Substantiae, vel essentiae: quia non proprie dicitur substantia, ut infra, 8 distinct., dicetur. The Trinity is said . . . to be of one and the same substance, or essence. He says both because substance is not said properly here, as will be explained below, in Distinction 8. Creditur et intelligitur. Ista ordinantur secundum quod acquiritur fides in credente. Primum enim est praedicatorum verbum, sicut dicitur, Roman. 10, 14: quomodo credent ei quem non audierunt? Secundum est assensus fidei in ipso credente; et ultimo per fidem devenitur in intellectum, Isa. 7, 9: nisi credideritis, non intelligetis. Believed, and understood. These are ordered according to how faith in the believer is acquired. For first there is the word of the preacher, as is said in Romans 10:14: how are they to believe in him of whom they have never heard? And how are they to hear without a preacher? Second, there is the assent of faith in the very one who believes; and lastly, through faith one comes to understanding: if you will not believe, you will not understand (Isa 7:9). Purgatis mentibus; sed diversimode. Ad hoc enim quod videatur naturali cognitione, oportet mentem purgari a sensibilibus et phantasmatibus; ad hoc autem quod per fidem cernatur, oportet mentem purgari ab erroribus et naturalibus rationibus; ad hoc autem quod videatur per essentiam, oportet mentem purgari ab omni culpa et miseria. The Trinity . . . is the highest good discerned by the most purified minds. But this [discernment of the highest good] occurs in different ways. For the mind must be purified from sensible and imaginable things for it to be seen by natural knowledge, but for it to be discerned through faith, the mind must be purified from errors and natural reasonings, and for it to be seen through its essence the mind must be purified from every fault and misery. In tam excellenti luce. Loquitur de intuitu mentis, ad similitudinem visus corporalis; sicut enim non possumus defigere oculum in excellens luminosum, ita etiam mens nostra non figitur in excellentia divinae lucis, ut aliquid determinate cognoscat, nisi per fidem. Unde etiam philosophi in diversos errores prolapsi sunt; et ideo dicit philosophus: sicut se habet oculus noctuae ad lucem solis, ita se habet intellectus noster ad manifestissima naturae. For the weak sharpness of the human mind is not fixed in this highest light. He is speaking of the gaze of the mind according to a likeness with bodily sight. For just as we cannot fasten our eyes on an extremely luminous thing, so too our mind cannot be held on the excellence of the divine light, such that it might determinately know anything, except through faith. Whence even the philosophers fell into diverse errors, and therefore the Philosopher says, as the eye of the bat is related to the light of the sun, so too our intellect is related to things most manifest by nature. Per justitiam fidei. Justitia hic sumitur pro justitia generali, quae est rectitudo animae in comparatione ad Deum et ad proximum et unius potentiae ad aliam; et dicitur justitia fidei, quia in justificatione primus motus est fidei, sicut dicitur Hebr. 11, 6: accedentem ad Deum oportet credere. Without being cleansed through the justice of faith. "Justice" here is being taken for general justice, which is the rectitude of the soul in its relation to God and neighbor, and of one power to another. And it is called the "justice of faith" because in becoming just the first motion is that of faith, as is said in Hebrews 11:6: whoever would draw near to God must believe. Non approbo quod in oratione dixi: Deus qui nonnisi mundos verum scire voluisti. Ista notula affigitur ad excludendum falsum intellectum qui posset de praedictis haberi, scilicet quod Deus nullo modo a peccatoribus cognosci posset. I do not approve what I said in a prayer: "God, who willed that none but the pure should know the truth." This little note is appended to exclude a false understanding that one could have of things he said previously, namely, that God could in no way be known by sinners. Nec periculosius alicubi erratur. Hoc enim est fundamentum totius fidei; quo destructo, totum aedificium subruit. Unde etiam dicit philosophus, quod parvus error in principio, maximus est in fine. With regard to no other matter is error more dangerous. For this is the foundation of our entire faith, by whose destruction the entire edifice collapses. Whence even the Philosopher says that a small error in the beginning is greatest in the end. Nec fructuosius aliquid invenitur. Cognitio enim Trinitatis in unitate est fructus et finis totius vitae nostrae. Or discovery more fruitful. For knowledge of the Trinity in unity is the fruit and end of our entire life. Ubi dixi de patre. Ista notula apponitur ad corrigendum hoc quod posuit in littera hoc verbum sum, es, est, singulariter praedicari de tribus personis; et ratio fuit, quia significat substantiam, quae est una trium personarum. Sed postea retractavit; quia quamvis significet substantiam, tamen significat eam per modum actus, et actus numerantur secundum