Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, ratio veritatis in duobus consistit: in esse rei, et in apprehensione virtutis cognoscitivae proportionata ad esse rei. Utrumque autem horum quamvis, ut dictum est, reducatur in Deum sicut in causam efficientem et exemplarem; nihilominus tamen quaelibet res participat suum esse creatum, quo formaliter est, et unusquisque intellectus participat lumen per quod recte de re judicat, quod quidem est exemplatum a lumine increato. Habet etiam intellectus suam operationem in se, ex qua completur ratio veritatis. Unde dico, quod sicut est unum esse divinum quo omnia sunt, sicut a principio effectivo exemplari, nihilominus tamen in rebus diversis est diversum esse, quo formaliter res est; ita etiam est una veritas, scilicet divina, qua omnia vera sunt, sicut principio effectivo exemplari; nihilominus sunt plures veritates in rebus creatis, quibus dicuntur verae formaliter. I answer that, as was said in the previous article, the account of truth consists in two things: in a reality’s existence, and in the apprehension of a cognitive power proportioned to the reality’s existence. However, although each of these, as was said above, is traced back to God as to the efficient and exemplar cause, nonetheless every real thing participates in its own created existence by which it formally exists, and each and every intellect participates in the light through which it rightly judges the real thing, which light is based on an exemplar, the uncreated Light. Also, the intellect has its own activity in itself due to which the account of truth is completed. Whence I say that, just as there is one divine Existence by which all things exist as derived from an exemplar efficient principle—even though there is a distinct existence in distinct real things, by which existence a real thing formally exists—so too there is also one truth, the divine truth, by which all truths are true as derived from an exemplar efficient principle. Nonetheless, in the created realities there are many truths, by which they are formally called “true.” Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur secundum analogiam tripliciter: vel secundum intentionem tantum, et non secundum esse; et hoc est quando una intentio refertur ad plura per prius et posterius, quae tamen non habet esse nisi in uno; sicut intentio sanitatis refertur ad animal, urinam et dietam diversimode, secundum prius et posterius; non tamen secundum diversum esse, quia esse sanitatis non est nisi in animali. Vel secundum esse et non secundum intentionem; et hoc contingit quando plura parificantur in intentione alicujus communis, sed illud commune non habet esse unius rationis in omnibus, sicut omnia corpora parificantur in intentione corporeitatis. Unde logicus, qui considerat intentiones tantum, dicit, hoc nomen, corpus, de omnibus corporibus univoce praedicari: sed esse hujus naturae non est ejusdem rationis in corporibus corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus. Unde quantum ad metaphysicum et naturalem, qui considerant res secundum suum esse, nec hoc nomen, corpus, nec aliquid aliud dicitur univoce de corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus, ut patet, 10 Metaph., ex Philosopho et Commentatore. Vel secundum intentionem et secundum esse; et hoc est quando neque parificatur in intentione communi, neque in esse; sicut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente; et de talibus oportet quod natura communis habeat aliquod esse in unoquoque eorum de quibus dicitur, sed differens secundum rationem majoris vel minoris perfectionis. Et similiter dico, quod veritas, et bonitas, et omnia hujusmodi dicuntur analogice de Deo et creaturis. Unde oportet quod secundum suum esse omnia haec in Deo sint, et in creaturis secundum rationem majoris perfectionis et minoris; ex quo sequitur, cum non possint esse secundum unum esse utrobique, quod sint diversae veritates. Reply Obj. 1: Something is said according to analogy in three ways. One is with respect to the intention alone, and not to existence. And this is when one intention is related to many things as prior and posterior, while it nevertheless has existence only in one. For example, the intention of health is referred to the animal, the urine, and the diet in diverse ways, according to priority and posteriority, and yet not according to a diverse existence; for the existence of health is only in the animal. A second is with respect to existence, and not intention. And this happens when many things are equivalent in the intention of something common, but that common