Quaestio 1 Question 1 De his quae a Deo cognoscuntur The things that are known by God Circa primum quaeruntur tria: As regards the first, three things are asked: primo utrum Deus cognoscat singularia; first, whether God knows singulars; secundo utrum cognoscat mala; second, whether he knows evil things; tertio qualiter ea quae cognoscit, in ipso esse dicuntur. third, how the things that he knows are said to exist in him. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum Deus cognoscat singularia Whether God knows singulars Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat singularia. To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that God does not know singulars. Dicit enim Boetius, quod universale est dum intelligitur, particulare dum sentitur. Sed in Deo non est potentia sensitiva, cum sit virtus impressa organo corporali, nisi forte metaphorice sumendo. Ergo videtur quod cognitio singularium Deo non conveniat. Obj. 1: For Boethius says that a thing is universal when understood, and particular when sensed. But in God there is no sense power, since this is a power impressed on a bodily organ—unless maybe “sensation” is taken metaphorically. Therefore it seems that the cognition of singulars does not befit God. Praeterea, nihil cognoscitur ab aliquo nisi secundum quod est in cognoscente. Sed particulares effectus non sunt in causis universalibus nisi in potentia. Ergo videtur, cum essentia divina sit universalis causa omnium, in qua omnia cognoscit, quod singularium propriam cognitionem non habeat. Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing is known by someone except insofar as it is in the knower. But the particular effects are not in universal causes except in potency. Therefore it seems that, because the divine essence is the universal cause of all things, wherein he knows all things, therefore he would not have a proper cognition of singulars. Praeterea, omnis cognitio est per assimilationem cognoscentis ad cognitum. Sed singulare non est singulare nisi per materiam. Ergo nulla virtus quae abstrahit a materia et ab omnibus appenditiis ejus, potest cognoscere singulare inquantum est singulare. Sed intellectus divinus est maxime a materia et a conditionibus materialibus separatus. Ergo Deus singularia non cognoscit. Obj. 3: Furthermore, every cognition occurs through the knower becoming like the thing known. But the singular is singular only through matter. Therefore no power that abstracts from matter and from all its accoutrements is able to know the singular as singular. But the divine intellect is separated from matter and material conditions to the greatest degree. Therefore God does not know singulars. Praeterea, sicut dicit Dionysius in 2 cap. De div. nom., eodem modo creaturae participant, quamvis sint diversae, unam Dei bonitatem, sicut plures lineae egrediuntur ab uno centro, et sicut plures figurationes fiunt ab uno sigillo. Sed qui cognoscit centrum non ex hoc cognoscit lineas productas a centro inquantum est haec et illa, sed in communi tantum; et similiter est in alio exemplo inducto. Ergo videtur quod Deus, cognoscendo seipsum, non cognoscat singularia inquantum hujusmodi. Obj. 4: Furthermore, as Dionysius says, although they are diverse things, created things participate in God’s one goodness in the same way, just as several lines go forth from one center, and just as several impressions arise from one seal. But he who knows the center does not from that very fact know the lines extended from the center insofar as they are this and that line, but only in common; and it is likewise in the other example. Therefore it seems that God, by knowing his very self, does not know singulars as such. Contra, ad Hebr. 11:6: credere oportet accedentem ad Deum, quia est, et quod diligentibus se remunerator sit. Sed non potest remunerare opera hominum singularium, nisi cognoscat operantes et ipsorum opera. Ergo oportet credere quod singularia Deus cognoscat. On the contrary, Hebrews 11:6 says, whoever would draw near to God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him. But he cannot reward the actions of individual men unless he knows the actors and their actions. Therefore one must believe that God knows singulars. Praeterea, Deus habet de rebus scientiam practicam, quae est operationis principium. Sed operatio est circa singularia. Ergo videtur quod sua scientia sit etiam singularium. Furthermore, God has a practical knowledge of realities, a knowledge that is the principle of action. But action is concerned with singulars. Therefore it seems that his knowledge is even of singulars. Respondeo dicendum, quod Deus absque dubio omnium, et universalium et singularium, cognitionem habet. Sciendum tamen, quod circa hanc quaestionem diversi diversimode processerunt. I answer that without a doubt God has cognition of all things, both of universals and of singulars. Nevertheless, one should note that about this question diverse thinkers have proceeded in different ways. Commentator enim, in 11 Metaph., videtur expresse negare Deo particularium cognitionem, nisi inquantum cognoscit essentiam suam, quae est principium omnis esse. Sed cum Deus non tantum sit causa esse rerum, sed omnium quae in rebus sunt, oportet ut cognitionem rerum non tantum in eo quod sunt habeat, sed etiam in eo quod sunt talia vel talia. For the Commentator, in Metaphysics 11, seems to have explicitly denied that God has cognition of particulars, except insofar as he knows his own essence, which is the principle of every existence. But since God is not only the cause of the existence of realities, but also of everything that is in these realities, it is necessary that he have cognition of realities not merely in that they exist, but even in that they exist in this way or that way. Et ideo alii dixerunt, scilicet Avicenna, tract. 