Quaestio 2 Question 2 De nomine verbi The name “word” Deinde quaeritur de verbo; et circa hoc tria quaeruntur: Next one asks about “word.” And three things are asked in regard to it: primo utrum verbum proprie sit in divinis; first, whether “word” is said properly in the divine; secundo utrum dicatur essentialiter vel personaliter tantum; second, whether it is said essentially, or only personally; tertio utrum in verbo importetur respectus ad creaturam. third, whether a reference to what is created is indicated in “word.” Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum “verbum” dicatur proprie in divinis Whether “word” is said properly in the divine Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod verbum non proprie in divinis dicatur. To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that “word” is not said properly in the divine. Omne enim nomen quod significat corporalem operationem, non potest Deo convenire nisi metaphorice. Sed verbum est hujusmodi: dicitur enim a verberatione aeris, ut dicit Priscianus, lib. 1, cap. “De verbo.” Ergo verbum proprie de Deo non dicitur. Obj. 1: For every name that signifies a bodily activity cannot belong to God except metaphorically. But “word” (verbum) is of this sort, for it is derived from the vibration (reverberatione) of the air, as Priscianus says. Therefore “word” is not said properly of God. Praeterea, inter omnia quae apud nos sunt, verbum videtur magis esse transiens, vel de magis transeuntibus, nec est quid subsistens. Sed quidquid dicitur in divinis, est permanens et subsistens. Ergo videtur quod verbum de Deo non proprie dicatur. Obj. 2: Furthermore, among all the things that are around us, a word appears to be rather transient, or among the more transient, and neither is it something subsistent. But whatever is spoken of in the divine is enduring and subsistent. Therefore it seems that “word” is not said properly of God. Si dicas, quod de Deo dicitur non verbum vocis, sed verbum cordis; Obj. 3: You might say that the word of the voice is not said of God, but rather the word of the heart. contra. Hoc verbum definiens Anselmus in Monolog., cap. 63, dicit, quod dicere summo Spiritui nihil est aliud, quam cogitando intueri. Sed cogitare Deo non convenit, quia cogitatio dicit quemdam discursum rationis inquirentis et procedentis ex uno in aliud. Ergo videtur quod nec verbum aut dicere Deo conveniat. On the contrary, Anselm, when defining this word, says that for the highest Spirit, to speak is nothing other than to behold in thought. But to think does not befit God, since “thought” signifies a certain discourse of an inquiring reason, and of something proceeding from one thing to another. Therefore it seems that neither a word nor speaking befit God. Praeterea, verbum cordis videtur esse quaedam conceptio intellectus. Sed nihil concipitur ab intellectu nisi species rei intelligibilis, quam apud se format. Cum igitur Deus non cognoscat per speciem aliquam, sed se per essentiam suam videat, et sic cognoscat omnia; videtur quod non sit ibi proprie verbum intellectus. Obj. 4: Furthermore, the word of the heart is a certain conception of the intellect. But nothing is conceived by an intellect besides the species of an intelligible reality, which it forms within itself. Therefore, since God does not know through any species, but sees himself through his own essence, and thereby knows all things, it seems that properly speaking there is no word of the intellect there. Contra, Joan. 1:1: in principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum. On the contrary, John 1:1 says, in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. Praeterea, nihil aliud est Verbum, ut infra Augustinus dicit, quam genita sapientia. Sed genita Sapientia est in Deo. Ergo videtur quod est Verbum. Furthermore, as Augustine will say below, the Word is nothing other than the wisdom begotten. But the begotten Wisdom is in God. Therefore, it seems, so is the Word. Respondeo, absque omni dubio confitendum est, Deum esse Verbum, et proprie Verbum dici. Ad cujus intellectum sciendum est, quod in nobis, ut quaedam Glossa super Joan., cap. 1, dicit, invenitur triplex verbum: scilicet cordis, et vocis, et quod habet imaginem vocis; cujus necessitas est, quod cum locutio nostra sit quaedam corporalis operatio, oportet quod ad ipsam concurrant ea quae ad omnem motum corporalem exiguntur. I answer that without any doubt one should confess that God is the Word, and is properly called a “Word.” To understand this one needs to know that, as an ordinary Gloss on John says, three sorts of words are found: that of the heart, that of the voice, and what holds the image of the voice. The need for this is that, because our speech is a certain bodily activity, the things that are required for every bodily motion must come together for it as