Ad septimum dicendum, quod substantia dicitur quatuor modis. Uno modo substantia idem est quod essentia; et sic substantia invenitur in omnibus generibus, sicut et essentia; et hoc significatur, cum quaeritur: quid est albedo? Color. Alio modo significat individuum in genere substantiae, quod dicitur substantia prima, vel hypostasis. Tertio modo dicitur substantia secunda. Quarto modo dicitur substantia communiter prout abstrahit a substantia prima et secunda, et sic sumitur hic, et per individuum, quasi per differentiam trahitur ad standum pro substantia prima; sicut cum dicitur animal rationale mortale, significat animal naturam animalis prout abstrahitur ab omnibus speciebus, et per differentiam additam trahitur in determinatam speciem. Reply Obj. 7: “Substance” is said in four ways. In one way, substance is the same thing as essence; and in this way substance is found in all genera, as is essence. This is being signified when one asks, “what is whiteness?” and one answers, “a color.” In another way it signifies an individual in the genus of substance, which is also called “first substance,” or “hypostasis.” In a third way, “second substance” is said. In a fourth way, “substance” is said commonly, insofar as it abstracts from first and second substance; and this is how it is being taken here. And by “individual,” as by a difference, it is being drawn to standing for first substance; this is just as, when one says “rational mortal animal,” “animal” signifies the nature of animal insofar as it is abstracted from all its species, and by the added difference it is drawn to a determinate species. Quidam tamen dicunt quod sumitur pro hypostasi substantia, et cum de ratione personae sit triplex incommunicabilitas, scilicet qua privatur communitas universalis, et qua privatur communitas particularis, quam habet in definitione totius, et qua privatur communitas assumptibilis conjuncti rei digniori, prout dicimus, quod natura humana non est persona in Christo; per nomen hypostasis tollitur ratio universalis et particularis, et per additionem individui tollitur communicabilitas assumptibilis. Yet some say that substance is being taken for hypostasis, and that there is a threefold incommunicability of the account of “person”: that by which the community of a universal is taken away; that by which the community of a particular, which it has in the definition of the whole, is taken away; and that by which is taken away the community of something assumable that can be joined to a higher reality, insofar as we say that the human nature in Christ is not a person. And the name “hypostasis” takes away the account of the universal and the particular, and the addition of “individual” takes away the communicability of the assumable. Sed primum melius est, quia hoc non potest trahi de significatione vocabulorum. Et praeterea adhuc remanet objectio, qualiter sumatur substantia in definitione hypostasis, cum dicimus, quod hypostasis est substantia individua. But the first account is better, since this latter one cannot be drawn out of the signification of the words. And further, the objection would still stand regarding how “substance” is being taken in the definition of “hypostasis,” when we say that a hypostasis is an individual substance. Ad octavum dicendum, quod, ut patet ex dictis, persona non nominat intentionem, sed rem cui accidit illa intentio: et ideo non nominat accidens, sed substantiam; nec hoc quod est individuum est differentia substantiae, quia particulare non addit aliquam differentiam supra speciem. Sed tamen particulare efficitur individuum per aliquod principium essentiale, quod quidem in rebus compositis est materia, et in rebus divinis est relatio distinguens; et quia essentialia principia sunt nobis ignota, frequenter ponimus in definitionibus aliquid accidentale, ad significandum aliquid essentiale; et sic etiam nomen individui, quod est nomen accidentis, ponitur ad designandum principium substantiale, per quod sit individuatio. Reply Obj. 8: As is clear from things said in the body, “person” does not name an intention, but a reality to which that intention accrues. And therefore it does not name an accident, but rather a substance. Nor is “individual” the difference of substance, since the particular does not add any difference over and above the species. But nevertheless the particular becomes individual through some essential principle, which in composite things is indeed matter, and in divine things is the distinguishing relation. And because essential principles are unknown to us, we frequently place in definitions something accidental for the sake of signifying something essential. And thus, even the name “individual,” which is the name of an accident, is placed here to designate the substantial principle through which there is individuation. Sciendum tamen est, quod de persona dantur aliae definitiones. Una est Richardi, 4 De Trinit., cap. 18, qui corrigens definitionem Boetii secundum illum modum quo persona dicitur in Deo, sic definit personam: persona est divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia, quia rationale et individuum et substantia non proprie competunt in divinis quantum ad communem usum nominum. Alia datur a magistris sic: persona est hypostasis distincta proprietate ad nobilitatem pertinente; et quasi in idem redit: nisi quod haec sumitur per comparationem ad proprietatem distinguentem et cui substat persona, et illa Boetii per comparationem ad naturam, ad quorum utrumque persona comparationem habet. Nonetheless, one should know that other definitions are given of “person.” One is that of Richard, who, correcting Boethius’s definition according to the way it is said of God, defines “person” as: a person is the incommunicable existence of the divine nature. For “rational,” “individual,” and “substance” do not properly speaking befit the divine, as far as the common usage of these names. Another is given by the masters, as follows: a person is a hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to nobility. And this reduces, as it were, to the same thing—except that this is taken in its comparison with a distinguishing property, and under which stands “person,” and Boethius’s definition is taken in comparison to the nature, to each of which “person” is related. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum “persona” dicatur univoce de Deo et creaturis Whether “person” is said univocally of God and created things Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod persona univoce dicatur de Deo et creaturis. To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that “person” is not said univocally of God and created things. Quantumcumque enim aliqua differant, univoce convenire possunt in negatione aliqua; sicut hoc quod est non esse lapidem, univoce convenit Deo et homini. Sed ratio personae consistit in negatione; est enim individua substantia. Ergo videtur quod univoce Deo, et creaturis conveniat. Obj. 1: For however different certain things are, they can agree univocally in some negation; for example, to be “not a stone” belongs to God and man univocally. But the account of “person” consists in negation, for it is an “individual” substance. Therefore it seems that it is said univocally of God and created things. Praeterea, quidquid praedicatur de aliquibus secundum unum nomen et unam rationem, univoce eis convenit. Sed nomen personae et definitio assignata convenit Deo et creaturis, ut patet per Boetium. Ergo videtur quod univoce dicatur. Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever is predicated of certain things according to one name and one account belongs to them univocally. But the name “person” and its assigned definition belongs to God and the creature, as is clear from Boethius. Therefore it seems that it is said univocally of them. Item, si non dicitur univoce, aut dicitur aequivoce aut analogice. Sed non aequivoce, quia omnia quae in definitione ponuntur, non aequivoce dicuntur de Deo et creaturis, ut ex dictis patet; nec etiam analogice, quia nihil analogice dictum de Deo et creaturis, per prius est in creatura quam in Deo; sicut hoc nomen “persona” quod a creaturis translatum est ad divina. Ergo persona univoce dicitur de Deo et creaturis. Obj. 3: Furthermore, if it is not said univocally, then it is said either equivocally or analogically. But it is not said equivocally, since all the things that are placed in the definition are not said equivocally of God and creatures, as is clear from things said in the previous article. Nor is it said analogically, since nothing said analogically of God and creatures is in the creature with priority over its being in God, as is the case with the name “person,” which has been carried over from created things to divine. Therefore “person” is said univocally of God and created things. Contra, quaecumque non conveniunt in uno genere generalissimo, non potest de eis aliquid univoce dici. Sed Deus, cum non sit in genere, non convenit cum creatura in genere, nec in specie, nec in accidente, cum subjectum esse non possit, ut Boetius probat, lib. 1 De Trinit., cap. 2, et sic de aliis. Ergo nec persona nec aliquid de Deo univoce et creaturis dicitur. On the contrary (4), nothing can be said univocally of things that do not agree in one most general genus. But God, since he is in no genus, does not agree with a created thing in genus, species, or accident, since he cannot be a subject, as Boethius proves, and so on. Therefore neither “person” nor anything else is said univocally of God and created things. Praeterea, persona significat distinctum in natura aliqua. Sed non est eadem ratio distinctionis in divinis, angelis et hominibus, quia in divinis est distinctio per solas relationes originis, in angelis per proprietates absolutas, in hominibus utroque modo, ut dicit Richardus, 4 De Trinit., c. 13. Ergo persona aequivoce dicitur de his. Furthermore (5), “person” signifies something distinct in a certain nature. But the account of distinction is not the same in the divine, angels, and men. For in the divine, distinction occurs only through relations of origin, whereas in angels it occurs