Ad rationem autem pulchritudinis duo concurrunt, secundum Dionysium, scilicet consonantia et claritas. Dicit enim, quod Deus est causa omnis pulchritudinis inquantum est causa consonantiae et claritatis, sicut dicimus homines pulchros qui habent membra proportionata et splendentem colorem. His duobus addit tertium Philosophus ubi dicit, quod pulchritudo non est nisi in magno corpore; unde parvi homines possunt dici commensurati et formosi, sed non pulchri. Now, two things come together for the account of beauty, according to Dionysius—namely, consonance and clarity. For he says that God is the cause of every beauty insofar as he is the cause of consonance and clarity, just as we call people beautiful who have proportionate members and brilliant color. To these two the Philosopher adds a third, when he says that beauty is only in a sizeable body; this is why small people can be called commensurate and comely, but not beautiful. Et secundum haec tria, pulchritudo convenit cum propriis Filii: inquantum enim Filius est imago perfecta Patris, sic est ibi consonantia perfecta; est enim aequalis et similis sine inaequalitate et dissimilitudine; et hoc tangit Augustinus, ubi dicit: ubi est tanta convenientia, id est maxima et prima aequalitas, et prima similitudo. Inquantum vero est Filius verus, habet perfectam naturam Patris: et ita etiam habet magnitudinem quae consistit in perfectione divinae naturae, ut supra dictum est, dist. 19, quaest. 1 art. 2: unde dicit Augustinus quod ibi est perfecta et summa vita. Sed inquantum est Verbum perfectum Patris, habet claritatem quae irradiat super omnia et in quo omnia resplendent. Unde dicit Augustinus, quod est tamquam Verbum perfectum. And according to these three things, beauty belongs with things proper to the Son. For insofar as the Son is the perfect image of the Father, so perfect consonance is there; for he is equal to and like him without any inequality and unlikeness. And Augustine touches on this when he says, where the agreement is so great, that is the greatest and first equality and first likeness. Indeed, insofar as he is a true Son, he has the perfect nature of the Father, and so too he has the magnitude that consists in the perfection of the divine nature, as was said earlier. Whence Augustine says that here is the perfect and greatest life. But insofar as he is the Father's perfect Word, he has the clarity that radiates over all things and in which all things shine forth. Whence Augustine says that he is as perfect a Word as could be. Potest etiam totum accipi ex verbis Augustini secundum rationem consonantiae, quae triplex in eo considerari potest: idest consonantia ipsius ad Patrem cui est per omnia aequalis et similis, et hoc tangit Augustinus ubi dicit: prima aequalitas. Item consonantia sui ad seipsum, inquantum omnia attributa in eo non differunt, sed unum sunt; et hoc tangit ubi dicit: cui non est aliud vivere et aliud esse, sed idem est esse et vivere. Item consonantia ad res creatas, quarum rationes in eo sunt, et unum sunt in eo sicut ipse est unum cum Patre: et hoc tangit ibi: et omnes unum in ea, sicut ipsa unum de uno cum quo unum. The whole of this can even be taken from Augustine's words respecting the account of consonance, wherein three things can be considered: that is, his consonance with the Father, to whom he is equal and like in all things; Augustine touches on this where he says, first equality. Moreover, one can consider his consonance with his very self, insofar as all the attributes in him are not different, but rather one; he touches on this where he says, for whom it is not one thing to be alive and another to be, but rather it is the same thing to be and to live. Moreover, one can consider his consonance in relation to created things, the accounts of which are within him, and are one in him, just as he himself is one with the Father; he touches on this when where he says, and all things are one in it, as it itself is One from One, and with One. Usus etiam de ratione sua duo habet. Primo quod est assumptum in facultatem voluntatis; et sic convenit Spiritui Sancto inquantum est amor: et hoc tangit Augustinus cum dicit: illa ergo dilectio, delectatio, felicitas vel beatitudo (...) est in Trinitate Spiritus Sanctus. Habet etiam aliud quod est ordinatum ad alterum: et iste etiam ordo competit Spiritui Sancto, inquantum ipse amor, qui est Spiritus Sanctus, non tantum est in Filio, sed redundat in omnes creaturas, secundum quod competit sibi nomen doni: et hoc tangit Augustinus cum dicit: ingenti largitate atque ubertate perfundens omnes creaturas pro captu earum. Use also has two elements from its own account. The first is that it is drawn into the faculty of will, and in this way it belongs to the Holy Spirit insofar as he is love; Augustine touches on this when he says, therefore that love, delight, happiness or beauty . . . in the Trinity is the Holy Spirit. It also contains the idea that one thing is ordered to another, and even this order befits the Holy Spirit, insofar as the very Love who is the Holy Spirit is not only in the Son, but overflows to all created things, insofar as the name "gift" befits him; Augustine touches on this when he says, he is flooding all created things with his vast largess and abundance for the sake of their capture. Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod una et principalis ratio est appropriationis, scilicet similitudo ad proprium, ut dictum est in corp. art.; sed possunt esse multae consequentes utilitates; quarum unam Augustinus tangit; unde ex hoc non potest concludi quod aliquid debeat appropriari Patri vel Filio, nisi adsit ratio principalis. Reply to Obj. 1: There is one and principal reason for appropriation—the likeness to the property, as was said in the body; but there can be many consequent advantages, one of which Augustine is touching upon. Whence it cannot be concluded from this that something should be appropriated to the Father or the Son unless the principal reason applies. Ad secundum dicendum, quod in aequivocis quae per fortunam sunt et casum, ut canis, non attenditur similitudo aliqua; sed in aequivocis quae dicuntur per respectum ad unum principium attenditur aliqua similitudo analogiae vel proportionis; et talis est multiplicitas hujus nominis principium: unde etiam Philosophus docet reducere omnia hujusmodi ad unum primum principium. Reply to Obj. 2: In equivocals that occur by luck or chance, like "dog," no likeness is attended to. But in equivocals that are said with respect to one principle, one does attend to a certain likeness of analogy or proportion. And such is the multiplicity of this name "principle"; this is why the Philosopher also teaches one to trace back all such to one first principle. Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa nihil valet. Reply to Obj. 3: Nothing in that argument is valid. Ad quartum dicendum, quod pulchritudo non habet rationem appetibilis nisi inquantum induit rationem boni: sic enim et verum appetibile est: sed secundum rationem propriam habet claritatem et ea quae dicta sunt, quae cum propriis Filii similitudinem habent. Reply to Obj. 4: Beauty does not have the account of the desirable except insofar as it takes on the account of the good; for in this way even the true is desirable. But according to its own proper account it does contain clarity and the things said, which have a likeness with things proper to the Son. Ad quintum dicendum, quod usus, ut supra dictum est, dist. 1, quaest. 1, art. 2, sumitur dupliciter. Communiter, prout uti dicitur assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis, et stricte, prout dicit relationem in finem. Et primo modo sumitur hic, quo continet in se etiam fruitionem; unde hic dicitur quod felicitas vel beatitudo ad usum pertinet. Nihilominus tamen competit proprio, et secundum quod habet rationem ordinis non quidem in finem, sed in effectum, in quo bonitas divina per Spiritum Sanctum uberrime effunditur. Reply to Obj. 5: "Use," as was said earlier, is taken in two ways: commonly, insofar as to use is to draw something into the faculty of the will; and strictly, insofar as it signifies a relation to an end. And it is being taken in the first way here, whereby it contains within itself even enjoyment; hence, here it is said that happiness or beatitude pertains to use. Nonetheless it fits the proper sense as well insofar as it has the account of order, but not an order into an end but into an effect, wherein the divine goodness is poured out in abundance by the Holy Spirit. Quaestio 3 Question 3 De appropriatione Augustini Augustine's appropriation Circa quartum duo quaeruntur: As regards the fourth, two things are asked about: primo de ratione appropriationis Augustini; first, about the reason for Augustine's appropriation; secundo de hoc quod dicit quod omnia sunt unum propter Patrem. second, about his saying that all are one on account of the Father. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum Augustinus convenienter appropriet unitatem Patri, aequalitatem Filio, nexum Spiritui Sancto Whether Augustine suitably appropriates unity to the Father, equality to the Son, and binding to the Holy Spirit Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod appropriatio Augustini sit incompetens. To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that Augustine's appropriation is not suitable. Supra enim, 10 dist., quaest. 1, art. 3, dictum est, quod Spiritus Sanctus est unitas duorum. Ergo videtur quod unitas non Patri, sed Spiritui Sancto approprietur. Obj. 1: For above it was said that the Holy Spirit is the unity of the two. Therefore it seems that "unity" would not be appropriated to the Father, but to the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, appropriatio est secundum similitudinem ad proprium. Illi ergo personae debet appropriari unitas, in qua minus de pluralitate invenitur. Sed maxima pluralitas notionum invenitur in Patre, qui habet tres notiones, minima in Spiritu Sancto, qui habet unam tantum. Ergo unitas Spiritui Sancto et non Patri appropriari debet. Obj. 2: Furthermore, appropriation is according to a likeness with something proper. Therefore unity should be appropriated to the person in which the least plurality is found. But the greatest plurality of notions is found in the Father, who has three notions, whereas the least is in the Holy Spirit, who has only one. Therefore "unity" should be appropriated to the Holy Spirit, not to the Father. Praeterea, unitas causa est aequalitatis. Si igitur unitas Patri appropriatur, et aequalitas sibi appropriari debet, et non Filio. Obj. 3: Furthermore, unity is the cause of equality. Therefore, if "unity" be appropriated to the Father, then "equality" should also be appropriated to