well. Oportet autem ad hoc quod sit motus corporalis hominis, ut hominis, qui scilicet est per deliberationem, quod praecedat deliberatio et judicium in parte intellectiva. Sed quia intellectus est universalium, et operationes singularium, ideo, ut dicitur 3 De anima, oportet esse quamdam virtutem particularem quae apprehendit intentionem particularem rei, circa quam est operatio; et tertio oportet quod sequatur motus in corpore per virtutes motivas affixas musculis et nervis; ut quasi videatur esse quidam syllogismus, cujus in parte intellectiva habeatur major universalis, et in parte sensitiva habeatur minor particularis, et demum sequatur conclusio operationis particularis, per virtutem motivam imperatam; ipsa enim operatio se habet in operabilibus sicut conclusio in speculativis, ut dicitur 7 Metaph. Now, for it to be the bodily motion of a man, as man—that is, what occurs through deliberation—preceding it must be a deliberation and judgment within the soul’s intellectual part. But because the intellect is concerned with universals, and activities are concerned with singulars, therefore there must be, as is said in On the Soul 3, a certain particular power that apprehends the particular intention of the reality that the activity concerns. And third, there must follow a certain motion in the body, through motive powers affixed to muscles and nerves. All this is such that it might, as it were, seem to be a certain syllogism of which the universal major premise is held in the intellectual part, the particular minor is held in the sensitive part, and lastly, the conclusion of the particular activity would follow through the commanded motive power. For the activity itself stands in things that can be done the way a conclusion stands in speculative matters, as is said in Metaphysics 7. Si ergo accipiatur locutio secundum quod est in parte intellectiva tantum, sic est verbum cordis, quod etiam ab aliis dicitur verbum rei, quia est immediata similitudo ipsius rei; et a Damasceno dicitur, lib. 1 Fid. orth., c. 13, quod est naturalis intellectus motus, velut lux ejus et splendor; et ab Augustino dicitur, lib. 9 De Trinitate, cap. 10, verbum animo impressum. Therefore if “speech” is taken only insofar as it is in the intellectual part, then it is the word of the heart, which others also call the “word of the reality,” because it is the unmediated likeness of the reality itself; and Damascene says that it is the natural motion of the intellect, or its light and splendor; and Augustine calls it the “word impressed on the mind.” Secundum autem quod est in imaginatione, quando scilicet quis imaginatur voces quibus intellectus conceptum proferre valeat, sic est verbum quod habet imaginem vocis, et quod ab aliis dicitur verbum speciei vocis, et a Damasceno dicitur verbum in corde enuntiatum, et ab Augustino dicitur verbum cum syllabis cogitatum. But insofar as it is in the imagination—namely, when someone imagines the vocal sounds by which the intellect is able to bring forth its concept—then this is the word that holds the voice’s image. Others call it the “word of the appearance of voice;” Damascene calls it the “word enunciated in the heart;” and Augustine calls it the word “thought with syllables.” Secundum autem quod jam est in corporali actione per motum linguae et aliorum instrumentorum corporalium dicitur verbum vocis; et a Damasceno verbum quod est angelus, scilicet nuntius, intelligentiae, et ab Augustino verbum cum syllabis pronuntiatum. However, insofar as it is already in the bodily action, through the motion of the tongue and the other bodily organs, it is called the “word of the voice.” And Damascene calls it the word that is the “angel of the intellect,” that is, its messenger; and Augustine calls it the word “pronounced with syllables.” Dico igitur, quod verbum vocis, et quod habet imaginem vocis, non potest dici in divinis, nisi metaphorice; sed verbum cordis quod consistit in intellectu tantum, dicitur etiam per prius de Deo quam de aliis. Therefore I say that the word of the voice and the word that holds voice’s image cannot be spoken of in the divine, except metaphorically, whereas the word of the heart, which consists only in understanding, is said of God, even with priority over the others. Sed tamen sciendum est, quod in operationibus intellectus est quidam gradus. Primo enim est simplex intuitus intellectus in cognitione intelligibilis, et hoc nondum habet rationem verbi. Secundo est ibi ordinatio illius intelligibilis ad manifestationem vel alterius, secundum quod aliquis alteri loquitur, vel sui ipsius, secundum quod contingit aliquem etiam sibi ipsi loqui, et haec primo accipit rationem verbi; unde verbum nihil aliud dicit quam quamdam emanationem ab intellectu per modum manifestantis. Et quia potest esse duplex intuitus, vel veri simpliciter, vel ulterius