through absolute properties, and in men it occurs in both ways, as Richard says. Therefore “person” is said equivocally of them. Respondeo dicendum, quod persona dicitur de Deo et creaturis, non univoce nec aequivoce, sed secundum analogiam; et quantum ad rem significatam per prius est in Deo quam in creaturis, sed quantum ad modum significandi est e converso, sicut est etiam de omnibus aliis nominibus quae de Deo et creaturis analogice dicuntur. I answer that “person” is said of God and created things neither univocally nor equivocally, but according to analogy. And as regards the reality signified, it is in God with priority over created things, whereas as regards the mode of signifying, the opposite is the case—as it is with all names that are said analogically of God and created things. Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod individuum, quamvis secundum rationem nominis importet negationem quamdam tamen talis negatio fundatur super aliquam rem scilicet super definitionem alicujus principii distinguentis, in quo non univocatur Deus et creatura. Et praeterea in definitione personae non tantum ponitur hoc nomen, individuum, sed etiam substantia, et quaedam alia quae Deo et creaturis univoce convenire non possunt: nisi forte diceretur quod persona est nomen accidentis, scilicet intentionis, et non nomen rei, et quod substantia ponitur in definitione personae, sicut subjectum in definitione accidentis, ut cum dicitur: simum est nasus curvus. Sed hoc est contra intentionem Boetii, qui venatur differentiam personae per divisionem substantiae. Reply Obj. 1: Although according to the account of the name, “individual” brings in a certain negation, nonetheless this negation is founded on some reality—namely, on the definition of a certain distinguishing principle—wherein God and the creature are not spoken of univocally. Further, in the definition of “person” not only is the name “individual” placed, but so is “substance,” and others that cannot belong univocally to God and created things—unless perhaps one were to say that “person” is the name of the accident, that is, of the intention, and not the name of the reality, and that “substance” is placed in the definition of “person” as a subject is placed in the definition of an accident, like when one says, “the snub” is the “curved nose.” But this is contrary to Boethius’s intention, who is hunting for the difference of “person” through a division of substance. Ad secundum dicendum, quod, secundum Philosophum 3 Metaph., quorumdam rationes nihil prohibet non univocas esse: unde sicut nomen personae non univoce dicitur de Deo et creaturis, sed analogice, ita etiam et definitio. Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher, nothing prevents the accounts of certain things from not being univocal. Whence, just as the name “person” is not said univocally but analogically of God and created things, so too is its definition. Ad tertium dicendum, quod hoc nomen “persona” quantum ad rem significatam, prius et verius est in Deo quam in creaturis, sed quantum ad modum significandi et impositionem nominis familiarius convenit creaturis. Reply Obj. 3: The name “person,” as regards the reality being signified, is with priority and more truly in God than it is in created things. But as regards the mode of signifying and the imposition of the name, it belongs to created things in a more familiar way. Quartum concedimus. Reply Sed Contra 4: We concede the fourth argument. Ad quintum dicendum, quod ratio personae importat distinctionem in communi; unde abstrahitur a quolibet modo distinctionis; et ideo potest esse una ratio analogice in his quae diversimode distinguuntur. Reply Sed Contra 5: The account of “person” brings in distinction in a common way, so it is abstracted from every mode of distinction. And therefore there can be analogically one account in things that are distinguished in diverse ways. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum “persona” sit commune tribus personis Whether “person” is said commonly in the Trinity Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod persona non sit commune in Trinitate. To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that “person” is not common in the Trinity. Quidquid enim communiter convenit tribus personis, significat essentiam, et singulariter praedicatur, ut sapientia, bonitas et hujusmodi; nec in ipso personae distinguuntur. Sed persona pluraliter praedicatur in Trinitate, et in persona Pater et Filius distinguuntur. Ergo persona non est commune in Trinitate. Obj. 1: For whatever belongs commonly to the three persons signifies the essence, and is predicated in the singular, as with “wisdom,” “goodness,” and such; nor are the persons distinguished in it. But “person” is predicated in the Trinity in the plural, and the Father and the Son are distinguished in their person. Therefore “person” is not common in the Trinity. Praeterea, omne commune quod est de ratione alicujus se habet sicut universale. Si igitur persona sit commune Patri et Filio, et non sit extra rationem utriusque, quia alias esset accidens, videtur quod sit universale. Sed totum universale non est in divinis. Ergo persona non est commune. Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything common that belongs to the account of anything stands as a universal. Therefore if “person” is common to the Father and the Son, and is not outside the account of each, since otherwise it would be an accident, it seems to be universal. But a universal whole is not in the divine. Therefore “person” is not common. Si dicas, quod est commune secundum rationem, et non secundum rem; Obj. 3: You might say that it is common according to account, but not according to a reality. contra. Quia etiam in universali non est eadem ratio numero, ut eadem humanitas in diversis particularibus; sed solum eadem secundum rationem. Ergo videtur quod hoc non impediat rationem universalis. On the contrary, not even in the universal is there numerically the same account, such that the humanity in diverse particulars would be the same; rather, they are the same only according to account. Therefore it seems that this would not prevent the account of the universal. Praeterea, illud quod de se habet rationem incommunicabilis, non potest dici commune, quia haec sunt opposita. Sed persona habet rationem incommunicabilis. Ergo non potest dici communis. Ergo videtur quod non possit esse communis. Obj. 4: Furthermore, what of itself has the account of the incommunicable cannot be called “common,” since these are opposites. But “person” has the account of the incommunicable; therefore it cannot be called common. Therefore it seems that it cannot be common. Contra est quod in littera dicitur ab Augustino. On the contrary, Augustine says otherwise in the text. Praeterea, nihil potest connumerari alicui nisi in eo quod est commune utrique. Furthermore, nothing can be counted with something else except in virtue of what is common to both. Respondeo dicendum, quod est duplex communitas: scilicet rei et rationis. Et dico communitatem rei quando aliquid unum et idem numero convenit pluribus; et talis communitas naturae non est nisi in divinis personis, nec aliqua talis communitas est in Trinitate, nisi essentiae, et eorum quae ad essentiam pertinent, ut attributorum, et operationum, et negationum, et relationum essentialium. Communitas autem rationis est, secundum quam “persona” communis dicitur in Trinitate. I answer that there are two sorts of community: a community of reality, and one of account. And I call it a “community of reality” when something numerically one and the same belongs to several. And this community of nature is not but in the divine persons, nor is there any such community in the Trinity except that of the essence, and of things that pertain to the essence, like the attributes, the activities, the negations, and the essential relations. However, a community of account is that according to which “person” is said to be common in the Trinity. Hoc autem diversimode assignatur a diversis. Quidam enim dicunt, quod est commune secundum rationem negationis, eo quod in definitione personae cadit individuum, quod dicit negationem. Unde dicunt quod talis communitas rationis, quae est per negationem tantum, non facit universale. Sed hoc non videtur sufficiens: quia persona de ratione sua non dicit negationem tantum, sed etiam positionem quamdam. However, this is assigned in diverse ways by diverse people. For some say that it is common according to an account of negation, in that “individual,” which signifies a negation, falls into the definition of “person.” Whence they say that such community of account, which is only through a negation, does not make a universal. But this does not seem sufficient, since from its own account “person” signifies not only negation, but also a certain assertion. Unde alii dicunt, quod est communitas secundum rationem proportionis, sicut dicimus, quod sicut se habet rector in civitate, ita nauta in navi; et sic dicunt, quod persona est commune Patri et Filio, quia sicut Pater se habet ut subsistens ad naturam divinam, ita et Filius. Alii dicunt, quod est communitas secundum rationem intentionis; sicut dicitur quod color et animal conveniunt in intentione generis. Sed haec duo dicta in idem referuntur: quia communitas intentionum non est nisi secundum proportionem communis ad proprium, vel e contrario. This is why others say that the community is according to an account of proportion, as we say that just as the ruler stands in the city, so does the sailor in the ship; in this way, they say, “person” is common to the Father and the Son. For just as the Father stands as subsisting to the divine nature, so too does the Son. But others say that it is a community of intention, just as one says that color and animal come together in the intention of “genus.” But these two claims reduce to the same thing, since a community of intentions is only according to the proportion of the common to the proper, or vice versa. Et hoc etiam non videtur sufficere: quia persona non tantum nominat intentionem vel habitudinem alicujus