Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in creatura differt essentia rei et esse suum, nec habet essentia esse nisi propter comparationem ad habentem essentiam; et ideo quando essentia creata communicatur, communicatur tantum secundum rationem suam et non secundum esse, quia secundum illud esse non est nisi in uno tantum habente. Divina autem essentia est idem quod suum esse; et ideo quando communicatur essentia, communicatur etiam esse. Unde essentia non tantum est una secundum rationem, sed secundum esse; et propter hoc potest esse una numero in pluribus suppositis. Creaturae autem quamvis exemplentur a Deo, tamen deficiunt a repraesentatione ejus. Reply Obj. 1: In a creature the thing’s essence and its existence differ, nor does its essence have existence except on account of a relation to something having the essence. And therefore when a created essence is communicated, it is communicated only according to its account, and not according to its existence, since according to that existence it is in only the one possessing it. The divine essence, however, is the same as its existence, and therefore when his essence is communicated, his existence is also communicated. Whence the essence is not only one in account, but one in existence, and on account of this it can be numerically one in several supposits. However, although created things have God as exemplar, nonetheless they fall short of representing him. Ad secundum dicendum, quod essentia et suppositum sunt in Deo idem re, nihilominus tamen differunt ratione, sicut de attributis dictum est supra. Unde Commentator, in 2 Metaph., dicit, quod vita et vivens non significant idem in Deo, sicut nomina synonyma; et ideo contra rationem suppositi est quod communicetur non autem contra rationem essentiae. Ideo una essentia communicatur pluribus suppositis. Reply Obj. 2: In God the essence and the supposit are the same in reality, yet they differ in account, as was said of the attributes above in the preceding article. Whence the Commentator says that life and living do not signify the same thing in God, like synonymous names. And therefore it is against the account of a supposit that it be communicated, but not against the account of an essence. Therefore one essence is communicated to many supposits. Ad tertium dicendum, quod necessitas finis est necessitas conditionata et ex suppositione. Unde non quaeritur in illis quae sunt necessaria absolute, et multo minus in illis quae sunt per se necessaria, non habentia necessitatem ab aliquo. Unde dico quod pluralitas suppositorum in divina essentia non est propter aliquem finem; immo propter se ipsam est necessario, cum ipse Deus sit finis omnium. Unde non potest concludi quod sit vana, quia vanum est quod est ordinatum ad finem quem non consequitur. Reply Obj. 3: The necessity of an end is a conditioned necessity, and one based on a supposition. Whence it is not sought in things that are necessary absolutely, and much less in things that are necessary through themselves, things not having their necessity from another. Whence I say that the plurality of supposits in the divine essence is not on account of some end; rather, it is necessary on account of its very self, since God himself is the end of all things. Whence it cannot be concluded that a plurality of supposits in God is pointless, since something is pointless when what is ordered to an end does not attain it. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum divinae personae differant realiter aut tantum ratione Whether the plurality of persons really differ or is only something of reason Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pluralitas suppositorum in divinis non sit realis, sed tantum rationis. To the fifth we proceed as follows. It seems that the plurality of supposits in the divine is not real, but only something of reason. Sicut enim dicit Damascenus, lib. 1 De fide orth., cap. 2, tres personae re idem sunt, ratione autem et cogitatione distinguuntur. Ergo videtur quod non sit ibi pluralitas realis. Obj. 1: For as Damascene says, the three persons are the same in reality, but they are distinguished by reason and cognition. Therefore it seems that the plurality there is not real. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, 5 De Trinit., cap. 8, quod tres personae in nullo absoluto distinguuntur, sed tantum in his quae sunt ad aliquid. Res autem non est ad aliquid, sed est absolutum. Ergo videtur quod tres personae non sunt tres res, et ita non est ibi realis distinctio. Obj. 2: Augustine says that the three persons are distinguished by nothing absolute, but only by things that are toward-something. Now, a real thing is not toward-something; rather, it is absolute. Therefore it seems that the three persons are not three realities, and thus there is no real distinction there. Item, personae distinguuntur per proprietates. Proprietates autem illae non addunt supra essentiam secundum rem, sed tantum secundum rationem. Ergo videtur quod distinctio personarum, quam faciunt, sit tantum distinctio rationis. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the persons are distinguished through their properties. Now, those properties do not add to the essence according to reality, but only according to reason. Therefore it seems that the distinction of persons that they make is only a distinction of reason. Item, sicut paternitas et essentia differunt ratione, ita sapientia et essentia. Si ergo hoc sufficit ad distinctionem realem suppositorum, videtur quod etiam secundum diversa attributa distinguantur realiter supposita; et ita sunt tot personae quot attributa. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Ergo proprietates non faciunt realem distinctionem suppositorum. Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as paternity and essence differ in account, so do wisdom and essence. Therefore if the former is enough for a real distinction of supposits, it seems that the supposits would also be really distinct according to the diverse attributes—and thus there are as many persons as there are attributes, which is incongruous. Therefore the properties do not make a real distinction of supposits. Contra, Augustinus, 1 De doctr. Christ., cap. 5, dicit: res quibus fruendum est, sunt Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus. Ergo tres personae sunt plures res. Ergo eorum pluralitas est pluralitas realis. On the contrary, Augustine says, the realities one should enjoy are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore the three persons are several realities. Therefore their plurality is a real plurality. Item, distinctio rationis non sufficit ad distinctionem suppositorum, cum unus et idem homo possit in se diversas rationes habere, et cum suppositum dicat quid reale. Si ergo non est in divinis nisi distinctio rationis, non erit ibi vera pluralitas personarum, quod est haereticum. Furthermore, a distinction of reason is not enough for a distinction of supposits, since one and the same man can have diverse accounts in himself, and since “supposit” signifies something real. If, therefore, in the divine there is only the distinction of reason, there will not be a true plurality of persons there, which is heretical. Respondeo dicendum, quod dicere personas distingui tantum ratione, sonat haeresim Sabellianam: et ideo simpliciter dicendum est, quod pluralitas personarum est realis. Quomodo autem hoc possit esse videndum est. Sciendum est igitur, quod proprietas personalis, scilicet relatio distinguens, est idem re quod divina essentia, sed differens ratione, sicut et de attributis dictum est. Ratio autem relationis est ut referatur ad alterum. Potest ergo dupliciter considerari relatio in divinis: vel per comparationem ad essentiam, et sic est ratio tantum; vel per comparationem ad illud ad quod refertur, et sic per propriam rationem relationis relatio realiter distinguitur ab illo. Sed per comparationem relationis ad suum correlativum oppositum distinguuntur personae, et non per comparationem relationis ad essentiam: et ideo est pluralitas personarum realis et non tantum rationis. I answer that to say that the persons are distinguished only by reason is to state the Sabellian heresy, and therefore one must say, simply speaking, that the plurality of persons is real. However, one must see how this can be so. Therefore one must know that a personal property—that is, a distinguishing relation—is the same in reality as the divine essence, but it differs from it in account, as was also said of the attributes. However, the account of relation is so that it is referred to another. Therefore relation can be considered in two ways in the divine: either through its comparison to the essence, and thus it is only an account, or through its comparison to what it refers to, and in this latter way the relation is really distinguished from that thing, through the proper account of relation. But the persons are distinguished through the relation’s comparison to its opposite correlative, and not through the relation’s comparison to the essence. Therefore the plurality of the persons is real and not merely something of reason. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod auctoritas Damasceni sic intelligenda est. Ratione, idest relatione; et dicitur relatio ratio, per comparationem ad essentiam, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: That authority of Damascene should be understood such that “by reason” means “by relation.” He calls a relation “reason” through its comparison to the essence, as was said in the body. Ad secundum dicendum, quod res est de transcendentibus, et ideo se habet communiter ad absoluta et ad relativa; et ideo est res essentialis, secundum quam personae non differunt, et est res sive personalis, secundum quam personae distinguuntur. Reply Obj. 2: The real is among transcendent things, and therefore it applies to the absolute and relative in common. Therefore there is an essential reality, according to which the persons do not differ, and there is a relative, or personal, reality, according to which the persons are distinguished. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis relatio per comparationem ad essentiam sit ratio tantum, tamen per comparationem ad suum correlativum est res et realiter distinguens ab ipso. Reply Obj. 3: Although a relation through its comparison to the essence is only a account, nonetheless through its comparison to its correlative it is a reality, and something really distinguishing it from that very correlative. Ad quartum dicendum, quod licet sapientia secundum suam rationem differat ab aliis attributis, non tamen opponitur ad aliquod aliud attributum, cum sapientia bonitatem, vitam et alia attributa secum compatiatur in eodem subjecto. Et ideo non habet rationem distinguendi supposita divinae naturae, sicut habent relationes oppositae. Sed sicut sapientia divina realiter facit effectum sapientiae propter veritatem rationis ipsius, quae manet; ita relatio facit veram distinctionem propter rationem relationis veram, quae salvatur. Reply Obj. 4: Although wisdom does differ from the other attributes according to its account, still it is not opposed to any other attribute. For wisdom is compatible with goodness, life, and the other attributes in the same subject. And therefore it does not have the character of distinguishing supposits of the divine nature, which opposite relations do have. But just as divine wisdom really makes the effect of wisdom on account of the truth of its account, which remains in God, so too a relation makes a true distinction on account of the true account of relation, which is preserved in God. Expositio textus Exposition of the text Substantiae, vel essentiae: quia non proprie dicitur substantia, ut infra, 8 dist., dicetur. The Trinity is said . . . to be of one and the same substance, or essence. He says both because substance is not said properly here, as will be explained below, in Distinction 8. Creditur et intelligitur. Ista ordinantur secundum quod acquiritur fides in credente. Primum enim est praedicatorum verbum, sicut dicitur Roman. 10:14: quomodo credent ei quem non audierunt? Secundum est assensus fidei in ipso credente; et ultimo per fidem devenitur in intellectum, Isa. 7:9: nisi credideritis, non intelligetis. Believed, and understood. These are ordered according to how faith in the believer is acquired. For first there is the word of the preacher, as is said in Romans 10:14: how are they to believe in him of whom they have never heard? And how are they to hear without a preacher? Second, there is the assent of faith in the very one who believes; and lastly, through faith one comes to understanding: if you will not believe, you will not understand (Isa 7:9). Purgatis mentibus; sed diversimode. Ad hoc enim quod videatur naturali cognitione, oportet mentem purgari a sensibilibus et phantasmatibus; ad hoc autem quod per fidem cernatur, oportet mentem purgari ab erroribus et naturalibus rationibus; ad hoc autem quod videatur per essentiam, oportet mentem purgari ab omni culpa et miseria. The Trinity . . . is the highest good discerned by the most purified minds. But this discernment of the highest good occurs in different ways. For the mind must be purified from sensible and imaginable things for it to be seen by natural knowledge, but for it to be discerned through faith, the mind must be purified from errors and natural reasonings, and for it to be seen through its essence the mind must be purified from every fault and misery. In tam excellenti luce. Loquitur de intuitu mentis, ad similitudinem visus corporalis, quem non possumus defigere oculum in excellens luminosum; ita etiam mens nostra non figitur in excellentia divinae lucis, ut aliquid determinate cognoscat, nisi per fidem. Unde etiam philosophi in diversos errores prolapsi sunt; et ideo dicit Philosophus in 2 Metaph.: sicut se habet oculus noctuae ad lucem solis, ita se habet intellectus noster ad manifestissima naturae. For the weak sharpness of the human mind is not fixed in this highest light. He is speaking of the gaze of the mind according to a likeness with bodily sight. For just as we cannot fasten our eyes on an extremely luminous thing, so too our mind cannot be held on the excellence of the divine light, such that it might determinately know anything, except through faith. Whence even the philosophers fell into diverse errors, and therefore the Philosopher says, as the eye of the bat is related to the light of the sun, so too our intellect is related to things most manifest by nature. Per justitiam fidei. Justitia hic sumitur pro justitia generali, quae est rectitudo animae in comparatione ad Deum et ad proximum et unius potentiae ad aliam; et