Praeterea, secundum Philosophum, in V Ethic., poena taxatur secundum dignitatem eius in quem peccatur: unde maiori poena punitur qui percutit alapa principem, quam alium quemcumque. Sed quicumque peccat mortaliter, peccat contra Deum, cuius praecepta transgreditur, et cuius honorem alii impartitur dum in alio finem constituit. Maiestas autem Dei est infinita. Ergo quicumque peccat mortaliter, dignus est infinita poena. Et ita videtur quod iuste pro peccato mortali quis perpetuo puniatur. Further, According to the Philosopher (Ethics 5.5), punishment is taxed according to the dignity of the person sinned against, so that a person who strikes one in authority receives a greater punishment than one who strikes anyone else. Now whoever sins mortally, sins against God, whose commandments he breaks, and whose honor he gives another by placing his end in some one other than God. But God’s majesty is infinite. Therefore, whoever sins mortally deserves infinite punishment; and consequently it seems just that for a mortal sin a man should be punished forever. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum poena duplicem habeat quantitatem, scilicet secundum intensionem acerbitatis, et secundum durationem temporis; quantitas poenae respondet quantitati culpae secundum intensionem acerbitatis, ut secundum quod gravius peccavit, secundum hoc gravior poena ei infligatur; unde Apoc. 18, [7]: quantum se glorificavit et in deliciis fuit, tantum date ei tormentum et luctum. Non autem respondet duratio poenae durationi culpae, ut dicit Augustinus, XXI de Civ. Dei: non enim adulterium, quod in momento temporis perpetratur, momentanea poena punitur, etiam secundum leges humanas. Sed duratio poenae respicit dispositionem peccantis. Quandoque enim ille qui peccat in aliqua civitate, ex ipso peccato efficitur dignus ut totaliter a societate civitatis repellatur, vel per exilium perpetuum, vel etiam per mortem. Quandoque vero non redditur dignus ut totaliter a civium societate excludatur: et ideo, ut possit esse conveniens membrum civitatis, poena ei prolongatur vel breviatur secundum quod expedit eius curationi, ut in civitate convenienter et pacifice vivere possit. I answer that, Since punishment is measured in two ways, namely, according to the degree of its severity, and according to its length of time, the measure of punishment corresponds to the measure of fault as regards the degree of severity, so that the more grievously a person sins the more grievously is he punished: as much as she has glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give to her (Rev 18:7). The duration of the punishment does not, however, correspond with the duration of the fault, as Augustine says (The City of God 21.11), for adultery, which is committed in a short space of time, is not punished with a momentary penalty even according to human laws. But the duration of punishment regards the disposition of the sinner: for sometimes a person who commits an offense in a city is rendered by his very offense worthy of being cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens, either by perpetual exile or even by death: whereas sometimes he is not rendered worthy of being cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens. Hence, in order that he may become a fitting member of the State, his punishment is prolonged or curtailed, according as is expedient for his amendment, so that he may live in the city in a becoming and peaceful manner. Ita etiam secundum divinam iustitiam aliquis ex peccato redditur dignus penitus a civitatis Dei consortio separari: quod fit per omne peccatum quo quis contra caritatem peccat, quae est vinculum civitatem praedictam uniens. Et ideo pro peccato mortali, quod est contrarium caritati, aliquis, in aeternum a societate sanctorum exclusus, aeternae poenae addicitur: quia, ut Augustinus in libro praedicto dicit, quod est de civitate ista mortali homines supplicio primae mortis, hoc est de civitate illa immortali homines supplicio secundae mortis auferre. Quod autem poena quam civitas mundana infligit perpetua non reputatur, hoc est per accidens: vel inquantum homo non perpetuo manet; vel in quantum etiam ipsa civitas deficit. Unde, si homo in perpetuum viveret poena exilii et servitutis, quae per legem humanam inferuntur, in eo perpetuo permanerent. Qui vero hoc modo peccant ut tamen, non reddantur digni totaliter separari a sanctae civitatis consortio, sicut peccantium venialiter, tanto eorum poena erit brevior vel diuturnior, quanto magis vel minus purgabiles erunt, secundum quod eis peccata vel plus vel minus inhaeserunt. Quod in poenis huius mundi et purgatorii secundum divinam iustitiam servatur. So too, according to divine justice, sin renders a person worthy to be altogether