8 Metaph., cap. 7, et Algazel, apud Aver., lib. Destructionum, et sequaces eorum, quod Deus cognoscit singularia universaliter; quod sic exponunt per exemplum. Si aliquis sciret omnes distantias orbium et planetarum, et tempus motuum ipsorum, ipse praevideret omnem eclipsim quae posset contingere; non tamen sciret hanc eclipsim inquantum est haec eclipsis, nisi per aliquid a sensu acceptum; sed sciret eclipsim quae cras contingeret, universaliter, scilicet secundum suas causas universales. Ita etiam dicunt, quod cum omnes causae reducantur in ipsum Deum sicut in causam, ipse cognoscendo se, cognoscit omnes causas secundas; et cognoscendo causas illas, cognoscit omne quod est effectum ex illis causis, non tamen nisi universaliter. Et ideo dicunt, quod Deus non cognoscit particularia nisi universaliter, ita ut, secundum eos, determinatio accipiatur ex parte cogniti, et non solum ex parte cognoscentis; quia si solum ex parte cognoscentis illa determinatio acciperetur, verum indubitanter esset quod Deus particularia non particulari scientia cognoscit, ut supra probatum est. And therefore others, namely, Avicenna and Algazel, and their followers, have said that God knows singulars universally, and this they explain through an example. If someone were to know all the distant spheres and planets, and the time of their motions, he would foreknow every eclipse that could occur; yet he would not know this eclipse insofar as it is this eclipse, unless something be received from the senses. Rather, he would know the eclipse that would occur tomorrow in a universal way, that is, according to its universal causes. So too, they say, since all causes are traced back to God himself as to their cause, he just by knowing himself knows all the secondary causes, and by knowing those causes knows their every effect, yet only universally. And therefore they say that God does not know particulars except universally, such that, according to them, their determination would be received on the side of the things known, and not only on the side of the knower. For if that determination were received only on the side of the knower, it would undoubtedly be true that God knows particulars not with particular knowledge, as was proved above. Cognoscit tamen particularia secundum particularitatem ipsorum. Unde dictum illud etiam est insufficiens. Cognoscere enim hoc modo singulare in universali, non est cognoscere propriam naturam hujus singularis vel illius; eo quod quocumque modo universalia aggregentur, nunquam ex eis fiet singulare, nisi per hoc quod individuantur per materiam. Et ideo ex hac etiam via sequeretur quod Deus non perfectam cognitionem de singularibus haberet. Universales enim causae non ducunt in cognitionem particularium, nisi secundum quod particularia participant naturam communem; et sic ex causis universalibus non sciretur de particulari nisi quod habet talem vel talem naturam communem, vel accidentaliter vel substantialiter. Nevertheless, he does know particulars according to their particularity, so that statement is also insufficient. For to know the singular in this way in the universal is not to know the proper nature of this or that singular; this is because in whatever way universals are gathered together, the singular never comes to be from them except through their being individuated by matter. And therefore even from this path it would follow that God would not have a perfect cognition about singulars. For universal causes do not lead to the cognition of particulars except insofar as the particulars participate in a common nature; and thus, from the universal causes one would not know of the particular anything but that it has such or such common nature, whether incidentally or substantially. Ideo alii dixerunt, sicut Rabbi Moyses, lib. 3 sui Directorii, cap. 17, quod Deus scit perfectissime singularia; et omnes rationes, quae in contrarium inducuntur, solvit per hoc quod dicit, scientiam Dei esse aequivocam scientiae nostrae; unde per conditiones scientiae nostrae non possumus aliquid de scientia Dei arguere: sicut enim esse Dei non comprehenditur a nobis, ita nec sua scientia. Hoc confirmat per id quod habetur per Isa. 55: sicut exaltati sunt caeli a terra, sic exaltatae sunt viae meae a viis vestris. Therefore others, like Rabbi Moses, have said that God knows singulars most perfectly, and all the arguments brought in to the contrary he resolves by saying this: God’s knowledge is an equivocal cause of our knowledge, so we cannot argue to anything about God’s knowledge from the conditions of our knowledge; for just as God’s existence is incomprehensible to us, so is his knowledge. He confirms this through what is said in Isaiah 55:9: as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts. Sed istud, quamvis sit verum, tamen oportet aliquid plus dicere: videlicet, quod quamvis scientia Dei sit alterius modi a scientia