Perfectissima pulchritudo intelligitur filius. Pulchritudo consistit in duobus, scilicet in splendore, et partium proportione. Veritas autem habet splendoris rationem et aequalitas tenet locum proportionis. The most perfect beauty is understood to be the Son. Beauty consists in two things: in splendor and in the proportion of parts. However, truth has the account of splendor, and equality holds the place of proportion. Divisio secundae partis textus Division of the Second Part of the Text Nunc vero jam ad eam perveniamus disputationem, ubi in mente humana (...) Trinitatis imaginem reperiamus. In parte ista ostendit Trinitatem personarum et unitatem essentiae per similitudinem imaginis: et dividitur in partes tres: in prima ostendit substantiam imaginis, in secunda ostendit, secundum quid attendatur imago, ibi: ecce enim mens meminit sui, intelligit se, diligit se; in tertia, ex similitudine imaginis ducit in Trinitatem personarum, ibi: quapropter juxta istam considerationem (...) credamus, patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum unum esse Deum. But now we have come to the debated point of where one may find the image of the Trinity in the human mind. In this part he shows the Trinity of Persons and the unity of the essence through a likeness of image. It is divided into three parts: in the first, he shows the substance of the image; in the second, he shows in what respect the image is being considered, at but see, the mind remembers, understands, and loves itself; in the third, he takes us from the likeness of the image to the Trinity of Persons, at in accordance with this consideration, . . . "let us believe that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one God." Ecce enim mens meminit sui, intelligit se, diligit se. Hic inquirit secundum quod attendatur imago in mente: et primo assignat imaginem secundum potentias; secundo, secundum habitus, ibi: potest etiam alio modo, aliisque nominibus distingui Trinitas in anima. But see, the mind remembers, understands, and loves itself. Here he makes inquiry as regards what the image attends to in the mind. First, he assigns the image in reference to the powers; second, he does so in reference to the habits, at the trinity in the soul, . . . can also be distinguished in another way and by other terms. Circa primum tria facit. Primo partes imaginis assignat: secundo ostendit in eis similitudinem trium personarum, ibi: haec igitur tria potissimum tractemus; tertio ostendit dissimilitudinem, ibi: verumtamen caveat ne hanc imaginem ab eadem Trinitate factam ita ei comparet ut omnino existimet similem. As regards the first he does three things: first, he assigns the parts of the image; second, he manifests in them the likeness of the three Persons, at and so let us most particularly discuss these three things; third, he manifests their dissimilarity, at and yet let him beware lest he so compare to its maker this image made by the Trinity as to believe it to be entirely like it. Haec igitur tria potissimum tractemus. Hic ostendit in tribus potentiis assignatis similitudinem personarum: et primo inducit probationem; secundo ponit dictorum manifestationem, ibi: mens autem hic pro animo ipso accipitur; tertio excludit objectionem, ibi: hic attendendum est diligenter. And so let us most particularly discuss these three things. Here he shows the likeness of the Persons within the three designated powers. And first he brings in a proof; second, he lays out a manifestation of the things said, at but the mind here is taken to stand for the spirit itself; third, he excludes an objection, at here it is to be diligently examined. In primo duo facit: primo ostendit similitudinem quo ad personarum distinctionem et essentiae unitatem; secundo quo ad personarum aequalitatem, ibi: aequalia etiam sunt non solum singula singulis, sed etiam singula omnibus. Quam aequalitatem ostendit tali ratione. Quaecumque se includunt invicem, sunt aequalia. Sed quaelibet dictarum potentiarum capit aliam, et quaelibet capit omnes. Ergo quaelibet est aequalis alteri, et quaelibet est aequalis omnibus simul, sicut est de divinis personis. Minorem probat ibi: totamque meam memoriam et intelligentiam et voluntatem simul memini: et primo de memoria; secundo de intelligentia, ibi: similiter cum haec tria intelligo, tota simul intelligo; tertio de voluntate, ibi: voluntas etiam mea totam intelligentiam totamque meam memoriam capit. In the first he does two things: first, he manifests the likeness as