Et ex hoc patet secundum, scilicet qualiter ratio dicatur esse in re. Non enim hoc dicitur, quasi ipsa intentio quam significat nomen rationis, sit in re; aut etiam ipsa conceptio, cui convenit talis intentio, sit in re extra animam, cum sit in anima sicut in subjecto: sed dicitur esse in re, inquantum in re extra animam est aliquid quod respondet conceptioni animae, sicut significatum signo. Unde sciendum, quod ipsa conceptio intellectus tripliciter se habet ad rem quae est extra animam. And from this the second item—how an account is said to be in a real thing—becomes clear. For this is not said as if the very intention that the name “account” signifies is in the reality, or even that the very conception, to which such an intention belongs, is in the reality outside the soul, since it is in the soul as in its subject. Rather, it is said to be in the reality insofar as in the reality outside the soul there is something that corresponds to the conception of the soul, as the signified corresponds to its sign. Whence one must notice that the very conception of the intellect is related in three ways to the reality outside the soul. Aliquando enim hoc quod intellectus concipit, est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sicut hoc quod concipitur de hoc nomine “homo”; et talis conceptio intellectus habet fundamentum in re immediate, inquantum res ipsa, ex sua conformitate ad intellectum, facit quod intellectus sit verus, et quod nomen significans illum intellectum proprie de re dicatur. For sometimes what the intellect conceives is a likeness of the reality existing outside the soul, for example, what is conceived of this reality with the name “man”; and such a conception of the intellect has a foundation in the reality immediately, insofar as the reality itself, due to its conformity with the intellect, makes the understanding true, and makes the name signifying that understanding properly to be said of the reality. Aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam; et hujusmodi sunt intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit; sicut significatum hujus nominis “genus” non est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, attribuit ei intentionem generis et hujusmodi intentionis licet proximum fundamentum non sit in re, sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa. Unde intellectus non est falsus, qui has intentiones adinvenit. Et simile est de omnibus aliis qui consequuntur ex modo intelligendi, sicut est abstractio mathematicorum et hujusmodi. But sometimes what a name signifies is not a likeness of a reality existing outside the soul; rather, it is something that follows from the mode of understanding the reality that is outside the soul. Of this sort are the intentions that our intellect comes to; for example, what is signified by the name “genus” is not a likeness of some reality existing outside the soul; but rather, from the fact that the intellect understands animal as within many species, it attributes to it the intention of genus. And although the proximate foundation of intentions of this sort is not in the reality but in the intellect, still the remote foundation is the reality itself. Whence the intellect that comes to these intentions is not false. And it is the same way for all the other things that follow from the mode of understanding, as is the abstraction of mathematical objects and the like. Aliquando vero id quod significatur per nomen, non habet fundamentum in re, neque proximum, neque remotum, sicut conceptio chimerae: quia neque est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam, neque consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem aliquam vere: et ideo ista conceptio est falsa. Unde patet secundum, scilicet quod ratio dicitur esse in re, inquantum significatum nominis, cui accidit esse rationem, est in re: et hoc contingit proprie quando conceptio intellectus est similitudo rei. And sometimes what is signified through the name has neither a proximate nor a remote foundation in the reality, such as the conception of a chimera. For it is neither the likeness of any reality outside the soul, nor does it follow from the mode of truly understanding any reality. And thus, such a conception is false. Thereby becomes clear the second item—that an account is said to be in a reality insofar as what is signified by its name, to which the account belongs, is in the reality. And this occurs properly when the conception of the intellect is a likeness of the reality. Quantum ad tertium, scilicet utrum rationes attributorum in Deo sint, sciendum est, quod circa hoc videtur esse duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, ut Avicenna, lib. De intelligent., cap. 1, et Rabbi Moyses, lib. 1, cap. 57 et 58, quod res illa quae Deus est, est quoddam esse subsistens, nec aliquid aliud nisi esse, in Deo est: unde dicunt, quod est esse sine essentia. Omnia autem alia quae Deo attribuuntur, verificantur de Deo dupliciter secundum eos: vel per modum negationis, vel per modum causalitatis. Per modum