Quaestio 2 Question 2 De ideis per quas res cognoscit The ideas through which God knows realities Deinde quaeritur de ideis; et circa hoc tria quaeruntur. Next, one asks about the ideas; and three things are asked about them: Et primo an ideae sint; first, whether ideas exist; secundo de pluralitate idearum; second, how many ideas there are; tertio utrum ideae omnium in Deo sint. third, whether the ideas of all things are in God. Articulus 1 Article 1 Quid nomine ideae importetur What the name of “idea” implies Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur ideas non esse. To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that ideas do not exist. Sicut enim dicit Philosophus in 1 Metaph.: dicere ideas exemplaria esse vaniloquium est, et poeticas metaphoras dicere. Sed ideas exemplaria rerum dicimus. Ergo vanum est ideas dicere. Obj. 1: For the Philosopher says, to speak of exemplary ideas is empty talk, and to speak poetic metaphors. But we are calling the exemplars of realities “ideas.” Therefore it is empty to speak of ideas. Praeterea, perfectius est agens quod non eget in sua actione ad exemplar respicere, quam quod exemplari indiget. Sed Deus est perfectissimum agens. Ergo non est sibi opus ideis, ad quarum exemplar faciat res; unde ibidem Philosophus subdit: nam quid est opus ad ideas respicere? Obj. 2: Furthermore, an agent that does not need to look to an exemplar in its own action is more perfect than one that does require an exemplar. But God is the most perfect agent. Therefore for him there is no need for ideas as an exemplar according to which he might make realities; whence the Philosopher adds, in the same passage, for what need is there to look to ideas? Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, melius scitur res per essentiam suam quam per similitudinem suam. Sed Deus nobilissime cognoscit res. Ergo scit eas per essentias earum, et non per aliquas similitudines ideales rerum. Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Augustine, a reality is known better through its own essence than through its likeness. But God knows realities in the most noble way. Therefore he knows them through their essences, and not through any ideal likenesses of the realities. Praeterea, omnis cognitio quae est per medium, videtur esse collativa, et discursum habere de uno in aliud. Sed Deus cognoscit simplici intuitu sine discursu et collatione. Ergo videtur quod non cognoscat res mediantibus ideis. Obj. 4: Furthermore, every cognition that occurs through a medium seems to involve a synthesis, and to have a discourse or running-across from one thing to another. But God knows by a simple look, without discourse or synthesis. Therefore it seems that he does not know realities by mediating ideas. Contra est quod dicit Augustinus, lib. 83 quaestion.: qui negat ideas esse, negat Filium esse. Sed hoc est haereticum. Ergo et primum. On the contrary, Augustine says, he who denies there are ideas, denies there is a Son. But the latter is heretical. Therefore so is the first. Praeterea, Commentator dicit in 11 Metaph., quod sicut omnes formae sunt in potentia in prima materia, ita sunt in actu in primo motore. Sed nihil aliud dicimus ideas, nisi formas rerum in Deo existentes. Ergo verum est ideas esse. Furthermore, the Commentator says that, just as all forms are in potency within first matter, so too they are in act within the first mover. But we call “ideas” nothing but the forms of realities existing within God. Therefore it is true that there are ideas. Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut formae artificiales habent duplex esse, unum in actu secundum quod sunt in materia, aliud in potentia secundum quod sunt in mente artificis, non quidem in potentia passiva, sed activa; ita etiam formae materiales habent duplex esse, ut dicit Commentator in 11 Metaph.: unum in actu secundum quod in rebus sunt; et aliud in potentia activa secundum quod sunt in motoribus orbium, ut ipse ponit, et praecipue in primo motore, loco cujus nos in Deo dicimus. Unde apud omnes philosophos communiter dicitur quod omnia sunt in mente Dei, sicut artificiata in mente artificis; et ideo formas rerum in Deo existentes ideas dicimus, quae sunt sicut formae operativae. Unde dicit Dionysius, loquens de ideis, in 5 cap. De div. nom.: exemplaria dicimus substantificas rationes existentium in Deo uniformiter praeexistentes, quas theologia praedefinitiones vocat, et divinas et bonas voluntates existentium praedeterminativas et productivas. I answer that artificial forms have two existences: one in act, insofar as they exist in matter, the other in potency, insofar as they exist in the mind of the artisan—not, of course, in a passive potency, but an active one. And in the same way, material forms as well have two existences, as the Commentator says: one in act, insofar as they exist in the realities, and the other in an active potency, insofar as they exist in the movers of the heavenly spheres, as he asserts it, and especially in the first mover—in place of which we ourselves say these forms are in God. Whence, among all the philosophers it is commonly said that all things are in the mind of God just as works of art are in the mind of the