Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum plantae et alia animalia remansura sint in illa innovatione Whether the plants and animals will remain in this renewal? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod plantae et alia animalia remaneant in illa innovatione. Elementis enim non debet aliquid subtrahi quod ad eorum ornatum pertinet. Sed animalibus et plantis elementa ornari dicuntur. Ergo non auferentur in illa: innovatione Objection 1: It would seem that the plants and animals will remain in this renewal. For the elements should be deprived of nothing that belongs to their adornment. Now the elements are said to be adorned by the animals and plants. Therefore, they will not be removed in this renewal. Praeterea, sicut elementa homini: servierunt, ita etiam animalia et plantae et corpora mineralia. Sed elementa propter praedictum ministerium glorificabuntur. Ergo et animalia et plantae et corpora mineralia glorificabuntur. Obj. 2: Further, just as the elements served man, so also did animals, plants and mineral bodies. But on account of this service, the elements will be glorified. Therefore, both animals and plants and mineral bodies will be glorified likewise. Praeterea, universum remanebit imperfectum si aliquid quod est de perfectione eius auferatur. Sed species: animalium et plantarum et corporum mineralium sunt de perfectione universi. Cum ergo non debeat dici quod mundus in sua innovatione imperfectus remaneat, videtur quod oporteat dicere plantas et alia animalia remanere. Obj. 3: Further, the universe will remain imperfect if anything belonging to its perfection be removed. Now the species of animals, plants, and mineral bodies belong to the perfection of the universe. Since, then, we must not say that the world will remain imperfect when it is renewed, it seems that we should assert that the plants and animals will remain. Praeterea, animalia et plantae habent nobiliorem formam quam ipsa elementa. Sed mundus in illa finali innovatione in melius mutabitur. Ergo magis debent remanere animalia et plantae quam elementa: cum sint nobiliora. Obj. 4: Further, animals and plants have a more noble form than the elements. Now the world, at this final renewal, will be changed for the better. Therefore, animals and plants should remain, rather than the elements, since they are nobler. Praeterea, inconveniens est dicere quod naturalis appetitus frustretur. Sed secundum naturalem appetitum animalia et plantae appetunt esse perpetua, etsi non secundum individuum, saltem secundum speciem: et. ad hoc ordinatur eorum generatio continua, ut in II de Generat. dicitur. Ergo inconveniens est dicere quod istae species aliquando deficiant. Obj. 5: Further, it is unseemly to assert that the natural appetite will be frustrated. But by their natural appetite animals and plants desire to be forever, if indeed not as regards the individual, at least as regards the species: and to this end their continual generation is directed (On Generation and Corruption 2). Therefore, it is unseemly to say that these species will at length cease to be. Sed contra, si plantae et animalia remanebunt, aut omnia aut quaedam. Si omnia, oportebit etiam animalia bruta quae prius fuerunt mortua, resurgere, sicut et homines resurgent. Quod dici non potest: quia, cum forma eorum in nihilum cedat, non potest eadem numero resumi. Si autem non omnia, sed quaedam: cum non sit maior ratio de uno quam de alio quod in perpetuum maneat, videtur quod nullum eorum in perpetuum manebit. Sed quidquid remanebit post mundi innovationem, in perpetuum erit, generatione et corruptione cessante. Ergo plantae et animalia penitus post mundi innovationem non erunt. On the contrary, If plants and animals are to remain, either all of them will, or some of them. If all of them, then dumb animals, which had previously died, will have to rise again just as men will rise again. But this cannot be asserted for, since their form comes to nothing, they cannot resume the same identical form. On the other hand, if not all but some of them remain, since there is no more reason for one of them remaining forever rather than another, it would seem that none of them will. But whatever remains after the world has been renewed will remain forever, generation and corruption being done away with. Therefore, plants and animals will altogether cease after the renewal of the world. