Quaestio 1 Question 1 Quomodo Deus in omnibus rebus sit How God is in all things Circa primum quaeruntur duo: As regards the first, two things are asked: primo utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus; first, whether God is in all realities; secundo de diversitate modorum quibus in rebus esse dicitur. second about the diversity of the modes by which he is said to be “in realities.” Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum Deus sit in rebus Whether God is in realities Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus in rebus non sit. To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that God is not in realities. Inter causas enim illae solae rei intrinsecae sunt quae partes ejus sunt, ut materia et forma; non autem agens et finis. Sed Deus non est causa rerum ut veniens in constitutionem ipsarum; quia regit omnes res, praeterquam commisceatur cum eis, ut dicitur lib. De causis. Ergo Deus in rebus creatis non est. Obj. 1: For among causes, only those that are parts of the reality, like matter and form, are internal to it—but not the agent and the end. Now, God is not a cause of realities as entering into their constitution; for he rules all realities without being mixed with them, as is said in the Book of Causes. Therefore God is not in created realities. Praeterea, nobilius agens est hoc quod potest producere effectum in absentia sua, quam quod non potest hoc facere nisi per suam praesentiam. Deus autem est nobilissimum agens. Cum igitur inveniantur quaedam agentia et secundum voluntatem, et secundum naturam, quae in absentia sui producunt effectus; sicut sol in caelo existens, efficit calorem in terra per emissionem virtutis suae, et rex aliquis per imperium suum multa efficit ubi ipse non est praesens; videtur quod multo fortius Deus in absentia sui possit effectum producere; et ita non oportet quod sit in rebus quas condidit. Obj. 2: Furthermore, an agent that can bring forth an effect even when it is absent is nobler than one that can do this only through its presence. But God is the noblest agent. Now, some agents are found to act, both according to will and according to nature, that bring forth their effects even when absent—for example, the sun, while in the heavens, brings forth heat on earth through the emission of its own power, and a king, through his command, brings about many things where he himself is not present. Therefore it seems that much more so can God bring forth his effects when absent, so he need not be in the realities that he establishes. Praeterea, quanto aliquod agens nobilius est, tanto nobiliorem effectum producere potest. Sed perfectius est quod potest per se conservari in esse absente sua causa quam quod non potest, sicut figura perfectius est in cera in qua manet etiam sigillo amoto, quam in aqua ubi non manet in absentia imprimentis. Cum igitur Deus sit perfectissimus agens, videtur quod rebus quas condidit, contulerit hoc ut etiam in absentia suae causae conservari possint in esse; et ita ad conservationem rerum non exigitur quod Deus in rebus sit. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the nobler an agent is, so much nobler an effect it can bring forth. But what is able through itself to be conserved in existence while its cause is absent is more perfect than what is incapable of this; for example, the shape in wax that remains even when the seal is removed is more perfect than is one in water, where it does not remain in the absence of what impresses itself upon it. Therefore, since God is the most perfect agent, it seems that he would have conferred on the realities that he created also the ability to be conserved in existence even in the absence of their cause. And thus, it is not required that, for the conservation of the realities, God also be in the realities. Praeterea, impossibile est quod duo agentia immediate operentur eamdem rem, ita quod utrumque illorum perfecte operetur; quia ad unum operatum terminatur una operatio, quae exit ab uno operante. Sed singulae res habent operationes proprias, ut dicit Damascenus, 2 De fid. orth., cap. 10, quibus suos effectus peragunt. Ergo videtur quod Deus non immediate sit operans quidquid in rebus efficitur; et ita videtur quod non in omnibus rebus sit. Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is impossible that two agents immediately accomplish the same reality, such that each of them accomplishes it perfectly; for one action that goes out from one agent is terminated at one thing being accomplished. But individual realities have their own proper actions, as Damascene says, by means of which they bring about their effects. Therefore it seems that God does not immediately effect whatever is brought about in realities, and thus it seems that he is not in all realities. Praeterea, daemones res quaedam sunt. Sed absurdissime dicitur Deus in daemonibus esse. Ergo Deus non est in omnibus rebus. Obj. 5: Furthermore, some realities are demons. But it is most absurd to say that God is in the demons. Therefore God is not in all realities. Sed contra, Hierem. 