cut off from the fellowship of God’s city, and this is the effect of every sin committed against charity, which is the bond uniting this same city together. Consequently, for mortal sin, which is contrary to charity, a person is expelled forever from the fellowship of the saints and condemned to everlasting punishment, because as Augustine says (The City of God xxi, 11), as men are cut off from this perishable city by the penalty of the first death, so are they excluded from that imperishable city by the punishment of the second death. That the punishment inflicted by the earthly state is not deemed everlasting is accidental, either because man endures not forever, or because the state itself comes to an end. Thus, if man lived forever, the punishment of exile or slavery, which is pronounced by human law, would remain in him forever. On the other hand, as regards those who sin in such a way as not to deserve to be entirely cut off from the fellowship of the saints, such as those who sin venially, their punishment will be so much the shorter or longer according as they are more or less fit to be cleansed through sin clinging to them more or less: this is observed in the punishments of this world and of purgatory according to divine justice. Inveniuntur etiam et aliae rationes a Sanctis assignatae quare iuste pro peccato temporali aliqui poena perpetua puniantur. Una est quia peccaverunt contra bonum aeternum, dum contempserunt aeternam vitam. Et hoc etiam est quod Augustinus in praedicto libro dicit: factus est malo dignus aeterno, quia hoc in se peremit bonum quod esse posset aeternum. We find also other reasons given by the saints why some are justly condemned to everlasting punishment for a temporal sin. One is because they sinned against an eternal good by despising eternal life. This is mentioned by Augustine (The City of God 12.12): he is become worthy of eternal evil who destroyed in himself a good which could be eternal. Alia ratio est quia homo in suo aeterno peccavit. Unde Gregorius dicit, in IV Dialog.: ad magnam iustitiam iudicantis pertinet ut nunquam careant supplicio qui nunquam voluerunt carere peccato. Et si obiiciatur quod quidam peccantes mortaliter proponunt vitam suam in melius commutare; et ita, secundum hoc, non essent digni aeterno supplicio, ut videtur: dicendum est, secundum quosdam, quod Gregorius loquitur de voluntate quae manifestatur per opus. Qui enim in peccatum mortale propria voluntate labitur, se ponit in statu a quo erui non potest nisi divinitus. Unde ex hoc ipso quod vult peccare, consequenter vult in peccato manere perpetuo: homo enim est spiritus vadens, scilicet in peccatum, et non rediens per seipsum. Sicut, si aliquis se iri foveam proiiceret unde exire non posset nisi adiutus, posset dici quod in aeternum ibi manere voluit, quantumcumque aliud cogitaret. Vel potest dici, et melius, quod ex hoc ipso quod mortaliter peccat, finem suum in creatura constituit. Et quia ad finem vitae tota vita ordinatur, ideo ex hoc ipso totam vitam suam ordinat ad illud peccatum; et vellet perpetuo in peccato manere si hoc sibi esset impune. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, in XXXIV lib. Moral., super illud Iob 41, [23], aestimabit abyssum quasi senescentem: Iniqui ideo cum fine deliquerunt, quia cum fine vixerunt. Voluissent quippe sine fine vivere ut sine fine potuissent in suis iniquitatibus permanere: nam magis appetunt peccare quam vivere. Another reason is because man sinned in his own eternity; wherefore Gregory says (Dialogues 4), it belongs to the great justice of the judge that those should never cease to be punished, who in this life never ceased to desire sin. And if it be objected that some who sin mortally propose to amend their life at some time, and that these accordingly do not seem to deserve eternal punishment, it must be replied according to some that Gregory speaks of the will that is made manifest by the deed. For he who falls into mortal sin of his own will puts himself in a state whence he cannot be rescued, except God help him: wherefore from the very fact that he is willing to sin, he is willing to remain in sin forever. For man is a wind that goes, namely to sin, and does not return by his own power (Ps 77:39). Thus, if a man were to throw himself into a pit whence he could not get out without help, one might say that he wished to remain there forever, whatever else he may have thought himself. Another and a better answer is that from the very fact that he commits a mortal sin, he places his end in a creature; and since the whole of life is directed to its end, it follows that for this very reason he directs the whole of his life to that sin, and is willing to remain in sin forever, if he could do so with impunity. This