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum, in II de Generat., in animalibus et plantis et huiusmodi corruptibilibus, speciei perpetuitas non conservatur nisi ex continuatione motus caelestis. Sed tunc motus caelestis deficiet. Ergo non poterit perpetuitas in illis speciebus conservari. Further, According to the Philosopher (On Generation and Corruption 2) the species of animals, plants, and such corruptible things are not perpetuated except by the continuance of the heavenly movement. Now this will cease then. Therefore, it will be impossible for those species to be perpetuated. Praeterea, cessante fine, cessare debet id quod est ad finem. Sed animalia et plantae facta sunt ad animalem vitam hominis sustentandam: unde dicitur Genes. 9, [3]: sicut olera virentia dedi vobis omnem carnem. Sed post illam innovationem animalis vita ini homine non erit. Ergo nec plantae nec animalia remanere debent. Further, If the end cease, those things which are directed to the end should cease. Now animals and plants were made for the upkeep of human life; wherefore it is written: even as the green herbs have I delivered all flesh to you (Gen 9:3). Therefore, when man’s animal life ceases, animals and plants should cease. But after this renewal animal life will cease in man. Therefore, neither plants nor animals ought to remain. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum innovatio mundi propter hominem fiat, oportet quod innovationi hominis conformetur. Homo autem innovatus de statu corruptionis in incorruptionem transibit et perpetuae quietis: I Cor. 15, [53], oportet corruptibile hoc induere incorruptionem. Et ideo mundus hoc modo innovabitur ut, abiecta omni corruptione, perpetuo maneat in quiete. Unde ad illam innovationem nihil ordinari poterit nisi quod habet ordinem ad incorruptionem. Huiusmodi autem sunt corpora caelestia, elementa et homines. Corpora autem caelestia secundum sui naturam incorruptibilia sunt et secundum totum et secundum partes. Elementa vero sunt corruptibilia quidem secundum partes, sed incorruptibilia secundum totum. Homines vero corrumpuntur et secundum totum et secundum partes: sed hoc ex parte materiae, non ex parte formae, scilicet animae rationalis, quae post corruptionem hominis remanet incorrupta. Animalia vero bruta et plantae et mineralia, et omnia corpora mixta, corrumpuntur et secundum totum et secundum partem, et ex parte materiae, quae formam amittit, et ex parte formae, quae actu non manet. Et sic nullo modo habent ordinem ad incorruptionem. Unde in illa innovatione non manebunt, sed sola ea quae dicta sunt. I answer that, Since the renewal of the world will be for man’s sake, it follows that it should be conformed to the renewal of man. Now, by being renewed, man will pass from the state of corruption to incorruptibility, and to a state of everlasting rest, wherefore it is written: this corruptible must put on incorruption (1 Cor 15:53); and consequently the world will be renewed in such a way as to throw off all corruption and remain forever at rest. Therefore, it will be impossible for anything to be the subject of that renewal, unless it be a subject of incorruption. Now such are the heavenly bodies, the elements, and man. For the heavenly bodies are by their very nature incorruptible both as to their whole and as to their part: the elements are corruptible as to their parts but incorruptible as a whole; while men are corruptible both in whole and in part, but this is on the part of their matter, not on the part of their form (namely, the rational soul) which will remain incorrupt after the corruption of man. On the other hand, dumb animals, plants, and minerals, and all mixed bodies, are corruptible both in their whole and in their parts, both on the part of their matter, which loses its form, and on the part of their form, which does not remain actually; and thus they are in no way subjects of incorruption. Hence they will not remain in this renewal, but those things alone which we have mentioned above. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi corpora dicuntur esse ad ornatum elementorum inquantum virtutes activae et passivae generales quae sunt in elementis, ad speciales actiones contrahuntur. Et ideo sunt ad ornatum elementorum in statu actionis et passionis. Sed hic status in elementis non remanebit. Unde nec animalia nec plantas remanere oportet. Reply Obj. 1: These bodies are said to adorn the elements inasmuch as the general active and passive forces which are in the elements are applied to specific actions: hence they adorn the elements in their active and passive state. But this state will not remain in the elements: wherefore there is no need for animals or plants to remain. Ad secundum dicendum quod nec animalia nec plantae nec alia corpora in ministrando homini aliquid meruerunt, cum libertate arbitrii careant, sed pro tanto dicuntur quaedam corpora remunerari, quia homo meruit ut illa innovarentur quae ad innovationem ordinem habent. Reply Obj. 2: Neither animals nor plants nor