regards the distinction of Persons and the unity of the essence; second, he does this as regards the equality of the Persons, at also, they are equal not only each to each, but also each to all. He shows this equality with the following argument. Whatever things include each other are equal to each other; but each of the aforesaid powers holds the other, and each holds all of them; therefore each is equal to each, and each of them is equal to all of them at once, as is so of the divine Persons. He proves the minor premise at and I remember concurrently my whole memory and intelligence and will; and he first does this for memory; second, for understanding, at similarly, when I understand these three, I understand all of them at once; and third, for will, at my will also contains my whole intelligence and my whole memory. Primum ostendit sic. Quidquid est praesens memoriae, illud est in memoria. Sed ipsa tota memoria est sibi praesens. Ergo totam se capit. Item, quidquid intelligo et volo, scio me intelligere et velle. Sed quidquid scio me intelligere et velle, est in memoria. Ergo quidquid intelligo et volo est in memoria. Ergo memoria capit se totam et intellectum et voluntatem. Secundo probat idem de intelligentia, hoc modo. Omne quod non est ignotum, est in intellectu. Sed quidquid est volitum vel intellectum vel in memoria existens, est non ignotum. Ergo omne hujusmodi est in intellectu. Intelligentia ergo capit omnes tres. Tertio ostendit idem de voluntate. Omne illud quo utor, est in voluntate mea, quacumque operatione utor; quia voluntas est universalis motor virium. Sed omni eo quod volo vel intelligo vel memoror, utor. Ergo omne hujusmodi est in voluntate mea, et sic voluntas capit omnes. Quo facto concludit similitudinem, ibi: cum itaque invicem a singulis et omnia et tota capiantur, aequalia sunt tota singula totis singulis. He shows the first as follows. Whatever is present to the memory is in the memory. But the whole of memory itself is present to itself. Therefore it holds its entire self. Furthermore, whatever I understand and will, I know myself to understand and will. But whatever I know myself to understand and will is in my memory. Therefore memory holds its entire self, and intellect and will. Second, he proves the same thing about intelligence, in this way. Everything that is not unknown is in the intellect, but whatever is willed or understood or held in memory is not unknown. Therefore every such thing is in the intellect. Therefore intelligence holds all three. Third, he shows the same thing about the will. For everything that I make use of is in my will, with whatever activity I use, because the will is the universal mover of one's powers. But I use everything that I will or understand or remember. Therefore everything of this sort is in my will, and thus my will holds all of them. Having established this, he concludes to the likeness, at and so, since all of them in their entirety are mutually contained by each, they are each severally equal to each severally. Mens autem hic pro animo ipso accipitur. Hic manifestat quaedam quae dixerat: et primo quomodo accipiatur mens; secundo quomodo accipiatur memoria, ibi: illud etiam sciendum. But the mind here is taken to stand for the spirit itself. Here he manifests some of the things that he had said: and first, how "mind" should be taken; and second, how "memory" should be taken, at it is also to be noted. Hic attendendum est diligenter, ex quo sensu accipiendum sit quod supra dixit. Hic removet objectionem contra illud quod dictum est, tres dictas potentias esse unam essentiam: et primo ponit objectum; secundo solutionem, ibi: sed jam videndum est quomodo haec tria dicantur una substantia. Objectio autem sumitur ex duobus. Primo ex hoc quod nulla proprietas est essentia ejus cujus est proprietas. Sed potentiae sunt proprietates naturales ipsius animae. Ergo non sunt una essentia animae. Secunda ponitur ibi: et haec tria etiam ad se ipsa referuntur. Et sumitur ex hoc quod istae potentiae dicuntur relative ad invicem; unde et differunt ab invicem. Ergo mirum videtur quomodo omnia possint esse una essentia. Here it is to be diligently examined in what sense is to be taken what was said above. Here he removes an objection against what he has said, that that the three aforesaid powers are one essence. And first he presents the objection; second he presents its solution, at but we must now examine how these three can be termed one substance. Now, the objection is