is what Gregory says on Job 41:23, he shall esteem the deep as growing old: the wicked only put an end to sinning because their life came to an end: they would indeed have wished to live forever, that they might continue in sin forever, for they desire rather to sin than to live (Morals on Job 34). Potest et alia ratio assignari quare poena peccati mortalis sit aeterna: quia per eam contra Deum, qui est infinitus, peccatur. Unde, cum non posset esse infinita poena per intensionem, quia creatura non est capax alicuius qualitatis infinitae; requiritur quod sit saltem duratione infinita. Still another reason may be given why the punishment of mortal sin is eternal: because thereby one offends God, who is infinite. Wherefore, since punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, because the creature is incapable of an infinite quality, it must be infinite at least in duration. Est etiam quarta ratio ad hoc idem: quia culpa manet in aeternum; cum culpa non possit remitti sine gratia, quam homo non potest post mortem acquirere. Nec debet poena cessare quandiu culpa manet. And again there is a fourth reason for the same: because guilt remains forever, since it cannot be remitted without grace, and men cannot receive grace after death; nor should punishment cease so long as guilt remains. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod poena non debet aequari culpae secundum quantitatem durationis: ut videtur etiam secundum leges humanas accidere. Reply Obj. 1: Punishment has not to be equal to fault as to the amount of duration, as is seen to be the case also with human laws. Vel dicendum, sicut Gregorius solvit, quod, quamvis culpa sit actu temporalis, voluntate tamen est aeterna. We may also reply with Gregory (Dialogues 44) that although sin is temporal in act, it is eternal in will. Ad secundum dicendum quod quantitati peccati respondet quantitas poenae secundum intensionem. Et ideo peccatorum mortalium inaequalium erunt poenae inaequales intensione, aequales autem duratione. Reply Obj. 2: The degree of intensity in the punishment corresponds to the degree of gravity in the sin; wherefore mortal sins unequal in gravity will receive a punishment unequal in intensity, but equal in duration. Ad tertium dicendum quod poenae quae infliguntur his qui a civitatis societate non penitus eiiciuntur, sunt ad correctionem eorum ordinatae: sed illae poenae per quas aliqui totaliter a civitatis societate exterminantur, non sunt ad correctionem eorum. Possunt tamen esse ad correctionem et tranquillitatem aliorum qui in civitate remanent. Et ita damnatio aeterna impiorum est ad correctionem eorum qui nunc sunt in Ecclesia: non enim poenae sunt ad correctionem solum quando infliguntur; sed etiam quando determinantur. Reply Obj. 3: The punishments inflicted on those who are not altogether expelled from the society of their fellow-citizens are intended for their correction: whereas those punishments whereby certain persons are wholly banished from the society of their fellow-citizens are not intended for their correction, although they may be intended for the correction and tranquillity of the others who remain in the state. Accordingly, the damnation of the wicked is for the correction of those who are now in the Church; for punishments are intended for correction not only when they are being inflicted, but also when they are decreed. Ad quartum dicendum quod impiorum poenae in perpetuum duraturae non erunt omnino ad nihilum utiles. Sunt enim utiles ad duo. Primo, ad hoc quod in eis divina iustitia conservatur: quae est Deo accepta propter seipsam. Unde Gregorius, IV Dialog.: omnipotens Deus, quia pius est, miserorum cruciatu non pascitur. Quia autem iustus est, ab iniquorum ultione in perpetuum non sedatur. Reply Obj. 4: The everlasting punishment of the wicked will not be altogether useless. For they are useful for two purposes. First, because thereby the divine justice is safeguarded, which is acceptable to God for its own sake. Hence Gregory says (Dialogues 4): almighty God on account of his loving kindness delights not in the torments of the unhappy; but on account of his justice, he is forever unappeased by the punishment of the wicked. Secundo, ad hoc sunt utiles ut de his electi gaudeant, dum in his Dei iustitiam contemplantur, et cum hoc se evasisse cognoscunt. Unde Psalmo [57, 11]: laetabitur iustus cum viderit vindictam; et Isaiae 66, [24]: erunt, scilicet impii, usque ad satietatem visionis, scilicet sanctis, ut Glossa dicit. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, IV Dialog.: iniqui omnes, aeterno supplicio deputati, sua quidem iniquitate puniuntur: et tamen ad aliquid ardebunt, scilicet ut iusti omnes et in Deo videant gaudia quae perceperunt, et in illis percipiant supplicia quae evaserunt; quatenus tanto magis in aeternum divinae gratiae debitores se esse cognoscant, quanto in aeternum mala puniri conspiciunt, quae eius adiutorio vicerunt. Second, they are useful, because the elect rejoice therein when they see God’s justice in them, and realize that they have escaped them. Hence it is written: the just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge (Ps 57:12), and, they, namely, the wicked, shall be a loathsome sight to all flesh (Isa 66:24), namely, to the saints, as a Gloss says. Gregory expresses himself in the same sense (Dialogues 4): the wicked are all condemned to eternal punishment, and are punished for their own wickedness. Yet they will burn to some purpose, namely, that the just may all both see in God the joys they receive, and perceive in them the torments they have escaped: for which reason they will acknowledge themselves forever the debtors of divine grace the more that they will see how the evils which they overcame by its assistance are punished eternally. Ad quintum dicendum quod, quamvis poena per accidens respondeat animae, tamen per se respondet animae culpa infectae. Et quia culpa in perpetuum in ea manebit, ideo et poena perpetua erit. Reply Obj. 5: Although the punishment relates to the soul accidentally, it relates essentially to the soul infected with guilt. And since guilt will remain in the soul forever, its punishment also will be everlasting. Ad sextum dicendum quod poena respondet culpae, proprie loquendo, secundum inordinationem quae invenitur in ipsa, et non secundum dignitatem ipsius in quem peccatur: quia sic cuilibet peccato responderet poena infinita intensione. Quamvis ergo ex hoc quod aliquis peccat contra Deum, qui est Auctor essendi, mereatur ipsum esse amittere; considerata tamen ipsius actus inordinatione, non debetur ei amissio esse: quia esse praesupponitur ad meritum et demeritum, nec per inordinationem peccati esse tollitur vel corrumpitur. Et ideo non potest esse debita poena alicuius culpae privatio ipsius esse. Reply Obj. 6: Punishment corresponds to fault, properly speaking, in respect of the inordinateness in the fault, and not of the dignity in the person offended: for if the latter were the case, a punishment of infinite intensity would correspond to every sin. Accordingly, although a man deserves to lose his being from the fact that he has sinned against God, the author of his being, yet, in view of the inordinateness of the act itself, loss of being is not due to him, since being is presupposed to merit and demerit, nor is being lost or corrupted by the inordinateness of sin: and consequently privation of being cannot be the punishment due to any sin. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum per divinam misericordiam omnis poena terminetur tam hominum quam etiam daemonum Whether by God’s mercy all punishment of the damned, both men and demons, comes to an end? Videtur quod per divinam misericordiam omnis poena terminetur tam hominum quam etiam daemonum: Sap. 11, [24]: misereris omnium, Domine, quoniam omnia potes. Sed inter omnia etiam daemones continentur, qui sunt Dei creaturae. Ergo et ipsorum daemonum poena finietur. Objection 1: It would seem that by God’s mercy all punishment of the damned, both men and demons, comes to an end. For it is written: you have mercy upon all, O Lord, because you can do all things (Wis 11:24). But among all things the demons also are included, since they are God’s creatures. And therefore their punishment will come to an end. Praeterea, Rom. 11, [32]: conclusit Deus omnia sub peccato ut omnium misereatur. Sed Deus daemones sub peccato conclusit, idest, sub peccato concludi permisit. Ergo videtur quod etiam daemonum aliquando misereatur. Obj. 2: Further, God has concluded all in sin, that he may have mercy on all (Rom 11:32). Now God has concluded the demons under sin, that is to say, he permitted them to be concluded. Therefore, it would seem that he will have mercy even on the demons. Praeterea, sicut dicit Anselmus, in libro Cur Deus homo: non est iustum ut Deus creaturam quam fecit ad beatitudinem, omnino perire sinat. Ergo videtur, cum quaelibet creatura rationalis creata fuerit ad beatitudinem, non esse iustum ut omnino perire permittatur, Obj. 3: Further, as Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo II), it is not just that God should permit the utter loss of a creature which he made for happiness. Therefore, since every rational creature was created for happiness, it would seem unjust for it to be allowed to perish altogether. Sed contra: Est quod dicitur Matth. 