negationis dupliciter: vel ad removendum privationem seu defectum oppositum, ut dicimus Deum sapientem, ut removeatur defectus qui est in carentibus sapientia; vel secundum quod aliquid ex negatione consequitur, sicut est de hoc nomine “unus,” qui ex hoc ipso quod non est divisus, est unus. Similiter ex hoc ipso quod est immaterialis, est intelligens. Unde, secundum eos, omnia ista nomina potius sunt inventa ad removendum, quam ad ponendum aliquid in Deo. Item per modum causalitatis dupliciter: vel inquantum producit ista in creaturis, ut dicatur Deus bonus, quia bonitatem creaturis influit, et sic de aliis, vel inquantum ad modum creaturae se habet ut dicatur Deus volens vel pius, inquantum se habet ad modum volentis vel pii in modo producendi effectum, sicut dicitur iratus, quia ad modum irati se habet. As regards the third item—whether the accounts of the attributes are in God—one should note that there appear to be two opinions about this. For some, like Avicenna and Rabbi Moses, say that that reality that is God is a certain subsistent existence, nor is there anything else in God except existence. Whence they say that he is existence without essence. However, all the other things that are attributed to God are true of God in two ways, according to them: either through the mode of negation, or through the mode of causality. This is done through the mode of negation in two ways: either for the sake of removing a privation or opposite defect, such that we call God “wise” in order to remove the defect in those who lack wisdom; or insofar as something follows on a negation, as is the case with the name “one,” as he is one from the very fact that he is not divided; likewise, from the very fact that he is immaterial, he is also intelligent. Whence, according to them, all such names have been invented to remove—rather than to assert—something in God. Furthermore, it is done through the mode of causality in two ways: either insofar as he produces such things in what is created, such that God is called “good” because he pours goodness into created things, and so on for other names; or insofar as he relates to us according to the mode of a created thing, such that God is called “willing” or “holy” insofar as he relates to us in the mode of one who wills or is holy in his manner of producing an effect, just as he is called “angry” because he relates to us in the mode of someone who is angry. Et secundum hanc opinionem sequitur quod omnia nomina quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis, dicantur aequivoce, et quod nulla similitudo sit creaturae ad Creatorem ex hoc quod creatura est bona vel sapiens vel hujusmodi aliquid; et hoc expresse dicit Rabbi Moyses. Secundum hoc, illud quod concipitur de nominibus attributorum, non refertur ad Deum, ut sit similitudo alicujus quod in eo est. Unde sequitur quod rationes istorum nominum non sunt in Deo, quasi fundamentum proximum habeant in ipso, sed remotum; sicut nos dicimus de relationibus quae ex tempore de Deo dicuntur; hujusmodi enim relationes in Deo secundum rem non sunt, sed sequuntur modum intelligendi, sicut dictum est de intentionibus. Et sic, secundum hanc opinionem, rationes horum attributorum sunt tantum in intellectu, et non in re, quae Deus est; et intellectus eas adinvenit ex consideratione creaturarum vel per negationem vel per causalitatem, ut dictum est. And according to this opinion it follows that all the names that are said of God and created things are said equivocally, and that there is no likeness between the created and the Creator arising from the fact that a created thing is good or wise or the like. And Rabbi Moses says this explicitly. According to this, what is conceived from the names of the attributes is not referred to God such that it is a likeness of something in him. Whence it follows that the accounts of these names are not in God as having their proximate foundation in him, but as having a remote one, just as we ourselves say about relations said of God in reference to time. For such relations are not in God according to reality; rather, they follow the mode of understanding, just as was said of intentions. And thus, according to this opinion, the accounts of these attributes are only in the intellect, and not in the reality that is God, and the intellect comes to them from a consideration of created things either through negation or through causality, as was said. Alii vero dicunt, ut Dionysius, cap. 13, De divin. nomin., et Anselmus, Monol., cap. 3, quod in Deo praeeminenter existit quidquid perfectionis in creaturis est. Et haec eminentia attenditur quantum ad tria: scilicet quantum ad universalitatem, quia in Deo sunt omnes perfectiones adunatae, quae non congregantur in una creatura. Item quantum ad plenitudinem, quia est ibi sapientia sine omni defectu, et similiter de aliis attributis: quod non est in creaturis. Et iterum quantum ad unitatem; quae enim in creaturis diversa sunt, in Deo sunt unum. Et quia in illo uno praehabet omnia, ideo secundum illud unum causat omnia, cognoscit omnia, et