dicitur justitia fidei, quia in justificatione primus motus est fidei, sicut dicitur Hebr. 11:6: oportet credere accedentem ad Deum. Without being cleansed through the justice of faith. “Justice” here is being taken for general justice, which is the rectitude of the soul in its relation to God and neighbor, and of one power to another. And it is called the “justice of faith” because in becoming just the first motion is that of faith, as is said in Hebrews 11:6: whoever would draw near to God must believe. Non approbo quod in oratione dixi: Deus qui nonnisi mundos verum scire voluisti. Ista notula affigitur ad excludendum falsum intellectum qui posset de praedictis haberi, scilicet quod Deus nullo modo a peccatoribus cognosci posset. I do not approve what I said in a prayer: ‘God, who willed that none but the pure should know the truth.’ This little note is appended to exclude a false understanding that one could have of things he said previously, namely, that God could in no way be known by sinners. Nec periculosius alicubi erratur. Hoc enim est fundamentum totius fidei; quo destructo, totum aedificium subruit. Unde etiam dicit Philosophus, in 1 De caelo et mundo, quod parvus error in principio, maximus est in fine. With regard to no other matter is error more dangerous. For this is the foundation of our entire faith, by whose destruction the entire edifice collapses. Whence even the Philosopher says that a small error in the beginning is greatest in the end. Nec fructuosius aliquid invenitur. Cognitio enim Trinitatis in unitate est fructus et finis totius vitae nostrae. Or discovery more fruitful. For knowledge of the Trinity in unity is the fruit and end of our entire life. Ubi dixi de Patre. Ista notula apponitur ad corrigendum hoc quod posuit in littera hoc verbum “sum, es, est,” singulariter praedicari de tribus personis, et ratio fuit, quia significat substantiam, quae est una trium personarum. Sed postea retractavit; quia quamvis significet substantiam, tamen significat eam per modum actus, et actus numerantur secundum supposita; unde debet pluraliter praedicari de tribus personis. Where I said of the Father and the Son: ‘The one who begets and the one who is begotten is one,’ I ought to have said, ‘they are one.’ This little note is appended to correct what he asserted in a text regarding the word “am/are/is” being predicated in the singular of the three persons. The reason why he said it was because it signifies substance, which is one for the three persons. But later he retracted this because, although it signifies substance, nonetheless it signifies it through the mode of act, and acts are numbered according to supposits. Whence it should be predicated of the three persons in the plural. Primo ipsa legis exordia occurrant: ubi scilicet primo legis praecepta poni incipiunt, Exod. 20, et Deut. 6. First, here are the very first words of the law, that is, where the precepts of the law first begin to be stated, at Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 6. Deus enim, ut ait Ambrosius, nomen est naturae, Dominus vero nomen est potestatis. Videtur quod Deus non sit nomen naturae per derivationes hujus nominis “Theos,” quas Damascenus, lib. 1 De fide orthod., cap. 9, ponit. Dicit enim, quod “Theos,” quod est Deus, dicitur ab “ethin,” quod est ardere, quia Deus noster ignis consumens est, Deut. 4:24. Dicitur etiam a “theaste,” quod est considerare vel videre, quia omnia videt: vel a “thein,” quod est currere, vel fovere, quia per omnia vadit, omnia salvans et continens: quae omnia operationem important. Ergo, etc. Item Dominus secundum esse suum est relativum. Ergo non significat potestatem, sed relationem. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc nomen Deus potest considerari dupliciter. Vel quantum ad id a quo nomen imponitur, quod est quasi qualitas nominis; et sic est nomen operationis, secundum Damascenum. Vel quantum ad id cui imponitur, quod est substantia significata per nomen; et sic est nomen naturae, quia ad significandum divinam naturam est impositum. Ad secundum dicendum, quod relationes fundantur super aliquid quod est causa ipsarum in subjecto, sicut aequalitas supra quantitatem, ita et dominium supra potestatem. Unde dicit Boetius, 1 De Trinit., cap. 5, quod dominium est potestas coercendi subditos; et Dionysius, 12 De div. nom., dicit, quod dominium est non pejorum, id est, subditorum, excessus tantum, sed bonorum et pulchriorum omnimoda et perfecta possessio; vera et non cadere valens fortitudo. Ad hoc enim quod aliquis sit dominus requiruntur divitiae et potentia, et super haec duo fundatur relatio dominii. As Ambrose says . . . : ‘for God and Lord is a name of nature and power.’ It seems that “God” is not the name of a nature, because of the derivatives of this name (Theos) that Damascene points out. For he says that Theos, which is “God,” is said from ethin, which is to burn, for the Lord your God is a devouring fire (Deut 4:24). It is also said from theaste, which is to contemplate or see, since he sees all things, or from thein, which is to run, or nourish, because he goes through all things, preserving and holding all things together—all of which indicate an activity, therefore and so on. Furthermore, “Lord” is a relative term according to existence, so it does not signify power, but rather relation. To the first argument, then, I say that this name “God” can be considered in two ways: either with respect to what the name is imposed from, which is, as it were, the quality of the name, and in this way it is the name of an activity, following Damascene; or with respect to what it is imposed on, which is the substance signified by the name, and in this way it is the name of a nature, because it is imposed to signify the divine nature. To the second, I say that relations are founded on something that is their cause within the subject, like equality being founded on quantity, and lordship on power. Whence Boethius says that lordship is the power of coercing those subject to it, and Dionysius says that lordship is not only being above those worse than oneself, that is, of subjects, but it is also the total and perfect possession of good and beautiful things, and a true and infallible strength. This is because for someone to be a lord he must have riches and power, and the relation of lordship is founded on these two things. Personarum quoque pluralitatem et naturae unitatem simul ostendit Dominus in Genesi. Sciendum, quod Augustinus et Hilarius ex hac auctoritate: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, nituntur ostendere unitatem essentiae et personarum pluralitatem ex quatuor verbis ibi positis, sed differenter. Quia Augustinus considerat tantum consignificationem numeri in eis; unde per haec duo, faciamus et nostram, ostendit Trinitatem; per haec vero duo, imaginem et similitudinem, unitatem essentiae. Hilarius autem ex quolibet horum quatuor intendit ostendere utrumque, hoc modo. Similitudo enim significat relationem causatam ex unitate qualitatis, quae relatio requirit distincta supposita; est enim similitudo rerum differentium eadem qualitas; unde ratione ejus quod causat similitudinem ostendit unitatem essentiae, quae est eadem bonitas et sapientia, vel quidquid aliud per modum qualitatis significatur. Nec potest ibi esse diversitas bonitatis secundum numerum, ut probatum est; sed ex parte relationis designatur suppositorum distinctio. Et eadem est ratio de hoc nomine imago, quae dicit imitationem unius ad alterum, secundum aliquid unum; et hoc tangitur ubi dicit: Hilarius quoque . . . dicit, his verbis significari, quod in Trinitate nec diversitas est nec singularitas, vel solitudo; sed similitudo et pluralitas. Similiter etiam ex parte harum duarum dictionum, faciamus et nostram, accipit utrumque: pluralitatem quidem personarum ratione pluralis numeri, sed unitatem essentiae ratione consortii, quod designatur in utroque. Consortium enim oportet quod sit in aliquo uno: et quia non potest esse in divinis unum in specie et diversum in numero, oportet quod sit unum numero; et hoc tangit ibi: item idem in 4 lib. absolutius voluit intelligi, significationem hanc non ad se esse referendam tantum. Differunt etiam quantum ad aliud; quia Augustinus videtur accipere similitudinem et imaginem tantum hominis ad Deum; sed Hilarius accipit similitudinem et imaginem unius personae ad aliam, et quod homo accedat ad illam similitudinem quantum potest. Diversitas, propter divisionem essentiae. Singularitas, propter incommunicabilitatem divinae naturae. Solitudo, ne removeatur societas personarum, quae est per unionem amoris. Similitudo, contra diversitatem. Pluralitas, contra singularitatem. Distinctio, contra solitudinem. In Genesis, the Lord shows at once the plurality of persons and the unity of nature. Note that Augustine and Hilary—based on this authority, let us make man in our image, and after our likeness (Gen 1:26)—try to show the unity of the essence and the plurality of the persons from the four words present there, but in different ways. For Augustine considers only the consignification of number in them, so through let us make and our he shows the Trinity, but through the words image and likeness he shows the unity of the essence. However, Hilary intends to show each of these things from each of these four, as follows. For likeness signifies a relation caused by a unity of quality, which relation requires distinct supposits, since likeness is the same quality of different things. Whence by reason of the fact that he causes a likeness, he shows the unity of the essence, which is the same goodness and wisdom, or whatever else is signified in the manner of a quality. Nor can a numerical diversity of goodness be there, as has been proved; rather, the distinction of the supposits is designated on the side of relation. And the