supposita; unde debet pluraliter praedicari de tribus personis. Where I said of the Father and the Son: "The one who begets and the one who is begotten is one," I ought to have said, "they are one." This little note is appended to correct what he asserted in a text regarding the word "am/are/is" being predicated in the singular of the three Persons. The reason why he said it was that it signifies substance, which is one for the three Persons. But later he retracted this because, although it signifies substance, nonetheless it signifies it through the mode of act, and acts are numbered according to supposits. Whence it should be predicated of the three Persons in the plural. Primo ipsa legis exordia occurrant: ubi scilicet primo legis praecepta poni incipiunt, Exod. 20 et Deut. 6. First, here are the very first words of the Law, that is, where the precepts of the Law first begin to be stated, at Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 6. Deus enim, ut ait Ambrosius, nomen est naturae, dominus vero nomen est potestatis. Videtur quod Deus non sit nomen naturae per derivationes hujus nominis Theos, quas Damascenus ponit. Dicit enim, quod Theos quod est Deus, dicitur ab ethim, quod est ardere, quia Deus noster, ignis consumens est, Deuter. 4, 24. Dicitur etiam a theaste, quod est considerare vel videre, quia omnia videt: vel a thein, quod est currere, vel fovere, quia per omnia vadit, omnia salvans et continens: quae omnia operationem important. Ergo et cetera. Item dominus secundum esse suum est relativum. Ergo non significat potestatem, sed relationem. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc nomen Deus potest considerari dupliciter. Vel quantum ad id a quo nomen imponitur, quod est quasi qualitas nominis; et sic est nomen operationis, secundum Damascenum. Vel quantum ad id cui imponitur, quod est substantia significata per nomen; et sic est nomen naturae, quia ad significandum divinam naturam est impositum. Ad secundum dicendum, quod relationes fundantur super aliquid quod est causa ipsarum in subjecto, sicut aequalitas supra quantitatem, et dominium supra potestatem. Unde dicit Boetius, quod dominium est potestas coercendi subditos; et Dionysius dicit, quod dominium est non pejorum, idest subditorum, excessus tantum, sed bonorum et pulchriorum omnimoda et perfecta possessio; vera et non cadere valens fortitudo. Ad hoc enim quod aliquis sit dominus requiruntur divitiae et potentia, et super haec duo fundatur relatio dominii. As Ambrose says . . . : "For God and Lord is a name of nature and power." It seems that "God" is not the name of a nature, because of the derivatives of this name (Theos) that Damascene points out. For he says that Theos, which is "God," is said from ethim, which is to burn, for the Lord your God is a devouring fire (Deut 4:24). It is also said from theaste, which is to contemplate or see, since he sees all things, or from thein, which is to run, or nourish, because he goes through all things, preserving and holding all things together—all of which indicate an activity, therefore and so on. Furthermore, "Lord" is a relative term according to existence, so it does not signify power, but rather relation. To the first argument, then, I say that this name "God" can be considered in two ways: either with respect to what the name is imposed from, which is, as it were, the quality of the name, and in this way it is the name of an activity, following Damascene; or with respect to what it is imposed on, which is the substance signified by the name, and in this way it is the name of a nature, because it is imposed to signify the divine nature. To the second, I say that relations are founded on something that is their cause within the subject, like equality being founded on quantity, and lordship on power. Whence Boethius says that lordship is the power of coercing those subject to it, and Dionysius says that lordship is not only being above those worse than oneself, that is, of subjects, but it is also the total and perfect possession of good and beautiful things, and a true and infallible strength. This is because for someone to be a lord he must have riches and power, and the relation of lordship is founded on these two things. Personarum quoque pluralitatem et naturae unitatem simul ostendit dominus in Genesi. Sciendum, quod Augustinus et Hilarius ex hac auctoritate: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, nituntur ostendere unitatem essentiae et personarum pluralitatem ex verbis ibi positis, sed differenter. Quia Augustinus considerat tantum consignificationem numeri in eis; unde per haec duo, faciamus, et nostram, ostendit Trinitatem; per haec vero duo imaginem, et similitudinem, unitatem essentiae. Hilarius autem ex quolibet horum quatuor intendit ostendere utrumque, hoc modo. Similitudo enim significat relationem causatam ex unitate qualitatis, quae relatio requirit distincta supposita; est enim similitudo rerum differentium eadem qualitas; unde ratione ejus quod causat similitudinem ostendit unitatem essentiae, quae est eadem bonitas et sapientia, vel