Unde dico, quod ipsum esse rei est causa veritatis, secundum quod est in cognitione intellectus. Sed tamen ratio veritatis per prius invenitur in intellectu quam in re: sicut etiam calidum et frigidum, et aliae causae sanitatis, sunt causa sanitatis quae est in animali, et tamen animal per prius dicitur sanum, et signa sanitatis et causa sanitatis dicuntur sana secundum analogiam ad sanum quod de animali dicitur. Unde dico, quod verum per prius dicitur de veritate intellectus, et de enuntiatione dicitur inquantum est signum illius veritatis; de re autem dicitur, inquantum est causa. Whence I say that a real thing’s very existence is the cause of its truth insofar as it is in the cognition of the intellect; but nevertheless the account of truth is found within the intellect primarily, rather than within the reality. This is like how even the hot and cold and other causes of health are the cause of the health in an animal, and yet the animal is primarily called “healthy,” and the signs of health and the cause of health are called “healthy” according to an analogy with the “healthy” that is said of the animal. Whence I say that “true” is said primarily of the truth of the intellect, and of the statement insofar as it is a sign of that truth, whereas it is said of the real thing insofar as it is the cause of truth. Unde res dicitur vera quae nata est de se facere veram apprehensionem quantum ad ea quae apparent exterius in ipsa; et similiter dicitur falsa res quae nata est facere, quantum ad id quod apparet exterius de ipsa, falsam apprehensionem, sicut aurichalcum dicitur aurum falsum. Et inde est etiam quod homo dicitur falsus, qui dictis vel factis ostendit de se aliud quam sit; et per oppositum intelligitur veritas quae est virtus in dictis et factis consistens, ut dicit Philosophus, 5 Metaph. Whence, a real thing that is of itself naturally apt to cause a true apprehension, according to aspects that are apparent in it exteriorly, is called “true.” And likewise, a real thing that is naturally apt to cause a false apprehension, according to what is apparent about it exteriorly, is called “false”; for example, fool’s gold is called “false gold.” And this is why even a man is called “false” when he presents himself, by his words or deeds, as being other than he is; and one understands in the opposite way the truth that is the virtue consisting in words and deeds, as the Philosopher says. Utraque autem veritas, scilicet intellectus et rei, reducitur sicut in primum principium, in ipsum Deum; quia suum esse est causa omnis esse, et suum intelligere est causa omnis cognitionis. Et ideo ipse est prima veritas, sicut et primum ens: unumquodque enim ita se habet ad veritatem sicut ad esse, ut patet ex dictis. Et inde est quod prima causa essendi est prima causa veritatis et maxime vera, scilicet Deus, ut probat Philosophus, 2 Metaph. However, both truths—that is, the truth of the intellect and the truth of the real thing—are traced back to God himself as to the first principle. For his own existence is the cause of every existence, and his understanding is the cause of all knowledge. And therefore he is the first truth, just as he is the first being, for each and every thing stands to truth the way it stands to existence, as is clear from the things said. And this is why the first cause of existing is the first cause of truth, and is true most of all, that is, God, as the Philosopher proves. Veritas autem enuntiationis reducitur in prima principia per se nota sicut in primas causas; et praecipue in hoc principium, quod affirmatio et negatio non sunt simul vera, ut dicit Avicenna, 2 parte Logicae, cap. 4. Now, the truth of a statement is traced back to the first principles known through themselves, as to its first causes; and this is especially so in the principle that an affirmation and a denial are not true simultaneously, as Avicenna says. Sic ergo patet quomodo diversae definitiones de veritate dantur. Quaedam enim veritatis definitio datur secundum hoc quod veritas completur in manifestatione intellectus; sicut dicit Augustinus, lib. De vera religione, cap. 36: veritas est qua ostenditur id quod est; et Hilarius, 5 De Trinitate: verum est declarativum aut manifestativum esse. Quaedam autem datur de veritate secundum quod habet fundamentum in re, sicut illa Augustini, 2 Soliloq., cap. 5: verum est id quod est; et alia magistralis: verum est indivisio esse et ejus quod est; et alia Avicennae, tract. 