Distinctio 35 Distinction 35 De scientia Dei Divine knowledge Divisio textus Division of the text Postquam determinavit Magister de processione divinarum personarum in unitate essentiae, quae est principium creaturarum et causa; antequam de creaturis determinet, prosequitur ea in quibus consistit perfecta ratio principii, secundum quod Deus creaturarum dicitur principium. Ratio autem principii efficientis in his quae agunt per necessitatem naturae sufficienter consistit in potentia et virtute perfecta, quam consequitur effectus, nisi sit impedimentum ex parte recipientis. Sed hoc non sufficit in his quae agunt per voluntatem; immo supra hoc exigitur scientia et voluntas, ut ostendit Philosophus in 9 Metaph. After having considered the procession of the divine persons within the unity of the essence, which is the principle and cause of created things, now, before considering created things themselves, the Master treats things in which consist the perfect account of being a principle, insofar as God is said to be the principle of created things. Now, the account of an efficient principle in things that act by a necessity of nature sufficiently consists in power and perfect virtue, upon which the effect follows unless there is some impediment on the side of the recipient. But this is not sufficient in things that act by will; indeed, over and above this, knowledge and will are required, as the Philosopher shows. Et ideo dividitur hoc in partes tres: in prima determinat de scientia Dei; in secunda de potentia, 42 dist., ibi: nunc de omnipotentia Dei agendum est; in tertia de bonitate, 45 dist., ibi: jam de bonitate Dei aliquid pro sensus nostri imbecillitate dicendum est; ratio autem ordinis est, quia scientia ad plura se extendit quam potentia; est enim tam bonorum quam malorum, quorum non est potentia; quae etiam ad plura se extendit quam voluntas, quia voluntas est tantum respectu illorum bonorum quae sunt, vel erunt, vel fuerunt; sed potentia ulterius est infinitorum aliorum quae facere posset. And therefore this part is divided into three parts: in the first, he considers God’s knowledge; in the second, he considers God’s power at now we must treat of God’s omnipotence; in the third, he considers God’s will at we must now say something about God’s will, so far as the weakness of our understanding allows. Now, the reason for this ordering is that his knowledge extends to more things than his power, for it is of both good and evil, whereas his power does not extend to the latter; and his power extends to more things than does his will, since the will is only in respect of the good things that either are, or will be, or have been, whereas the power extends even to an infinity of other things that he could do. Prima dividitur in duas: in prima determinat de scientia in communi; in secunda de quadam specie scientiae Dei, quae specialem difficultatem affert, scilicet de praedestinatione, 40 distinct.: praedestinatio vero est de bonis salutaribus, et de hominibus salvandis. The first part is divided into two: in the first, he considers his knowledge in common; in the second, he considers a certain species of God’s knowledge that brings in a specific difficulty: predestination, at but predestination is about the goods of salvation and about the men to be saved. Prima in duas: in prima ostendit quorum sit Dei scientia; in secunda ostendit qualiter se habeat ad res scitas, 38 distinct.: nunc ergo ad propositum revertamur. The first is divided into two: in the first, he shows what things God’s knowledge concerns; in the second, he shows in what way he stands to the realities known at and so now, returning to our purpose. Prima in duas: in prima ostendit quod scientia Dei universaliter est omnium; in secunda ostendit quomodo ea quae Deus scit, in Dei scientia esse dicuntur, 36 distinct.: solet quaeri hic, cum omnia dicantur esse in Dei cognitione . . . , utrum concedendum sit, omnia esse in divina essentia, vel in Deo per essentiam. The first is divided into two: in the first, he shows that God’s knowledge is universally about all things; in the second, he shows how the things God knows are said to be within God’s knowledge at it is usual to ask here, since all things are said to be in God’s cognition . . . , whether it is to be granted that all things are in the divine essence or in God through essence. Prima in duas: in prima ostendit scientiam Dei esse omnium: in secunda ex hoc duas conclusiones inducit, ibi: propterea omnia dicuntur esse in Deo et fuisse ab aeterno. The first is divided into two: in the first, he shows that God’s knowledge is about all things; in the second, he deduces two conclusions from this, at for that reason, all things are said to be in God, and to have been in him from eternity. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit necessitatem tractatus; secundo prosequitur suam intentionem, ibi: sciendum est igitur, quod sapientia vel scientia Dei, cum sit una et simplex, tamen propter varios rerum status et diversos effectus plura ac diversa sortitur nomina. As regards the first, he does two things: first, he shows the need to treat this; second, he follows out his intention, at and so it is to be known that God’s wisdom or knowledge, although it is one and simple, yet it is given several different names because of the varying states of things and their different effects. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit quomodo divina scientia ratione diversorum scitorum diversimode nominatur; secundo ostendit quae istorum nominum esse res creatas actu exigant, quae non, ibi: hic considerari oportet, utrum scientia vel praescientia, vel dispositio, vel praedestinatio, potuerit esse in Deo, si nulla fuissent futura. And as regards this latter, he does two things: first, he shows how the divine knowledge is named in diverse ways by reason of the diverse things known; second, he shows which of these names demands that there be actually created realities, and which do not, at here it needs to be considered whether knowledge or foreknowledge or disposition or predestination could have been in God, if there had been no future things. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit quae nomina Deo non competunt, creaturis remotis; secundo ostendit quae nomina nihilominus sibi conveniunt, si creaturae non essent, ibi: scientia vero vel sapientia non tantum de temporalibus, sed etiam de aeternis est. And about this latter, he does two things: first, he shows which names do not belong to God if created things be removed; second, he shows which names nevertheless would befit him even if nothing were created, at but knowledge or wisdom is not only of temporal things, but also of eternal ones. Circa primum tria facit: primo ostendit veritatem; secundo inducit objectionem in contrarium, ibi: ad hoc autem ita a quibusdam opponitur; tertio ponit solutionem, ibi: ad hoc juxta modulum nostrae intelligentiae ita dicimus. As regards the first, he does three things: first, he manifests the truth; second, he takes up an objection to the contrary, at some make the following objection to this; third, he presents the solution, at in regard to this, in accordance with our little share of intelligence, we say as follows. Quaestio 1 Question 1 De scientia Dei Divine knowledge Hic quinque quaeruntur: Here five things are asked: primo utrum in Deo sit scientia; first, whether there is knowledge in God; secundo utrum habeat tantum sui scientiam, vel etiam aliorum; et si aliorum, quaeritur second, whether he has knowledge only about himself, or also about other things; tertio utrum de eis certam et propriam cognitionem habeat; third, and if about others, whether he has a certain and proper cognition of them; quarto utrum scientia sua sit univoca nostrae scientiae; fourth, whether his knowledge is univocal with our knowledge; quinto utrum scientia sua possit dici universalis vel particularis, vel in potentia vel in habitu, sicut scientia nostra. fifth, whether his knowledge can be called universal or particular, or in potency or in habit, as is so with our knowledge. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum scientia conveniat Deo Whether knowledge befits God Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Deo non conveniat. To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that knowledge does not befit God. Ubi enim non est intellectus, ibi non potest esse scientia. Sed nomen intellectus proprie Deo non competit; immo dicitur in lib. De causis: cum Deus dicitur intelligens, nominatur nomine creati sui primi, quod est intelligentia. Ergo videtur quod scientia proprie Deo non conveniat. Obj. 1: For where there is no intellect there cannot be knowledge. But the name “intellect” does not properly belong to God; rather, in the Book of Causes it says, when God is called ‘intelligent,’ he is being named with the name of the first thing he has created, which is an intelligence. Therefore it seems that knowledge does not properly befit God. Praeterea, simplicissimo et primo nihil convenit quod sibi aliquid praesupponat, ad quod ex additione se habet. Sed scientia praesupponit vitam et essentiam, et habet se ex additione ad illa, ut ex principio libri De causis patet. Ergo cum Deus sit simplicissimus et primus, sibi scientia non competit. Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing that presupposes something to itself, which it would be added to, is fitting to what is simplest and first. But knowledge presupposes life and essence, and it stands as something added to them, as is clear from the beginning of the Book of Causes. Therefore, since God is the simplest and first thing, knowledge does not befit him. Praeterea, nihil quod pluralitatem requirit invenitur in eo quod summe est unum. Sed scientia requirit pluralitatem quamdam, scilicet scientis, scientiae et scibilis. Ergo Deo qui summe unus est, non convenit. Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing that requires plurality is found in what is supremely one. But knowledge requires a certain plurality: that of the knower, the knowledge, and the knowable thing. Therefore it does not befit God, who is supremely one. Si dicas, quod in Deo idem est scibile et sciens: Obj. 4: You might say that in God the knowable and the knower are the same. contra. Nihil sibi ipsi simile dici potest, ut dicit Hilarius, De syn., post med., nec aliquid seipsum recipit aut capit. Sed secundum philosophos scientia est assimilatio scientis ad rem scitam: item scientia fit secundum receptionem scibilis in sciente. Ergo videtur quod non possit idem esse in Deo sciens et scitum. On the contrary, nothing can be said to be like its very self, as Hilary points out, nor does anything receive or take its very self. But according to the philosophers, knowledge is the knower becoming like the reality known; moreover, knowledge occurs according to the reception of the knowable within the knower. Therefore it seems that the knower and the known cannot be the same thing in God. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum, in 6 Ethic., cap. 6, scientia conclusionum est, et intellectus principiorum. Sed cognitio conclusionum sequitur inquisitionem rationis. Cum igitur in Deo non sit cognitio per inquisitionem, videtur quod proprie in Deo scientia esse non possit. Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, knowledge is of the conclusions, and understanding is of the principles. But cognition of the conclusions follows on the inquiry of reason. Therefore, since in God there is no cognition through inquiry, it seems that there cannot be, properly speaking, knowledge in God. Contra est quod dicitur ad Colos. 