omnia sibi per analogiam similantur. Secundum ergo hanc opinionem, conceptiones quas intellectus noster ex nominibus attributorum concipit, sunt vere similitudines rei, quae Deus est, quamvis deficientes et non plenae, sicut est de aliis rebus quae Deo similantur. Unde hujusmodi rationes non sunt tantum in intellectu, quia habent proximum fundamentum in re quae Deus est. Et ex hoc contingit quod quidquid sequitur ad sapientiam, inquantum hujusmodi, recte et proprie convenit Deo. Others, like Dionysius and Anselm, say that whatever there is of perfection in created things is in God preeminently. And this eminence is noted in three respects: with respect to universality, since although all perfections are not gathered together in any one creature, they are so united in God; with respect to fullness, since wisdom is there without any defect, and the same is true of the other attributes, which is not the case in created things; and with respect to unity, for things that are divided in created things are one in God. And because in that one he has all, thus according to that one he causes all, knows all, and makes them all like him through analogy. Therefore, according to this opinion, the conceptions that our intellect conceives from the names of the attributes are truly likenesses of the reality that is God, although they are deficient and not full, just as is the case for other realities that are like God. Whence such accounts are not merely in the intellect, since they have their proximate foundation in the reality that is God. And from this it arises that whatever follows upon wisdom, as such, rightly and properly speaking belongs to God. Hae autem opiniones, quamvis in superficie diversae videantur, tamen non sunt contrariae, si quis dictorum rationes ex causis assumit dicendi. Quia primi consideraverunt ipsas res creatas, quibus imponuntur nomina attributorum, sicut quod hoc nomen “sapientia” imponitur cuidam qualitati, et hoc nomen “essentia” cuidam rei quae non subsistit: et haec longe a Deo sunt: et ideo dixerunt, quod Deus est esse sine essentia, et quod non est in eo sapientia secundum se. Alii vero consideraverunt modos perfectionis, ex quibus dicta nomina sumuntur: et, quia Deus secundum unum simplex esse omnibus modis perfectus est, qui importantur per hujusmodi nomina, ideo dixerunt, quod ista nomina positive Deo conveniunt. Sic ergo patet quod quaelibet harum opinionum non negat hoc quod alia dicit: quia nec primi dicerent aliquem modum perfectionis Deo deesse, nec secundi qualitatem aut res non subsistentes in Deo ponerent. However, these opinions, although they appear diverse on the surface, nonetheless are not contrary, if one takes the accounts of the claims from the causes for saying them. For the first group considered the created realities themselves, on which the names of the attributes are imposed; for example, the name “wisdom” is imposed on a certain quality, and the name “essence” is imposed on some reality that does not subsist—and these things are a long ways from God. And therefore they say that God is existence without essence, and that wisdom according to itself is not in him. But the others considered the modes of perfection, from which the aforesaid names are taken. And because God is perfect in all ways according to one simple existence, which modes of perfection are indicated through these names, therefore they said that such names belong to God in a positive way. Thus it is clear that neither of these opinions denies what the other says, since the first ones do not say that some mode of perfection is absent from God, and the second ones do not assert the presence of a quality or a non-subsisting reality in God. Sic ergo patet tertium, scilicet quod rationes attributorum sunt vere in Deo, quia ratio nominis magis se tenet ex parte ejus a quo imponitur nomen, quam ex parte ejus cui imponitur. Therefore in this way the third item—that the accounts of the attributes are truly in God—becomes clear. For the account of a name stands on the side of that due to which the name is imposed more than on the side of that on which it is imposed. Quantum vero ad quartum, scilicet utrum pluralitas istarum rationum sit tantum ex parte intellectus nostri, vel aliquo modo ex parte rei, sciendum est, quod ista pluralitas rationum contingit ex hoc quod res quae Deus est, superat intellectum nostrum. Intellectus enim noster non potest una conceptione diversos modos perfectionis accipere: tum quia ex creaturis cognitionem accipit, in quibus sunt diversi modi perfectionum secundum diversas formas: tum quia hoc quod in Deo est unum et simplex, plurificatur in intellectu nostro, etiam si immediate a Deo reciperet; sicut multiplicatur processio suae bonitatis in aliis creaturis. Unde, cum Deus secundum unam et eamdem rem sit omnibus modis perfectus, una conceptione non potest integre perfectionem ejus apprehendere, et per consequens nec nominare; et ideo oportet quod diversas conceptiones de eo habeat, quae sunt diversae rationes, et quod diversa nomina imponat significantia