8 Metaph.: veritas cujusque rei, est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum ei est. Quaedam autem datur secundum commensurationem ejus quod est in intellectu ad id quod est in re, sicut dicitur: veritas est adaequatio rei ad intellectum; et Augustinus, ubi supra: verum est quod ita se habet ut cognitori videtur si velit et possit cognoscere. Quaedam autem datur de veritate secundum quod appropriatur Filio, cui etiam appropriatur cognitio, scilicet ab Augustino, lib. De vera relig., cap. 36: veritas est summa similitudo principii quae sine ulla dissimilitudine est. Quaedam autem datur de veritate, comprehendens omnes veritatis acceptiones, scilicet: veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis. In rectitudine tangitur commensuratio; et in hoc quod dicitur sola mente perceptibilis, tangitur id quod complet rationem veritatis. Patet etiam ex dictis, quod veritas addit supra essentiam secundum rationem, scilicet ordinem ad cognitionem vel demonstrationem alicujus. Therefore in this way it is clear how the diverse definitions of truth are given. For one definition of truth is given insofar as truth is completed in the manifestation of the intellect, as when Augustine says, truth is that by which is shown that which is; and Hilary says, the true is existence made clear and manifest. Moreover, another definition of truth is given insofar as truth has its foundation in the real, as this one from Augustine: the true is that which is; and another from a master: the true is the non-division of existence and of that which is; and another one from Avicenna: the truth of each thing is the property of its existence that is its stability. However, another definition is given according to the commensuration of that which is in the intellect with that which is in the reality, as when it is said that truth is the reality’s being equal to the intellect; and Augustine speaks this way: the true is what exists just as it seems to the knower, if he wants to know it and is able to do so. However, another definition is given of truth insofar as it is appropriated to the Son, to whom knowledge is also appropriated; this is given by Augustine: truth is the supreme likeness of the principle, one that is without any unlikeness. But another definition is given of truth that embraces all the ways of taking truth, that is: truth is the rectitude perceptible only to the mind. In “rectitude” the commensuration is touched on, and in saying “perceptible only to the mind” that which completes the account of the truth is touched upon. It is also clear from the things said that “truth” adds something over and above “essence,” according to account, namely, the order to the knowledge or demonstration of it. Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod esse dicitur dupliciter: uno modo secundum quod ens significat essentiam rerum prout dividitur per decem genera; alio modo secundum quod esse significat compositionem quam anima facit; et istud ens Philosophus, 5 Metaph., appellat verum. Et similiter Augustinus, cum dicit quod verum est id quod est; quasi dicat: verum est quando dicitur de eo quod est; et similiter intelligitur quod dicitur: verum est indivisio esse et ejus quod est. Et si in negativis sit veritas quae non consistit in compositione, sed in divisione, tamen veritas negative fundatur supra veritatem affirmative, cujus signum est quod nulla negativa probatur nisi per aliquam affirmationem. Vel potest dici, quod definitiones istae dantur de vero non secundum completam sui rationem, sed secundum illud quod fundatur in re. Reply Obj. 1: “To be” is said in two ways: in one way, insofar as “being” signifies the essence of realities inasmuch as it is divided by the ten genera; in another way, insofar as “to be” signifies the composition that the soul makes, and this being the Philosopher calls the “true”; and so does Augustine, when he says the true is that which is, as if to say, “the true is when one says of a thing that it is”; and one should understand in a similar way the saying that the true is non-division of existence and of that which is. And if in denials there is a truth that does not consist in composition, but rather in division, truth said negatively is still founded upon truth said affirmatively; a sign of this is that no denial is proved except through some affirmation. Or it can be said that such definitions are given of the true not according to its complete account but insofar as it is founded on reality. Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut bonitas dicit rationem per quam essentia ordinatur ad appetitum, ita veritas dicit rationem per quam essentia ordinatur ad intellectum. Unde sicut nullum esse appetitur amota ratione boni, ita nullum esse intelligitur amota ratione veri. Nihilominus tamen alia est ratio veri et alia ratio entis. Reply Obj. 2: Just as “goodness” indicates an account through which an essence is ordered to appetite, so too “truth” indicates the account through which the essence is ordered to intellect. Whence, just as no existence is desired if the account of the good is removed, so too no existence is understood if the account of the true is removed. Nonetheless the account of the true is other than the account of a being. Dupliciter enim dicitur aliquid non posse