Ad secundum dicendum, quod visus noster est proportionatus ad videndum lucem corporalem per seipsam; sed intellectus noster non est proportionatus ad cognoscendum naturali cognitione aliquid nisi per sensibilia; et ideo in intelligibilia pura devenire non potest nisi argumentando. Reply Obj. 2: Our sight is proportionate to seeing corporeal light through its very self, but our intellect is not proportionate to knowing by its natural light anything except through sensible things. And therefore it cannot come to purely intelligible things except through argumentation. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis Deus sit in anima per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam, non tamen est in ea sicut objectum intellectus; et hoc requiritur ad cognitionem. Unde etiam anima sibi ipsi praesens est; tamen maxima difficultas est in cognitione animae, nec devenitur in ipsam, nisi ratiocinando ex objectis in actus et ex actibus in potentiam. Reply Obj. 3: Although God is in the soul through his essence, presence, and power, nonetheless he is not in it as an object of the intellect, which is what is required for knowing. Whence even the soul is present to its very self, yet there is great difficulty in knowing the soul; nor does one come to it except by reasoning from objects to acts, and from acts to a power. Ad quartum dicendum, quod ratio Anselmi ita intelligenda est. Postquam intelligimus Deum, non potest intelligi quod sit Deus, et possit cogitari non esse; sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur quod aliquis non possit negare vel cogitare, Deum non esse; potest enim cogitare nihil hujusmodi esse quo majus cogitari non possit; et ideo ratio sua procedit ex hac suppositione, quod supponatur aliquid esse quo majus cogitari non potest. Reply Obj. 4: Anselm’s argument should be understood as follows. After we understand God, it cannot be understood that God exists and can be thought not to exist. But still from this it does not follow that someone cannot deny it and think that God does not exist; for he can think that there is no such thing as that than which a greater cannot be thought. And therefore his argument proceeds from this supposition: let it be supposed that there is something than which a greater cannot be thought. Et similiter etiam dicendum ad aliam probationem. Reply Sed Contra 1–2: And one can speak likewise as regards the other proof. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum Deus possit cognosci ab homine per creaturas Whether God can be known by man through created things Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus possit cognosci per creaturas ab homine. To the third we proceed as follows. It appears that man can know God through created things. Rom., 1:20: invisibilia Dei a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. Creatura autem dicitur homo secundum expositionem Magistri. Ergo per creaturas ab homine potest cognosci. Obj. 1: For through the things that were made, the invisible things of God, when understood, are seen by a creature of the world (Rom 1:20). Now, the creature is said to be man, according to the Master’s interpretation. Therefore God can be known by man through created things. Item, videtur quod ab angelo. Cognitio enim Dei per creaturas fit per hoc quod videtur divina bonitas relucens in creatura. Sed angelus cognoscens res in proprio genere, videt divinam bonitatem in ipsis. Ergo cognoscit Creatorem ex creaturis. Obj. 2: Furthermore, he is seen by an angel. For the knowledge of God occurs through created things by the fact that the divine goodness is seen shining forth in what is created. But an angel knowing realities in their proper genus sees the divine goodness in them. Therefore it knows the Creator from created things. Item, videtur quod etiam bruta. Nulli enim fit praeceptum nisi ei qui cognoscit praeceptum. Sed Jonae 4, dicitur, quod praecepit Dominus vermi, quod percuteret hederam. Ergo vermis potest cognoscere divinum praeceptum, et ita potest etiam cognoscere praecipientem. Obj. 3: Furthermore, it seems that brutes also know God. For no precept is made except to one who can know a precept. But in Jonah 4:7 it is said that the Lord commands the worm that he attack the plant. Therefore the worm can know a divine precept, and so it can also know the one giving the precept. Item, videtur quod etiam a peccatoribus possit cognosci: dicitur enim Rom. 1:21: cum cognovissent Deum, non sicut Deum glorificaverunt. Tales autem peccatores fuerunt. Ergo, etc. Obj. 4: Furthermore, it appears that he can be known even by sinners. For Romans 1:21 