rationes illas. Unde nomina illa non sunt synonyma, inquantum significant rationes diversas. As regards the fourth item—whether the plurality of these accounts is only on the side of our intellect, or is also in some way on the side of the real thing—one should note that such plurality of accounts arises from the fact that the reality that is God surpasses our intellect. For our intellect cannot receive diverse modes of perfection by means of one conception. For we receive knowledge from created things, wherein the diverse modes of perfections exist according to their diverse forms. This is also because what in God is one and simple becomes manifold in our understanding—even if we were to receive it immediately from God—just as the procession of his goodness is multiplied in the different creatures. Whence, since God is perfect in all ways according to one and the same reality, one cannot apprehend his perfection in an integral way by a single conception, and consequently neither can one so name him. And therefore one must have diverse conceptions of him, which are the diverse accounts, and one must impose diverse names signifying those accounts. Whence those names are not synonyms, inasmuch as they signify diverse accounts. Si autem intellectus noster Deum per seipsum videret, illi rei posset imponere nomen unum: quod erit in patria; et ideo dicitur Zach., ult., 9: in die illa erit Dominus unus, et nomen ejus unum. Illud autem nomen unum non significaret bonitatem tantum, nec sapientiam tantum, aut aliquid hujusmodi, sed significata omnium istorum includeret. Sed tamen si intellectus videns Deum per essentiam imponeret nomen rei quam videret, et nominaret mediante conceptione quam de ea habet, oporteret adhuc quod imponeret plura nomina: quia impossibile est quod conceptio intellectus creati repraesentet totam perfectionem divinae essentiae. Unde una re visa diversas conceptiones formaret, et diversa nomina imponeret, sicut etiam Chrysostomus dicit, quod angeli laudant Deum, quidam ut majestatem, quidam ut bonitatem, et sic de aliis, in signum quod ipsum non vident visione comprehendente; sed conceptio perfecte repraesentans eum est Verbum increatum; et ideo est unum tantum. If, however, our intellect were to see God through his very self, it would be able to impose one name on that thing. And this will happen in the heavenly fatherland; therefore Zachariah 14:9 says, on that day the Lord will be one and his name one. However, that one name would signify not only goodness, or only wisdom, or the like; rather, it would include all the things that are signified in all such names. Nevertheless if an intellect seeing God through his essence were to impose a name on the reality that it sees, and were to name it by the mediation of the conception that it has of it, it would still have to impose many names. For it is impossible for the conception of a created intellect to represent the entire perfection of the divine essence. Whence it would form diverse conceptions when the one reality has been seen, and it would impose diverse names; for example, Chrysostom also says that the angels praise God, some as majesty, others as goodness, and so on, as a sign that they do not see him with a vision that comprehends him. Rather, the conception that perfectly represents him is the uncreated Word, and therefore it is only one. Sic ergo patet quod pluralitas nominum venit ex hoc quod ipse Deus nostrum intellectum excedit. Quod autem Deus excedat intellectum nostrum est ex parte ipsius Dei, propter plenitudinem perfectionis ejus, et ex parte intellectus nostri, qui deficienter se habet ad eam comprehendendam. Unde patet quod pluralitas istarum rationum non tantum est ex parte intellectus nostri, sed etiam ex parte ipsius Dei, inquantum sua perfectio superat unamquamque conceptionem nostri intellectus. Et ideo pluralitati istarum rationum respondet aliquid in re quae Deus est: non quidem pluralitas rei, sed plena perfectio, ex qua contingit ut omnes istae conceptiones ei aptentur. In this way, then, it is clear that the plurality of the names comes from the fact that God himself exceeds our intellect. However, the fact that God exceeds our intellect is due both to God himself, on account of the fullness of his perfection, and to our intellect, which stands in a deficient way as regards comprehending him. Whence it is clear that the plurality of these accounts is not only on the side of our intellect, but also on the side of God himself, insofar as his perfection surpasses every conception of our intellect. And therefore something in the reality that is God corresponds to the plurality of these accounts—though this is not a plurality of the reality, but rather the full perfection, from which it arises that all such conceptions are conformed to him. Qui ergo dixerunt, quod pluralitas ista est tantum ex parte intellectus nostri, vel ex parte effectuum, quodammodo verum dixerunt, et quodammodo non. Si enim hoc referatur ad causam multiplicationis, sic verum dicunt, quod est ex parte intellectus