intelligi sine altero. Aut ita quod unum non possit intelligi si non ponatur alterum esse; et sic dicitur quod esse non potest intelligi sine vero, sicut etiam non potest intelligi sine hoc quod est esse intelligibile. Sive ita quod quandocumque intelligitur unum, intelligatur alterum, sicut quicumque intelligit hominem intelligit animal. Et hoc modo “esse” potest intelligi sine vero, sed non e converso: quia verum non est in ratione entis, sed ens in ratione veri; sicut potest aliquis intelligere ens, et tamen non intelligit aliquid de ratione intelligibilitatis; sed nunquam potest intelligi intelligibile, secundum hanc rationem, nisi intelligatur ens. Unde etiam patet quod ens est prima conceptio intellectus. For in two ways is something said to be unintelligible without something else: either such that the one cannot be understood if the other is not asserted to be—and in this way one says that existence cannot be understood without the true, just as it also cannot be understood without the fact that it is intelligible existence; or such that whenever the one is understood, the other is understood—as whoever understands man, understands animal. And in this latter way “existence” can be understood without the true, but the converse is not the case, since the true is not in the account of a being, whereas a being is in the account of the true. For example, someone can understand a being, and yet not understand anything of the account of intelligibility, whereas one can never understand the intelligible, according to this account, unless a being is understood. Whence it is also clear that being is the first conception of the intellect. Ad tertium dicendum, quod verum addit supra ens, sicut et bonum et unum. Nullum tamen eorum addit aliquam differentiam contrahentem ens, sed rationem quae consequitur omne ens; sicut unum addit rationem indivisionis, et bonum rationem finis, et verum rationem ordinis ad cognitionem; et ideo haec quatuor convertuntur, ens, bonum, unum et verum. Reply Obj. 3: “True” adds something over and above “being” just as both “good” and “one” do. Nonetheless, none of these add any difference that contracts being, but rather an account that follows upon every being. For example, “one” adds the account of non-division, and “good” the account of the end, and “true” the account of order to knowledge. And therefore these four—being, good, one, and true—are convertible. Ad quartum dicendum, quod rectitudo dicitur de bonitate, justitia et veritate metaphorice, secundum diversas rationes. Invenitur enim in recto quaedam aequalis proportio principii, medii et finis; unde secundum hoc quod aliquis in distribuendo vel communicando, mensuram aequalitatis justitiae servat, vel mensuram praecepti legis, dicitur rectitudo justitiae; secundum autem quod aliquid non egreditur commensurationem finis, dicitur rectitudo bonitatis; secundum autem quod non egreditur ordinem commensurationis rei et intellectus, dicitur rectitudo veritatis. Reply Obj. 4: “Rectitude” is said of goodness, justice, and truth metaphorically, according to diverse accounts. For one finds in something rectified a certain equal proportion of beginning, middle, and end. Whence insofar as someone engaged in distributing or sharing upholds the measure of the equality of justice, or the measure of a precept of law, there is said to be a rectitude of justice. But insofar as something does not deviate from the commensuration of its end, there is said to be a rectitude of goodness. Moreover, insofar as it does not deviate from the order of commensuration of the reality and the understanding, there is said to be a rectitude of truth. Ad quintum dicendum, quod, secundum Avicennam, tract. 2 Metaph., cap. 1, de eo quod nullo modo est, non potest aliquid enuntiari; ad minus enim oportet quod illud de quo aliquid enuntiatur, sit apprehensum; et ita habet aliquod esse ad minus in intellectu apprehendente; et ita constat quod semper veritati respondet aliquod esse; nec oportet quod semper respondeat sibi esse in re extra animam, cum ratio veritatis compleatur in ratione animae. Reply Sed Contra 5: According to Avicenna, nothing can be stated about that which in no way is. For that of which anything is stated must at least be apprehended, and in this way it has a certain existence, at least in the apprehending intellect. And thus it is certain that some existence always corresponds to a truth; nor is it necessary that there always corresponds to it an existence in a real thing outside the soul, since the account of truth is completed in the account of the soul. Ad sextum dicendum, quod quamvis esse sit in rebus sensibilibus, tamen rationem essendi, vel intentionem entis, sensus non apprehendit, sicut nec aliquam formam substantialem, nisi per accidens, sed tantum accidentia sensibilia. Ita etiam quamvis veritas sit in rebus sensibilibus, prout dicitur