says, although they knew God, they did not honor him as God. And these were sinners. Therefore and so on. Contra, omnis effectus ducens in cognitionem suae causae, est aliquo modo proportionatus sibi. Sed creaturae non sunt proportionatae Deo. Ergo ex eis non potest homo in suam cognitionem venire. On the contrary (1), every effect leading to the knowledge of its cause is in some way proportionate to it. But created things are not proportionate to God. Therefore man cannot come to a knowledge of him from them. Item, videtur quod nec angeli. Quod enim per se cognoscitur, non cognoscitur per aliquid aliud. Sed Deum cognoscunt angeli per se, videntes ipsum in sua essentia. Ergo non cognoscunt ipsum per creaturas. Furthermore (2), it seems that neither is this so for an angel. For what is known through itself is not known through something else. But angels know God through themselves, seeing him within their own essence. Therefore they do not know him through created things. Item, videtur quod nec etiam a brutis. Nulla enim potentia affixa organo habet virtutem ad cognoscendum nisi speciem materialem, eo quod cognitio sit in cognoscente secundum modum ipsius cognoscentis. Sed bruta non habent virtutes cognoscitivas, nisi sensitivas, quae sunt affixae organo. Ergo nullo modo possunt cognoscere Deum, qui omnino est immaterialis. Furthermore (3), it appears that neither is it possible for brutes. For no power attached to an organ has the power to know anything but a material species, in that knowledge is in the knower according to the mode of the latter. But brutes have only sensory cognitive powers, which are attached to an organ. Therefore in no way can they know God, who is altogether immaterial. Item, videtur quod nec etiam a peccatoribus. Ambrosius enim dicit, super illud Matth. 5:8: beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt, lib. 1 In Luc.: si qui mundo corde sunt, Deum videbunt, ergo alii non videbunt; neque enim maligni Deum videbunt, neque is qui Deum videre noluerit, potest videre Deum. Furthermore (4), it seems that neither is he known by sinners. For Ambrose says, on Matthew 5:8, blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God, that if they are pure in heart, they will see God, so then the others will not see him. For neither will the wicked see God, nor can someone see God who does not wish to see God. Respondeo dicendum, quod, cum creatura exemplariter procedat ab ipso Deo sicut a causa quodammodo simili per analogiam, ex creaturis potest in Deum deveniri tribus illis modis quibus dictum est, scilicet per causalitatem, remotionem, eminentiam. I answer that a created thing proceeds by way of exemplarity from God himself, as from a cause that is in a certain manner like it by analogy. One can come to God from created things in those three modes spoken of before: through causality, removal, and eminence. Ad hoc autem quod aliquis ex creaturis in Deum deveniat, duo requiruntur: scilicet quod ipsum Deum possit aliquo modo capere, et ideo brutis non convenit talis processus cognitionis; secundo requiritur quod cognitio divina in eis incipiat a creaturis et terminetur ad Creatorem; et ideo angelis non convenit Deum cognoscere per creaturas, neque beatis hominibus, qui a Creatoris cognitione procedunt in creaturas. Sed convenit iste processus hominibus, secundum statum viae, bonis et malis. Now, for someone to come to God from created things, two things are required: that he can in some manner take in God—and therefore such a progression of knowledge does fit the beasts; second, it is required that the divine knowledge begins in them from created things and ends at the Creator—and therefore to know God through created things does not fit the angels, nor even beatified men, who proceed from knowledge of the Creator to that of creatures. But this progression does fit men according to the state of the earthly path, both the good and the evil. Primum ergo concedimus. Reply Obj. 1: Therefore we concede the first objection. Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis angelus cognoscat divinam bonitatem relucere in creatura, non tamen ex creatura venit in Creatorem, sed e contrario. Reply Obj. 2: Although an angel knows the divine goodness shining forth in what is created, nonetheless it does not come to the Creator from what is created, but vice versa. Ad tertium dicendum, quod praeceptum Dei non devenit ad vermem, ita quod intentionem praecepti apprehenderet, sed quia divina virtute mota est ejus aestimativa naturali motu ad complendum illud quod Deus disponebat. Reply Obj. 3: God’s precept did not come to the worm in such a way that it apprehended the intention of the precept, but because its estimative power was moved by the divine power with a natural motion for fulfilling what God was arranging. Quartum concedimus. Reply Obj. 4: We concede the fourth objection. Ad quintum dicendum, quod creatura est effectus non proportionatus Creatori; et ideo non ducit in perfectam cognitionem ipsius sed in imperfectam. Reply Sed Contra 1: To the fifth objection, it should be said that a created thing is not an effect proportionate to the Creator, and therefore it does not lead to a perfect knowledge of him, but an imperfect knowledge. Sextum et septimum concedimus. Reply Sed Contra 2–3: We concede the sixth and seventh objections. Ad octavum dicendum, quod Ambrosius loquitur de visione Dei per essentiam, quae erit in patria, ad quam nullus malus poterit pervenire. Similiter etiam ad cognitionem fidei nullus venit nisi fidelis. Sed cognitio naturalis de Deo communis est bonis et malis, fidelibus et infidelibus. Reply Sed Contra 4: Ambrose is speaking of the vision of God through his essence, which will occur in the heavenly fatherland, to which no evil man will be able to reach. Likewise also no one except the believer comes to the knowledge of faith. But natural knowledge of God is common to both the good and the bad, believers and those who do not believe. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum philosophi naturali cognitione cognoverint Trinitatem ex creaturis Whether philosophers by means of natural knowledge came to the Trinity from created things Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod philosophi naturali cognitione ex creaturis in Trinitatem devenerunt. To the fourth we proceed as follows. It appears that by natural knowledge the philosophers did come to the Trinity from created things. Dicit enim Aristoteles, in principio De caelo et mundo: et per hunc quidem numerum, scilicet ternarium, adhibuimus nos ipsos magnificare Deum unum eminentem proprietatibus eorum quae creata sunt. Similiter etiam Plato, in Parmen., loquitur multa de paterno intellectu, et multi alii philosophi. Obj. 1: For Aristotle says that through this number, namely three, we apply ourselves to magnifying the one God by way of the properties of things that have been created. So too Plato said many things about a father intellect, as did many other philosophers. Praeterea, philosophi potuerunt devenire in cognitionem eorum quae in creaturis relucent. Sed in anima est expressa similitudo Trinitatis personarum. Ergo videtur quod per potentias animae, quas philosophi multum consideraverunt, potuerunt in Trinitatem personarum devenire. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the philosophers were able to come to knowledge of the things that shine forth in created things. But within the soul there is an expressed likeness of the Trinity of persons. Therefore it seems that through the powers of the soul, which the philosophers frequently contemplated, they were able to come to the Trinity of persons. Item, Richardus de Sancto Victore, 1 De Trinit., cap. 4, dicit: credo sine dubio quod ad quamcumque explanationem veritatis, quae necesse est esse, non modo probabilia, immo et necessaria argumenta non desunt. Sed necessarium est cognoscere Trinitatem. Ergo videtur quod ad ipsius cognitionem philosophi rationem habere potuerunt. Quod etiam videtur ex probationibus supra inductis, quibus Trinitas probatur. Obj. 3: Furthermore, Richard of Saint Victor says, I believe without a doubt that for any explanation of a truth that is necessary, there are not lacking arguments that are not merely probable, but even ones that are necessary. But it is necessary to know the Trinity. Therefore it seems that the philosophers were able to have an argument for knowing it. And this also seems true based on the proofs brought in above, by which the Trinity is proved. Item, dicitur Rom. 1, in Glossa, quod philosophi non pervenerunt ad notitiam personae tertiae, scilicet Spiritus Sancti, et idem habetur super Exod., 8, ubi dicitur, quod magi Pharaonis defecerunt in tertio signo. Ergo videtur ad minus quod ad notitiam duarum personarum venerunt. Obj. 4: Furthermore, a Gloss on Romans 1 says that the philosophers did not reach an awareness of the third person, the Holy Spirit; the same is held at Exodus 8, where it is said that the Pharaoh’s magicians failed in the third sign. Therefore it seems that they at least came to an awareness of two of the persons. Contra, Hebr. 11:1: est fides substantia sperandarum rerum, argumentum non apparentium. Sed Deum esse trinum et unum est articulus fidei. Ergo