secundum quod verum extenditur in bonum et conveniens, et haec est perfecta apprehensio; ideo est duplex verbum: scilicet rei prolatae quae placet, quod spirat amorem, et hoc est verbum perfectum; et verbum rei quae etiam displicet; unde dicit Augustinus quod verbum dicitur animo impressum, quamvis res ipsa displiceat aut complaceat. But nonetheless one needs to know that in the activities of the intellect there is a certain gradation. For there is first the intellect’s simple beholding in the cognition of what is intelligible, and this does not yet have the account of a word. Second, there is the ordination of that intelligible to its manifestation, either to someone else, insofar as someone speaks to another, or to one’s own self, insofar as it happens that someone even speaks to himself; and here it first receives the account of a word. Whence “word” signifies nothing other than a certain emanation from the intellect through the mode of manifesting. But one’s beholding can be of two sorts: either the beholding of the true, simply speaking, or further, insofar as the true extends into the good and fitting, and this is perfect apprehension. And therefore a word is of two sorts: that of the reality uttered that pleases—a word that spirates love—and this is a perfect word; and the word of a reality that even displeases—this is why Augustine says that the word is said to be impressed on the spirit, even though the reality might displease or please. Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod quamvis nomen verbi impositum sit a motu corporali, quod est ultimum in nostra locutione; tamen impositum est ad significandum omne quod dicitur vel exterius vel interius. Unde quamvis interpretatio nominis non conveniat Deo, convenit tamen res significata per nomen, sicut frequenter contingit, ut dictum est, de hoc nomine “persona.” Reply Obj. 1: Although the name “word” has been imposed from a bodily motion, which is the final part of our speech, nonetheless it was imposed for signifying everything that is said, whether exteriorly or interiorly. Whence, even though the name’s etymology does not befit God, still the reality signified by the name does, as frequently happens, as was said before about the name “person.” Ad secundum dicendum, quod verbum vocis neque permanet neque subsistit in nobis, sed verbum cordis nostri permanet, quamvis non subsistat: et ideo patet quod quamvis verbum non habeat ex ratione verbi quod permaneat vel subsistat, tamen habet diversas rationes perfectionis, secundum quod in diversis invenitur; et ideo Verbum divinum, inquantum divinum, habet quod sit permanens et subsistens; sicut et de amore supra dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: For us, the word of the voice neither endures nor subsists, but the word of our heart does endure, though it does not subsist. And therefore it is clear that although a word does not endure or subsist just from the account of being a word, nonetheless it has diverse accounts of perfection insofar as it is found in diverse things. And therefore the divine Word, inasmuch as it is divine, has it that it endures and subsists, just as it is with the divine Love, as was said before. Ad tertium dicendum, quod sine dubio cogitatio in Deo proprie non est; sed Anselmus per similitudinem nomen cogitationis posuit. Sicut enim in cogitatione est exitus rationis ab uno in aliud per collationem, ita etiam ratio verbi, ut dictum est, completur in quadam emanatione et exitu ab intellectu; unde addit supra simplicem intuitum intellectus aliquid cogitationi simile. Reply Obj. 3: Without a doubt, thought is not properly speaking in God, but Anselm used the name “thought” by way of a likeness. For just as in thought reason goes forth from one thing to another by bringing them together, so also the account of a word, as was said in the body of the article, is completed in a certain emanation and going forth from the intellect. Whence over and above the intellect’s simple beholding, “word” adds something akin to thought. Ad quartum dicendum, quod intellectus divinus non intelligit essentiam suam per aliquam speciem differentem essentialiter aut realiter ab ipsa essentia; nihilominus tamen ipse intelligit essentiam suam per essentiam suam; unde essentia se habet ut intelligens, et ut intellecta, et ut quo intelligitur; et inquantum se habet ut intelligens, sic vere et proprie est ibi ratio intellectus, et inquantum se habet ut id quod intelligitur, est ibi vere ratio intellecti; sed inquantum se habet ut quo intelligitur, sic est ibi ratio verbi. Reply Obj. 4: The divine intellect does not understand its own essence through any species essentially or really different from the essence itself. Nonetheless it understands its essence through its essence; whence the divine essence stands as what understands, and what is understood, and that by which it is understood. And insofar as it stands as what understands, thus truly and properly speaking is the account of intellect there; insofar as it stands as what is understood, the account of the understood is truly there; but insofar as it stands as that by which it is understood, the account of a word is there. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum “verbum” dicatur personaliter et utrum solus Filius dicendus sit “verbum” Whether “word” is said personally and, if so, whether only the Son should be called “word” Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod verbum non dicatur personaliter. To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that “word” is not said personally. Sicut enim dicit Augustinus lib. 9 De Trinit., c. 10, verbum quod insinuare intendimus, cum amore notitia est. Sed notitia dicitur essentialiter. Ergo et verbum. Obj. 1: For Augustine says that the word that we intend to hold in our breast is a knowledge with love. But “knowledge” is said essentially. Therefore so is “word.” Praeterea, omne illud quod potest intelligi non intellecta distinctione personarum, est essentiale in divinis. Sed non intellecta distinctione personarum, adhuc potest intelligi quod intellectus divinus manifestat se sibi, et manifestat se creaturae. Cum ergo verbum non addat aliquid supra rationem intellectus nisi ordinem manifestationis, videtur quod verbum sit essentiale, sicut et intelligere. Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything in the divine that can be understood without understanding the distinction of the persons is essential. But even without understanding the distinction of the persons one can still understand that the divine intellect manifests itself to itself, and manifests itself to created things. Therefore, since “word” adds over and above the account of understanding only an order toward manifestation, it seems that “word” is an essential name, the way “understanding” is. Item, verbum est terminus hujus actus qui est dicere; nihil enim dicitur nisi verbum. Sed quaelibet persona potest dicere se, et potest dicere essentiam suam. Ergo essentia est verbum, et quaelibet persona est verbum; et ita verbum essentialiter dicetur. Nec potest dici, quod quilibet eorum dicat se Verbo Patris; quia perfectius est dicere verbo proprio, quam alterius; et ita, cum unaquaeque persona perfectissime se dicat, videtur quod quaelibet dicat se verbo proprio; sed non verbo proprio quod sit ab ipsa; quia sic essent plures personae quam tres. Ergo verbo proprio quod est ipsa. Obj. 3: Furthermore, a word is the terminus of the act that is speaking, for nothing else is spoken but a word. But each person can speak himself and can speak his essence. Therefore the essence is a word, and each person is a word; thus, “word” will be said essentially. Nor can one say that each of them speaks himself by the Word of the Father. For it is more perfect to speak by one’s own proper word than to do so by that of another. And thus, since each person speaks himself most perfectly, it seems that each speaks himself by his own word—and not by his own word that is from him himself, since then there would be more than three persons. Therefore each does so by its own word which is himself. Praeterea, ut dictum est, verbum dicit conceptionem intellectus. Sed conceptus intellectus nullus est nisi species intelligibilis formata in intellectu. Ergo in Deo non potest esse verbum nisi illud quod se habet per modum speciei, et quo intelligitur. Sed hoc est principium intelligendi, in quo aliquid intelligitur, et quo intelligitur. Ergo videtur quod si Filius diceretur tantum Verbum personaliter, Filius esset principium actus intelligendi in Patre, quod supra improbatum est ab Augustino. Obj. 4: Furthermore, as was said in the previous article, “word” signifies the conception of the intellect. But the concept of the intellect is nothing other than the intelligible species formed in the intellect. Therefore in God there cannot be a word unless it be what stands through the mode of a species, and one whereby he is understood. But this principle of understanding is that wherein something is understood and that whereby it is understood. Therefore it seems that if the Son were called the “Word” only personally, then the Son would be the principle of the act of understanding in the Father—which was disproved earlier by Augustine. Contra est quod Augustinus dicit, lib. 7 De Trinit., cap. 2, quod eo dicitur verbum in divinis quo Filius et quo Sapientia genita. Sed ista omnia dicuntur personaliter. Ergo videtur quod et verbum. On the contrary (5), Augustine says that “word” is said in the divine in reference to the one who is called “Son” and “begotten Wisdom.” But all such latter names are said personally. Therefore it seems that “word” is as well.