nostra, tamen per scientiam nostram aliqualiter devenimus in scientiam Dei; et sic scientia nostra non est penitus aequivoca scientiae Dei, sed potius analogica, ut dictum est. Et ideo oportet dicere secundum quid scientia nostra imitatur scientiam Dei, et in quo deficit et quare; et ita rationes dissolvere. But although this is true, one must still say something more: namely, that although God’s knowledge is of a different mode from our knowledge, nonetheless we do in a certain way come to God’s knowledge through our knowledge, and in this way our knowledge is not wholly equivocal with God’s knowledge, but rather is analogous with it, as was said in the previous distinction. Therefore one must say in what respect our knowledge imitates God’s knowledge, in what way it falls short, and why it does so; and in this way one must refute the arguments. Unde procedendum est per viam quam docet Dionysius, 7 cap. De div. nomin. Dicit enim, quod cum Deus cognoscit res per essentiam suam quae est causa rerum, eodem modo cognoscit res quo modo esse rebus tradidit; unde si aliquid est in rebus non cognitum ab ipso, oportet quod circa illud vacet divina operatio, id est quod non sit operatum ab ipso; et ex hoc accidit difficultas philosophis propter duo: primo, quia quidam ipsorum non ponebant Deum operari immediate in rebus omnibus, sed ab ipso esse primas res, quibus mediantibus ab eo aliae producuntur; et ideo non poterant invenire qualiter cognosceret res quae sunt hic, nisi in primis causis universalibus: secundo, quia quidam eorum non ponebant materiam esse factam, sed Deum agere tantum inducendo formam. Et ideo cum materia sit principium individuationis, non poterat inveniri apud eos, quomodo Deus singularia, inquantum hujusmodi, cognoscat. Whence one should proceed along the path that Dionysius teaches. For he says that, because God knows realities through his own essence, which is their cause, he knows the realities in the same way that he gives them existence. Whence if there be something among realities that is not known by him, the divine activity would have to be empty as regards it—that is, it would not be brought about by him. And from this a difficulty befalls the philosophers, from two sources. The first is due to the fact that some of them did not assert that God acts immediately in all realities, but that the first realities are from him, and by their mediation other things are produced by him. And this is why they were not able to discover how he would know the realities that are here, except in their universal causes. The second is due to the fact that some of them did not assert that matter came to be, but assert rather that God acts only by inducing form. And therefore, since matter is the principle of individuation, one could not find among them a way that God might know singulars as such. Sed quia nos ponimus Deum immediate operantem in rebus omnibus, et ab ipso esse non solum principia formalia, sed etiam materiam rei; ideo per essentiam suam, sicut per causam, totum quod est in re cognoscit, et formalia et materialia; unde non tantum cognoscit res secundum naturas universales, sed secundum quod sunt individuatae per materiam; sicut aedificator si per formam artis conceptam posset producere totam domum, quantum ad materiam et formam, per formam artis quam habet apud se, cognosceret domum hanc et illam: sed quia per artem suam non inducit nisi formam, ideo ars sua est solum similitudo formae domus; unde non potest per eam cognoscere hanc domum vel illam, nisi per aliquid acceptum a sensu. But because we do assert that God is immediately active in all realities, and not only formal principles are from him but so is a thing’s matter, therefore through his own essence as through their cause he knows all that is in the reality, both the formal and the material elements. This is why he knows realities not only according to their universal natures, but even insofar as they are individuated through matter. This is just as a builder, if through the conceived form of the art he could produce the entire house—both as regards its matter and its form—he would know this and that house through the artform that he holds within himself. But because through his art he in fact induces only the form, his art is only a likeness of the form of the house, so through the art he cannot know this or that house, except through something received from sensation. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, forma per quam intellectus divinus intelligit, neque est universalis, quia additiones non recipit, neque singularis, quia a materia et a dispositionibus ejus immunis est; sed tamen est principium et similitudo perfecta totius quod in re est, et materiae et formae, ut dictum est. Et ideo hoc quod dicitur, quod universale est dum intelligitur, particulare dum sentitur, referendum est ad cognitionem nostram, quae in sensu est per formam materialem, et in intellectu per formam universalem; et ideo particularia non cognoscimus nisi per virtutem in qua est aliquid particulariter; sed Deus particularia cognoscit neque universaliter neque particulariter ex parte cognoscentis, sed universaliter et particulariter ex parte rei cognitae. Reply Obj. 1: As is clear from the things said, the form through which the divine intellect understands is neither universal, since it does not admit of additions, nor