23:24: numquid non caelum et terram ego impleo? Sed per caelum et terram intelligitur omnis creatura, ut patet ex principio Genesis. Ergo Deus in omnibus creaturis est. On the contrary, Jeremiah 23:24 says, do I not fill heaven and earth? says the Lord. But everything created is understood in heaven and earth, as is clear from the beginning of Genesis. Therefore God is in all created things. Hoc etiam videtur per hoc quod habetur ad Hebr. 1:3: portans omnia verbo virtutis suae. Non autem potest conservare res, nisi sit praesens eis. Ergo videtur quod in omnibus rebus sit. Furthermore, this is also seen in Hebrews 1:3, where the Son is upholding the universe by his word of power. Now, he cannot conserve realities unless he be present to them. Therefore it seems that he is in all realities. Respondeo dicendum, quod Deus essentialiter in omnibus rebus est, non tamen ita quod rebus commisceatur, quasi pars alicujus rei. Ad cujus evidentiam oportet tria praenotare. I answer that God is in all realities essentially, yet not in such a way that he is mixed with the realities, as though he were some part of the reality. To make this evident, one must first take note of three things. Primo, quod movens et motum, et operans et operatum, oportet simul esse, ut in 7 Physic., probatur. Sed hoc diversimode contingit in corporalibus et spiritualibus. Quia enim corpus per essentiam suam, quae circumlimitata est terminis quantitatis, determinatum est ad situm aliquem, non potest esse quod corpus movens et motum sint in eodem situ; unde oportet quod simul sint per contactum; et sic virtute sua corpus immutat, quia immediate sibi conjungitur quod etiam immutatum aliud immutare potest, usque ad aliquem terminum. Spiritualis vero substantia, cujus essentia omnino absoluta est a quantitate et situ, ac per hoc loco, non est distincta ab eo quod movet per locum vel situm; sed ubi est quod movetur, ibi est ipsum movens; sicut anima est in corpore, et sicut virtus movens caelum dicitur esse in dextra parte orbis quem movet; unde incipit motus, ut habetur in 8 Physic. First, note that a mover and what is moved, and a doer and what he accomplishes, must be together, as is proved in Physics 7. But this happens in diverse ways for bodily and spiritual things. For because a body by its own essence, which is limited on all sides by the boundaries of quantity, is determined to a certain site, it cannot occur that the moving body and the body being moved be in the same site. Whence they must be together through contact. And in this way by its own power the body changes a thing, because it is immediately joined to it, and this latter too, when changed, can change something else, and so on to some terminus. But a spiritual substance, the essence of which is wholly absolved from quantity and site, and thereby from place, is not distinct from what it moves by place or site; rather, where what is being moved is, there too is the thing moving it. This is like how the soul is in the body, and the power moving the heavens is said to be in the right side of the sphere that it moves, from which its motion begins, as is said in Physics 8. Secundum est, quod esse cujuslibet rei et cujuslibet partis ejus est immediate a Deo, eo quod non ponimus, secundum fidem, aliquem creare nisi Deum. Creare autem est dare esse. The second is that the existence of each and every reality, and of every part of it, is immediately from God. This is insofar as we assert, according to our faith, that nothing can create except God. However, to create is to give existence. Tertium est, quod illud quod est causa esse, non potest cessare ab operatione qua esse datur, quin ipsa res etiam esse cesset. Sicut enim dicit Avicenna, lib. 1 Sufficientiae, cap. 11, haec est differentia inter agens divinum et agens naturale, quod agens naturale est tantum causa motus, et agens divinum est causa esse. Unde, juxta ipsum, qualibet causa efficiente remota, removetur effectus suus; et ideo, remoto aedificatore, non tollitur esse domus, cujus causa est gravitas lapidum quae manet; sed fieri domus cujus causa erat; et similiter, remota causa essendi, tollitur esse. Unde dicit Gregorius, lib. 16 Moral., c. 37, quod omnia in nihilum deciderent, nisi ea manus omnipotentis contineret. Unde oportet quod operatio ipsius, qua dat esse, non sit intercisa, sed continua; unde dicitur Joan. 5:17: Pater meus usque modo operatur, et ego operor. The third is that what is the cause of existence cannot cease its activity whereby it gives existence without the thing itself ceasing to exist. For as Avicenna says, this is the difference between the