thing does not have an existence of one account in all of them. For example, all bodies are equivalent in the intention of corporeity; this is why the logician, who considers only intentions, says that this name “body” is predicated of all bodies univocally. But the existence of this nature is not of the same account in corruptible and incorruptible bodies; whence as regards the metaphysician and natural scientist, who consider realities according to their own existence, neither this name “body” nor anything else is said univocally of corruptible and incorruptible things, as is clear in Metaphysics 10, both according to the Philosopher and the Commentator. The third is with respect to both the intention and the existence. And this is when it is equivalent neither in a common intention nor in existence; for example, “being” is said of both substance and accident. Of such things the common nature must have some existence in each of the things of which it is said, but it differs according to the account of greater or lesser perfection. And likewise I say that “truth,” “goodness,” and all such things are said of God and created things analogically. Whence according to their own existence all these things are in God, and in created things according to the account of greater and lesser perfection; from this it follows that, since they cannot exist according to one existence in each, they are distinct truths. Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum veritas sit quaedam rectitudo et commensuratio, oportet quod in ratione veritatis intelligatur mensura, et, sicut dictum est, oportet esse commensurationem rei ad intellectum, ut compleatur ratio veritatis. Res autem diversimode se habent ad diversos intellectus: quia intellectus divinus est causa rei; unde oportet quod res mensuretur per intellectum divinum cum unumquodque mensuretur per suum primum principium; et ideo dicit Anselmus, De ver., cap. 7, quod res dicitur esse vera quando implet hoc ad quod est ordinata in intellectu divino. Reply Obj. 2: Since truth is a certain rectitude and commensuration, in the account of truth one must understand measure, and, as was said in the body of the article, there must be a commensuration of the real thing with the intellect, so that the account of truth might be completed. However, realities stand in diverse ways to diverse intellects, since the divine intellect is the reality’s cause; this is why the real is measured by the divine intellect, because each thing is measured through its own first principle. Whence Anselm says that a reality is said to be true when it fulfills that to which it was ordered in the divine intellect. Sed res se habent ad intellectum nostrum sicut causa, inquantum scilicet intellectus accipit a rebus; et inde est quod scientia nostra non mensurat res, sed mensuratur ab eis, ut dicitur 10 Metaph. Non enim ita ideo est in re, quia sic videtur nobis; sed magis quia ita est in re, verum est quod videtur nobis. But realities stand to our intellect as a cause, that is, insofar as the intellect receives from the realities. This is why our knowledge does not measure realities, but is measured by them, as is said in Metaphysics 10. For it is not so in reality because we see it is so; but rather, because it is so in reality, what we see is true. Sic ergo intellectus divinus est ut mensura prima, non mensurata: res autem est mensura secunda, mensurata; intellectus autem noster est mensuratus et non mensurans. Dico igitur, quod prima mensura veritatis est una tantum; sed mensurae secundae, scilicet ipsae res, sunt plures; unde sunt plures veritates. Et si non esset nisi una mensura veritatis, adhuc non sequeretur quod esset tantum una veritas; quia veritas non est mensura, sed commensuratio vel adaequatio; et respectu unius mensurae possunt esse diversae commensurationes in diversis. Unde non est simile de tempore, quia tempus est ipsa mensura. Therefore in this way the divine intellect is as the first unmeasured measure, whereas reality is the second measure, a measured measure, and moreover, our intellect is measured, and is not a measure. Therefore I say that the first measure of truth is only one, but the second measure, that is, realities themselves, are many, so there are many truths. And if there were only one measure of truth, still it would not follow that there is only one truth; for truth is not the measure, but its commensuration or equalization, and with respect to one measure there can be diverse commensurations in diverse things. Whence this is not like time, since time is itself a measure. Ad tertium