2:3: in ipso sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi, et Commentator, 11 Metaph., dicit, quod vita et scientia proprie esse in Deo dicuntur. On the contrary, in Colossians 2:3 he is said to be the one in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge; and the Commentator, in Metaphysics 11, says that life and knowledge are properly said to be in God. Praeterea, nulla perfectio deest ei qui perfectissimus est. Sed scientia est nobilissima perfectio. Ergo Deo, in quo omnium generum perfectiones adunantur, ut in 5 Met., dicitur, scientia deesse non potest. Furthermore, no perfection is absent from him who is most perfect. But knowledge is the noblest perfection. Therefore knowledge cannot be absent from God, in whom are united the perfections of all the genera, as is said in Metaphysics 6. Respondeo dicendum, quod, secundum Dionysium, in lib. De div. nom., cap. 7, tribus viis ex creaturis in Deum devenimus: scilicet per remotionem, per causalitatem, per eminentiam, quarum quaelibet nos in Dei scientiam inducit. I answer that, according to Dionysius, we arrive at the knowledge of God from created things by means of three paths: through removal, through causality, and through eminence—each of which leads us to a knowledge of God. Prima igitur via, quae est per remotionem est haec: cum a Deo omnis potentia et materialitas removeatur, eo quod ipse est actus primus et purus, oportet essentiam ejus esse denudatam a materia, et esse formam tantum. Sicut autem particulationis principium est materia, ita formae debetur intelligibilitas: unde forma principium cognitionis est; unde oportet quod omnis forma per se existens separata a materia, sit intellectualis naturae: et si quidem sit per se subsistens, erit et intelligens; si autem non sit per se subsistens, sed quasi perfectio alicujus subsistentis, non erit intelligens, sed principium intelligendi: quemadmodum omnis forma non in se subsistens non operatur, sed est operationis principium, ut caliditas in igne. Cum igitur ipse Deus sit immunis ab omni materia, et sit per se subsistens, quia esse suum ab alio non dependet, oportet quod ipse sit intelligens et sciens. The first way, which is through removal, is as follows: since every potency and materiality is remote from God, in that he is the first and pure act, his essence must be stripped from matter and be form alone. Now, just as the principle of being a particular is matter, so intelligibility is owed to form; whence form is the principle of cognition. This is why every form existing through itself separate from matter must be of an intellectual nature; and if it is indeed subsisting through itself, it will also be intelligent, whereas if it is not subsisting through itself, but is, as it were, a perfection of something subsisting, it will not be intelligent but a principle of understanding—just as every form not subsisting in itself does not act, but is the principle of an action, like the heat in a fire. Therefore, since God himself is unstained by any matter, and is subsisting through himself, since he is his own existence without dependence on any other, he himself must be an intelligence and a knower. Secunda via, quae est per causalitatem, est haec. Omne enim agens habet aliquam intentionem et desiderium finis. Omne autem desiderium finis praecedit aliqua cognitio praestituens finem, et dirigens in finem ea quae sunt ad finem. Sed in quibusdam ista cognitio non est conjuncta ipsi tendenti in finem; unde oportet quod dirigatur per aliquod prius agens, sicut sagitta tendit in determinatum locum per determinationem sagittantis; et ita est in omnibus quae agunt per necessitatem naturae; quia horum operatio est determinata per intellectum aliquem instituentem naturam; unde Philosophus, 2 Physic., dicit, quod opus naturae est opus intelligentiae. In aliquibus autem ista cognitio est conjuncta ipsi agenti, ut patet in animalibus; unde oportet quod primum non agat per necessitatem naturae, quia sic non esset primum, sed dirigeretur ab aliquo priori intelligente. Oportet igitur quod agat per intellectum et voluntatem; et ita, quod sit intelligens et sciens. The second way, which is through causality, is as follows: for every agent has some intention and desire for an end. Now, every desire for an end is preceded by some cognition establishing the end and directing to that end the things that are for that end. But in some things this cognition is not joined to what itself has the tendency to that end, so it must be directed to it through some prior agent, as an arrow has a tendency toward a determinate place through the archer’s determination of it. And so it is in all things that act through the necessity of nature, since the activity of these things is determined though some intellect that establishes the nature. Whence the Philosopher says that a work of nature is a work of intelligence. But in other things such cognition is joined to the agent itself, as is clear in animals. Whence it is necessary that the first thing does not act by a necessity of nature—since then it would not be first, but rather would be directed by some prior intelligence. Therefore it must act through intellect and will, and thus it must be an intelligence and a knower. Tertia via, quae est per eminentiam, est haec. Quod enim invenitur in pluribus magis ac magis secundum quod plures alicui appropinquant, oportet ut in illo maxime inveniatur; sicut calor in igne, ad quem quanto corpora mixta magis accedunt, calidiora sunt. Invenitur autem quod quanto aliqua magis accedunt ad primum, nobilius cognitionem participant; sicut homines plus quam bruta et angeli magis homines; unde oportet quod in Deo nobilissima cognitio inveniatur. The third way, which is through eminence, is as follows: what is found in many things more and more insofar as the many approach closer to something, must be found in that one most of all. For example, heat is in fire: to the degree that composite bodies approach closer to it, they are hotter. Now, we find that to the degree that certain things approach closer the First thing, they participate in knowledge in a nobler way; for example, men do so better than beasts, and angels better than men. Whence it must be that in God there is found the noblest knowledge.