quidquid aliud per modum qualitatis significatur. Nec potest ibi esse diversitas bonitatis secundum numerum, ut probatum est; sed ex parte relationis designatur suppositorum distinctio. Et eadem est ratio de hoc nomen imago, quae dicit imitationem unius ad alterum, secundum aliquid unum; et hoc tangitur ubi dicit: Hilarius quoque (...) dicit, his verbis significari, quod in Trinitate nec diversitas est nec singularitas, vel solitudo; sed similitudo et pluralitas. Similiter etiam ex parte harum duarum dictionum, faciamus et nostram, accipit utrumque: pluralitatem quidem personarum ratione pluralis numeri, sed unitatem essentiae ratione consortii, quod designatur in utroque. Consortium enim oportet quod sit in aliquo uno: et quia non potest esse in divinis unum in specie et diversum in numero, oportet quod sit unum numero; et hoc tangit ibi: item idem in 4 Lib. absolutius voluit intelligi, significationem hanc non ad se esse referendam tantum. Differunt etiam quantum ad aliud; quia Augustinus videtur accipere similitudinem et imaginem tantum hominis ad Deum; sed Hilarius accipit similitudinem et imaginem unius personae ad aliam, et quod homo accedat ad illam similitudinem quantum potest. Diversitas, propter divisionem essentiae. Singularitas, propter incommunicabilitatem divinae naturae. Solitudo, ne removeatur societas personarum, quae est per unionem amoris. Similitudo, contra diversitatem. Pluralitas, contra singularitatem. Distinctio, contra solitudinem. In Genesis, the Lord shows at once the plurality of persons and the unity of nature. Note that Augustine and Hilary—based on this authority, let us make man in our image, and after our likeness (Gen 1:26)—try to show the unity of the essence and the plurality of the Persons from the words present there, but in different ways. For Augustine considers only the consignification of number in them, so through let us make and our he shows the Trinity, but through the words image and likeness he shows the unity of the essence. However, Hilary intends to show each of these things from each of these four, as follows. For likeness signifies a relation caused by a unity of quality, which relation requires distinct supposits, since likeness is the same quality of different things. Whence by reason of the fact that he causes a likeness, he shows the unity of the essence, which is the same goodness and wisdom, or whatever else is signified in the manner of a quality. Nor can a numerical diversity of goodness be there, as has been proved; rather, the distinction of the supposits is designated on the side of relation. And the account of the name image is the same, for it signifies the imitation of one thing by another in reference to some one thing. And this is touched upon where it says, Hilary too . . . says that by these word sit is signified that in the Trinity there is neither diversity, nor singularity, nor solitude, but likeness and plurality. Likewise also he takes both from the side of the two expressions let us make and our: he takes the plurality of Persons by reason of the plural number, but the unity of the essence by reason of the companionship, which is designated in each. For companionship must be in something one, and because in the divine there cannot be something one in species but diverse in number, it must be one in number. And he touches on this, at the same [Hilary], in book 4: "He wished this expression to be understood more absolutely not to be referred to himself alone." They also differ as regards something else, since Augustine appears to take the likeness and image as being only of man relative to God, but Hilary takes the likeness and image as being of one Person to another, and says that man approaches this likeness as far as he can. [Hilary says there is no] diversity, on account of a division of essence; no singularity, on account of the incommunicability of the divine nature; no solitude, lest one take away the fellowship of the Persons, which exists through the union of love; [but he says that there is] plurality, as opposed to singularity, and distinction, as opposed to solitude. Significatio efficientis, quantum ad hoc quod dicit, faciamus. Operatio constituta, in ipsum operatum. [Hilary speaks of] the identification of a maker, in reference to its saying let us make, and the work of making in reference to the work itself. Maximus propheta, quantum ad modum revelationis, quae est per intellectualem visionem, et quantum ad privilegium promissi seminis. [The Master says David is] the greatest prophet as regards to the mode his revelation, which occurs through an intellectual vision, and as regards the privilege of the promised seed. Dominus possedit me. Loquitur de filio, inquantum appropriatur sibi sapientia. Dicitur autem Deus possidere sapientiam, quia ipse solus eam perfecte habet. Possidetur enim quod ad nutum habetur; unde philosophus dicit, quod divina scientia est possessio divina, non humana. Viarum, idest creaturarum, per quas in ipsum itur. Ordinata, secundum ordinem naturae, qui est filii ad patrem, et secundum