him, and not to the Son. Item, secundum convenientiam in natura vel in forma magis attenditur similitudo quam aequalitas. Sed Filius inquantum est genitus a Patre, habet naturam et formam Patris: et similiter imago et verbum habet similitudinem ejus ad quod dicitur. Ergo magis debet appropriari Filio similitudo quam aequalitas. Obj. 4: Furthermore, likeness is viewed according to agreement in nature and form than is equality. But the Son, as begotten by the Father, has the nature and form of the Father; similarly, "image" and "word" have a likeness with that relative to which they are said. Therefore "likeness" more than "equality" should be appropriated to the Son. Praeterea, nexus proprie dicitur de Spiritu Sancto. Sed aeternitas et aequalitas non proprie dicuntur de Patre et Filio. Ergo videtur quod appropriatio non sit uniformis. Obj. 5: Furthermore, "binding" is said properly of the Holy Spirit. But "eternity" and "equality" are not said properly of the Father and the Son. Therefore it seems that the appropriation is not uniform. Respondeo dicendum, quod appropriatio Augustini bona est, et ratio appropriationis haec est. Unitas enim, quantum ad id quod positive dicit, habet rationem principii secundum quod est principium numeri: et ita habet similitudinem cum duabus proprietatibus Patris, scilicet cum paternitate et communi spiratione quibus dicitur principium Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Secundum autem quod ratio ejus consistit in negatione, sic negat divisionem, et per consequens compositionem praeexistentem; et ita negat rationem principii: quia ea in quae aliquid dividitur, sunt principia integrantia ipsum; et ita unitas habet similitudinem cum innascibilitate, sicut et aeternitas, ut dicit Magister. I answer that Augustine's appropriation is good, and the reason for the appropriation is as follows. "Unity," insofar as it is said in a positive way, has the account of a principle insofar as it is the principle of number. Thus, it has a likeness with two properties of the Father: paternity and common spiration, whereby he is called the principle of the Son and the Holy Spirit. However, insofar as its account consists in a negation, so does it negate division, and consequently a preexisting composition; in this way it negates the account of a principle, since that in which something is divided has principles integrating it as a whole. And in this way unity has a likeness with innascibility just as it does with eternity, as the Master says. Similiter etiam aequalitas secundum proprium modum suae processionis convenit Filio, ut patet in omnibus nominibus personalibus ipsius Filii. Ex eo enim dicitur Filius quod recipit aequalem et eamdem naturam quam habet generans: similiter etiam imago includit in se rationem aequalitatis; et similiter Verbum perfectum. Similarly, too, "equality" belongs to the Son according to the mode proper to his procession, as is clear in all the personal names of the Son himself. For from this, the Son is said to receive an equal, and the same, nature that his begetter has; likewise too "image" includes within itself the account of equality, as does "perfect Word." Ita etiam nexus convenit Spiritui Sancto ex modo suae processionis inquantum est amor Patris et Filii, quo uniuntur, et etiam est connectens nos Deo, inquantum est donum. In this way "binding" also belongs to the Holy Spirit, from the mode of his procession insofar as he is the Love of the Father and the Son, by which they are united; and he is also binding us to God, insofar as he is the gift. Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod differt unitum et unum; quia unitum est quod ex pluribus unum effectum est; unde unio importat relationem quamdam plurium secundum quod in uno conveniunt; sed unum absolute dicitur. Unde dicendum, quod unitas, secundum quod ponitur pro unione plurium in uno amore, attribuitur Spiritui Sancto: secundum autem quod absolute sumitur inquantum est principium, habet similitudinem ad proprium Patris: unde appropriatur Patri. Reply to Obj. 1: The united and the one are different, since the united is what is made one from many. Whence "union" indicates a certain relation of several things insofar as they come together in one. But the "one" is said in an absolute way. This is why it is said that "unity," insofar as it is used for the union of the many in one love, is attributed to the Holy Spirit. However insofar as "unity" is taken absolutely, inasmuch as it is a principle, it has a likeness with what is proper to the Father, so it is appropriated to the Father. Ad secundum dicendum, quod tres notiones in Patre non sunt tres res, sed tres rationes innotescendi: unde pluralitas notionum non impedit quin sibi unitas approprietur; et praecipue cum ratio unitatis cum omnibus notionibus ejus similitudinem habeat. Reply to Obj. 2: The three notions in the Father are not three realities, but three accounts that make him known. Whence the plurality of notions does not impede "unity" being appropriated to him, and especially since the account of unity has a likeness with all his notions. Ad tertium dicendum, quod aequalitas non est unitas, sed relatio unitatem consequens; et ideo appropriatur Filio, qui adaequat Patrem procedens ab eo: quamvis non approprietur sibi unitas. Reply to Obj. 3: Equality is not unity, but a relation following on unity. And therefore "equality" is