, quandiu est totum in A, non movetur. Similiter nec quando est totum in B: quia tunc motum est. Ergo, si aliquando movetur, oportet quod neque sit totum in A neque totum in B. Ergo, quando movetur, vel nusquam est; vel est partim in A et partim in B; vel totum in alio loco medio, puta in C; aut partim in C et partim in A seu in B. Sed non potest poni quod nusquam sit: quia sic esset aliqua quantitas dimensiva non habens situm, quod est impossibile. Neque potest poni quod sit partim in A et partim in B et non sit in medio aliquo modo: quia, cum B sit locus distans ab A, sequeretur in medio interiacente quod pars Z quae est in B, non esset continua parti quae est in A.
But this is impossible since it implies a contradiction: which is proved as follows. Suppose a body, which we will call Z, to be in motion from A to B. It is clear that Z, as long as it is wholly in A, is not in motion; and in like manner when it is wholly in B, because then the movement is past. Therefore, if it is at any time in motion it must be neither wholly in A nor wholly in B. Therefore, while it is in motion, it is either nowhere, or partly in A and partly in B, or wholly in some other intervening place, say C, or partly in A and C and partly in C and B. But it is impossible for it to be nowhere, for then there would be a dimensive quantity without a place, which is impossible. Nor again is it possible for it to be partly in A and partly in B without being in some way in the intervening space, for since B is a place distant from A, it would follow that in the intervening space the part of Z which is in B is not continuous with the part which is in A.
Ergo restat quod vel sit totum in C; vel partim in eo et partim in alio loco, quod ponetur medium inter C et A, puta D; et sic de aliis. Ergo oportet quod Z non perveniat de A in B nisi prius sit in omnibus mediis: nisi dicatur quod pervenit de A in B et nunquam movetur; quod implicat contradictionem, quia ipsa successio locorum est motus localis. Et eadem ratio est de qualibet mutatione quae habet duos contrarios terminos quorum utrumque est aliquid positive. Secus autem est de illis mutationibus quae habent unum terminum tantum positivum et alteram puram privationem: quia inter affirmationem et negationem seu privationem non est aliqua determinata distantia; unde quod est in negatione potest esse propinquius vel remotius ab affirmatione, vel e converso, ratione alicuius quod causat alterum eorum vel disponit ad ea; et sic, dum id quod movetur est totum sub negatione, mutatur in affirmationem, et e converso. Unde etiam in eis mutans praecedit mutatum esse, ut probatur in VI Physic. Nec est simile de motu angeli: quia esse in loco aequivoce dicitur de corpore et angelo. Et sic patet quod nullo modo potest esse quod aliquod corpus perveniat de uno loco ad alium nisi transeat omnia media.
Therefore, it follows that it is either wholly in C, or partly in C and partly in some other place that intervenes between C and A, say D, and so forth. Therefore, it follows that Z does not pass from A to B unless it is first in all the intervening places: unless we suppose that it passes from A to B without ever being moved, which implies a contradiction, because the very succession of places is local movement. The same applies to any change whatever having two opposite terms, each of which is a positive entity, but not to those changes which have only one positive term, the other being a pure privation. For between affirmation and negation or privation there is no fixed distance; wherefore that which is in the negation may be nearer to or more remote from affirmation (and conversely) by reason of something that causes either of them or disposes thereto, so that while that which is moved is wholly under a negation, it is changed into affirmation, and vice versa. Thus in such things to be changing precedes to be changed, as is proved in Physics 6.5. Nor is there any comparison with the movement of an angel, because being in a place is predicated equivocally of a body and an angel. Hence it is clear that it is altogether impossible for a body to pass from one place to another, unless it pass through every interval.
Et ideo alii hoc concedunt, sed tamen dicunt quod corpus gloriosum movetur in instanti. Sed ex hoc sequitur quod corpus gloriosum in eodem instanti sit in duobus locis simul, vel pluribus: scilicet in termino ultimo et in omnibus mediis locis. Quod non potest esse.
Wherefore others grant this, and yet they maintain that the glorified body is moved instantaneously. But it follows from this that a glorified body is at the same instant in two or more places together, namely, in the ultimate term and in all the intervening places, which is impossible.
Sed ad hoc dicunt quod, quamvis sit idem instans secundum rem, tamen differt ratione: sicut punctus ad quem terminantur diversae lineae. Sed hoc non sufficit. Quia instans mensurat hoc quod est in instanti secundum rem, non secundum hoc quod consideratur. Unde diversa consideratio instantis non facit quod instans possit mensurare illa quae non sunt simul tempore: sicut nec diversa consideratio puncti potest facere quod sub uno puncto loci contineantur quae sunt distantia situ.
To this, however, they reply that although it is the same instant really, it is not the same logically, like a point at which different lines terminate. But this is not enough, because an instant measures the instantaneous according to its reality and not according to our way of considering it. Wherefore an instant through being considered in a different way is not rendered capable of measuring things that are not simultaneous in time, just as a point through being considered in a different way does not make it possible for one point of place to contain things that are locally distant from one another.