nostri, et effectuum quodammodo, ex eo quod intellectus noster non potest concipere divinam perfectionem una conceptione, sed pluribus; cujus una ratio est ex hoc quod est assuefactus ad res creatas. Si autem referatur ad modum quo istae rationes attribuuntur Deo, falsum dicunt. Non enim ex hoc quod bona facit, vel quia ad modum bonorum se habet, bonus est; sed quia bonus est, ideo bona facit, et alia participando ejus bonitatem ad modum ejus se habent. Unde si nullam creaturam fecisset nec facturus esset, ipse in se talis esset ut posset vere considerari secundum omnes istas conceptiones, quas habet nunc intellectus noster ipsum considerando. Therefore those who say that such plurality is only on the side of our intellect or on the side of his effects in a way speak the truth, and in a way do not. For if this is referred to the cause of the multiplication, they speak the truth that it is in a certain way on the side of our intellect and the effects, because our intellect cannot conceive the divine perfection with one conception, but only with many; one reason for this is that it is accommodated to created things. However, if this is referred to the mode by which such accounts are attributed to God, they speak falsely. For he is not good from the fact that he does good things, or because he relates to us according to the mode of good things; rather, he does good things because he is good, and other things by participating in his goodness relate to us according to his mode. Whence even if he had not created, and were not going to create, he would in himself be such that he could truly be considered according to all these conceptions that our intellect now has in considering him. Et sic patet quartum, quod pluralitas istorum nominum non tantum est ex parte intellectus nostri formantis diversas conceptiones de Deo, quae dicuntur diversae rationes, ut ex dictis patet, sed ex parte ipsius Dei, inquantum scilicet est aliquid in Deo correspondens omnibus istis conceptionibus, scilicet plena et omnimoda ipsius perfectio, secundum quam contingit quod quodlibet nominum significantium istas conceptiones, de Deo vere et proprie dicitur; non autem ita quod aliqua diversitas vel multiplicitas ponatur in re, quae Deus est, ratione istorum attributorum. And thereby the fourth item is clear, that the plurality of these names is not only on the side of our intellect forming the diverse conceptions about God, which are called the “diverse accounts,” as is clear from things said in the previous article. Rather, it is also on the side of God himself, insofar as there is something in God corresponding to all these conceptions, that is, his full and total perfection, according to which it arises that each of the names signifying these conceptions is said truly and properly of God. However, this is not in such a way that any diversity or multiplicity is placed in the reality that is God by reason of such attributes. His visis facile est respondere ad objecta. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod intentio Dionysii est dicere, quod secundum diversas bonitates quas creaturis influit, Deus nominatur, manifestatur et laudatur; non autem ita quod rationes illarum bonitatum ex hoc verificentur de eo, quia creaturis eas influit, sed magis e converso, ut dictum est. Quamvis enim conditio causae cognoscatur ex conditionibus effectus, non tamen conditio causae verificatur propter conditiones effectus, sed e converso. Reply Obj. 1: Having seen these things, it is easy to respond to the objections. To the first we say that Dionysius’s intention is to say that God is named, manifested, and praised according to the diverse goodnesses that he pours into created things. But he does not mean this in such a way that the accounts of these goodnesses are true of him because he pours them into created things, but rather vice versa, as was said in the body. For although the condition of the cause is known from the conditions of the effects, still the condition of the cause is not true on account of the conditions of the effects, but rather vice versa. Ad secundum dicendum, quod intellectus noster id quod concipit de bonitate vel de sapientia non refert in Deum quasi in eo sit per modum quo ipse concipit, quia hoc esset comprehendere ejus sapientiam vel bonitatem; sed intelligit ipsam bonitatem divinam cui aliqualiter simile est quod intellectus noster concipit esse supra id quod de eo concipitur. Unde per hujusmodi conceptiones non videtur ipse Deus secundum quod in se est, sed intelligitur supra intellectum. Et hoc vult dicere Dionysius in illa auctoritate. Reply Obj. 2: Our intellect does not refer to God what it conceives about goodness or wisdom as though it were in him in the way in which he conceives it, since this would be to comprehend his wisdom or goodness. Rather, he understands the divine goodness itself—which what our intellect conceives is in some way like—to be above what is conceived of it. This is why God himself is not seen through such conceptions as he is in himself; rather, he is understood