esse veritas in rebus, tamen intentio veritatis solo intellectu percipitur. Reply Sed Contra 6: Although existence is in sensible realities, still sensation does not apprehend the account of existing, or the intention of a being—just as neither does it apprehend any substantial form, except incidentally, but apprehends only sensible accidents. So too, even though truth is in sensible things insofar as truth is said to be in real things, nonetheless the intention of truth is perceived by the intellect alone. Ad septimum dicendum, quod cum sit duplex operatio intellectus: una quarum dicitur a quibusdam imaginatio intellectus, quam Philosophus, 3 De anima, nominat intelligentiam indivisibilium, quae consistit in apprehensione quidditatis simplicis, quae alio etiam nomine formatio dicitur; alia est quam dicunt fidem, quae consistit in compositione vel divisione propositionis: prima operatio respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius. Et quia ratio veritatis fundatur in esse, et non in quidditate, ut dictum est, ideo veritas et falsitas proprie invenitur in secunda operatione, et in signo ejus quod est enuntiatio, et non in prima, vel signo ejus quod est definitio, nisi secundum quid; sicut etiam quidditatis esse est quoddam esse rationis, et secundum istud esse dicitur veritas in prima operatione intellectus: per quem etiam modum dicitur definitio vera. Reply Sed Contra 7: The activity of the intellect is of two sorts: one that some call the “imagination of the intellect,” which the Philosopher names “the understanding of indivisibles,” which consists in the apprehension of what a simple thing is, and which by another name is called “formation”; the other that they call “belief,” which consists in the composition or division of a proposition. Therefore the first activity looks to what a reality is, and the second looks to its existence. And because the account of truth is founded on existence, and not on “whatness,” as was said in the body, therefore truth and falsity are properly speaking founded on the second activity, and on its sign, which is a statement, and not on the first, or its sign, which is a definition, except in a certain respect. This is just as even the existence of a “whatness” is a certain existence of an account, and according to that the existence is called “truth” in the first activity of the intellect. And thereby even a definition is called “true.” Sed huic veritati non adjungitur falsitas per se, quia intellectus habet verum judicium de proprio objecto, in quod naturaliter tendit, quod est quidditas rei, sicut et visus de colore; sed per accidens admiscetur falsitas, scilicet ratione affirmationis vel negationis annexae, quod contingit dupliciter: vel ex comparatione definitionis ad definitum, et tunc dicitur definitio falsa respectu alicujus et non simpliciter, sicut definitio circuli est falsa de triangulo; vel in respectu partium definitionis ad invicem, in quibus implicatur impossibilis affirmatio; sicut definitio vacui, quod est locus in quo nullum corpus est; et haec definitio dicitur falsa simpliciter, ut in 5 Metaph., dicitur. Sed hoc non contingit nisi in quidditatibus compositorum: quia in quidditatibus rerum simplicium non deficit intellectus, nisi ex hoc quod omnino nihil intelligit, ut in 9 Metaph., dicitur. But to this truth is not joined falsity through itself, since the intellect has a true judgment about its proper object, to which it tends naturally—which is the “whatness” of the real—just as sight is related to color. But falsity is mixed with it incidentally, that is, by reason of an affirmation or denial joined to it. This happens in two ways: either through the connecting of the definition with the thing defined—and thereby the definition is called “false” in relation to a thing, and not simply, the way that the definition of a circle is false when said of a triangle; or in the reference of the parts of the definition to each other, wherein an impossible affirmation is implied—for example, the definition of a void, which is a place in which there is no body. And this definition is false simply speaking, as is said in Metaphysics 5. But this can happen only in the “whatnesses” of composite things, since in the “whatnesses” of simple realities the intellect fails only if it understands absolutely nothing, as is said in Metaphysics 9. Secundae autem operationi admiscetur falsitas etiam per se: non quidem quantum ad primas affirmationes quas naturaliter intellectus cognoscit, ut sunt dignitates, sed quantum ad consequentes: quia rationem inducendo contingit errare per applicationem unius ad aliud. Patet igitur ex dictis, quod verum proprie loquendo, quod invenitur tantum in complexis, non impedit conversionem veri et entis: quia quaelibet res incomplexa habet esse suum, quod non accipitur ab intellectu nisi per modum complexionis; et ideo ipsa ratione