dicendum, quod similiter dico de bonitate, quod est una bonitas, qua sicut principio effectivo exemplari omnia sunt bona. Sed tamen bonitas qua unumquodque formaliter est bonum, diversa est in diversis. Sed quia bonitas universalis non invenitur in aliqua creatura, sed particulata, et secundum aliquid; ideo dicit Augustinus, quod si removeamus omnes rationes particulationis ab ipsa bonitate, remanebit in intellectu bonitas integra et plena, quae est bonitas divina, quae videtur in bonitate creata sicut exemplar in exemplato. Reply Obj. 3: Likewise, I say of goodness that there is one goodness by which, as by an efficient exemplar principle, all goods are good. But nevertheless the goodness by which each thing is formally good is diverse in diverse things. But because universal goodness is not found in any created thing, but a partial goodness, and goodness in a certain respect, this is why Augustine says that, if we remove all accounts of partialness from goodness itself, there will remain in the intellect the integral and full goodness that is the divine goodness. And this is seen in created goodness as an exemplar is seen in what is based on it. Ad quartum dicendum, quod exemplar rerum est in Deo dupliciter. Vel quantum ad id quod est in intellectu suo, et sic secundum ideas est exemplar intellectus divinus omnium quae ab ipso sunt, sicut intellectus artificis per formam artis omnium artificiatorum. Vel quantum ad id quod est in natura sua, sicut ratione suae bonitatis qua est bonus, est exemplar omnis bonitatis; et similiter est de veritate. Unde patet quod non eodem modo Deus est exemplar coloris et veritatis, et ideo objectio non procedit. Reply Obj. 4: The exemplar of realities is in God in two ways: either with regard to what is in his intellect—and in this way, the divine intellect with respect to its ideas is the exemplar of all things that are from him, just as an artisan’s intellect, through the form of the art, is for all the artwork—or with regard to what is in his nature, just as by the account of his own goodness, by which he is good, he is the exemplar of every goodness. And the same is true of truth. Whence it is clear that God is not the exemplar of color and truth in the same way, and therefore the objection does not follow. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod quamvis malum non sit bonum, nec sit a Deo, nihilominus intelligere malum bonum est, et a Deo est; et ideo veritas quae consistit in commensuratione intellectus ad privationem existentem extra animam, bona est, et a Deo; et ideo dicit Ambrosius, Sup. 12 cap. 1 ad Cor., quod omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, a Spiritu Sancto est. Reply Sed Contra 5: Although evil is not good, nor is it from God, nonetheless to understand evil is good, and is from God. And therefore a truth that consists in the commensuration of the intellect to a privation existing outside the soul, is good, and from God. And this is why Ambrose says that everything true, regardless who says it, is from the Holy Spirit. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum sint plures veritates aeternae Whether there are several eternal truths Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod sint plures veritates aeternae. To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that several truths are eternal. Sicut enim patet ex dictis, diversarum propositionum diversae sunt veritates. Sed: Pater est Deus, Filius est Deus, sunt duae propositiones. Ergo et sunt duae veritates. Sed utrumque istorum ab aeterno est verum. Ergo plures veritates sunt aeternae. Obj. 1: For, as is clear from the things said, there are diverse truths of diverse propositions. But “the Father is God” and “the Son is God” are two propositions. Therefore they are also two truths. But each of them is true from eternity. Therefore several truths are eternal. Praeterea, omnia quaecumque fuerunt, sunt et erunt, Deus ab aeterno praescivit, quae constat quod plura sunt. Sed Deus non praescivit nisi verum. Ergo plura vera sunt ab aeterno. Obj. 2: Furthermore, God has foreknown from eternity all the things that were, are, and will be, and it is certain that they are many. But God has foreknown only what is true. Therefore several truths are from eternity. Item, Augustinus, De immort. animae, cap. 2, probat animam esse immortalem per hoc quod est subjectum veritatis, quae est aeterna. Sed constat quod veritas quae est in intellectu nostro sicut in subjecto, non est veritas divina per essentiam. Ergo videtur quod plures veritates sint aeternae. Quod autem veritas sit aeterna, sic