Et ideo alii probabilius dicunt quod corpus gloriosum movetur in tempore, sed imperceptibili propter brevitatem. Et quod tamen unum corpus gloriosum potest iri minori tempore idem spatium pertransire quam aliud: quia tempus, quantumcumque parvum accipiatur, est in infinitum divisibile.
Hence others with greater probability hold that a glorified body moves in time, but that this time is so short as to be imperceptible; and that nevertheless one glorified body can pass through the same space in less time than another, because there is no limit to the divisibility of time, no matter how short a space we may take.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud quod parum deest, quasi nihil deesse videtur, ut dicitur in II Physic. Et ideo dicimus, statim facio, quod post modicum tempus fiet. Et per hunc modum loquitur Augustinus, quod ubicumque erit voluntas, ibi erit statim corpus.
Reply Obj. 1: That which is lacking little is as it were not lacking at all (Physics 2.5); wherefore we say: I do this immediately, when it is to be done after a short time. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks when he says that wheresoever the will shall be, there shall the body be forthwith.
Vel dicendum quod voluntas nunquam erit inordinata in beatis. Unde nunquam volent corpus suum esse alicubi in aliquo instanti in quo non possit ibi esse. Et sic, quodcumque instans voluntas determinabit, in illo corpus erit in illo loco quem voluntas determinat.
Or we may say that in the blessed there will never be an inordinate will: so that they never will wish their body to be instantaneously where it cannot be, and consequently whatever instant the will shall choose, at that same instant the body will be in whatever place the will shall determine.
Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam contradixerunt illi propositioni quam Philosophus inducit in parte illa, ut Commentator ibidem dicit: dicentes quod non oportet esse proportionem totius motus ad totum motum secundum proportionem resistentis medii ad aliud medium resistens; sed Oportet quod secundum proportionem mediorum per quae transitur, attendatur proportio retardationum quae accidit in motibus ex resistentia medii. Quilibet enim motus habet determinatum tempus velocitatis et tarditatis ex victoria moventis supra mobile, etiam si nihil resistat ex parte medii: sicut patet in corporibus caelestibus, in quibus non invenitur aliquid quod obstet motui ipsorum, et tamen non moventur in instanti, sed in tempore determinato secundum proportionem potentiae moventis ad mobile. Et ita patet quod, si ponatur aliquid moveri in vacuo, non oportebit quod moveatur in instanti: sed quod nihil addatur tempori quod debetur motui ex proportione praedicta moventis ad mobile, quia motus non retardatur.
Reply Obj. 2: Some have contradicted this proposition of the Philosopher’s, as the Commentator thereon observes. They say that the ratio of one whole movement to another whole movement is not necessarily as the ratio of one resisting medium to another resisting medium, but that the ratio of the intervening mediums gives us the ratio of retardations attending the movements on account of the resistance of the medium. For every movement has a certain fixed speed, either fast or slow, through the mover overcoming the movable, although there be no resistance on the part of the medium, as evidenced in heavenly bodies, which have nothing to hinder their movement; and yet they do not move instantaneously, but in a fixed time proportionate to the power of the mover in comparison with the movable. Consequently, it is clear that even if we suppose something to move in a vacuum, it does not follow that it moves instantaneously, but that nothing is added to the time which that movement requires in the aforesaid proportion of the mover to the movable, because the movement is not retarded.
Sed haec responsio, ut Commentator dicit ibidem, procedit ex falsa imaginatione qua quis imaginatur quod tarditas quae causatur ex resistentia medii, sit aliqua pars motus addita motui naturali, qui habet quantitatem secundum proportionem moventis ad mobile, sicut una linea additur lineae, ratione cuius accidit iri lineis quod non remanet eadem proportio totius ad totam lineam, quae erat linearum additarum ad invicem: ut sic etiam non sit eadem proportio totius motus ad totum motum sensibilem quae est retardationum contingentium ex resistentia medii.
But this reply, as the Commentator observes, proceeds from an error in the imagination; for it is imagined that the retardation resulting from the resistance of the medium is a part of movement added to the natural movement, the quantity of which is in proportion to the mover in comparison with the movable, as when one line is added to another: for the proportion of one total to the other is not the same as the proportion of the lines to which an addition has been made. And so there would not be the same proportion between one whole sensible movement and another, as between the retardations resulting from the resistance of the medium.
Quae quidem imaginatio falsa est. Quia quaelibet pars motus habet tantum de velocitate quantum totus motus: non autem quaelibet pars lineae habet tantum de quantitate dimensiva quantum habet tota linea. Unde tarditas vel velocitas addita motui redundat in quamlibet partem eius: quod de lineis non contigit. Et sic tarditas addita motui non facit aliam partem motus, sicut in lineis accidebat quod additum est pars totius lineae.
This is an error of the imagination, because each part of a movement has as much speed as the whole movement: whereas not every part of a line has as much of the dimensive quantity as the whole line has. Hence any retardation or acceleration affecting the movement affects each of its parts, which is not the case with lines: and consequently the retardation that comes to a movement is not another part of the movement, whereas in the case of the lines that which is added is a part of the total line.