any other bodies merited anything by their services to man, since they lack free-will. However, certain bodies are said to be rewarded insofar as man merited that those things should be renewed which are adapted to be renewed. Plantae autem et animalia non habent ordinem ad innovationem incorruptionis. Unde ex hoc homo non meruit ut illa innovarentur: quia nullus potest alteri mereri nisi id cuius est capax, nec etiam sibi ipsi. Unde, etiam dato quod animalia bruta mererentur in ministerio hominis, non tamen essent innovanda. But plants and animals are not adapted to the renewal of incorruption, as stated above. Therefore, for this very reason man did not merit that they should be renewed, since no one can merit for another, or even for himself, that which another or himself is incapable of receiving. Hence, granted even that dumb animals merited by serving man, it would not follow that they are to be renewed. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut perfectio hominis multipliciter assignatur, est enim perfectio naturae conditae et naturae glorificatae, ita etiam perfectio universi est duplex: una secundum statum huius mutabilitatis; altera secundum statum futurae novitatis. Plantae autem et animalia sunt de perfectione eius secundum statum istum: non autem secundum statum novitatis illius, cum ordinem ad eam non habeant. Reply Obj. 3: Just as several kinds of perfection are ascribed to man (for there is the perfection of created nature and the perfection of glorified nature), so also there is a twofold perfection of the universe, one corresponding to this state of changeableness, the other corresponding to the state of a future renewal. Now plants and animals belong to its perfection according to the present state, and not according to the state of this renewal, since they are not capable thereof. Ad quartum dicendum quod, quamvis animalia et plantae quantum ad quaedam alia sint nobiliora quam ipsa elementa, tamen quantum ad ordinem incorruptionis elementa sunt nobiliora, ut ex dictis patet. Reply Obj. 4: Although animals and plants as to certain other respects are more noble than the elements, the elements are more noble in relation to incorruption, as explained above (Q. 74, A. 1). Ad quintum dicendum quod naturalis appetitus ad perpetuitatem quae inest animalibus et plantis, est accipiendus secundum ordinem ad motum caeli, ut scilicet tantum in esse permaneant quantum motus caeli durabit: non enim potest appetitus esse in effectu ut permaneat ultra causam suam. Et ideo si, cessante motu primi mobilis, plantae et animalia non remanent secundum speciem, non sequitur appetitum naturalem frustrari. Reply Obj. 5: The natural desire to be forever that is in animals and plants must be understood in reference to the movement of the heaven, so that they may continue in being as long as the movement of the heaven lasts: since there cannot be an appetite for an effect to last longer than its cause. Therefore, if at the cessation of movement in the first movable body, plants, and animals cease as to their species, it does not follow that the natural appetite is frustrated. Quaestio 92 Question 92 De visione divinae essentiae per comparationem ad beatos The Vision of the Divine Essence in Reference to the Blessed Consequenter considerandum est de his quae spectant ad beatos post iudicium generale. Et primo, de visione eorum respectu divinae essentiae, in qua eorum beatitudo principaliter consistit; secundo, de eorum beatitudine et eorum mansionibus; tertio, de modo quo se erga damnatos habebunt; quarto, de dotibus ipsorum, quae in beatitudine eorum continentur; quinto, de aureolis, quibus eorum beatitudo perficitur et decoratur. In the next place we must consider matters concerning the blessed after the general judgment. We shall consider: (1) Their vision of the divine essence, wherein their bliss chiefly consists; (2) Their bliss and their mansions; (3) Their relations with the damned; (4) Their gifts, which are contained in their bliss; (5) The crowns which perfect and adorn their happiness. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: Primo: utrum sancti videbunt Deum per essentiam. (1) Whether the saints will see God in his essence? Secundo: utrum videbunt eum oculo corporali. (2) Whether they will see him with the eyes of the body? Tertio: utrum, videndo eum, videant omnia quae Deus videt. (3) Whether, in seeing God, they will see all that God sees? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum intellectus humanus possit pervenire ad videndum Deum per essentiam Whether the human intellect can attain to the vision of God in his essence? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus humanus non possit pervenire ad videndum Deum per essentiam. Quia Ioan. 1, [18] dicitur: Deum nemo vidit unquam. Et exponit Chrysostomus quod nec ipsae caelestes essentiae, ipsa dico Cherubim et Seraphim, ipsum ut est nunquam videre potuerunt. Sed hominibus non promittitur nisi aequalitas angelorum: Matth. 22, [30], erunt sicut angeli Dei in caelo: Ergo nec sancti in patria Deum per essentiam videbunt. Objection 1: It would seem that the human intellect cannot attain to the vision of God in his essence. For it is written: no man has seen God at any time (John 1:18); and Chrysostom in his commentary says that not even the heavenly essences, namely, the Cherubim and Seraphim, have ever been able to see him as he is (Homilies on John 14). Now, only equality with the angels is promised to men: they shall be as the angels of God in heaven (Matt 22:30). Therefore, neither will the saints in heaven see God in his essence. Praeterea, Dionysius sic argumentatur in 1 cap. de Div. Nom.: cognitio non est nisi exsistentium. Omne autem existens finitum est: cum sit in aliquo genere determinatum. Et sic Deus, cum infinitus sit, est super omnia exsistentia. Ergo eius non est cognitio, sed est super cognitionem. Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius argues thus (On the Divine Names 1): knowledge is only of existing things. Now whatever exists is finite, since it is confined to a certain genus: and therefore God, since he is infinite, is above all existing things. Therefore, there is no knowledge of him, but he is above all knowledge. Praeterea, Dionysius, in 1 cap. de Mystica Theologia, ostendit quod perfectissimus modus quo intellectus noster Deo coniungi potest, est inquantum coniungitur ei ut ignoto. Sed illud quod est visum per essentiam, non est ignotum. Ergo impossibile est quod intellectus noster per essentiam Deum videat. Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius (Mystical Theology 1) shows that the most perfect way in which our intellect can be united to God is when it is united to him as to something unknown. Now that which is seen in its essence is not unknown. Therefore, it is impossible for our intellect to see God in his essence. Praeterea, Dionysius, in Epistola ad Caium Monachum, dicit quod superpositae Dei tenebrae, quas abundantiam lucis appellat, cooperiuntur omni lumini, et absconduntur omni cognitioni: et si aliquis videns Deum intellexit quod vidit, non ipsum vidit, sed aliquid eorum quae sunt eius. Ergo nullus intellectus creatus poterit Deum per essentiam videre. Obj. 4: Further, Dionysius says (Epistle to Gaius) that the darkness—for thus he calls the abundance of light—which screens God is impervious to all illuminations, and hidden from all knowledge: and if anyone in seeing God understood what he saw, he saw not God himself, but one of those things that are his. Therefore, no created intellect will be able to see God in his essence. Praeterea, sicut Dionysius dicit, in Epistola ad Hierotheum: invisibilis quidem Deus est existens propter excedentem claritatem. Sed claritas eius, sicut excedit intellectum hominis in via, ita excedit intellectum hominis in patria. Ergo, sicut est invisibilis in via, ita erit invisibilis in patria. Obj. 5: Further, according to Dionysius (Epistle to Hierotheus) God is invisible on account of his surpassing glory. Now his glory surpasses the human intellect in heaven even as on the way. Therefore, since he is invisible on the way, so will he be in heaven. Praeterea, cum intelligibile sit perfectio intellectus, oportet esse proportionem aliquam inter intelligibile et intellectum, visibile et visum. Sed non est accipere proportionem aliquam inter intellectum nostrum et essentiam divinam: cum in infinitum distent. Ergo intellectus noster non potest pertingere ad essentiam divinam videndam. Obj. 6: Further, since the intelligible object is the perfection of the intellect, there must be proportion between intelligible and intellect, as between the visible object and the sight. But there is no possible proportion between our intellect and the divine essence, since an infinite distance separates them. Therefore, our intellect will be unable to attain to the vision of the divine essence. Praeterea, plus distat Deus ab intellectu nostro quam intelligibile creatum a sensu. Sed sensus nullo modo potest pertingere ad creaturam spiritualem videndam. Ergo nec intellectus noster poterit pertingere ad videndam divinam essentiam. Obj. 7: Further, God is more distant from our intellect than the created intelligible is from our senses. But the senses can in no way attain to the sight of a spiritual creature. Therefore, neither will our intellect be able to attain to the vision of the divine essence. Praeterea, quandocumque