probatur. Omne illud ad cujus remotionem sequitur positio ejus, est aeternum. Sed si negatur veritas esse, ponitur esse. Ergo veritas est aeterna. Probatio mediae. Si veritas non est, veritatem esse est falsum. Sed si affirmatio est falsa, negatio est vera. Ergo veritatem non esse erit verum. Sed non est verum nisi aliqua veritate. Ergo aliqua veritas est. Obj. 3: Furthermore, Augustine proves that the soul is immortal through the fact that it is the subject of truth, which is eternal. But it is certain that the truth that is in our intellect as in a subject is not the divine truth by its essence. Therefore it seems that many truths are eternal. However, he proves that truth is eternal as follows: everything that must be posited, even if it is taken away, is eternal; but if one denies truth exists, one posits that it exists; therefore truth is eternal. Proof of the middle premise: if truth does not exist, it is false that truth exists; but if an affirmation is false, its denial is true; therefore it will be true that truth does not exist. But a thing is true only by some truth. Therefore some truth exists. Praeterea, illud quod non potest intelligi non esse, est aeternum: quia quidquid potest non esse, potest intelligi non esse. Sed veritas non potest intelligi non esse, quia quidquid intelligitur, intelligitur per judicium veritatis. Ergo videtur quod veritas quae est in intellectu, sit aeterna et immutabilis. Obj. 4: Furthermore, what cannot be understood not to exist is eternal; for whatever is able not to exist can be understood not to exist. But truth cannot be understood not to exist, since whatever is understood is understood through a judgment of its truth. Therefore it seems that the truth that is in the intellect is eternal and unchangeable. Praeterea, idem videtur de veritate enuniationis. Si enim veritas enuntiationis mutetur vel destruatur, hoc erit vel per destructionem signi vel per destructionem rei. Sed neutro modo destruitur vel mutatur. Ergo veritas enuntiationis est immutabilis et aeterna. Probatio mediae. Non existente signo, rectum est rem signari. Sed veritas est rectitudo, et veritas signi est rectitudo significationis. Ergo si non sit enuntiatio, vel quodcumque signum veritatis, adhuc remanebit veritas signi. Obj. 5: Furthermore, the same thing seems to be the case for the truth of a statement. For if the truth of a statement changes or is destroyed, this will be either due to the destruction of the sign, or due to the destruction of the reality it signifies. But it is destroyed or changed in neither of these ways. Therefore the truth of a statement is unchangeable and eternal. Proof of the middle premise: even without there being a sign, the reality to be signified is correct; but truth is the rectitude, and the truth of a sign is the rectitude of its signification; therefore even if the statement, or any sign of the truth, does not exist, the sign’s truth will remain. Similiter probatur, quod non mutetur ex mutatione rei; quia ut dictum est, unumquodque habet veritatem quando implet id ad quod est ordinatum in mente divina. Sed, cessante cursu Socratis, adhuc ista enuntiatio, Socrates currit, facit id ad quod ordinata est in mente divina, quia significat Socratem currere. Ergo videtur quod destructa vel mutata re non mutatur neque destruitur veritas signi. Likewise one proves that it does not change due to a change of the reality, since, as was said, each thing has truth when it fulfills that to which it is ordered in the divine mind. But when Socrates ceases running, the statement “Socrates is running” still does what it is ordered to do in the divine mind, because it signifies Socrates running. Therefore it seems that even with the reality destroyed or changed, the sign’s truth does not change nor is destroyed. Praeterea, idem videtur de veritate quae est in re: quia, ut dicit Augustinus, 2 Solil., c. 15, pereunte vero, non perit veritas. Sed veritas rei non posset destrui vel mutari nisi per mutationem rei. Ergo videtur quod nullo modo pereat. Obj. 6: Furthermore, the same thing seems to be the case for the truth that is in the reality. For as Augustine says, when a true thing perishes, the truth does not perish. But a reality’s truth cannot be destroyed or changed except through a change of the reality. Therefore it seems that in no way does it perish. Item, omne totum est majus sua parte, est quaedam veritas, quae nullo modo videtur mutabilis; et similiter multa hujusmodi. Ergo videtur quod sint plures veritates aeternae immutabiles. Obj. 7: Furthermore, every whole is greater than its part is