25, [41]: ite, maledicti, in ignem aeternum, qui paratus est diabolo et angelis eius. Ergo aeternaliter punientur. On the contrary, It is written: depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels (Matt 25:41). Therefore, they will be punished eternally. Praeterea, sicut boni angeli effecti sunt beati per conversionem ad Deum, ita mali angeli effecti sunt miseri per aversionem a Deo. Si ergo miseria malorum angelorum finiatur quandoque, et beatitudo bonorum finem habebit. Quod est inconveniens. Further, Just as the good angels were made happy through turning to God, so the bad angels were made unhappy through turning away from God. Therefore, if the unhappiness of the wicked angels comes at length to an end, the happiness of the good will also come to an end, which is inadmissible. Respondeo dicendum quod error Origenis fuit, ut Augustinus, XXI de Civ. Dei, dicit, quod daemones quandoque per Dei misericordiam liberandi sunt a poenis. Sed iste error est ab Ecclesia reprobatus propter duo. Primo, quia manifeste auctoritati Scripturae repugnat, quae habet, Apoc. 20, [9–10]: diabolus, qui seducebat eos, missus est in stagnum ignis et sulphuris, ubi bestia et pseudoprophetae cruciabuntur die ac nocte in saecula saeculorum, per quod in Scriptura significari aeternitas consuevit. I answer that, As Augustine says (The City of God 21) Origen erred in maintaining that the demons will at length, through God’s mercy, be delivered from their punishment. Now, this error has been condemned by the Church for two reasons. First, because it is clearly contrary to the authority of Sacred Scripture: the devil who seduced them was cast into the pool of fire and brimstone, where both the beasts and the false prophets shall be tormented day and night forever and ever (Rev 20:9–10), which is the Scriptural expression for eternity. Secundo, quia ex una parte nimis Dei misericordiam extendebat, et ex alia parte nimis eam coarctabat. Eiusdem enim rationis esse videtur bonos angelos in aeterna beatitudine permanere, et malos angelos in aeternum puniri. Unde, sicut ponebat daemones et animas damnatorum quandoque a poena liberandas, ita ponebat angelos et animas beatorum quandoque a beatitudine in huius vitae miserias devolvendas. Second, because this opinion exaggerated God’s mercy in one direction and depreciated it in another. For it would seem equally reasonable for the good angels to remain in eternal happiness, and for the wicked angels to be eternally punished. Therefore, just as he maintained that the demons and the souls of the damned are to be delivered at length from their sufferings, so he maintained that the angels and the souls of the blessed will at length pass from their happy state to the unhappiness of this life. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod; Deus, quantum in ipso est, miseretur omnibus: sed quia eius misericordia sapientiae ordine regulatur, inde est quod ad quosdam non se extendit, qui se misericordiae fecerunt indignos, sicut daemones et damnati, qui sunt in malitia obstinati. Tamen potest dici quod etiam in eis misericordia locum habet, inquantum citra condignum puniuntur: non quod a poena totaliter absolvantur. Reply Obj. 1: God, for his own part, has mercy on all. Since, however, his mercy is ruled by the order of his wisdom, the result is that it does not reach to certain people who render themselves unworthy of that mercy, as do the demons and the damned, who are obstinate in wickedness. And yet we may say that even in them his mercy finds a place, insofar as they are punished less than they deserve condignly, but not that they are entirely delivered from punishment. Ad secundum dicendum quod ibi intelligenda est distributio pro generibus singulorum, et non pro singulis generum: ut intelligatur auctoritas de hominibus secundum statum viae; quia scilicet et Iudaeorum et gentilium misertus est, sed non omnium gentilium vel omnium Iudaeorum. Reply Obj. 2: In the words quoted the distribution [of the predicate] regards the genera and not the individuals: so that the statement applies to men in the state of wayfarer, inasmuch as he had mercy both on Jews and on Gentiles, but not on every Gentile or every Jew. Ad tertium dicendum quod Anselmus intelligit non esse iustum quantum ad decentiam divinae bonitatis: et loquitur de creatura secundum genus suum. Non enim est conveniens divinae bonitati ut totum unum genus creaturae deficiat a fine propter quod est factum. Unde nec omnes homines, nec omnes angelos damnari convenit. Sed nihil prohibet quin aliqui vel ex hominibus vel ex angelis in aeternum pereant: quia divinae voluntatis intentio impletur in aliis, qui salvantur. Reply Obj. 3: Anselm means that it is not just in the sense of becoming God’s goodness, and is speaking of the creature generically. For it becomes not the divine goodness that a whole genus of creature fail of the end for which it was made: wherefore it is unbecoming for all men or all angels to be damned. But there is no reason why some men or some angels should not perish forever, because the intention of the divine will is fulfilled in the others who are saved. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum divina misericordia patiatur homines in aeternum puniri Whether God’s mercy suffers at least men to be punished eternally? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod divina misericordia non patiatur saltem homines in aeternum puniri . Genes. 6, [3]: non permanebit spiritus meus in homine in aeternum, quia caro est: et accipitur ibi spiritus pro indignatione, ut patet per Glossam ibidem. Cum ergo indignatio Dei non sit aliud quam eius poena, non punientur aeternaliter. Objection 1: It would seem that God’s mercy does not suffer at least men to be punished eternally. For it is written: my spirit shall not remain in man forever because he is flesh (Gen 6:3); where spirit denotes indignation, as a Gloss observes. Therefore, since God’s indignation is not distinct from his punishment, man will not be punished eternally. Praeterea, caritas sanctorum in praesenti hoc facit ut pro inimicis exorent. Sed tunc habebunt perfectiorem caritatem. Ergo tunc orabunt pro inimicis damnatis. Sed orationes eorum esse cassae non poterunt: cum sint maxime Deo acceptae. Ergo precibus sanctorum divina misericordia damnatos quandoque a poena liberabit. Obj. 2: Further, the charity of the saints in this life makes them pray for their enemies. Now they will have more perfect charity in that life. Therefore, they will pray then for their enemies who are damned. But the prayers of the saints cannot be in vain, since they are most acceptable to God. Therefore, at the saints’ prayers the divine mercy will in time deliver the damned from their punishment. Praeterea, hoc quod Deus poenam damnatorum aeternam praedixit, ad prophetiam comminationis pertinet. Sed prophetia comminationis non semper impletur: quod patet per hoc quod dictum est de subversione Ninive, quae non fuit subversa sicut praedictum fuerat per prophetam, qui ex hoc etiam contristatus fuit. Ergo videtur quod multo amplius per divinam misericordiam comminatio poenae aeternae mutabitur in mitiorem sententiam, quando in nullius tristitiam, sed in omnium gaudium cedere poterit. Obj. 3: Further, God’s foretelling of the punishment of the damned belongs to the prophecy of condemnation. Now the prophecy of condemnation is not always fulfilled: as appears from what was said of the destruction of Nineveh (Jonah 3); and yet it was not destroyed as foretold by the prophet, who also was troubled for that very reason (Jonah 4:1). Therefore, it would seem that much more will the threat of eternal punishment be commuted by God’s mercy for a more lenient punishment, when this will be able to give sorrow to none, but joy to all. Praeterea, ad hoc facit quod in Psalmo [76, 8] dicitur: nunquid in aeternum irascetur Deus? Sed ira Dei est eius punitio. Ergo Deus in aeternum homines non puniet. Obj. 4: Further, the words of Ps. 76:8 are to the point, where it is said: will God then be angry forever? But God’s anger is his punishment. Therefore, God does not punish men eternally. Praeterea, Isaiae 14, super illud [v. 19], tu autem proiectus es etc., dicit Glossa: si omnes animae aliquando habebunt requiem, tu nunquam, loquens de diabolo. Ergo videtur quod omnes animae humanae aliquando requiem habebunt de poenis. Obj. 5: Further, a Gloss on Isaiah 14:19: but you are cast out, says, even though all souls shall have rest at last, you never shall: and it refers to the devil. Therefore, it would seem that all human souls shall at length have rest from their pains. Sed contra: Est quod dicitur Matth. 25, [46], simul de electis et reprobis: ibunt hi in supplicium aeternum; iusti autem in vitam aeternam. Sed inconveniens est ponere quod iustorum vita quandoque finiatur. Ergo inconveniens est ponere quod reproborum supplicium terminetur. On the contrary, It is written of the elect conjointly with the damned: these shall go into everlasting punishment: but the just, into life everlasting (Matt 25:46). But it is inadmissible that the life of the just will ever have an end. Therefore, it is inadmissible that the punishment of the damned will ever come to an end. Praeterea, sicut dicit Damascenus, hoc est hominibus mors quod angelis casus. Sed angeli post casum irreparabiles fuerunt. Ergo et homines post mortem. Et sic reproborum supplicium nunquam terminabitur. Further, As Damascene says (On the Orthodox Faith 2) death is to men what the fall was to the angels. Now after their fall the angels could not be restored. Therefore, neither can man after death: and thus the punishment of the damned will have no end.