Distinctio 37 Distinction 37 Quomodo Deus sit in rebus How God is in realities Divisio primae partis textus Division of the first part of the text Ostenso quomodo res sint in Deo, hic ex incidenti ostendit quomodo Deus sit in rebus; et dividitur in partes duas: in prima ostendit Deum esse ubique et in omnibus rebus; in secunda parte removet a Deo quaedam quae creaturas in loco existentes consequuntur, ibi: cumque natura divina veraciter et essentialiter sit in omni loco et in omni tempore, non tamen movetur per loca vel per tempora. Having manifested the realities that are within God, here he manifests how God is within the realities. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows that God is everywhere and in all realities; in the second, he removes from God certain things that follow for created things that exist in place, at and although the divine nature is truly and essentially in every place and in every time, yet it is not moved through places or times. Prima in duas: in prima ponit modos quibus Deus in rebus esse dicitur; in secunda inquirit rationes illorum modorum, ibi: quomodo autem Deus habitet in nobis, ex illis aliquatenus intelligere valebis quae supra dicta sunt. The first is divided into two parts: in the first, he asserts the modes in which God is said to be in realities; in the second, he inquires into the accounts of those modes, at as to how God dwells in us, you will be able to understand it somewhat from what was said above. Circa primum duo facit: primo enumerat modos; secundo auctoritatibus confirmat, ibi: ne autem ista . . . falsitatis arguere aliqui praesumant; sanctorum auctoritatibus munienda mihi videntur. As regards the first, he does two things: first, he enumerates the modes; second, he confirms them by authorities, at lest some presume to accuse these statements of falsehood . . . they seem to me to require the support of the authorities of the Saints. Et primo confirmat modum quo est communiter in omnibus creaturis; secundo, modum quo specialiter est in sanctis, ibi: in sanctis vero etiam habitat. Modus autem quo specialissime est in homine Christo, pertinet ad tertium librum; et ideo eum praetermittit. And first he confirms the mode by which he is commonly in all created things; second, he confirms the mode by which he is specifically in the saints, at but in the saints, in whom he is by grace, he also dwells. However, the mode wherein he is most specifically in Christ the man pertains to Book III; therefore he sets it aside here. Quomodo autem Deus habitet in bonis, ex illis aliquatenus intelligere valebis quae supra dicta sunt. Hic ostendit rationes dictorum modorum: et primo quantum ad modum quo specialiter in sanctis est; secundo quantum ad modum communem quo est in omnibus creaturis, ibi: ex praedictis patet quod Deus ubique totus est per essentiam. As to how God dwells in us, you will be able to understand it somewhat from what was said above. Here he manifests the accounts of the stated modes. First, he does so for the mode by which he is specifically in the saints; second, he does so for the common mode by which he is in all created things, at from what is said above, it is manifest that God is everywhere in his entirety through essence. Et circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit veritatem; secundo excludit quasdam dubitationes, ibi: si autem quaeris, ubi habitabat Deus antequam sancti essent, dicimus quia in se habitabat. Et sunt tres per ordinem inductae, ut patet in littera. And as regards the first, he does two things: first, he manifests its truth; second, he excludes certain doubts, at if you ask where God dwelled before there were saints, we say that he dwelled in himself. And there are three doubts, presented in order, as is clear in the text. Ex praedictis patet quod Deus ubique totus est per essentiam, et in sanctis habitat per gratiam. Hic inquirit rationem quantum ad modum communem; et circa hoc tria facit: primo ostendit modi illius incomprehensibilitatem; secundo redarguit quorumdam insufficientem assignationem, ibi: quidam tamen immensa ingenio suo metiri praesumentes, hoc ita forte intelligendum tradiderunt; tertio excludit erroneam quaestionem, ibi: solet etiam ab eisdem quaeri, quomodo Deus substantialiter insit omnibus rebus. From what is said above, it is manifest that God is everywhere in his entirety through essence, and he dwells in the saints through grace. Here he inquires about the account as regards the common mode. And about this he does three things: first, he