a truth that seems to be in no way changeable; and so it is for many similar things. Therefore it seems that there are many eternal truths. Contra, Augustinus, De natura boni, cap. 1, dicit, quod vera aeternitas et sola immutabilitas in Deo est. Sed veritas Dei est una tantum, sicut et essentia. Ergo videtur quod sit una tantum veritas aeterna et immutabilis. On the contrary, Augustine says that true eternity and unchangeability is only in God. But God’s truth is only one, just as his essence is only one. Therefore it seems that only one truth is eternal and unchangeable. Respondeo dicendum, quod est una tantum veritas aeterna, scilicet veritas divina. Cum enim ratio veritatis in actione compleatur intellectus, et fundamentum habeat ipsum esse rei; judicium de veritate sequitur judicium de esse rei et de intellectu. Unde sicut esse unum tantum est aeternum, scilicet divinum, ita una tantum veritas. Similiter de mutabilitate veritatis idem dicendum est quod de mutabilitate essendi; ut enim supra dictum est, simpliciter immutabile non est nisi esse divinum; unde simpliciter immutabilis veritas non est nisi una, scilicet divina. I answer that there is only one eternal truth, that is, the divine truth. For since the account of truth is completed in an activity of the intellect and has as its foundation the very existence of a real thing, a judgment about truth follows a judgment about the thing’s existence and the understanding. Whence, just as only one existence is eternal, that is, the divine, so too only one truth. Likewise, as regards the changeability of truth, the same thing should be said as about the changeability of existing; for above it was said, in a previous article, that only the divine existence is simply unchangeable, so the simply unchangeable truth is only one, the divine truth. Esse autem aliarum rerum quarumdam dicitur mutabile mutatione variabilitatis, sicut est in contingentibus; et horum etiam veritas mutabilis est et contingens. Quorumdam vero esse est mutabile solum secundum vertibilitatem in nihil, si sibi relinqueretur; et horum veritas similiter mutabilis est per vertibilitatem in nihil, si sibi relinqueretur. Unde patet quod nulla veritas est necessaria in creaturis. Similiter etiam si loquaris de veritate secundum quod ratio ejus completur in ratione intellectus, patet quod nullus intellectus est aeternus et invariabilis ex natura sua, nisi intellectus divinus. Ex quo etiam patet quod sola veritas una quae in Deo est, et quae Deus est, est aeterna et immutabilis. Now, the existence of certain other real things is said to be changeable by a change of variability, for example, in contingent things; and even the truth of these things is changeable and also contingent. Yet the existence of some things is changeable only according to an ability to return to nothing, if it were to be left to itself; and the truth of these things is similarly changeable through that ability to return to nothing, were it left to itself. Whence it is clear that no truth in created things is a necessary truth. Likewise, even if you were to speak about truth insofar as its account is completed in the account of intellect, it is clear that no intellect is eternal and invariable from its own nature, other than the divine intellect. From this it is clear that only the one truth that is in God, and which is God, is eternal and unchangeable. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut trium personarum una est essentia qua quaelibet habet esse, quamvis sint plures proprietates quibus distinguuntur, quae tamen omnes non differunt secundum rem ab essentia, ita etiam est una veritas trium personarum ex parte ipsius rei, de qua fit enuntiatio. Sed quod sint enuntiationes plures verae, est per intellectum nostrum. Unde veritas quae est in istis enuntiationibus, qua formaliter verae sunt, vel quae est in intellectu nostro, non est aeterna, sicut nec propositiones, nec intellectus noster aeternus. Reply Obj. 1: Just as of the three persons there is one essence by which each has existence, even though there are many properties by which they are distinguished, (all of which nevertheless do not differ from the essence according to reality), so too there is one truth of the three persons, on the side of the reality itself, concerning which a statement is made. But that there are several true statements is because of our intellect. Whence the truth that is in the statements themselves, by which formally they are true, or which is in our intellect, is not eternal, just as neither the propositions nor our intellect is eternal. Ad secundum