subsistentis ad naturam communem, sicut hoc nomen “suppositum” vel “particulare” vel aliquid hujusmodi; sed magis nominat illam rem cui accidit talis intentio: unde communitas personae in divinis non potest esse secundum communitatem talis habitudinis vel intentionis; sed ista communitas est, qua hoc nomen “suppositum” commune est tribus personis. And this also seems insufficient, since “person” names not only the intention or relation of something subsisting toward a common nature, as does the name “supposit,” or “particular,” or the like, but it more names that reality to which this intention accrues. Whence, in the divine, the community of “person” cannot be according to the community of such relationship or intention; rather, such a community is that by which the name “supposit” is common to the three persons. Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod praeter has communitates est ibi communitas rationis fundata in re. Sed ratio fundata in re est duplex: quia quaedam est communis, sicut ratio animalis, et quaedam est specialis, sicut ratio hominis. Sic etiam est in divinis, quod cum realiter sit ibi relatio, est ibi communis ratio relationis. Item cum realiter sit ibi paternitas, est ibi specialis ratio paternitatis realiter: unde relatio est communis paternitati et filiationi, sicut ratio communis in rationibus specialibus. Non tamen ex hoc sequitur quod relatio sit universale ad paternitatem et filiationem: quia omne universale est secundum aliud et aliud esse in suis inferioribus, sed in divinis non est nisi unum esse, unde idem esse relationis est in paternitate et filiatione: unde communis ratio in divinis non potest distingui per esse, sed solum per speciales rationes. Et inde est quod nihil unum secundum specialem rationem potest numero multiplicari in divinis. And therefore one should explain it differently, saying that besides these communities there is also a community of account founded in the reality. But an account founded in a real thing is of two sorts, since something is common, like the account of animal, and something is specific, like the account of man. So too in the divine, since relation is really there, the common account of relation is there. Moreover, since paternity is really there, the specific account of paternity is really there, so relation is common to paternity and filiation as the common account in the specific account. Yet it does not follow from this that relation is a universal as regards paternity and filiation, since every universal is in its inferiors in different existences, whereas in the divine there is only one existence. Whence the existence of relation in the paternity and the filiation is the same. This is why the common account in the divine cannot be distinguished through existence, but only through the specific account. And this is also why nothing one according to the specific account can be numerically multiplied in the divine. Ita dico de persona quod persona in divinis significat communiter rationem distincti subsistentis in tali natura, et pater significat relationem distincti speciali ratione subsistentis in natura communi, et similiter filius: et inde patet quod persona secundum rem non est communis Patri et Filio: quia non est numero una persona utriusque, sicut una numero essentia: sed sicut habens rationem communem est commune habentibus rationes speciales et proprias in quibus distinguuntur, nec tamen est universale: quia non est secundum aliud et aliud esse in Patre et Filio. Thus, about “person” I say that in the divine, “person” signifies commonly the account of a distinct thing subsisting in that nature, and “father” signifies the relation of the thing distinct by a specific account, subsisting in the common nature; and likewise with “son.” And thereby it is clear that “person” is not common to the Father and the Son according to a reality, for there is not numerically one person for both of them, the way there is numerically one essence. Rather, it is one the way having a common account is common to things that have specific and proper accounts wherein they are distinguished. Yet this is not a universal, since it is not in the Father and the Son according to different existences. Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod persona non est communis communitate rei, sicut essentia: et ideo quamvis secundum rem non differat ab essentia, non tamen significat per modum essentiae; et similiter cum dicitur quod Pater distinguitur a Filio in persona, non intelligitur quod sit distinctio in ratione communi personae, sed solum in ratione speciali, quae est ratio Patris. Reply Obj. 1: “Person” is not common by a community of reality, as with essence. And therefore although it does not differ from the essence according to reality, nonetheless it does not signify through the mode of essence. And likewise, when one says that the Father is distinguished from the Son “in person,” it is not understood that there is a distinction in the common account of “person,” but only in the specific account that is the account of the Father.