non est apparens rationi. On the contrary, Hebrews 11:1 says, faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen. But God being three and one is an article of the faith. Therefore it is not apparent to reason. Respondeo dicendum, quod per naturalem rationem non potest perveniri in cognitionem Trinitatis personarum; et ideo philosophi nihil de hoc sciverunt, nisi forte per revelationem vel auditum ab aliis. Et hujus ratio est, quia naturalis ratio non cognoscit Deum nisi ex creaturis. Omnia autem quae dicuntur de Deo per respectum ad creaturas, pertinent ad essentiam et non ad personas. Et ideo ex naturali ratione non venitur nisi in attributa divinae essentiae. Tamen personas, secundum appropriata eis, philosophi cognoscere potuerunt, cognoscentes potentiam, sapientiam, bonitatem. I answer that through natural reason one cannot come to the knowledge of the Trinity of persons, and therefore the philosophers knew nothing about this, except perhaps through a revelation, or something heard from others. The reason for this is that natural reason can know God only from created things, but all the things said of God through reference to created things pertain to his essence, and not to the persons. And therefore from natural reason one comes only to attributes of the divine essence. Nonetheless, the philosophers were able to know the persons in reference to things that are appropriated to them, knowing his power, wisdom, and goodness. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, secundum expositionem Commentatoris, Aristoteles non intendit Trinitatem personarum in Deo ponere; sed propter hoc quod in omnibus creaturis apparet perfectio in ternario, sicut in principio, medio et fine, ideo antiqui honorabant Deum in sacrificiis et orationibus triplicatis. Plato autem dicitur multa cognovisse de divinis, legens in libris Veteris Legis, quos invenit in Aegypto. Vel forte intellectum paternum nominat intellectum divinum, secundum quod in se quodam modo concipit ideam mundi, quae est mundus archetypus. Reply Obj. 1: According to the exposition of the Commentator, Aristotle does not intend to assert a trinity of persons here. Rather, on account of the fact that in all created things their perfection is apparent in the threefold, like in beginning, middle, and end, the ancients therefore honored God in triple sacrifices and prayers. Moreover, Plato is said to have known many things about the divine from reading the books of the Old Law, which he found in Egypt. Or perhaps he names the divine intellect the “father intellect” insofar as in a certain way he conceived the idea of the world in himself, which is the archetype world. Ad secundum dicendum, quod similitudo Trinitatis relucens in anima est omnino imperfecta et deficiens, sicut infra dicet Magister. Sed dicitur expressa per comparationem ad similitudinem vestigii. Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of the Trinity that shines forth in the soul is altogether imperfect and deficient, as the Master will say below. But it is called “expressed” in comparison to the likeness of a vestige. Ad tertium dicendum, quod si dictum Richardi intelligatur universaliter, quod omne verum possit probari per rationem, est expresse falsum; quia prima principia per se nota non probantur. Si autem aliqua sunt in se nota quae nobis occulta sunt, illa probantur per notiora quoad nos. Notiora autem quoad nos sunt effectus principiorum. Ex effectibus autem creaturarum, Trinitas personarum probari non potest, ut dictum est. Et ideo relinquitur quod nullo modo possit probari; et omnes rationes inductae sunt magis adaptationes quaedam, quam necessario concludentes. Remoto enim per impossibile intellectu distinctionis personarum, adhuc remanebit in Deo summa bonitas, et beatitudo, et caritas. Reply Obj. 3: If Richard’s statement is understood universally, that everything true can be proved through reason, then it is expressly false, since first principles known through themselves are not proved. If, however, some things that are known through themselves are hidden to us, such are proved through things more known relative to us. However, the effects of the principles are more known to us. Moreover, the Trinity of persons cannot be proved from the effects of created things, as has been said. Therefore what remains is that it can in no way be proved, and all such arguments that are introduced are certain suitabilities, rather than arguments concluding with necessity. For were the intellect to do the impossible and remove the distinction of persons, still supreme goodness, beatitude, and love will remain in God.