dicendum, quod rationes ideales rerum, quae sunt in Deo ab aeterno, non sunt aliud secundum rem ab ipso intellectu et essentia divina. Unde sicut veritas essentiae est una secundum rem, ita etiam veritas omnium illarum rationum; et non multiplicatur, nisi secundum respectum ad diversas res. Unde ex hoc non probatur quod sint plures veritates ab aeterno, sed solum hoc quod sit una veritas plurium secundum rationem. Reply Obj. 2: The ideal accounts of things that are in God from eternity are not in reality other than the divine intellect and essence itself. Whence, just as the truth of the divine essence is one in reality, so too is the truth of all of those accounts; and it is not multiplied except as regards its reference to the diverse realities. Whence it is not proved from this that there are many truths from eternity, but only that there is one truth of things that are many according to account. Ad tertium dicendum, quod si anima non esset, nec aliquis intellectus creatus, veritas, secundum quod consistit in operatione animae, non esset. Posset tamen remanere, secundum quod fundamentum habet in re. Remaneret etiam intentio veritatis intellecta in Deo. Unde cum anima non sit aeterna, nec aliquis intellectus creatus, antequam haec essent, nulla veritas creata erat. Reply Obj. 3: If there were no soul, nor a created intellect, truth, insofar as it consists in an activity of the soul, would not exist. Nevertheless it could still remain insofar as it has its foundation in reality. Also, the intention of truth understood in God would remain. Whence, because the soul is not eternal, nor is any created intellect, before these things existed, there was no created truth. Et si objicitur: veritas non est; ergo veritatem esse est falsum, quantum ad illud tempus in quo non erat veritas creata; dico quod non sequitur: quia quando non est veritas, nec etiam falsitas est. Hoc autem quod non sit veritas, vel falsitas, non est ex defectu veritatis vel falsitatis quantum ad intentiones ipsarum, sed ex defectu eorum in quibus veritas habet esse. Sicut enim dicimus de universalibus quod sunt incorruptibilia et aeterna, quia non corrumpuntur nisi per accidens, scilicet quantum ad esse quod habent in alio, quod potest non esse; ita etiam est de veritate et falsitate, quod consideratae secundum intentiones suas, non accidit eis corruptio per se, sed solum secundum esse quod habent in alio: et ex hoc procedit probatio Augustini; quia omnis virtus quae apprehendit rationem intentionis alicujus, oportet quod sit virtus non obligata ad corpus, nec dependens a corpore, eo quod virtutes apprehensivae quae sunt impressae in organis corporalibus, ut patet in sensibus, non apprehendunt intentionem rationis, ut rationem hominis vel coloris, sed tantum apprehendunt hujusmodi, secundum quod sunt particulata. Virtus autem quae non dependet a corpore, est incorruptibilis; et ita probatur quod anima intellectiva est immortalis ex eo quod apprehendit veritatem. Virtutes enim sensitivae, quamvis sint verae in suis apprehensionibus, non tamen apprehendunt rationem suae veritatis, sicut facit intellectus. And if one objects: truth does not exist, so it is false that truth exists in reference to the time in which there was no created truth—then I say that it does not follow that when truth does not exist, neither does falsity exist. However, the fact that there is no truth or falsity is not due to a defect of truth or falsity as regards their intentions, but is due to a defect of the things wherein truth has its existence. For just as we say about universals that they are incorruptible and eternal because they are corrupted only incidentally, namely, in reference to the existence that they have in something else that can not-exist, so it is even with truth and falsity. Considered according to their own intentions, corruption does not occur to them through themselves, but only in reference to the existence that they have in something else. Augustine’s proof follows based on this, since every power that apprehends the account of some intention must be a power not bound to a body, nor dependent on a body; for apprehensive powers that are impressed on bodily organs, as is clear in the senses, do not apprehend the intention of the account, such as the account of man or of color, but apprehend things of this sort insofar as they are particulars. However, a power that does not depend on the body is incorruptible. And it is proved that the intellectual soul is immortal from the fact that it apprehends truth; for the sense powers, although they are true in their