artisan. And therefore we call the forms of realities existing in God the “ideas,” which are operative forms. Whence Dionysius, when speaking about the ideas, says, we call the substantifying accounts of things existing in God, themselves preexisting in a uniform way, ‘ideas,’ which theology calls ‘primordial definitions’; and they are the predetermining and productive divine and good volitions for existing things. Per ideas tamen Deus non tantum practicam sed speculativam cognitionem de rebus habet, cum non solum cognoscat res secundum hoc quod ab ipso exeunt, sed etiam secundum quod in propria natura subsistunt. Idea enim dicitur ab eidos, quod est forma; unde nomen ideae, quantum ad proprietatem nominis, aequaliter se habet ad practicam et speculativam cognitionem; forma enim rei in intellectu existens, utriusque cognitionis principium est. Quamvis enim secundum usum loquentium idea sumatur pro forma quae est principium practicae cognitionis, secundum quod ideas exemplares rerum formas nominamus; tamen etiam principium speculativae cognitionis est, secundum quod ideas contemplantes formas rerum nominamus. Nevertheless through these ideas God has not merely a practical cognition of realities, but even a speculative cognition. For he knows realities not merely insofar as they go forth from him, but even insofar as they subsist in their own proper nature. For “idea” is said from eidos, which is form, so the name “idea,” as regards what is proper to the name, equally relates to practical and speculative knowledge. For a reality’s form existing in the intellect is the principle of both cognitions. For even though, according to common usage, “idea” is taken for a form that is the principle of practical cognition, insofar as we name the exemplary forms of realities their “ideas,” nonetheless such is also the principle of speculative cognition, insofar as we also name the forms of realities we contemplate “ideas.” Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Commentator in 11 Metaph., Plato et alii antiqui philosophi, quasi ab ipsa veritate coacti, tendebant in illud quod postmodum Aristoteles expressit, quamvis non pervenerint in ipsum: et ideo Plato, ponens ideas, ad hoc tendebat, secundum quod et Aristoteles posuit, scilicet eas esse in intellectu divino; unde hoc improbare Philosophus non intendit; sed modum quo Plato posuit formas naturales per se existentes sine materia esse. Reply Obj. 1: As the Commentator says, Plato and other ancient philosophers, as though coerced by the truth itself, stretched toward what Aristotle later said explicitly, even though they did not thoroughly reach it. And therefore Plato, asserting that there are ideas, stretched toward what Aristotle also asserted, namely, that they exist in the divine intellect. Whence the Philosopher does not intend to disprove this, but rather the mode in which Plato asserted natural forms exist through themselves without matter. Ad secundum dicendum, quod si Deus indigeret respicere in aliquod exemplar extra se, esset imperfectum agens; sed hoc non contingit, si essentia sua exemplar omnium rerum ponatur: quia, sic intuendo essentiam suam, omnia producit. Reply Obj. 2: If God were to need to look to some exemplar outside himself, he would be an imperfect agent. But this does not happen if his own essence be asserted to be the exemplar of all realities. For by thus looking upon his own essence, he produces all things. Ad tertium dicendum, quod oportet illud per quod est cognitio rei, esse unitum cognoscenti; unde essentia rerum creatarum, cum sit separata a Deo, non potest esse medium cognoscendi ipsas res a Deo, sed cognoscit eas nobiliori medio, scilicet per essentiam suam; et ideo perfectius cognoscit et nobiliori modo; quia sic nihil nisi essentia ejus est principium suae cognitionis. Oporteret enim quod esset aliud, si per essentiam rerum quasi per medium cognosceret res, cum medium cognoscendi sit cognitionis principium. Reply Obj. 3: That through which one has knowledge of a reality must be united to the knower. Whence the essence of created realities, since it is separate from God, cannot be the medium of the very realities becoming known by God. Rather, he knows them by a nobler medium, that is, through his own essence. And therefore he knows them more perfectly and in a nobler mode; for nothing but his essence is the principle of his knowledge. For it would be necessary that there be something else, if he were to know realities through the realities’ essence as through a medium; for the medium of knowing is the principle of the knowledge. Ad quartum dicendum, quod cognitio discursiva est quando ex prius notis in ignotum devenitur, et non quando per similitudinem rei apprehenditur res ipsa: quia sic etiam oculus, videns lapidem, haberet cognitionem collativam de ipso: et ideo quamvis Deus sciat res per similitudinem quae in ipso est, sicut per medium, et quamvis cognoscat etiam ordinem rerum, non tamen habet discursivam scientiam, quia omnia simul intuetur. Reply Obj. 4: Discursive knowledge is when one reaches the unknown based on certain things known beforehand, and not when the reality itself is apprehended through the reality’s likeness. For in this way, the eye, when it sees a stone, would have a constructive knowledge of it. And therefore, although God knows realities through a likeness that is in him as through a medium, and even though he knows even the order of realities, nonetheless he does not have discursive knowledge, since he beholds all things simultaneously. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum ideae sint plures Whether there are several ideas Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint plures ideae. To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that there are not several ideas. Idea enim dicitur similitudo per quam cognoscitur res. Sed, sicut supra habitum est, Deus cognoscit omnia per essentiam suam. Cum igitur essentia sua sit una, videtur quod idea sit tantum una. Obj. 1: For an idea is said to be a likeness through which a reality is known. But earlier it was said that God knows all things through his own essence. Therefore, since his essence is one, it seems that there is only one idea. Si dicas, quod sunt plures respectus ad res; Obj. 2: You might say that there are several references to realities. contra. Relationes quae sunt Dei ad creaturam, sunt realiter in creaturis, et non in Deo. Creaturae autem non fuerunt ab aeterno: ergo nec relationes Dei ad creaturam. Ergo ideae non fuerunt plures ab aeterno. Sed Deus non alio modo cognoscit res factas quam antequam faceret, ut habitum est ex verbis Augustini, lib. 5 Super Gen. ad litt., cap. 15. Ergo modo non cognoscit res per plures ideas, sed per unam tantum. On the contrary, God’s relations to what is created are really in the created things, and not in God. Now, created things have not existed from eternity, so neither have God’s relations to the created. Therefore there have not been several ideas from eternity. But God does not know things that have been made in any way other than how he makes them, as is clear from the words of Augustine. Therefore he does not now know things through several ideas, but only through one. Praeterea, ut dictum est, idea se habet ad rem cujus est, sicut forma artis, quae est in mente artificis, ad artificiatum. Sed diversitas artificiatorum provenit ex pluralitate formarum quae sunt in mente artificis, et non e contrario. Ergo videtur quod nec diversitas rerum possit inducere pluralitatem idearum. Obj. 3: Furthermore, as has been said, an idea stands to its reality as the form of the art in the artisan’s mind stands to the artwork. But a diversity of works of art arises from the plurality of the forms that are in an artisan’s mind, and not vice versa. Therefore it seems that neither can a diversity of realities bring about a plurality of ideas. Praeterea, sicut idea dicitur relative ad ideatum, ita et scientia dicitur per respectum ad scibile. Sed quamvis sint plura scita a Deo, tamen est una tantum scientia. Ergo rerum omnium quae ab ipso producuntur, est una tantum idea. Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as “idea” is said in relation to what it is an idea of, so too “knowledge” is said in reference to the knowable. But even though God knows many things, still it is only one knowledge. Therefore there is only one idea of all the realities that he produces. Sed contra, illud in quo non est pluralitas aliqua, non potest pluraliter consignificari. Sed Augustinus, lib. 83 quaestion., quaest. 46, pluraliter ideas nominat, dicens, quod ideae sunt rationes rerum stabiles, in mente divina existentes; et cum ipsae nec oriantur nec intereant, secundum eas tamen fit omne quod interit et oritur. Ergo ideae sunt plures. On the contrary, that in which there is no plurality cannot be consignified in the plural. But Augustine names “ideas” in the plural, saying that ideas are the stable accounts of realities existing in the divine mind; and although they themselves neither arise nor depart, still with reference to them everything that departs or arises comes to be. Therefore there are several ideas. Praeterea, secundum Damascenum, lib. 3 Fid. orth., cap. 8, differentia est causa numeri. Sed, secundum Augustinum, lib. 83 quaestion., loc. cit., Deus alia ratione creavit hominem et equum. Ergo videtur quod sint plures rationes ideales rerum in Deo. Furthermore, according to Damascene, difference is the cause of number. But according to Augustine, God has created man and horse by different accounts. Therefore it seems that in God there are several ideal accounts of realities. Respondeo dicendum, quod cum Deus de singulis rebus propriam cognitionem habeat, oportet quod essentia sua sit similitudo singularium rerum, secundum quod diversae res diversimode et particulariter ipsam imitantur secundum suam capacitatem, quamvis ipsa se totam imitabilem praebeat; sed quod perfecte non imitantur eam creaturae, sed difformiter, hoc est ex earum diversitate et defectu, ut dicit Dionysius, in 2 cap. De divin. nom. Unde cum hoc nomen “idea” nominet essentiam divinam secundum quod est exemplar imitatum a creatura, divina essentia erit propria idea istius rei secundum determinatum imitationis modum. I answer that, since God has a proper knowledge of the singular realities, his essence must be a likeness of the singular realities, insofar as diverse realities in diverse and