drawn from two sources, first from the fact that no property is the essence to which the property belongs, whereas these powers are natural properties of the soul itself, so they are not the one essence of the soul. The second is presented at and these three also refer to themselves. And it is drawn from the fact that these powers are spoken of in relation to each other, whence they differ from each other. Therefore how all of them could be one essence appears wondrous. Verumtamen caveat ne hanc imaginem ab eadem Trinitate factam ita ei comparet ut omnino existimet similem. Hic ostendit dissimilitudinem: et dividitur in duas, secundum duas dissimilitudines. Secunda ibi: rursus et imago, quae est homo habens illa tria, una persona est. And yet let him beware lest he so compare to its maker this image made by the Trinity as to believe it to be entirely like it. Here he shows its unlikeness, and it is divided into two parts, according to the two dissimilarities. The second is at moreover, this image, which is man endowed with those three things, is one person. Potest etiam alio modo aliisque nominibus distingui Trinitas in anima. Hic assignat imaginem secundum habitus: et primo assignat partes imaginis; secundo probat similitudinem, ibi: haec autem tria, cum sint distincta a se invicem, dicuntur tamen esse unum; tertio concludit suam intentionem, ibi: mens itaque rationalis considerans haec tria et illam unam essentiam in qua ista sunt, extendit se ad contemplationem creatoris. Ostendit autem similitudinem quantum ad tria. Primo quantum ad personarum distinctionem in essentiae unitate; secundo quantum ad personarum processionem, ibi: et est ipsa mens quasi parens, et notitia ejus quasi proles ejus; tertio quantum ad aequalitatem, ibi: nec minor est proles parente. Quam ostendit dupliciter. Primo, quia quanta est mens, tanta se intelligit et amat; secundo, quia haec tria mutuo se includunt, ibi: sunt etiam singula in se ipsis. The trinity in the soul, . . . can also be distinguished in another way and by other terms. Here he assigns the image in reference to the habits. And first he assigns the parts of the image; second, he proves the likeness, at these three things, even though they are mutually distinct, yet are said to be one; third, he concludes his intention, at and so the rational mind, considering these three things and the one essence in which they exist, extends itself to the contemplation of the Creator. Moreover, he shows the likeness in three respects: first, as regards the distinction of the Persons in the unity of the essence; second, as regards the procession of the Persons, at and the mind is, as it were, the parent, and its knowledge is, as it were, its offspring; third, as regards their equality, at nor is the offspring less than the parent. This he shows in two ways: first, because to the degree that it is a mind, so far does it understand and love; second, because these three mutually contain each other, at these three things also exist severally in themselves. Quaestio 3 Question 3 On the Image of the Trinity Ad intelligentiam hujus partis duo quaeruntur: To understand this part, two things are asked about: primo de subjecto imaginis; first, the subject of the image; secundo de partibus imaginis enumeratis. second, the enumerated parts of the image. Articulus 1 Article 1 Whether the subject of the Divine image is only the mind Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non tantum mens sit subjectum imaginis. Augustinus enim ostendit, imaginem Trinitatis in visu corporali secundum tria quae necessaria sunt ad visionem, scilicet res exterior et imago ejus in oculo, et intentio videntis, quae ista duo conjungit. Visus autem corporeus non pertinet ad mentem. Ergo et cetera. Obj. 1: To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the subject of the image [of God] is not only the mind. For Augustine shows that there is an image of the Trinity within bodily vision with respect to the three things necessary for vision: the exterior reality, its image in the eye, and the intention of the one seeing it, which joins together the first two. But bodily vision does not pertain to the mind. Therefore and so on. Item, Damascenus, assignat imaginem in libero arbitrio, quod etiam non videtur esse de pertinentibus ad mentem. Obj. 2: Furthermore, Damascene points out the image within our free decision, which also does not seem to be among things pertaining to the mind. Item, Augustinus: imago Trinitatis ibi