apprehensions, still do not apprehend the account of their truth, whereas the intellect does. Ad quartum dicendum, quod aliquid non posse intelligi non esse, contingit dupliciter: vel ex parte ipsius intellecti, vel ex parte intelligentis. Ex parte intellecti, sicut illud quod de ratione sua habet esse, sicut est Deus, cujus esse est sua quidditas per quam intelligitur. Ex parte intelligentis, sicut non potest intelligi res sine actu intelligendi; unde si actus intelligendi non esset, nihil posset intelligi; unde non potest intelligi actus intelligendi non esse. Reply Obj. 4: It happens in two ways that something is incapable of being understood not to exist: either on the side of the very thing understood, or on the side of the understanding. It happens on the side of the thing understood just as that, which has existence from its own account, is God, whose existence is his own “whatness,” through which he is understood. It happens on the side of the one understanding insofar as a thing cannot be understood without an act of understanding; whence were there no act of understanding, nothing could be understood, so the act of understanding not existing could not itself be understood. Utroque modo veritas non potest intelligi non esse; quia verum habet in ratione sua esse, secundum quod fundatur in re, et habet in ratione sua actum intellectus, secundum quod completur in anima. In both ways the truth cannot be understood not to exist. For the true has existence within its own account insofar as it is founded on a reality, and it has the act of the intellect in its own account insofar as it is completed in the soul. Tamen ex hoc non sequitur quod sit aeterna, nisi sub hac conditione, si ab aeterno fuisset intelligere: quamvis enim non possit intelligi de veritate non esse, ita scilicet quod apprehendatur intentio veritatis et non apprehendatur esse, tamen possibile est nec istum intellectum esse, nec illud esse in quo veritas fundatur, sicut aliquando fuit; sed illa veritas sola est aeterna quae fundatur in esse aeterno et intellectu aeterno. Yet it does not follow from this that it is eternal, except under this condition: if understanding were to be from eternity. For although it could not be understood that truth does not exist, such that the intention of truth is apprehended and it is not apprehended to exist, nonetheless it is possible that neither that intellect exists nor that existence in which truth is founded exists, as at a certain time was the case. But only that truth founded on eternal existence and the eternal intellect is eternal. Ad quintum dicendum, quod utroque modo veritas enuntiationis potest mutari; si enim nulla enuntiatio esset, veritas enuntiationis non esset. Et ad id quod objicitur, quod adhuc rectum esset rem significari, dicimus, quod verum est; sed tamen illa rectitudo nihil est aliud quam signabilitas rei; et hoc non ponit veritatem signi in actu, sed tantum in potentia. Similiter etiam quando mutatur res, mutatur veritas enuntiationis. Unde, secundum Philosophum, in Praed., cap. “De substantia in sexta proprietate,” eadem propositio quandoque potest esse vera et quandoque falsa. Reply Obj. 5: In both ways the truth of a statement can change. For if there were no statement, there would be no truth of the statement. But to what is objected—that the thing to be signified would still be correct—we say that this is true. But still, that rectitude is nothing other than the real thing’s ability to be signified, and this does not assert the actual truth of a sign, but only potential truth. Likewise, when a real thing changes, so does the truth of the statement. Whence, following the Philosopher, the same proposition can sometimes be true and sometimes false. Et ad id quod ulterius objicitur, quod implet illud ad quod ordinatum est in mente divina, dicendum quod enuntiatio potest dupliciter considerari: vel ut res quaedam, et sic est in ipsa veritas rei, sicut in qualibet re, quando implet illud ad quod ordinata est in mente divina; et talis veritas manet in ipsa etiam mutata re; vel ut signum talis rei, et sic veritas ejus est per adaequationem ad rem illam. Mutata autem re, tollitur adaequatio signi ad signatum, sine aliqua mutatione ipsius signi; quod manifestum est in relationibus posse contingere; unde veritas enuntiationis non manet. And to the further objection—that it fulfills that to which it was ordered in the divine mind—one should say that a statement can be considered in two ways. The first is as a reality—and in this way the truth of a reality is in it, as it is in every reality, when it fulfills that to