ordinem causae, qui est ideae ad ideatum. Concepta. Dicitur concipi, quia clauditur in unitate essentiae patris. Parturiebar, inquantum exit a patre per distinctionem personarum. Cardines, idest extremitates terrae, secundum Isidorum, vel causae in quibus terrae, et ea quae in terris, quasi volvuntur et conservantur. Delectabar, consors paternae gloriae. Per singulos dies, quantum ad rationes creaturarum quae in Deo sunt lux, quamvis creaturae in seipsis sint tenebrae. Ludens, propter otium contemplationis sapientiae. Sicut enim operationes ludi non appetuntur propter aliud, sed in seipsis habent delectationem, ita et contemplatio sapientiae. The Lord possessed me at the beginning of his ways. This is speaking about the Son, insofar as wisdom is appropriated to him. However, God is said to possess wisdom because he alone has it perfectly. For what is possessed is had at a nod, whence the Philosopher says that the divine science is a divine, not a human possession. Of his ways, that is, of created things, through which one goes to him [i.e., the Lord]. From eternity I was ordained, according to the order of nature, which is that of the Son to the Father, and according to the order of the cause, which is that of the idea to what it is an idea of. I was already conceived; he is said to have been conceived because he is contained in the unity of the essence of the Father. I was brought forth, insofar as he went forth from the Father through the distinction of Persons. By the hinges [upon which the earth would rest] is meant the extremities of the earth, according to Isidore, or the causes on which the lands and the things on the lands, as it were, turn and are conserved. And delighting, as a companion of the paternal glory, in each day, insofar as the accounts of created things within God are light, although created things in themselves are shadows, as I played, on account of the delight of wisdom's contemplation. For just as the activities of play are not desired for the sake of something else, but possess their delight within their very selves, so too is the contemplation of wisdom. In medio duorum animalium. Hoc sumitur de Habacuc 3, secundum aliam litteram; et per duo animalia significantur duo testamenta. Truth can be known "in the midst of two animals." This is taken from Habakkuk 3:2, according to a different text. And by the two animals are signified the two testaments. Forcipem de altari. Hoc dicitur Isaiae 6, et per forcipem, qui habet duo brachia, significantur duo testamenta, et per calculum veritas sacrae Scripturae. Unde in Psalm. 118, 140 dicitur: ignitum eloquium tuum vehementer. "With tongs" can be taken "from the altar the coal" with which the mouths of the faithful may be touched. This is said based on Isaiah 6, and by tongs, which have two arms, the two testaments are signified, and by the coal is signified the truth of Sacred Scripture. Whence Psalm 117:140 says, your eloquence was burned vehemently. Distinctio 3 Distinction 3 Knowledge of the Creator through the Created In parte ista ostendit Magister unitatem essentiae et Trinitatem personarum per rationes et similitudines quasdam, et dividitur in partes duas: in prima ostendit unitatem essentiae divinae per rationes naturales; in secunda ostendit Trinitatem personarum per similitudines creaturarum, ibi: nunc restat ostendere utrum per ea quae facta sunt, aliquod Trinitatis indicium vel exiguum haberi potuerit. In the this part the Master shows the unity of essence and Trinity of Persons through arguments and certain likenesses. It is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows the unity of the divine essence through natural arguments; in the second, he shows the Trinity of Persons through likenesses in created things, at now it remains to show whether it may have been possible to obtain some indication, if a small one, of the Trinity through those things which are made. Circa primum tria facit: primo ostendit per auctoritatem apostoli, probantis unitatis divinae essentiae possibilitatem; secundo inducit probationem, ibi: nam sicut ait Ambrosius; tertio excludit quamdam objectionem, ibi: cum ergo Deus una sit et simplex essentia (...) pluraliter tamen dicit apostolus: invisibilia Dei. As regards the first he does three things. First, he shows, through the Apostle's authority, the possibility of proving the unity of the divine essence; second, he brings in proof, at as Ambrose says; third, he excludes a certain objection, at God is a single and simple essence . . . But the Apostle says in the plural, "the invisible things of God." Secunda autem pars in qua ponit probationem, dividitur in quatuor, secundum quatuor rationes quas ponit. Harum autem diversitas sumitur secundum vias deveniendi ex creaturis in Deum, quas Dionysius ponit. Dicit enim quod ex creaturis tribus modis devenimus in Deum: scilicet per causalitatem, per remotionem, per eminentiam. Et ratio hujus est, quia esse creaturae est ab altero. Unde secundum hoc ducimur in causam a qua est. Hoc autem potest esse dupliciter. Aut quantum ad id quod receptum