quam addit verum supra ens, scilicet ordinem ad intellectum, sequitur ista differentia, quod verum sit complexorum, et ens dicatur de re extra animam incomplexa. However, falsity is mixed with the second activity even through itself—but not as regards the first affirmations that the intellect naturally knows, as are the axioms, but as regards consequent ones. For it is possible for the reason, by inducing, to err through an application of one thing to something else. Therefore it is clear from things said above that the true properly speaking, which is found only in complex things, does not impede the convertibility of the true and being. For every non-complex reality has its own existence that is not received by the intellect except through the mode of composition, and therefore by the very account that “true” adds over and above “being,” that is, the order to the intellect, there follows this difference: that the “true” belongs to complex things, and “being” is said of a non-complex reality outside the soul. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, ens est prima intentio intellectus; unde enti non potest aliquid opponi per modum contrarietatis vel privationis, sed solum per modum negationis: quia sicut ipsum non fundatur in aliquo, ita nec oppositum suum; opposita enim sunt circa idem. Sed unum, verum et bonum, secundum proprias intentiones, fundantur supra intentionem entis, et ideo possunt habere oppositionem contrarietatis vel privationis fundatae super ens, sicut et ipsa super ens fundantur. Unde patet quod non eodem modo se habet verum, et falsum, et malum, et bonum, sicut ens et non ens, nisi accipiatur non ens particulariter pro remotione alicujus cui substernitur aliquod ens. Unde sicut quaelibet privatio entis particularis fundatur in bono, sic et falsum fundatur in aliquo vero sicut in aliquo esse. Unde sicut illud in quo est falsitas vel malitia, est aliquod ens, sed non est ens completum: ita etiam illud quod est malum vel falsum est aliquod bonum vel verum incompletum. Reply Sed Contra 8: As has been said in the body, being is the first intention of the intellect. Whence nothing can be opposed to being through the mode of contrariety or privation, but only through the mode of negation. For just as it itself is not founded on anything, so neither is its opposite, since opposites are concerned with the same thing. But one, true, and good, according to their own proper intentions, are founded on the intention of being, and therefore they can have an opposition of contrariety or privation founded on being, just as they themselves are founded on being. Whence it is clear that true and false, and evil and good, do not stand to each other the way being and non-being do, unless one takes “non-being” in a particular way, as the removal of something under which stands a certain being. This is why, just as every privation of a particular being is founded on a good, so too the false is founded on something true, just as it is founded on some existence. Whence, just as that in which there is falsity or evil is some being, but is not a complete being, so too that which is evil or false is some incomplete good or truth. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum omnia sint vera veritate increata Whether all things are true by the uncreated truth Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia sint vera una veritate quae est veritas increata. To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that all things are true by the one truth that is uncreated truth. Sicut enim dictum est in solutione praecedentis articuli, verum dicitur analogice de illis in quibus est veritas, sicut sanitas de omnibus sanis. Sed una est sanitas numero a qua denominatur animal sanum, sicut subjectum ejus, et medicina sana, sicut causa ejus, et urina sana, sicut signum ejus. Ergo videtur quod una sit veritas qua omnia dicuntur vera. Obj. 1: For, as was said in the solution of the previous article, “true” is said analogically of the things wherein there is truth, just as “health” is said of all healthy things. But the health from which the animal is denominated “healthy,” as its subject, the medicine “healthy,” as its cause, and the urine “healthy,” as its sign, is numerically one health. Therefore the truth by which all things are called “true” is one. Praeterea, omnis rectitudo attenditur per aliquam mensuram. Sed veritas est rectitudo quaedam. Cum igitur videamus omnibus temporalibus respondere unum tempus quasi mensuram, videtur etiam quod omnibus veris respondeat una veritas, secundum quam dicantur vera. Obj. 2: Furthermore, every rectitude is viewed through a certain measure. But truth is a certain rectitude. Therefore, since we see one time corresponding to all temporal things as their measure, it also seems that one truth corresponds to all truths, according to which they are called “true.” Praeterea, sicut se habet bonitas ad bona, ita se habet veritas ad vera. Sed omnia sunt bona una bonitate. Unde Augustinus, lib. 8 De Trinit., c. 3: bonus est homo, bona est facies, bonum est hoc et illud. Tolle hoc et illud, et videbis bonum omnis boni. Unde videtur quod sit una bonitas numero in omnibus participata, secundum quam dicuntur bona. Ergo videtur quod similiter omnia dicantur vera una veritate, quae est veritas increata. Obj. 3: Furthermore, as goodness stands to goods, so does truth to truths. But all things are good by one goodness; this is why Augustine says, a man is good, a face is good, this and that are goods. Take away the this and the that, and you will see the good of every good. Whence it seems that there is numerically one goodness in all things participating in it, according to which they are called “good.” Therefore it seems that, similarly, all things are called “true” by one truth, which is the uncreated truth. Si dicas quod omnia dicuntur vera veritate increata exemplariter; Obj. 4: You might say that all things are called “true” by the uncreated truth as their exemplar. contra. Uniuscujusque formae exemplar est in Deo, quod est creatrix essentia. Si igitur hoc sufficeret ut omnia dicerentur vera veritate increata, quia exemplantur ab ipsa, videtur quod similiter omnia possent dici colorata, quia exemplantur colore, qui est in Deo exemplariter: quod est inconveniens. On the contrary, the exemplar of each and every form is in God, which exemplar is the creative essence. Therefore, if this were enough so that all things could be called “true” by the uncreated truth, because they are based on it as their exemplar, it seems that likewise all things could be called “colored” because they are based on an exemplar color, which is in God in an exemplary way—which is incongruous. Contra, mala fieri est verum. Sed nullum malum est a Deo. Ergo videtur quod non omnia vera sint vera veritate increata. On the contrary (5), it is true that evil things come to be. But no evil is from God. Therefore it seems that not all truths are true by the uncreated truth. Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, ratio veritatis in duobus consistit: in esse rei, et in apprehensione virtutis cognoscitivae proportionata ad esse rei. Utrumque autem horum quamvis, ut dictum est, reducatur in Deum sicut in causam efficientem et exemplarem; nihilominus tamen quaelibet res participat suum esse creatum, quo formaliter est, et unusquisque intellectus participat lumen per quod recte de re judicat, quod quidem est exemplatum a lumine increato. Habet etiam intellectus suam operationem in se, ex qua completur ratio veritatis. Unde dico, quod sicut est unum esse divinum quo omnia sunt, sicut a principio effectivo exemplari, nihilominus tamen in rebus diversis est diversum esse, quo formaliter res est; ita etiam est una veritas, scilicet divina, qua omnia vera sunt, sicut principio effectivo exemplari; nihilominus sunt plures veritates in rebus creatis, quibus dicuntur verae formaliter. I answer that, as was said in the previous article, the account of truth consists in two things: in a reality’s existence, and in the apprehension of a cognitive power proportioned to the reality’s existence. However, although each of these, as was said above, is traced back to God as to the efficient and exemplar cause, nonetheless every real thing participates in its own created existence by which it formally exists, and each and every intellect participates in the light through which it rightly judges the real thing, which light is based on an exemplar, the uncreated Light. Also, the intellect has its own activity in itself due to which the account of truth is completed. Whence I say that, just as there is one divine Existence by which all things exist as derived from an exemplar efficient principle—even though there is a distinct existence in distinct real things, by which existence a real thing formally exists—so too there is also one truth, the divine truth, by which all truths are true as derived from an exemplar efficient principle. Nonetheless, in the created realities there are many truths, by which they are formally called “true.” Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur secundum analogiam tripliciter: vel secundum intentionem tantum, et non secundum esse; et hoc est quando una intentio refertur ad plura per prius et posterius, quae tamen non habet esse nisi in uno; sicut intentio sanitatis refertur ad animal, urinam et dietam diversimode, secundum prius et posterius; non tamen secundum diversum esse, quia esse sanitatis non est nisi in animali. Vel secundum esse et non secundum intentionem; et hoc contingit quando plura parificantur in intentione alicujus communis, sed illud commune non habet esse unius rationis in omnibus, sicut omnia corpora parificantur in intentione corporeitatis. Unde logicus, qui considerat intentiones tantum, dicit, hoc nomen, corpus, de omnibus corporibus univoce praedicari: sed esse hujus naturae non est ejusdem rationis in corporibus corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus. Unde quantum ad metaphysicum et naturalem, qui considerant res secundum suum esse, nec hoc nomen, corpus, nec aliquid aliud dicitur univoce de corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus, ut patet, 10 Metaph., ex Philosopho et Commentatore. Vel secundum intentionem et secundum esse; et hoc est quando neque parificatur in intentione communi, neque in esse; sicut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente; et de talibus oportet quod natura communis habeat aliquod esse in unoquoque eorum de quibus dicitur, sed differens secundum rationem majoris vel minoris perfectionis. Et similiter dico, quod veritas, et bonitas, et omnia hujusmodi dicuntur analogice de Deo et creaturis. Unde oportet quod secundum suum esse omnia haec in Deo sint, et in creaturis secundum rationem majoris perfectionis et minoris; ex quo sequitur, cum non possint esse secundum unum esse utrobique, quod sint diversae veritates. Reply Obj. 1: Something is said according to analogy in three ways. One is with respect to the intention alone, and not to existence. And this is when one intention is related to many things as prior and posterior, while it nevertheless has existence only in one. For example, the intention of health is referred to the animal, the urine, and the diet in diverse ways, according to priority and posteriority, and yet not according to a diverse existence; for the existence of health is only in the animal. A second is with respect to existence, and not intention. And this happens when many things are equivalent in the intention of something common, but that common thing does not have an existence of one account in all of them. For example, all bodies are equivalent in the intention of corporeity; this is why the logician, who considers only intentions, says that this name “body” is predicated of all bodies univocally. But the existence of this nature is not of the same account in corruptible and incorruptible bodies; whence as regards the metaphysician and natural scientist, who consider realities according to their own existence, neither this name “body” nor anything else is said univocally of corruptible and incorruptible things, as is clear in Metaphysics 10, both according to the Philosopher and the Commentator. The third is with respect to both the intention and the existence. And this is when it is equivalent neither in a common intention nor in existence; for example, “being” is said of both substance and accident. Of such things the common nature must have some existence in each of the things of which it is said, but it differs according to the account of greater or lesser perfection. And likewise I say that “truth,” “goodness,” and all such things are said of God and created things analogically. Whence according to their own existence all these things are in God, and in created things according to the account of greater and lesser perfection; from this it follows that, since they cannot exist according to one existence in each, they are distinct truths. Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum veritas sit quaedam rectitudo et commensuratio, oportet quod in ratione veritatis intelligatur mensura, et, sicut dictum est, oportet esse commensurationem rei ad intellectum, ut compleatur ratio veritatis. Res autem diversimode se habent ad diversos intellectus: quia intellectus divinus est causa rei; unde oportet quod res mensuretur per intellectum divinum cum unumquodque mensuretur per suum primum principium; et ideo dicit Anselmus, De ver., cap. 7, quod res dicitur esse vera quando implet hoc ad quod est ordinata in intellectu divino. Reply Obj. 2: Since truth is a certain rectitude and commensuration, in the account of truth one must understand measure, and, as was said in the body of the article, there must be a commensuration of the real thing with the intellect, so that the account of truth might be completed. However, realities stand in diverse ways to diverse intellects, since the divine intellect is the reality’s cause; this is why the real is measured by the divine intellect, because each thing is measured through its own first principle. Whence Anselm says that a reality is said to be true when it fulfills that to which it was ordered in the divine intellect. Sed res se habent ad intellectum nostrum sicut causa, inquantum scilicet intellectus accipit a rebus; et inde est quod scientia nostra non mensurat res, sed mensuratur ab eis, ut dicitur 10 Metaph. Non enim ita ideo est in re, quia sic videtur nobis; sed magis quia ita est in re, verum est quod videtur nobis. But realities stand to our intellect as a cause, that is, insofar as the intellect receives