appropriated to the Son, who is equal to the Father, proceeding from him, even though "unity" is not appropriated to him. Ad quartum dicendum, quod sicut aequalitas appropriatur Filio, ita et similitudo: sed Augustinus posuit aequalitatem, quia in divinis aequalitas includit similitudinem, et non e converso. Cum enim in divinis non sit quantitas nisi virtutis, quae fundatur in aliqua forma; sequitur ut quaecumque conveniunt in quantitate virtuali, conveniant in forma; et ita, si sunt aequalia, quod sint similia. Sed non convertitur: quia aequalitas privat excessum, quem non privat similitudo; unde duo quorum alter altero albior est, sunt similes in albedine, sed non aequales. Reply to Obj. 4: Just as "equality" is appropriated to the Son, so too is "likeness." But Augustine has proposed "equality" because, within the divine, equality includes likeness, and not vice versa. For because there is no quantity in the divine except that of power, which is founded in some form, it follows that whatever belongs to quantity of power belongs to form. And thus, if they are equal, then they are like. But this does not convert, since equality takes away excess, which likeness does not; this is why two things, one of which is whiter than the other, are alike in whiteness, but not equal. Ad quintum dicendum, quod nexus vel connexio amoris proprium est Spiritus Sancti. Sed quia quaecumque conveniunt in aliquo uno, possunt dici connexa in illo; ideo connexio absolute dicta non importat nisi convenientiam quamdam; et sic non est proprium Spiritus Sancti, sed appropriatum. Si tamen sumeretur ut est proprium, non esset magnum inconveniens, quod assignatio non est uniformis simpliciter: quia hujusmodi attribuuntur personis inquantum sunt appropriata, et sic accedunt ad rationem propriorum; unde proprium et appropriatum inquantum appropriatum, non habent rationem difformitatis. Reply to Obj. 5: The bond or binding of love is proper to the Holy Spirit. But when any things come together in something one, they can be said to be "bound" in it; therefore "binding," when said in an absolute way, does not indicate anything but a certain coming together; and in this way it is not proper to the Holy Spirit, but only appropriated to him. Yet even if it be taken insofar as it is proper, it would be no great incongruity that the assignment is not simply speaking uniform. For such names are attributed to the persons to the degree that they are appropriated, and thus they approach toward the account of the proper names. This is why the proper and the appropriated, as appropriated, do not have the account of divergence in form. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum omnia sint unum propter Patrem Whether all are one on account of the Father Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur falsum quod dicit Augustinus. To the second we proceed as follows. What Augustine says seems to be false. Cum enim haec praepositio propter importet habitudinem alicujus causae; cum dicitur quod omnia sunt unum propter Patrem, aut importat habitudinem quasi efficientis, aut quasi formae. Si quasi formae, tunc falsum est; quia Filius, formaliter loquendo, non est unus cum Patre, sed essentia divina, vel proprietate sua, vel seipso. Si quasi efficientis, sic idem erit dictum propter Patrem, ac si diceretur quod habet unitatem a Patre. Sed sicut habet unitatem a Patre Filius, ita et aequalitatem. Ergo sicut dicuntur omnia unum propter Patrem, ita dicuntur omnia aequalia propter Patrem; et sic distinctio nulla esset. Obj. 1: For because this preposition "on account of" (propter) indicates the bearing of a cause, when it is said that "all things are one on account of the Father," this would indicate either the bearing, as it were, of an efficient cause or, as it were, of a form. If it is as of a form, then it is false, since the Son, formally speaking, is not one with the Father, but with the divine essence, or with his own property, or with his very self. If it is as of an efficient cause, then it will be the same thing to say the Son has unity "on account of the Father" as to say he has unity "from the Father." But just as the Son has unity from the Father, so does he have equality as well. Therefore, just as all are said to be one on account of the Father, all are said to be equal on account of the Father. And then there would be no distinction. Praeterea, quidquid sit de Patre, constat quod Filius nullam rationem principii habeat respectu Patris. Si ergo haec praepositio propter importat habitudinem alicujus principii, videtur omnino falsum quod dicit, quod omnia sunt aequalia propter Filium. Obj. 2: Whatever is from the Father, it is certain that the Son has no account of a principle relative to the Father. Therefore if this preposition "on account of" indicates the bearing of a principle, it seems wholly false when he says that all are equal on account of the Son. Item, sicut idem est Deo sapere quod esse; ita idem est esse aequalem Deo quod esse. Sed non potest dici quod omnia sint in divinis propter Filium. Ergo nec quod omnia sint aequalia. Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as for God to be wise and to be are the same thing, so too for God to be equal and to be are the same thing. But it cannot be said that, within the divine, all exist on account of the Son. Therefore neither are all equal on account of the Son.