est; et sic ducimur per modum causalitatis: aut quantum ad modum recipiendi, quia imperfecte recipitur; et sic habemus duos modos, scilicet secundum remotionem imperfectionis a Deo et secundum hoc quod illud quod receptum est in creatura, perfectius et nobilius est in creatore; et ita est modus per eminentiam. But the second part, in which he lays out the proof, is divided into four, following to the four arguments that he lays out. Now, the diversity of these arguments is taken from the ways of coming to God from created things that Dionysius asserts. For he says that we come to God from created things in three modes: through causality, through removal, and through eminence. And the reason for this is that a created thing's existence is from another, so following this, we are led to the cause from which it exists. Now, this can occur in two ways: either with respect to that which is received [from the cause], and in this way we are led through the mode of causality; or with respect to the mode of receiving it, since it is received imperfectly. And in this latter way we have two modes: according to the removal of an imperfection from God, and insofar as what is received in the created thing exists more perfectly and more nobly in the Creator, and this latter is the mode through eminence. Prima ergo ratio sumitur per viam causalitatis, et formatur sic. Omne quod habet esse ex nihilo, oportet quod sit ab alio, a quo esse suum fluxerit. Sed omnes creaturae habent esse ex nihilo: quod manifestatur ex earum imperfectione et potentialitate. Ergo oportet quod sint ab aliquo uno primo, et hoc est Deus. The first argument, therefore, is taken through the path of causality, and is formed as follows. Everything that has existence from nothing must exist due to something else from which flowed its existence. But all created things have their existence from nothing, which is manifest from their imperfection and potentiality. Therefore they must exist due to some one first thing, and this is God. Secunda ratio sumitur per viam remotionis, et est talis. Ultra omne imperfectum oportet esse aliquod perfectum, cui nulla quidem imperfectio admisceatur. Sed corpus est imperfectum, quia est terminatum et finitum suis dimensionibus et mobile. Ergo oportet ultra corpora esse aliquid quod non est corpus. Item, omne incorporeum mutabile de sui natura est imperfectum. Ergo ultra omnes species mutabiles, sicut sunt animae et Angeli, oportet esse aliquod ens incorporeum et immobile et omnino perfectum, et hoc est Deus. The second argument is taken through the path of removal, and is as follows. Beyond every imperfect thing there must be something perfect, to which there is no admixture of imperfection. But a body is imperfect, because it is bounded and finite in its dimensions, and is mobile. Therefore there must be, beyond bodies, something that is not a body. Furthermore, every changeable incorporeal thing is imperfect from its nature. Therefore beyond all changeable species, such as souls and angels, there must be some incorporeal, immobile, and altogether perfect being, and this is God. Aliae duae rationes sumuntur per viam eminentiae. Sed potest dupliciter attendi eminentia, vel quantum ad esse vel quantum ad cognitionem. Tertia ergo sumitur ratio per viam eminentiae in esse, et est talis. Bonum et melius dicuntur per comparationem ad optimum. Sed in substantiis invenimus corpus bonum et spiritum creatum melius, in quo tamen bonitas non est a seipso. Ergo oportet esse aliquod optimum a quo sit bonitas in utroque. The other two arguments are taken through the path of eminence. But eminence can be considered in two ways, either with respect to being or with respect to knowledge. Therefore the third argument is taken through the path of eminence in being, and it is as follows. The good and the better are said through a comparison to the best. But in substances we find a body to be good, and a created spirit to be better, yet even in the latter the goodness is not from its very self. Therefore there must be something best, due to which goodness is present in each thing. Quarta sumitur per eminentiam in cognitione, et est talis. In quibuscumque est invenire magis et minus speciosum, est invenire aliquod speciositatis principium, per cujus propinquitatem aliud alio dicitur speciosius. Sed invenimus corpora esse speciosa sensibili specie, spiritus autem speciosiores specie intelligibili. Ergo oportet esse aliquid a quo utraque speciosa sint, cui spiritus creati magis appropinquant. The fourth is taken through eminence in knowledge, and is as follows. In whatsoever one can find the more and the less beautiful, one can find some principle of beauty, through proximity to which one thing is said to be more beautiful than another. But we find bodies to be beautiful by a sensible form, whereas spirits are more beautiful by their intelligible form. Therefore there must be something due to which both of them are beautiful, something to which created spirits are closer. Nunc restat ostendere, utrum per ea quae facta sunt aliquid Trinitatis