manifests the incomprehensibility of that mode; second, he refutes the insufficient account some give, at but some people, presuming to measure immensity by their own intellect, have taught that the following is to be understood; third, he excludes an erroneous question, at it is also usual for them to ask how God can be substantially present in all things. Ubi duo facit: primo includit objectionem; secundo destruit positionem, ibi: postremo respondeant quid potius de Deo respondendum existiment. In this last, he does two things: first, he includes the objection; second, he destroys the position, at finally, let them answer what they would rather assert about God. Hic est duplex quaestio: Here there are two questions: Primo quomodo Deus in omnibus sit; first, about how God is in all realities; Secundo quomodo ubique sit. second, about how he is everywhere. Quaestio 1 Question 1 Quomodo Deus in omnibus rebus sit How God is in all things Circa primum quaeruntur duo: As regards the first, two things are asked: primo utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus; first, whether God is in all realities; secundo de diversitate modorum quibus in rebus esse dicitur. second about the diversity of the modes by which he is said to be “in realities.” Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum Deus sit in rebus Whether God is in realities Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus in rebus non sit. To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that God is not in realities. Inter causas enim illae solae rei intrinsecae sunt quae partes ejus sunt, ut materia et forma; non autem agens et finis. Sed Deus non est causa rerum ut veniens in constitutionem ipsarum; quia regit omnes res, praeterquam commisceatur cum eis, ut dicitur lib. De causis. Ergo Deus in rebus creatis non est. Obj. 1: For among causes, only those that are parts of the reality, like matter and form, are internal to it—but not the agent and the end. Now, God is not a cause of realities as entering into their constitution; for he rules all realities without being mixed with them, as is said in the Book of Causes. Therefore God is not in created realities. Praeterea, nobilius agens est hoc quod potest producere effectum in absentia sua, quam quod non potest hoc facere nisi per suam praesentiam. Deus autem est nobilissimum agens. Cum igitur inveniantur quaedam agentia et secundum voluntatem, et secundum naturam, quae in absentia sui producunt effectus; sicut sol in caelo existens, efficit calorem in terra per emissionem virtutis suae, et rex aliquis per imperium suum multa efficit ubi ipse non est praesens; videtur quod multo fortius Deus in absentia sui possit effectum producere; et ita non oportet quod sit in rebus quas condidit. Obj. 2: Furthermore, an agent that can bring forth an effect even when it is absent is nobler than one that can do this only through its presence. But God is the noblest agent. Now, some agents are found to act, both according to will and according to nature, that bring forth their effects even when absent—for example, the sun, while in the heavens, brings forth heat on earth through the emission of its own power, and a king, through his command, brings about many things where he himself is not present. Therefore it seems that much more so can God bring forth his effects when absent, so he need not be in the realities that he establishes. Praeterea, quanto aliquod agens nobilius est, tanto nobiliorem effectum producere potest. Sed perfectius est quod potest per se conservari in esse absente sua causa quam quod non potest, sicut figura perfectius est in cera in qua manet etiam sigillo amoto, quam in aqua ubi non manet in absentia imprimentis. Cum igitur Deus sit perfectissimus agens, videtur quod rebus quas condidit, contulerit hoc ut etiam in absentia suae causae conservari possint in esse; et ita ad conservationem rerum non exigitur quod Deus in rebus sit. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the nobler an agent is, so much nobler an effect it can bring forth. But what is able through itself to be conserved in existence while its cause is absent is more perfect than what is incapable of this; for example, the shape in wax that remains even when the seal is removed is more perfect than is one in water, where it does not remain in the absence of what impresses itself upon it. Therefore, since God is the most perfect agent, it seems that he would have conferred on the realities that he created also the ability to be conserved in existence even in the absence of their cause. And thus, it is not required that, for the conservation of the realities, God also be in the realities. Praeterea, impossibile est quod duo agentia immediate operentur eamdem rem, ita quod utrumque illorum perfecte operetur; quia ad unum operatum terminatur una operatio, quae exit ab uno operante. Sed singulae res habent operationes proprias, ut dicit Damascenus, 2 De fid. orth., cap. 10, quibus suos effectus peragunt. Ergo videtur quod Deus non immediate sit operans quidquid in rebus efficitur; et ita videtur quod non in omnibus rebus sit. Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is impossible that two agents immediately accomplish the same reality, such that each of them accomplishes it perfectly; for one action that goes out from one agent is terminated at one thing being accomplished. But individual realities have their own proper actions, as Damascene says, by means of which they bring about their effects. Therefore it seems that God does not immediately effect whatever is brought about in realities, and thus it seems that he is not in all realities. Praeterea, daemones res quaedam sunt. Sed absurdissime dicitur Deus in daemonibus esse. Ergo Deus non est in omnibus rebus. Obj. 5: Furthermore, some realities are demons. But it is most absurd to say that God is in the demons. Therefore God is not in all realities. Sed contra, Hierem. 23:24: numquid non caelum et terram ego impleo? Sed per caelum et terram intelligitur omnis creatura, ut patet ex principio Genesis. Ergo Deus in omnibus creaturis est. On the contrary, Jeremiah 23:24 says, do I not fill heaven and earth? says the Lord. But everything created is understood in heaven and earth, as is clear from the beginning of Genesis. Therefore God is in all created things. Hoc etiam videtur per hoc quod habetur ad Hebr. 1:3: portans omnia verbo virtutis suae. Non autem potest conservare res, nisi sit praesens eis. Ergo videtur quod in omnibus rebus sit. Furthermore, this is also seen in Hebrews 1:3, where the Son is upholding the universe by his word of power. Now, he cannot conserve realities unless he be present to them. Therefore it seems that he is in all realities. Respondeo dicendum, quod Deus essentialiter in omnibus rebus est, non tamen ita quod rebus commisceatur, quasi pars alicujus rei. Ad cujus evidentiam oportet tria praenotare. I answer that God is in all realities essentially, yet not in such a way that he is mixed with the realities, as though he were some part of the reality. To make this evident, one must first take note of three things. Primo, quod movens et motum, et operans et operatum, oportet simul esse, ut in 7 Physic., probatur. Sed hoc diversimode contingit in corporalibus et spiritualibus. Quia enim corpus per essentiam suam, quae circumlimitata est terminis quantitatis, determinatum est ad situm aliquem, non potest esse quod corpus movens et motum sint in eodem situ; unde oportet quod simul sint per contactum; et sic virtute sua corpus immutat, quia immediate sibi conjungitur quod etiam immutatum aliud immutare potest, usque ad aliquem terminum. Spiritualis vero substantia, cujus essentia omnino absoluta est a quantitate et situ, ac per hoc loco, non est distincta ab eo quod movet per locum vel situm; sed ubi est quod movetur, ibi est ipsum movens; sicut anima est in corpore, et sicut virtus movens caelum dicitur esse in dextra parte orbis quem movet; unde incipit motus, ut habetur in 8 Physic. First, note that a mover and what is moved, and a doer and what he accomplishes, must be together, as is proved in Physics 7. But this happens in diverse ways for bodily and spiritual things. For because a body by its own essence, which is limited on all sides by the boundaries of quantity, is determined to a certain site, it cannot occur that the moving body and the body being moved be in the same site. Whence they must be together through contact. And in this way by its own power the body changes a thing, because it is immediately joined to it, and this latter too, when changed, can change something else, and so on to some terminus. But a spiritual substance, the essence of which is wholly absolved from quantity and site, and thereby from place, is not distinct from what it moves by place or site; rather, where what is being moved is, there too is the thing moving it. This is like how the soul is in the body, and the power moving the heavens is said to be in the right side of the sphere that it moves, from which its motion