which it was ordered in the divine mind; and such truth does remain in it even when the reality changes. The other is as the sign of such a reality—and in this way its truth is through its becoming equal to that reality. However, when the reality has changed, the equalization of the sign to what it signifies is taken away, without any change in the sign itself. That this can happen is manifest in relations. Whence the truth of the statement does not remain. Ad sextum dicendum, quod, pereunte re vera, perit veritas quantum ad illud esse quod habet in re illa. Sed tamen potest remanere intentio veritatis secundum esse quod habet in alia re, vel secundum esse quod habet in anima. Quae omnia si auferantur, non remanebit veritas nisi in Deo. Nec ille defectus accidit veritati per se, sed per accidens, ut dictum est; quia, secundum Philosophum, in Praedicam., cap. “De substantia,” destructis primis, impossibile est aliquod ceterorum remanere, quamvis universalia sint per se incorruptibilia. Reply Obj. 6: When a true reality perishes, the truth relative to that existence that it has in that reality perishes. But still the intention of truth according to the existence it has in the other reality, or according to the existence it has in the soul, can remain. But if all of this is removed, truth will remain only in God. Nor does that defect happen to the truth through itself, but rather incidentally, as was said; for according to the Philosopher, if first substances are destroyed, it is impossible that any of the other categories remain, even though universals are through themselves incorruptible. Ad septimum dicendum similiter, quod veritas propositorum necessariorum potest deficere per accidens quantum ad esse quod habet in anima vel in rebus si res illae deficerent: tunc enim non remanerent istae veritates nisi in Deo, in quo sunt una et eadem veritas. Reply Obj. 7: Likewise, the truth of necessary propositions can fail incidentally as regards the existence that it has in the soul, or in the realities, if those realities were to fail. For then these truths would remain only in God, in whom they are one and the same truth. Expositio secundae partis textus Exposition of the second part of the text Si ergo in una persona Patris illa invenis quae plura videntur, et partes non invenis, quia una virtus simplex est; quanto magis Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus, et propter individuam deitatem unus Deus est, et propter uniuscujusque proprietatem tres personae sunt? Videtur quod ipse arguat a majori affirmando. Magis enim videtur quod in una persona simplicitas inveniatur quam in duabus simul acceptis. Respondeo dicendum, quod est locus a minori; quia Augustinus in una persona Patris accipit ea quae sunt diversa secundum rationem, ut sapientiam, virtutem et hujusmodi, sed in duabus personis Patris et Filii accipit hoc quod est unum secundum rationem, scilicet naturam divinam, quae secundum numerum etiam multiplicari non potest. If, then, in the one person of the Father you find what seem to be many things, and do not find parts because it is one simple power, how much more are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit one God because of their undivided divinity? It seems that he is arguing by affirming the major premise, for it seems that simplicity is found more in one person than in two taken together. I answer that this is the logical topic moving from the lesser; for in the one person of the Father, Augustine takes things that are diverse in account, like wisdom, power, and such, whereas in the two persons of the Father and the Son, he takes what is one according to account, that is, the divine nature, which also cannot be multiplied according to number. Sicut tres statuae dicuntur unum aurum. Videtur hoc esse falsum, quia materia non praedicatur de composito, cum sit pars. Et dicendum, quod hoc est verum in naturalibus, quorum materia non est tota substantia eorum, sed non verum in artificialibus quae ordinantur in genere substantiae per suam materiam, ut Commentator dicit in 2 De anima, et non per suam formam; formae enim artificiales accidentia sunt. Just as if three statues were made from the same gold. This seems to be false, since matter is not predicated of the composite, because it is its part. And one should say that this is true in natural things, the matter of which is not their entire substance. But this is not true in artificial things, which are ordered in the genus of substance through their matter, as the Commentator says, and not through their own form, for artificial forms are accidents.