from the realities. This is why our knowledge does not measure realities, but is measured by them, as is said in Metaphysics 10. For it is not so in reality because we see it is so; but rather, because it is so in reality, what we see is true. Sic ergo intellectus divinus est ut mensura prima, non mensurata: res autem est mensura secunda, mensurata; intellectus autem noster est mensuratus et non mensurans. Dico igitur, quod prima mensura veritatis est una tantum; sed mensurae secundae, scilicet ipsae res, sunt plures; unde sunt plures veritates. Et si non esset nisi una mensura veritatis, adhuc non sequeretur quod esset tantum una veritas; quia veritas non est mensura, sed commensuratio vel adaequatio; et respectu unius mensurae possunt esse diversae commensurationes in diversis. Unde non est simile de tempore, quia tempus est ipsa mensura. Therefore in this way the divine intellect is as the first unmeasured measure, whereas reality is the second measure, a measured measure, and moreover, our intellect is measured, and is not a measure. Therefore I say that the first measure of truth is only one, but the second measure, that is, realities themselves, are many, so there are many truths. And if there were only one measure of truth, still it would not follow that there is only one truth; for truth is not the measure, but its commensuration or equalization, and with respect to one measure there can be diverse commensurations in diverse things. Whence this is not like time, since time is itself a measure. Ad tertium dicendum, quod similiter dico de bonitate, quod est una bonitas, qua sicut principio effectivo exemplari omnia sunt bona. Sed tamen bonitas qua unumquodque formaliter est bonum, diversa est in diversis. Sed quia bonitas universalis non invenitur in aliqua creatura, sed particulata, et secundum aliquid; ideo dicit Augustinus, quod si removeamus omnes rationes particulationis ab ipsa bonitate, remanebit in intellectu bonitas integra et plena, quae est bonitas divina, quae videtur in bonitate creata sicut exemplar in exemplato. Reply Obj. 3: Likewise, I say of goodness that there is one goodness by which, as by an efficient exemplar principle, all goods are good. But nevertheless the goodness by which each thing is formally good is diverse in diverse things. But because universal goodness is not found in any created thing, but a partial goodness, and goodness in a certain respect, this is why Augustine says that, if we remove all accounts of partialness from goodness itself, there will remain in the intellect the integral and full goodness that is the divine goodness. And this is seen in created goodness as an exemplar is seen in what is based on it. Ad quartum dicendum, quod exemplar rerum est in Deo dupliciter. Vel quantum ad id quod est in intellectu suo, et sic secundum ideas est exemplar intellectus divinus omnium quae ab ipso sunt, sicut intellectus artificis per formam artis omnium artificiatorum. Vel quantum ad id quod est in natura sua, sicut ratione suae bonitatis qua est bonus, est exemplar omnis bonitatis; et similiter est de veritate. Unde patet quod non eodem modo Deus est exemplar coloris et veritatis, et ideo objectio non procedit. Reply Obj. 4: The exemplar of realities is in God in two ways: either with regard to what is in his intellect—and in this way, the divine intellect with respect to its ideas is the exemplar of all things that are from him, just as an artisan’s intellect, through the form of the art, is for all the artwork—or with regard to what is in his nature, just as by the account of his own goodness, by which he is good, he is the exemplar of every goodness. And the same is true of truth. Whence it is clear that God is not the exemplar of color and truth in the same way, and therefore the objection does not follow. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod quamvis malum non sit bonum, nec sit a Deo, nihilominus intelligere malum bonum est, et a Deo est; et ideo veritas quae consistit in commensuratione intellectus ad privationem existentem extra animam, bona est, et a Deo; et ideo dicit Ambrosius, Sup. 12 cap. 1 ad Cor., quod omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, a Spiritu Sancto est. Reply Sed Contra 5: Although evil is not good, nor is it from God, nonetheless to understand evil is good, and is from God. And therefore a truth that consists in the commensuration of the intellect to a privation existing outside the soul, is good, and from God. And this is why Ambrose says that everything true, regardless who says it, is from the Holy Spirit. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum sint plures veritates aeternae Whether there are several eternal truths Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod sint plures veritates aeternae. To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that several truths are eternal.