begins, as is said in Physics 8. Secundum est, quod esse cujuslibet rei et cujuslibet partis ejus est immediate a Deo, eo quod non ponimus, secundum fidem, aliquem creare nisi Deum. Creare autem est dare esse. The second is that the existence of each and every reality, and of every part of it, is immediately from God. This is insofar as we assert, according to our faith, that nothing can create except God. However, to create is to give existence. Tertium est, quod illud quod est causa esse, non potest cessare ab operatione qua esse datur, quin ipsa res etiam esse cesset. Sicut enim dicit Avicenna, lib. 1 Sufficientiae, cap. 11, haec est differentia inter agens divinum et agens naturale, quod agens naturale est tantum causa motus, et agens divinum est causa esse. Unde, juxta ipsum, qualibet causa efficiente remota, removetur effectus suus; et ideo, remoto aedificatore, non tollitur esse domus, cujus causa est gravitas lapidum quae manet; sed fieri domus cujus causa erat; et similiter, remota causa essendi, tollitur esse. Unde dicit Gregorius, lib. 16 Moral., c. 37, quod omnia in nihilum deciderent, nisi ea manus omnipotentis contineret. Unde oportet quod operatio ipsius, qua dat esse, non sit intercisa, sed continua; unde dicitur Joan. 5:17: Pater meus usque modo operatur, et ego operor. The third is that what is the cause of existence cannot cease its activity whereby it gives existence without the thing itself ceasing to exist. For as Avicenna says, this is the difference between the divine agent and a natural agent: a natural agent is the cause of motion, whereas the divine agent is the cause of existence. Whence, according to him, if all natural efficient causes were removed, their effect would be removed. And therefore, were the builder to be removed, the existing house is not thereby taken away, the cause of which is the heaviness of the stones, which remains; but the coming to be of a house would be taken away, as he was its cause. And likewise, were the cause of existing to be removed, the existence is thereby taken away. Whence Gregory says that all things would fall into nothingness without the hand of the Omnipotent holding them together. Whence his activity whereby he gives existence must not be intermittent, but rather, continuous. Whence John 5:17 says, my Father is working still, and I am working. Ex quibus omnibus aperte colligitur quod Deus est unicuique intimus, sicut esse proprium rei est intimum ipsi rei, quae nec incipere nec durare posset, nisi per operationem Dei, per quam suo operi conjungitur ut in eo sit. From all these things it can obviously be gathered that God is intimate with each thing, just as the proper existence of a reality is intimate to that very reality, which could neither begin nor endure except through God’s agency, through which he is joined to his work such that he might be in it. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis essentia divina non sit intrinseca rei quasi pars veniens in constitutionem ejus; tamen est intra rem quasi operans et agens esse uniuscujusque rei; et hoc oportet in omni agente incorporeo, ut ex praedictis patet. Reply Obj. 1: Although the divine essence is not internal to the reality as though it were a part entering into its constitution, nonetheless it is within the reality as the agent and worker of the existence of each and every reality. And this must be so in every incorporeal agent, as is clear from things said earlier. Ad secundum dicendum, quod illud quod agit per suam absentiam, non est causa proxima ejus quod fit, sed remota; virtus enim solis primo et principaliter est in corpore sibi conjuncto, et sic deinceps usque ad ultimum; et haec virtus est lumen ejus per quod agit in his inferioribus, ut Avicenna, lib. cit., cap. 2, dicit. Similiter patet quod rex praecipiens est causa prima: sed exequens praeceptum est causa proxima et conjuncta. Deus autem immediate in omnibus operatur; unde oportet quod in omnibus sit. Reply Obj. 2: What acts while being absent is not the proximate cause of what comes to be, but only the remote cause. For the power of the sun is first and principally in the body joined to it, and from there it goes on to the last body; and this power is its light, through which it acts in the lower bodies, as Avicenna says in the same context. Likewise it is clear that a king when he commands is the first cause, but the one executing his precept is the proximate and conjoined cause. However, God immediately acts in all things; whence he must be in all things.