particular ways imitate it according to their own capacity, even though it offers its entire self as able to be imitated. But the fact that created things do not perfectly imitate it, but do so in a non-uniform way, is due to their diversity and deficiency, as Dionysius says. Whence, because the name “idea” names the divine essence insofar as it is the exemplar imitated by the created thing, the divine essence will be the proper idea of that reality according to a determinate mode of imitation. Et quia alio modo imitantur eam diversae creaturae, ideo dicitur quod est alia idea vel ratio qua creatur homo et equus; et exinde sequitur quod secundum respectum ad plures res quae divinam essentiam diversimode imitantur, sit pluralitas in ideis, quamvis essentia imitata sit una: verbi gratia, sicut ex praedictis patet, quidquid perfectionis in rebus est, hoc totum Deo secundum unum et idem indivisibile convenit, scilicet esse, vivere et intelligere, et omnia hujusmodi. And because diverse created things imitate it in diverse ways, this is why it is said that the idea or account by which man is created is different from the idea by which horse is created. And from this it follows that, according to the reference to many realities that imitate the divine essence in diverse ways, there is a plurality in the ideas, even though the essence being imitated is one. For example, as is clear from things said earlier, whatever there is of perfection in realities—such as to be, to live, to understand, and all such—belong as a whole to God according to one and the same indivisible account. Cum autem omnes creaturae imitentur ipsam essentiam quantum ad esse, non tamen omnes quantum ad vivere: nec iterum illa quae imitantur ipsam quantum ad esse, eodem modo esse participant, cum quaedam aliis nobilius esse possideant: et ex hoc efficitur alius respectus essentiae divinae ad ea quae habent tantum esse et ad ea quae habent esse et vivere, et similiter ad ea quae diversimode esse habent: et ex hoc sunt plures rationes ideales, secundum quod Deus intelligit essentiam suam ut imitabilem per hunc vel per illum modum. Ipsae enim rationes imitationis intellectae, seu modi, sunt ideae; idea enim, ut ex dictis patet, nominat formam ut intellectam, et non prout est in natura intelligentis. However, all created things, as regards existence, imitate the divine essence itself, whereas not all things do so as regards living, nor again, do those that imitate it as regards existence participate in existence in the same way, since some possess a nobler existence than do others. And from this it is brought about that the divine essence has a different reference to things that have only existence than to those that have existence and life, and likewise to things that have diverse modes of existence. And due to that, there are several ideal accounts, insofar as God understands his own essence as capable of imitation through this mode or that one. For the understood accounts or modes of imitation are the ideas, for “idea,” as is clear from things said in the previous article, names the form as understood, and not insofar as it is within the nature of the one who understands it. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod idea non nominat tantum essentiam, sed essentiam imitabilem; unde secundum quod est multiplex imitabilitas in essentia divina, propter plenitudinem suae perfectionis, est pluralitas idearum. Reply Obj. 1: “Idea” names not merely the essence, but the essence as capable of imitation. Whence insofar as there is a manifold capacity for imitation in the divine essence, on account of the fullness of its perfection, there is a plurality of ideas. Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis relationes quae sunt Dei ad creaturam, realiter in creatura fundentur, tamen secundum rationem et intellectum in Deo etiam sunt; intellectum autem dico non tantum humanum, sed etiam angelicum et divinum; et ideo quamvis creaturae ab aeterno non fuerint, tamen intellectus divinus ab aeterno fuit intelligens essentiam suam diversimode a creaturis imitabilem; et propter hoc fuit ab aeterno pluralitas idearum in intellectu divino, non in natura ipsius. Non enim eodem modo est in Deo forma equi et vita; quia forma equi non est in Deo nisi sicut ratio intellecta; sed ratio vitae in Deo est non tantum sicut intellecta, sed etiam sicut in natura rei firmata. Reply Obj. 2: Although God’s relations to the created are really founded in the created thing, still they are in God as well, according to account and intellect. However, I am speaking not only about the human intellect, but also the angelic and divine. And therefore even though created things did not exist from eternity, still the divine intellect was from eternity understanding his own essence as capable of imitation in diverse ways by created things. And on account of this, there was a plurality of ideas in the divine intellect from eternity, and not in his very nature. For the form and life of a horse are not in God in the same way: for the form of a horse is in God only as an understood account, whereas the account of life is in God not only as something understood, but also as established in the nature of his reality.