intellectus intelligit aliquid in actu, oportet quod informetur per similitudinem intellecti, quae est principium intellectualis operationis in tale obiectum determinatae, sicut calor est principium calefactionis. Si ergo intellectus noster Deum intelligat, oportet quod fiat per aliquam similitudinem informantem ipsum intellectum. Hoc autem non potest esse ipsa divina essentia: quia formae et formati oportet esse unum esse; divina autem essentia ab intellectu nostro differt secundum essentiam et esse. Ergo oportet quod forma qua informatur intellectus noster intelligendo Deum, sit aliqua similitudo impressa a Deo in intellectum nostrum. Sed similitudo illa, cum sit quid creatum, non potest ducere in Dei cognitionem nisi sicut effectus in causam. Ergo impossibile est ut intellectus noster Deum videat nisi per effectum ipsius. Sed visio Dei quae est per effectus, non est visio Dei per essentiam. Ergo intellectus noster non poterit Deum per essentiam videre. Obj. 8: Further, whenever the intellect understands something actually it needs to be informed with the likeness of the object understood, which likeness is the principle of the intellectual operation terminating in that object, even as heat is the principle of heating. Accordingly, if our intellect understands God, this must be by means of some likeness informing the intellect itself. Now this cannot be the very essence of God, since form and thing informed must have one being, while the divine essence differs from our intellect in essence and being. Therefore, the form whereby our intellect is informed in understanding God must be a likeness impressed by God on our intellect. But this likeness, being something created, cannot lead to the knowledge of God except as an effect leads to the knowledge of its cause. Therefore, it is impossible for our intellect to see God except through his effect. But to see God through his effect is not to see him in his essence. Therefore, our intellect will be unable to see God in his essence. Praeterea, divina essentia magis distat ab intellectu nostro quam quicumque angelus vel intelligentia. Sed, sicut dicit Avicenna, in sua Metaphysica, intelligentiam esse in nostro intellectu non est essentiam intelligentiae esse in intellectu (quia sic scientia quam de intelligentiis habemus, esset substantia et non accidens): sed hoc est impressionem intelligentiae esse in nostro intellectu. Ergo et Deus non est in intellectu nostro, ut intelligatur a nobis, nisi inquantum impressio eius est in intellectu. Sed illa impressio non potest ducere in cognitionem divinae essentiae: quia, cum in infinitum distet a divina essentia, degenerat in aliam speciem; multo amplius quam si species albi degeneraret in speciem nigri. Ergo, sicut ille in cuius visu species albi degenerat in speciem nigri propter indispositionem organi, non dicitur videre album; ita nec intellectus noster, qui solum per huiusmodi impressionem Deum intelligit, eum per essentiam poterit videre. Obj. 9: Further, the divine essence is more distant from our intellect than any angel or intelligence. Now according to Avicenna (Metaphysics 3), the existence of an intelligence in our intellect does not imply that its essence is in our intellect, because in that case our knowledge of the intelligence would be a substance and not an accident, but that its likeness is impressed on our intellect. Therefore, neither is God in our intellect to be understood by us, except insofar as an impression of him is in our intellect. But this impression cannot lead to the knowledge of the divine essence, for since it is infinitely distant from the divine essence, it degenerates to another image much more than if the image of a white thing were to degenerate to the image of a black thing. Therefore, just as a person in whose sight the image of a white thing degenerates to the image of a black thing, on account of an indisposition in the organ, is not said to see a white thing, so neither will our intellect be able to see God in his essence, since it understands God only by means of this impression. Praeterea, in rebus separatis a materia idem est intelligens, et quod intelligitur: ut patet in III de Anima. Sed Deus est maxime a materia separatus. Cum ergo intellectus qui est creatus, non possit ad hoc pertingere ut fiat essentia increata, non poterit esse quod intellectus noster Deum per essentiam videat. Obj. 10: Further, in things devoid of matter that which understands is the same as that which is understood (On the Soul 3). Now God is supremely devoid of matter. Since, then, our intellect, which is created, cannot attain to be an uncreated essence, it is impossible for our intellect to see God in his essence.