quaerenda est in anima nostra, quo nihil habet melius. Haec autem videtur esse ratio superior, secundum quam aeternis contemplandis inhaeret. Ergo videtur quod in ratione superiori sit imago. Obj. 3: Furthermore, Augustine says, the image of the Trinity should be sought in our soul, and it holds nothing better than it. But this appears to be the higher reason, according to which the soul adheres to eternal contemplations. Therefore it seems that the image is in our higher reason. Item, Dionysius: Angelus est imago divina. Ergo videtur quod non tantum in mente nostra sit imago. Obj. 4: Furthermore, Dionysius says, an angel is a divine image. Therefore it seems that the image is not only in our mind. Contra, videtur quod in nulla creatura sit imago. Imago enim, ut dicit Hilarius, est rei ad rem coaequandam discreta et unica similitudo. Sed nulla res creata coaequat creatorem. Ergo in nulla creatura potest imago creatoris inveniri. On the contrary, it seems that [God's] image is not in any created thing. For an image, as Hilary says, is a thing's discrete and unique likeness to a coequal thing. But nothing created is coequal with its Creator. Therefore in no created thing can there be found an image of the Creator. Respondeo dicendum, quod imago in hoc differt a vestigio: quod vestigium est confusa similitudo alicujus rei et imperfecta; imago autem repraesentat rem magis determinate secundum omnes partes et dispositiones partium, ex quibus etiam aliquid de interioribus rei percipi potest. Et ideo in illis tantum creaturis dicitur esse imago Dei quae propter sui nobilitatem ipsum perfectius imitantur et repraesentant; et ideo in Angelo et homine tantum dicitur imago divinitatis, et in homine secundum id quod est in ipso nobilius. Alia autem, quae plus et minus participant de Dei bonitate, magis accedunt ad rationem imaginis. I answer that an image differs from a vestige in this: a vestige is a confused and imperfect likeness of some reality, whereas an image represents the reality more determinately with respect to all its parts and the dispositions of its parts, from which also something of the interior parts of the reality can be perceived. And therefore God's image is said to be only in those creatures that, on account of their nobility, more perfectly imitate and represent him. And therefore only in the angel and in man is the image of the divinity said to be present, and in man [only] with respect to what is nobler in him. However, other things that participate in more and less of God's goodness more approach the account of an image. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus in multis ostendit similitudinem Trinitatis esse; sed in nullo esse perfectam similitudinem, sicut in potentiis mentis, ubi invenitur distinctio consubstantialis et aequalitas. Constat autem illa tria in visu dicta, non esse consubstantialia, et ideo solum in mente ponit imaginem. Reply to Obj. 1: Augustine shows that there is a likeness of the Trinity in many things, but in none of them is there as perfect likeness as there is in the powers of the mind, where one finds a consubstantial distinction and equality. However, it is certain that those three elements spoken of in vision are not consubstantial, and therefore he asserts that the image is only in the mind. Ad secundum dicendum, quod in libero arbitrio non potest esse perfecta similitudo, cum non inveniatur ibi aliqua distinctio potentiarum; nec etiam est excellentior pars animae, cum sit tantum operativa. Constat autem quod contemplativa nobilior est parte operativa. Sed Damascenus assignat ibi imaginem, large vocans imaginem quamcumque similitudinem. Imitatur autem Deum liberum arbitrium, inquantum est primum principium suorum operum non potens cogi. Reply to Obj. 2: There cannot be a perfect likeness in free decision, since no distinction of powers is found there. Nor is it even a more excellent part of the soul, since it is only an operative part, whereas it is certain that the contemplative part of the soul is nobler than the operative. But Damascene points out the image there by calling broadly just any likeness an "image." However, free decision does imitate God insofar as it is the first principle of their actions that is incapable of being coerced. Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio superior inhaeret aeternis contemplandis, inquantum sunt regula et norma agendorum, prout scilicet ex divinis rationibus dirigimur in nostris operibus. Unde ibi non est imago; sed in illa parte quae aeterna secundum se contemplatur. Reply to Obj. 3: The higher reason adheres to eternal contemplations insofar as they are rules and norms for things to be done, that is, insofar as we are directed by divine reasons in our actions. Whence an image is not there, but in that part that contemplates eternal things in reference to themselves. Ad quartum dicendum, quod imago Trinitatis potest attendi tripliciter. Vel quantum ad expressam repraesentationem divinorum attributorum; et sic, cum divinae bonitates copiosius effulgeant in Angelo quam in homine, Angelus est expressior imago Dei quam homo, unde etiam signaculum dicitur Ezech. 28, secundum expositionem Gregorii. Vel quantum ad distinctionem personarum; et sic expressior est similitudo in homine quam in Angelo, quia in Angelo suae potentiae sunt minus distinctae. Vel inquantum ipse Deus est principium rerum; et sic imago invenitur in homine et non in Angelo, inquantum unus homo est principium omnium hominum, sicut Deus omnium rerum, et inquantum anima est in toto corpore tota, sicut Deus in mundo. Sed quia ista repraesentatio est quantum ad exteriora, simpliciter concedendum est quod Angelus magis est ad imaginem, quam homo. Reply to Obj. 4: The Trinity's image can be considered in three ways. The first is with respect to an express representation of the divine attributes. And in this way, since divine goodnesses more copiously shine forth in an angel than in a man, the angel is a more express image of God than is man; according to Gregory's exposition, this is why it is also called the "signet of perfection" (Ezek 28:12). The second is with respect to the distinction of the Persons. And in this way there is more express likeness in a man than in an angel, since in an angel its powers are less distinct from each other. The third is inasmuch as God himself is the principle of things. And in this way the image is found in man and not in the angel, insofar as one man is the principle of all men just as God is the principle of all things, and insofar as the soul is a whole in the entire body just as God is in the world. But because this representation is in reference to exterior things, one should grant that simply speaking the angel is more according to the image [of God] than is man. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod imago invenitur in filio et in creatura differenter, ut dicit Augustinus, sicut imago regis in filio, et in denario. Filius enim Dei est perfecta imago patris, perfecte repraesentans ipsum: creatura autem, secundum quod deficit a repraesentatione, deficit a perfecta ratione imaginis. Unde etiam dicitur imago, et ad imaginem: quod de filio non dicitur. Et ideo non oportet quod creatura simpliciter adaequet creatorem: hoc enim tantum verum est de filio, qui est perfecta imago; sed sicut secundum quid repraesentat, ut imperfecta imago, ita etiam secundum quid coaequat. Reply to Obj. 5: The image is found in the Son and what is created in different ways, as Augustine says, like the king's image in his son and in a coin. For the Son of God is a perfect image of the Father representing him perfectly, whereas the creature, insofar as it falls short of representing him, falls short of the perfect account of an image. So too he is called both the image and "according to the image" (Gen 1:26-27), which latter is not said of the Son. Therefore it is not necessary that the creature be simply speaking equal to the Creator, for this is true only of the Son, who is the perfect image, but insofar as the image represents in only a certain respect, as imperfect, so too it is coequal only in a certain respect. Quaestio 4 Question 4 The Parts of the Image of God Deinde quaeritur de partibus imaginis: et primo de prima assignatione; secundo de secunda. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque: Next one asks about the parts of the image: and first about the first assignment of its parts; second, about the second. As regards the first, five things are asked about: primo de partibus imaginis quid unaquaeque sit, et qualiter ab invicem differant; first, what each of the parts of the image is, and how they differ from each other; secundo quomodo se habeant ad essentiam, utrum sint ipsa essentia animae; second, how they stand to the essence, whether they themselves are the soul's essence; tertio quomodo se habeant ad invicem, utrum scilicet una ex alia oriatur; third, how they stand to each other, that is, whether one arises from another;