account of the name image is the same, for it signifies the imitation of one thing by another in reference to some one thing. And this is touched upon where it says, Hilary too . . . says that by these words signify that in the Trinity there is neither diversity, nor singularity, nor solitude, but likeness and plurality. Likewise also he takes both from the side of the two expressions let us make and our: he takes the plurality of persons by reason of the plural number, but the unity of the essence by reason of the companionship, which is designated in each. For companionship must be in something one, and because in the divine there cannot be something one in species but diverse in number, it must be one in number. And he touches on this, at the same Hilary, in book 4: ‘he wished this expression to be understood more absolutely not to be referred to himself alone.’ They also differ as regards something else, since Augustine appears to take the likeness and image as being only of man relative to God, but Hilary takes the likeness and image as being of one person to another, and says that man approaches this likeness as far as he can. Hilary says there is no diversity, on account of a division of essence; no singularity, on account of the incommunicability of the divine nature; no solitude, lest one take away the fellowship of the persons, which exists through the union of love; but there is likeness, as opposed to diversity, and plurality, as opposed to singularity, and distinction, as opposed to solitude. Significatio efficientis, quantum ad hoc quod dicit, faciamus. Operatio constituta, in ipsum operatum. Hilary speaks of the identification of a maker, in reference to its saying, let us make, and the work of making in reference to the work itself. Maximus propheta, quantum ad modum revelationis, quae per est intellectualem visionem, et quantum ad privilegium promissi seminis. The Master says David is the greatest prophet as regards the mode his revelation, which occurs through an intellectual vision, and as regards the privilege of the promised seed. Dominus possedit me. Loquitur de Filio, inquantum appropriatur sibi sapientia. Dicitur autem Deus possidere sapientiam, quia ipse solus eam perfecte habet. Possidetur enim quod ad nutum habetur; unde Philosophus, in principio Metaph., dicit, quod divina scientia est possessio divina, non humana. Viarum, id est creaturarum, per quas in ipsum itur. The Lord possessed me at the beginning of his ways. This is speaking about the Son, insofar as wisdom is appropriated to him. However, God is said to possess wisdom because he alone has it perfectly. For what is possessed is had at a nod, whence the Philosopher says that the divine science is a divine, not a human possession. Of his ways, that is, of created things, through which one goes to the Lord. Ordinata, secundum ordinem naturae, qui est Filii ad Patrem, et secundum ordinem causae, qui est ideae ad ideatum. Concepta. Dicitur concipi, quia clauditur in unitate essentiae Patris. Parturiebar, inquantum exit a Patre per distinctionem personarum. From eternity I was ordained, according to the order of nature, which is that of the Son to the Father, and according to the order of the cause, which is that of the idea to what it is an idea of. I was already conceived; he is said to have been conceived because he is contained in the unity of the essence of the Father. I was brought forth, insofar as he went forth from the Father through the distinction of persons. Cardines, id est, extremitates terrae, secundum Isidorum, lib. 3 Etymol., cap. 38, vel causae in quibus terrae, et ea quae in terris, quasi volvuntur et conservantur. Delectabar, consors paternae gloriae. Per singulos dies, quantum ad rationes creaturarum quae in Deo sunt lux, quamvis creaturae in seipsis sint tenebrae. Ludens, propter otium contemplationis sapientiae. Sicut enim operationes ludi non appetuntur propter aliud, sed in seipsis habent delectationem, ita et contemplatio sapientiae. By the hinges upon which the earth would rest is meant the extremities of the earth, according to Isidore, or the causes on which the lands and the things on the lands, as it were, turn and are conserved. And delighting, as a companion of the paternal glory, in each day, insofar as the accounts of created things within God are light, although created things in themselves are shadows, as I played, on account of the leisure of wisdom’s contemplation. For just as the activities of play are not desired for the sake of something else, but possess their delight within their very selves, so too is the contemplation of wisdom. In medio duorum animalium. Hoc sumitur de Habacuc 3, secundum aliam litteram; et per duo animalia significantur duo Testamenta. Truth can be known ‘in the midst of two animals.’ This is taken from Habakkuk 3:2, according to a different text. And by the two animals are signified the two Testaments.