Quaestio 94 Question 94 De modo quo se sancti habebunt erga damnatos The Relation of the Saints Towards the Damned Deinde considerandum est de modo quo se sancti habebunt erga damnatos. We must next consider the relations of the saints towards the damned. Circa quod quaeruntur tria. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: Primo: utrum sancti poenas damnatorum videant. (1) Whether the saints see the sufferings of the damned? Secundo: utrum eis compatiantur. (2) Whether they pity them? Tertio: utrum de eorum poenis laetentur. (3) Whether they rejoice in their sufferings? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum beati qui erunt in patria, visuri sint poenas damnatorum Whether the blessed in heaven will see the sufferings of the damned? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beati qui erunt in patria, non videant poenas damnatorum. Maior enim est distantia damnatorum a beatis quam viatorum. Sed beati semper viatorum facta non vident: unde Isaiae 63, [16], Abraham nescivit nos, dicit Glossa: nesciunt mortui, etiam sancti, quid faciunt vivi, etiam eorum filii. Ergo multo minus vident poenas damnatorum. Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed in heaven will not see the sufferings of the damned. For the damned are more cut off from the blessed than wayfarers. But the blessed do not see the deeds of wayfarers; hence a Gloss on Isaiah 63:16: Abraham has not known us, says, the dead, even the saints, know not what the living, even their own children, are doing (St. Augustine, On The Care of the Dead 8, 15). Much less, therefore, do they see the sufferings of the damned. Praeterea, perfectio visionis dependet a perfectione visibilis: unde Philosophus dicit, X Ethic., quod perfectissima sensus operatio est sensus optime dispositi ad pulcherrimum sub sensu iacentium. Ergo e contrario turpitudo visibilis redundat in imperfectionem visionis: Sed imperfectio nulla erit in beatis. Ergo non videbunt miserias damnatorum, in quibus est summa turpitudo. Obj. 2: Further, perfection of vision depends on the perfection of the visible object: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethics 10.4) that the most perfect operation of the sense of sight is when the sense is most disposed with reference to the most beautiful of the objects which fall under the sight. Therefore, on the other hand, any deformity in the visible object redounds to the imperfection of the sight. But there will be no imperfection in the blessed. Therefore, they will not see the sufferings of the damned, wherein there is extreme deformity. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae 66, [24]: egredientur et videbunt cadavera virorum qui praevaricati sunt in me: Glossa, electi egredientur, intelligentia vel visione manifesta, ut ad laudem Dei magis accendantur. On the contrary, Isaiah 66:24 says: they shall go out and see the carcasses of the men that have transgressed against me, upon which a Gloss says, the elect will go out by understanding or seeing manifestly, so that they may be urged the more to praise God. Respondeo dicendum quod a beatis nihil subtrahi debet quod ad perfectionem beatitudinis eorum pertineat. Unumquodque autem ex comparatione contrarii magis cognoscitur: quia contraria iuxta se posita magis elucescunt. Et ideo ut beatitudo sanctorum eis magis complaceat, et de ea uberiores gratias Deo agant, datur eis ut poenam impiorum perfecte intueantur. I answer that, Nothing should be denied the blessed that belongs to the perfection of their beatitude. Now everything is known the more for being compared with its contrary, because when contraries are placed beside one another they become more conspicuous. Wherefore in order that the happiness of the saints may be more delightful to them and that they may render more copious thanks to God for it, they are allowed to see perfectly the sufferings of the damned. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Glossa illa loquitur de sanctis mortuis secundum impossibilitatem naturae: non enim oportet ut naturali cognitione cognoscant omnia quae erga vivos aguntur. Sed sancti qui sunt in patria omnia clare cognoscunt quae aguntur et apud viatores et apud damnatos. Unde Gregorius dicit, XII lib. Moral.: de animabus sanctis, sentiendum non est (hoc scilicet quod Iob dicit, sive nobiles fuerint filii eius sive ignobiles nesciet etc.): quia qui intus habent Dei claritatem, nullo modo credendum est quod sit foris aliquid quod ignorent. Reply Obj. 1: This Gloss speaks of what the departed saints are able to do by nature: for it is not necessary that they should know by natural knowledge all that happens to the living. But the saints in heaven know distinctly all that happens both to wayfarers and to the damned. Hence on Job 14:21: whether his children come to honor or dishonour, he will not know, Gregory says, we should not hold this opnion to apply to the souls of the saints, because since they possess the glory of God within them, we cannot believe that external things are unknown to them (Morals on Job 12). Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis pulchritudo visibilis ad perfectionem faciat visionis, visibilis tamen turpitudo sine visionis infectione esse potest: species enim rerum in anima per quas contraria cognoscuntur, non sunt contrariae. Unde etiam Deus, qui perfectissimam cognitionem habet, omnia pulchra et turpia videt. Reply Obj. 2: Although the beauty of the thing seen conduces to the perfection of vision, there may be deformity of the thing seen without imperfection of vision: because the images of things whereby the soul knows contraries are not themselves contrary. Wherefore also God, who has most perfect knowledge, sees all things, beautiful and deformed. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum beati miseriis damnatorum compatiantur Whether the blessed pity the unhappiness of the damned? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beati miseriis damnatorum compatiantur. Compassio enim ex caritate procedit. Sed in beatis erit perfectissima caritas. Ergo maxime miseriis damnatorum compatiuntur. Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed pity the unhappiness of the damned. For pity proceeds from charity; and charity will be most perfect in the blessed. Therefore, they will most especially pity the sufferings of the damned. Praeterea, beati nunquam erunt tantum elongati a compassione quantum Deus est. Sed Deus quodammodo miseriis nostris compatitur, unde et misericors dicitur: et similiter angeli. Ergo beati compatientur miseriis damnatorum. Obj. 2: Further, the blessed will never be so far from taking pity as God is. Yet in a sense God has compassion on our afflictions, wherefore he is said to be merciful. Therefore, the blessed will pity the miseries of the damned. Sed contra, quicumque alii compatitur, fit miseriae eius quodammodo particeps. Sed beati non possunt esse participes alicuius miseriae. Ergo miseriis damnatorum non compatiuntur. On the contrary, Whoever pities another shares somewhat in his unhappiness. But the blessed cannot share in any unhappiness. Therefore, they do not pity the afflictions of the damned. Respondeo dicendum quod misericordia, vel compassio, potest in aliquo inveniri dupliciter: uno modo, per modum passionis; alio modo, per modum electionis. In beatis autem non erit aliqua passio in parte inferiori nisi consequens electionem rationis. Unde non erit in eis compassio vel misericordia nisi secundum electionem rationis. Hoc autem modo ex electione rationis misericordia vel compassio nascitur, prout scilicet aliquis vult malum alterius repelli: unde in illis quae secundum iudicium rationis repelli non volumus, compassionem talem non habemus. Peccatores autem quandiu sunt in hoc mundo, in tali statu sunt quod sine praeiudicio divinae iustitiae possunt in beatitudinem transferri a statu miseriae et peccati. Et ideo beatorum compassio ad eos locum habet: et secundum electionem voluntatis, prout Deus, angeli et beati eis compati dicuntur, eorum salutem volendo; et secundum passionem, sicut compatiuntur eis homines boni in statu viae existentes. Sed in futuro non poterunt transferri a sua miseria. Unde ad eorum miserias non poterit esse compassio secundum electionem rectam. Et ideo beati qui erunt in gloria, nullam compassionem ad damnatos. habebunt. I answer that, Mercy or compassion may be in a person in two ways: first, by way of passion; second, by way of choice. In the blessed there will be no passion in the lower powers except as a result of the reason’s choice. Hence compassion or mercy will not be in them, except by the choice of reason. Now mercy or compassion comes of the reason’s choice when a person wishes another’s evil to be dispelled: wherefore in those things which, in accordance with reason, we do not wish to be dispelled, we have no such compassion. But so long as sinners are in this world they are in such a state that without prejudice to the divine justice they can be taken away from a state of unhappiness and sin to a state of happiness. Consequently, it is possible to have compassion on them both by the choice of the will—in which sense God, the angels, and the blessed are said to pity them by desiring their salvation—and by passion, in which way they are pitied by the good men who are in the state of wayfarers. But in the future state it will be impossible for them to be taken away from their unhappiness: and consequently it will not be possible to pity their sufferings according to right reason. Therefore, the blessed in glory will have no pity on the damned. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caritas tunc est compassionis principium quando possumus ex caritate velle remotionem miseriae alicuius. Sed sancti ex caritate hoc velle non possunt de damnatis: cum divinae iustitiae repugnet. Unde ratio non sequitur. Reply Obj. 1: Charity is the principle of pity when it is possible for us out of charity to wish the cessation of a person’s unhappiness. But the saints cannot desire this for the damned, since it would be contrary to divine justice. Consequently, the argument does not follow. Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus dicitur esse misericors inquantum subvenit illis quos secundum ordinem sapientiae et iustitiae suae convenit a miseria liberari: non quod damnatorum misereatur, nisi forte puniendo citra condignum. Reply Obj. 2: God is said to be merciful insofar as he succors those whom it is befitting to be released from their afflictions in accordance with the order of wisdom and justice: not as though he pitied the damned, except perhaps in punishing them less than they deserve. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum beati laetentur de poenis impiorum Whether the blessed rejoice in the punishment of the wicked? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod beati non laetentur de poenis impiorum; Laetari enim de malo alterius ad odium pertinet. Sed in beatis nullum erit odium. Ergo non laetabuntur de miseriis damnatorum. Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed do not rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. For rejoicing in another’s evil pertains to hatred. But there will be no hatred in the blessed. Therefore, they will not rejoice in the unhappiness of the damned. Praeterea, beati in patria erunt summe Deo conformes. Sed Deus non delectatur in poenis nostris. Ergo nec beati delectabuntur in poenis damnatorum. Obj. 2: Further, the blessed in heaven will be in the highest degree conformed to God. Now God does not rejoice in our afflictions. Therefore, neither will the blessed rejoice in the afflictions of the damned. Praeterea, illud quod est vituperabile in viatore, nullo modo cadit in comprehensorem. Sed in homine viatore est maxime vituperabile quod reficiatur aliorum poenis; et maxime commendabile ut de poenis doleat. Ergo beati nullo modo laetantur de poenis damnatorum. Obj. 3: Further, that which is blameworthy in a wayfarer has no place whatever in a comprehensor. Now it is most reprehensible in a wayfarer to take pleasure in the pains of others, and most praiseworthy to grieve for them. Therefore, the blessed in no way rejoice in the punishment of the damned. Sed contra: Est quod in Psalmo [57, 11] dicitur: laetabitur iustus cum viderit vindictam. On the contrary, It is written: the just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge (Ps 57:11). Praeterea, Isaiae 66, [24]: erunt usque ad satietatem visionis omni carni. Satietas autem refectionem mentis designat. Ergo beati gaudebunt de poenis impiorum. Further, It is written: they shall satiate the sight of all flesh (Isa 56:24). Now satiety denotes refreshment of the mind. Therefore, the blessed will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest esse materia gaudii dupliciter. Uno modo, per se: quando scilicet de aliquo gaudetur inquantum huiusmodi. Et sic sancti non laetabuntur de poenis impiorum. Alio modo, per accidens, idest ratione alicuius adiuncti. Et hoc modo sancti de poenis impiorum gaudebunt, considerando in eis ordinem divinae iustitiae et suam liberationem, de qua gaudebunt. Et sic divina iustitia et sua liberatio erunt per se causa gaudii beatorum, sed poenae damnatorum per accidens. I answer that, A thing may be a matter of rejoicing in two ways. First, directly, when one rejoices in a thing as such: and thus the saints will not rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. Second, indirectly, by reason of something annexed to it: and in this way the saints will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked, by considering therein the order of divine justice and their own deliverance, which will fill them with joy. And thus the divine justice and their own deliverance will be the direct cause of the joy of the blessed: while the punishment of the damned will cause it indirectly. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod laetari de malo alterius inquantum huiusmodi, pertinet ad odium: non autem laetari de malo alterius ratione alicuius adiuncti. Sic autem aliquis de malo proprio quandoque laetatur: sicut cum quis gaudet de propriis afflictionibus secundum quod prosunt ei ad meritum vitae; Iac. 1, [2], omne gaudium existimate, fratres mei, cum in tentationes varias incideritis. Reply Obj. 1: To rejoice in another’s evil as such belongs to hatred, but not to rejoice in another’s evil by reason of something annexed to it. Thus a person sometimes rejoices in his own evil, such as when we rejoice in our own afflictions as helping us to merit life: my brethren, count it all joy when you shall fall into diverse temptations (Jas 1:2). Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis Deus non delectetur in poenis inquantum huiusmodi delectatur tamen eis inquantum sunt per suam iustitiam ordinatae. Reply Obj. 2: Although God rejoices not in punishments as such, he rejoices in them as being ordered by his justice. Ad tertium dicendum quod in viatore non est laudabile quod delectetur de aliorum poenis secundum se: est tamen laudabile si delectetur de eis inquantum habent aliquid annexum. Tamen alia ratio est de viatore et comprehensore. Quia in viatore passiones frequenter insurgunt sine iudicio rationis. Et tamen tales passiones interdum sunt laudabiles, secundum quod bonam dispositionem mentis indicant: sicut patet de verecundia et misericordia et poenitentia de malo. Sed in comprehensoribus non potest esse passio nisi consequens iudicium rationis. Reply Obj. 3: It is not praiseworthy in a wayfarer to rejoice in another’s afflictions as such: yet it is praiseworthy if he rejoice in them as having something annexed. However, it is not the same with a wayfarer as with a comprehensor, because in a wayfarer the passions often forestall the judgment of reason, and yet sometimes such passions are praiseworthy as indicating the good disposition of the mind, like in the case of shame, pity, and repentance for evil: whereas in a comprehensor there can be no passion but such as follows the judgment of reason. Quaestio 95 Question 95 De dotibus beatorum The Gifts of the Blessed