singular, since it is unmarked by matter and its dispositions. But nonetheless it is the principle and perfect likeness of the whole that is in a reality, both of matter and of form, as was said. And therefore the statement—that what is universal when understood is particular when sensed—should be referred only to our knowledge, which is in the senses through a material form, and in the intellect through a universal form. And this is why we do not know particulars except through a power in which something exists as a particular, but God knows particulars neither universally nor as particulars, on the side of the knower, but he does know them universally and as particulars on the side of the reality that is known. Ad secundum dicendum, quod in causis universalibus quae non sunt tota causa rei non potest particulare perfecte sciri. Sed Deus est causa omnium universalis, ita quod est perfecta causa uniuscujusque; et ideo, se cognoscens, omnia perfecte cognoscit. Reply Obj. 2: In universal causes that are not the entire cause of the reality, the particular cannot be known perfectly. But God is the universal cause of all things such that he is the perfect cause of each and every thing. And therefore by knowing himself, he knows all things perfectly. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis in Deo non sit aliquid materiale, sed essentia ejus sit actus tantum, tamen ille actus est causa omnium quae sunt in re et materialium et formalium; quem actum imitatur quantum potest omnis res et quidquid in re est; et ideo essentia divina est similitudo non tantum formalium, sed etiam materialium rei; et ideo per ipsam possunt cognosci singularia etiam inquantum hujusmodi. Reply Obj. 3: Although in God there is nothing material, but his essence is only act, nonetheless that act is the cause of all things that are in reality, both of material and formal elements. Every reality and whatever is in reality imitates this act, as much as it can. And therefore the divine essence is the likeness not only of a reality’s formal elements but even of its material ones. And therefore through it, singulars, even as such, can be known. Ad quartum dicendum, quod omnia exempla quae adducuntur a creaturis in Deum, deficientia sunt, ut idem Dionysius dicit, De divin. nomin., cap. 2: non enim invenitur in creaturis aliqua causa communis quae sit causa totius quod in re est; sicut sigillum est causa figurae in cera et non ipsius cerae; et ideo per cognitionem sigilli non potest cognosci figura impressa inquantum est haec vel illa, quia hoc habet ex materia. Reply Obj. 4: All the examples that are applied from created things to God fall short, as Dionysius says in the same place. For one does not find in created things any common cause that is the cause of all that is in a reality. For example, the seal is the cause of the shape in the wax, and not of the wax itself; and therefore through a knowledge of the seal one cannot know the impressed shape as this or that one, since it has this from matter. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum Deus cognoscat mala Whether God knows evils Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat mala. To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that God does not know evils. Sicut enim dicit Commentator in 3 De anima, si aliquis intellectus sit semper in actu, non cognoscit privationem omnino. Sed intellectus divinus semper est in actu. Cum igitur malum sit privatio, ut Augustinus dicit in Enchir., cap. 11, videtur quod Deus non cognoscat malum. Obj. 1: For as the Commentator says, if any intellect is always in act, it does not know privation in a complete way. But the divine intellect is always in act. Therefore, since evil is a privation, as Augustine says, it seems that God does not know evil. Praeterea, omnis scientia vel est causa scitorum, vel causata ab eis. Sed Dei scientia causata non est. Cum ergo malorum causa non sit, videtur quod Deus mala nesciat. Obj. 2: Furthermore, all knowledge is either the cause of the things known, or it is caused by them. But God’s knowledge is not caused. Therefore, since he is not the cause of evils, it seems that God does not know evils. Praeterea, scientia est assimilatio scientis ad rem scitam. Cum igitur malum inquantum hujusmodi non assimiletur Deo, immo ipse recessus a similitudine est malum; videtur quod Deus malum non cognoscat. Obj. 3: Furthermore, knowledge is the knower’s becoming like the reality known. Therefore, since what is evil as such would not become like God—indeed, evil is the very withdrawal from such likeness—it seems that God does not know what is evil. Si dicas, quod cognoscit malum per bonum; Obj. 4: You might say that God knows evil through good. contra. Cognoscere aliquid non per se sed per aliud est imperfectae cognitionis. Nihil autem imperfectum Deo est attribuendum. Ergo Deus non cognoscit mala per bona. On the contrary, to know something not through itself but through another belongs to imperfect cognition. Now, nothing imperfect should be attributed to God. Therefore God does not know evil things through good ones. Sed contra est quod in Psal. 68:6, dicitur: Deus, tu scis insipientiam meam, et delicta mea a te non sunt abscondita. On the contrary, it says in the Psalms: O God, thou knowest my folly; the wrongs I have done are not hidden from thee (Ps 69:5 [68:6]).