to be above understanding. And this is what Dionysius intends to say in that authority. Ad tertium dicendum, quod multiplicitas ista attributorum nullo modo ponitur in Deo quasi ipse secundum rem sit multiplex; sed tamen ipse secundum suam simplicem perfectionem, multitudini istorum attributorum correspondet ut vere de Deo dicantur. Et hoc intendit Commentator. Reply Obj. 3: Such multiplicity of the attributes is in no way placed in God as though he were manifold according to reality. But nonetheless he himself, according to his simple perfection, corresponds to the multitude of these attributes, such that they are said of God truly. And this is what the Commentator intends. Ad quartum dicendum, quod sicut ratio hominis non dicitur esse in homine quasi res quaedam in ipso, sed est sicut in subjecto in intellectu, et est in homine sicut in eo quod praestat fulcimentum veritati ipsius; ita etiam ratio bonitatis divinae est in intellectu sicut in subjecto, in Deo autem sicut in eo quod correspondet per quamdam similitudinem isti rationi, faciens ejus veritatem. Unde patet quod ratio procedit ex malo intellectu ejus quod dicitur. Reply Obj. 4: The account of man is not said to be in a man as though it were some real thing in him; rather, it is in him as in a subject within his intellect, and it is in a man as in what provides the support for the account’s truth. In the same way, so too the account of the divine goodness is in the intellect as in a subject, but it is in God as in that to which it corresponds through a certain likeness with that account, making its truth. Whence it is clear that the argument proceeds from a misunderstanding of what is being said. Ad quintum dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur fundari vel radicari in aliquo metaphorice, ex quo firmitatem habet. Rationes autem intellectae habent duplicem firmitatem: scilicet firmitatem sui esse, et hanc habent ab intellectu, sicut alia accidentia a suis subjectis; et firmitatem suae veritatis, et hanc habent ex re cui conformantur. Ex eo enim quod res est vel non est, locutio et intellectus veritatem vel falsitatem habet. Rationes ergo attributorum fundantur vel radicantur in intellectu quantum ad firmitatem sui esse, quia, ut dictum est, intellectus est earum subjectum; in essentia autem divina quantum ad firmitatem suae veritatis; et hoc in nullo repugnat divinae simplicitati. Reply Obj. 5: Something is said to be “founded upon” or “rooted in” something else metaphorically as that due to which it has stability. Now, understood accounts have a double stability: the stability of their existence—and this they have due to the intellect, as do other accidents due to their subjects—and the stability of their truth—and this they have due to the reality to which they conform. For speech and the understanding have their truth or falsity due to the fact that a reality is or is not. Therefore the accounts of the attributes are founded on or rooted in the understanding as regards the stability of their existence, since, as was said in the previous article, the intellect is their subject. But they are founded on or rooted in the divine essence as regards the stability of their truth, and this is in no way repugnant to the divine simplicity. Ad sextum dicendum, quod in Deo omnia sunt unum re, praeter ingenerationem, generationem et processionem, quae constituunt personas re distinctas: non autem oportet quod quidquid praeter ista de Deo dicitur, sit unum ratione. Et similiter intelligendum est quod dicit Boetius, 1 De Trinit., cap. 6, quod sola relatio multiplicat Trinitatem, scilicet pluralitate reali. Tunc enim aliquid est unum re et ratione multiplex, quando una res respondet diversis conceptionibus et nominibus, ut de ea verificentur; sicut punctum, quod cum sit una res, respondet secundum veritatem diversis conceptionibus de eo factis, sive prout cogitatur in se, sive prout cogitatur centrum, sive prout cogitatur principium linearum; et hae rationes sive conceptiones sunt in intellectu sicut in subjecto, et in ipso puncto sicut in fundamento veritatis istarum conceptionum. Quamvis istud exemplum non sit usquequaque conveniens, sicut nec alia quae in divinis inducuntur. Reply Obj. 6: In God all things are one in reality, aside from non-generation, generation, and procession, which constitute the really distinct persons. However, it is not necessary that whatever is said of God aside from these is one in account. And in the same way one should understand what Boethius says—that only relation multiplies the Trinity, that is, with a real plurality. For something is one in reality but manifold in account when one reality corresponds to diverse conceptions and names, such that they are true of it. For example, a point, although it is one reality, truly corresponds to diverse conceptions made of it, whether as thought of in itself, or as thought of as a center, or as thought of as the beginning of lines. And these accounts or conceptions are in the intellect as in a subject, and in the point itself as in the foundation of the truth of these conceptions. But this example is not altogether fitting, just as neither are others that are introduced in divine matters. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum in divinis sint plures personae Whether there is a plurality of persons in the divine essence Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in unitate divinae essentiae non sit pluralitas personarum. To the fourth we proceed as follows. It appears that there is no plurality of persons within the unity of the divine essence. In omnibus enim creaturis ita est quod ad multiplicationem suppositorum sequitur multiplicatio essentiae secundum numerum, sicut alia humanitas est numero in Socrate et Platone. Sed creaturae sunt exemplatae a Deo. Cum igitur divinam essentiam impossibile sit multiplicari, ut supra ostensum est, videtur quod impossibile sit esse ibi pluralitatem suppositorum, vel personarum. Obj. 1: For in all created things it is the case that from the multiplication of supposits follows a numerical multiplication of the essence; for example, the humanity in Socrates and that in Plato are numerically different. But created things have their exemplar in God. Therefore, since it is impossible that the divine essence be multiplied, as was shown above, it seems impossible that a plurality of supposits, or persons, be there. Item, eorum quae sunt idem, si unum multiplicatur vel communicatur, et reliquum. Sed in Deo idem est quo est et quod est, sive essentia et suppositum. Si ergo essentia non multiplicatur, ergo nec suppositum. Ergo, etc. Obj. 2: Furthermore, of things that are the same thing, if one is multiplied or communicated, so is the other. But in God that whereby he exists and that which he is—that is, the essence and the supposit—are the same thing. Therefore if his essence is not multiplied, then neither is his supposit. Therefore and so on. Item, natura speciei ad hoc multiplicatur in pluribus individuis, quia non potest totam perfectionem habere in uno, eo quod individuum est corruptibile, et species incorruptibilis: unde in incorruptibilibus est tantum unum individuum in una specie, sicut sol. Sed natura divina habet omnem perfectionem in uno supposito. Ergo vanum est esse pluralitatem suppositorum, et hoc non potest esse in Deo. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the nature of a species is multiplied in many individuals for the sake of this: because it cannot have its entire perfection in one, because the individual is corruptible whereas the species is incorruptible. Whence in incorruptible things there is only one individual in one species, like the sun. But the divine nature has every perfection in one supposit. Therefore a plurality of supposits would be pointless, and that cannot be in God. Contra. Sicut dicit Dionysius, De divin. nom., cap. 4, bonum est communicativum sui. Sed Deus est summe bonus. Ergo summe se communicabit. Sed in creaturis non summe se communicat, quia non recipiunt totam bonitatem suam. Ergo oportet quod sit communicatio perfecta, ut scilicet totam suam bonitatem alii communicet. Hoc autem non potest esse in diversitate essentiae. Ergo oportet esse plures distinctos in unitate divinae essentiae. Hoc idem arguitur ex perfectione divinae beatitudinis, quae ponit summum gaudium quod sine consortio haberi non potest. Hoc etiam arguitur ex perfectione divinae caritatis. Perfecta enim caritas est amor gratuitus qui tendit in alium. Sed non erit amor summus, nisi summe diligat. Summe autem non diligit creaturam, quae non summe diligenda est. Ergo oportet quod in ipsa creatrice essentia, sit summe diligens et summe dilectus, distincti in essentiae unitate. On the contrary, as Dionysius says, the good is communicative of itself. But God is supremely good. Therefore he will supremely communicate himself. But he does not supremely communicate himself in created things, since they are not receptive of his entire goodness. Therefore there must be a perfect communication, namely, one such that he would communicate his entire goodness to another. Now, this cannot be in a diversity of essence. Therefore there must be many distinct things within the unity of the divine essence. This same thing is argued from the perfection of the divine beatitude, which asserts the highest joy, which cannot be possessed without companionship. And this same thing is argued from the perfection of the divine charity. For perfect charity is a gratuitous love that stretches toward another. But it will not be the supreme love unless he loves supremely, and he does not supremely love a created thing, since it should not be loved supremely. Therefore in the creating essence itself there must be one loving supremely and one loved supremely, the two being distinct in the unity of the essence. Respondeo: concedendum est, absque ulla ambiguitate, esse in Deo pluralitatem suppositorum vel personarum in unitate essentiae, non propter rationes inductas, quae non necessario concludunt, sed propter fidei veritatem. I answer that one should grant, without any ambiguity, that there is within God a plurality of supposits, or persons, in a unity of essence—not on account of the reasons introduced above, which do not conclude with necessity, but on account of the truth of the faith. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in creatura differt essentia rei et esse suum, nec habet essentia esse nisi propter comparationem ad habentem essentiam; et ideo quando essentia creata communicatur, communicatur tantum secundum rationem suam et non secundum esse, quia secundum illud esse non est nisi in uno tantum habente. Divina autem essentia est idem quod suum esse; et ideo quando communicatur essentia, communicatur etiam esse. Unde essentia non tantum est una secundum rationem, sed secundum esse; et propter hoc potest esse una numero in pluribus suppositis. Creaturae autem quamvis exemplentur a Deo, tamen deficiunt a repraesentatione ejus. Reply Obj. 1: In a creature the thing’s essence and its existence differ, nor does its essence have existence except on account of a relation to something having the essence. And therefore when a created essence is communicated, it is communicated only according to its account, and not according to its existence, since according to that existence it is in only the one possessing it. The divine essence, however, is the same as its existence, and therefore when his essence is communicated, his existence is also communicated. Whence the essence is not only one in account, but one in existence, and on account of this it can be numerically one in several supposits. However, although created things have God as exemplar, nonetheless they fall short of representing him. Ad secundum dicendum, quod essentia et suppositum sunt in Deo idem re, nihilominus tamen differunt ratione, sicut de attributis dictum est supra. Unde Commentator, in 2 Metaph., dicit, quod vita et vivens non significant idem in Deo, sicut nomina synonyma; et ideo contra rationem suppositi est quod communicetur non autem contra rationem essentiae. Ideo una essentia communicatur pluribus suppositis. Reply Obj. 2: In God the essence and the supposit are the same in reality, yet they differ in account, as was said of the attributes above in the preceding article. Whence the Commentator says that life and living do not signify the same thing in God, like synonymous names. And therefore it is against the account of a supposit that it be communicated, but not against the account of an essence. Therefore one essence is communicated to many supposits. Ad tertium dicendum, quod necessitas finis est necessitas conditionata et ex suppositione. Unde non quaeritur in illis quae sunt necessaria absolute, et multo minus in illis quae sunt per se necessaria, non habentia necessitatem ab aliquo. Unde dico quod pluralitas suppositorum in divina essentia non est propter aliquem finem; immo propter se ipsam est necessario, cum ipse Deus sit finis omnium. Unde non potest concludi quod sit vana, quia vanum est quod est ordinatum ad finem quem non consequitur. Reply Obj. 3: The necessity of an end is a conditioned necessity, and one based on a supposition. Whence it is not sought in things that are necessary absolutely, and much less in things that are necessary through themselves, things not having their necessity from another. Whence I say that the plurality of supposits in the divine essence is not on account of some end; rather, it is necessary on account of its very self, since God himself is the end of all things. Whence it cannot be concluded that a plurality of supposits in God is pointless, since something is pointless when what is ordered to an end does not attain it. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum divinae personae differant realiter aut tantum ratione Whether the plurality of persons really differ or is only something of reason Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pluralitas suppositorum in divinis non sit realis, sed tantum rationis. To the fifth we proceed as follows. It seems that the plurality of supposits in the divine is not real, but only something of reason. Sicut enim dicit Damascenus, lib. 1 De fide orth., cap. 2, tres personae re idem sunt, ratione autem et cogitatione distinguuntur. Ergo videtur quod non sit ibi pluralitas realis. Obj. 1: For as Damascene says, the three persons are the same in reality, but they are distinguished by reason and cognition. Therefore it seems that the plurality there is not real. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, 5 De Trinit., cap. 8, quod tres personae in nullo absoluto distinguuntur, sed tantum in his quae sunt ad aliquid. Res autem non est ad aliquid, sed est absolutum. Ergo videtur quod tres personae non sunt tres res, et ita non est ibi realis distinctio. Obj. 2: Augustine says that the three persons are distinguished by nothing absolute, but only by things that are toward-something. Now, a real thing is not toward-something; rather, it is absolute. Therefore it seems that the three persons are not three realities, and thus there is no real distinction there.