indicium vel exiguum haberi potuerit. Hic ostendit Trinitatem personarum per similitudines in creaturis: et primo per similitudinem vestigii; secundo per similitudinem imaginis, ibi: nunc autem ad eam jam perveniamus disputationem, ubi in mente humana (...) Trinitatis imaginem reperiamus. Circa primum duo facit: primo enim ostendit per auctoritatem Augustini quomodo in vestigio creaturarum repraesentatur Trinitas personarum; secundo ex ipsa similitudine vestigii concludit personarum distinctionem, ibi: per considerationem creaturarum, unius substantiae Trinitatem intelligimus. Now it remains to show whether it may have been possible to obtain some indication, if a small one, of the Trinity through those things which are made. Here he shows the the Trinity of Persons through likenesses in created things, and first through the likeness of a vestige, and second through a likeness of image, at but now we have come to the debated point of where one may find the image of the Trinity in the human mind. As regards the first, he does two things: for first he shows through an authority of Augustine how the Trinity of Persons is represented in the vestige of created things; and second, he concludes to the distinction of Persons from the very likeness of the vestige, at thus, by our consideration of creatures, we perceive the Trinity to be of one substance. Ubi distinguit tres personas: primo quo ad nos, et hoc tripliciter; secundum exitum nostrum a Deo, et secundum reditum in ipsum, ibi, scilicet principium ad quod recurrimus; et secundum beneficium ipsius Dei, ibi: unum scilicet, quo auctore conditi sumus. Secundo concludit per comparationem ad omnia, ibi: scilicet Deum qui dixit: fiat lux. Ultimo ostendit vestigii repraesentationem esse insufficientem, ibi: ecce ostensum qualiter in creaturis aliquatenus imago Trinitatis inducatur. Here he distinguishes the three Persons: first relative to us, and this in three ways: according to our going forth from God; according to our return to him, at the beginning to which we return; and according to the blessing of God himself, at by whose act we are created. Second, he concludes through a comparison to all things, at God who said "Let there be." And lastly, he shows that the representation of a vestige is insufficient, at and so it has been shown how the image of the Trinity in some measure is revealed in creatures. Quia autem in parte ista ostenditur, qualiter venitur in cognitionem Dei per vestigium creaturarum, ideo quaeruntur duo: primo de divina cognitione. Secundo de creaturarum vestigio. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor: 1 utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis a creaturis; 2 utrum Deum esse sit per se notum; 3 utrum possit cognosci per creaturas, et quorum sit Deum per creaturas cognoscere; 4 quid de Deo philosophi per creaturas cognoscere potuerunt. However, because in this part is manifested how one comes to the knowledge of God through a vestige in created things, therefore two things are sought. The first is about divine knowledge, and the second is about the vestige in created things. As regards the first, four things are asked: 1. whether created things can know God; 2. whether God's existence is known through itself; 3. whether he can be known through created things, and to whom does it belong to know God through created things; 4. what the philosophers have been able to know of God through created things. Quaestio 1 Question 1 On Divine Knowledge Articulus 1 Article 1 Whether God can be known by a created intellect Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit cognoscibilis a creato intellectu. Dicit enim Dionysius, quod Deum nec dicere nec intelligere possumus: quod sic probat. Cognitio est tantum existentium. Sed Deus est supra omnia existentia. Ergo est supra omnem cognitionem. Obj. 1: To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that God is not knowable by any created intellect. For Dionysius says that we can neither speak of nor understand God. He proves this as follows: knowledge is only of existing things, but God is above all existing things. Therefore he is above all knowledge. Item, Deus plus distat a quolibet existentium intelligibilium notorum nobis, quam distet intelligibile a sensibili. Sed sensus non potest intelligibile cognoscere. Ergo nec Deus potest a nostro intellectu cognosci. Obj. 2: Furthermore, God is more distant from any of the existing intelligible things known to us than the intelligible is distant from the sensible. But sense cannot know the intelligible. Therefore neither can God be known by our intellect. Item, omnis cognitio est per speciem aliquam, per cujus informationem fit assimilatio cognoscentis ad rem cognitam. Sed a Deo non potest abstrahi aliqua species, cum sit simplicissimus. Ergo non est cognoscibilis. Obj. 3: Furthermore, every knowledge is through some species, through the informing of which the knower becomes like the reality known. But no species can be abstracted from God, since he is the simplest thing there is. Therefore he is not knowable.