divine agent and a natural agent: a natural agent is the cause of motion, whereas the divine agent is the cause of existence. Whence, according to him, if all natural efficient causes were removed, their effect would be removed. And therefore, were the builder to be removed, the existing house is not thereby taken away, the cause of which is the heaviness of the stones, which remains; but the coming to be of a house would be taken away, as he was its cause. And likewise, were the cause of existing to be removed, the existence is thereby taken away. Whence Gregory says that all things would fall into nothingness without the hand of the Omnipotent holding them together. Whence his activity whereby he gives existence must not be intermittent, but rather, continuous. Whence John 5:17 says, my Father is working still, and I am working. Ex quibus omnibus aperte colligitur quod Deus est unicuique intimus, sicut esse proprium rei est intimum ipsi rei, quae nec incipere nec durare posset, nisi per operationem Dei, per quam suo operi conjungitur ut in eo sit. From all these things it can obviously be gathered that God is intimate with each thing, just as the proper existence of a reality is intimate to that very reality, which could neither begin nor endure except through God’s agency, through which he is joined to his work such that he might be in it. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis essentia divina non sit intrinseca rei quasi pars veniens in constitutionem ejus; tamen est intra rem quasi operans et agens esse uniuscujusque rei; et hoc oportet in omni agente incorporeo, ut ex praedictis patet. Reply Obj. 1: Although the divine essence is not internal to the reality as though it were a part entering into its constitution, nonetheless it is within the reality as the agent and worker of the existence of each and every reality. And this must be so in every incorporeal agent, as is clear from things said earlier. Ad secundum dicendum, quod illud quod agit per suam absentiam, non est causa proxima ejus quod fit, sed remota; virtus enim solis primo et principaliter est in corpore sibi conjuncto, et sic deinceps usque ad ultimum; et haec virtus est lumen ejus per quod agit in his inferioribus, ut Avicenna, lib. cit., cap. 2, dicit. Similiter patet quod rex praecipiens est causa prima: sed exequens praeceptum est causa proxima et conjuncta. Deus autem immediate in omnibus operatur; unde oportet quod in omnibus sit. Reply Obj. 2: What acts while being absent is not the proximate cause of what comes to be, but only the remote cause. For the power of the sun is first and principally in the body joined to it, and from there it goes on to the last body; and this power is its light, through which it acts in the lower bodies, as Avicenna says in the same context. Likewise it is clear that a king when he commands is the first cause, but the one executing his precept is the proximate and conjoined cause. However, God immediately acts in all things; whence he must be in all things. Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, esse rei non potest conservari sine causa essendi, sicut nec motus sine causa movente. Unde si sine aliquo agente esse rei conservetur, illud agens non erit causa essendi, sed fiendi tantum, sicut sigillum est causa figurae in cera; unde remoto sigillo, remanet figura, sicut etiam de aedificatore dictum est; et hoc est agens imperfectum; unde ratio procedit ex falsis. Reply Obj. 3: As is clear from things said in the previous article, a reality’s existence cannot be conserved without the cause of its being, just as neither can motion be conserved without a moving cause. Whence, if a reality’s existence were conserved without a certain agent, that agent will not be the cause of existing, but only of coming to be, the way the seal is the cause of the shape in the wax; whence the figure remains when the seal is removed. This is also like the builder mentioned. And this is an imperfect agent, so the argument is based on false premises. Ad quartum dicendum, quod respectu ejusdem operationis non potest esse duplex causa proxima eodem modo, sed diversimode potest; quod sic patet. Operatio reducitur sicut in principium in duo; in ipsum agentem, et in virtutem agentis, qua mediante exit operatio ab agente. Reply Obj. 4: There cannot be two proximate causes in reference to the same activity in the same way; but in diverse ways, this can occur. This is clear as follows. For an activity is traced back to a principle in two ways: to the agent itself, and to the agent’s power, by the mediation of which the activity comes forth from the agent. Quanto autem agens est magis proximum et immediatum, tanto virtus ejus est mediata, et primi agentis virtus est immediatissima; quod sic patet in terminis. Sint A, B, C tres causae ordinatae, ita quod C sit ultima, quae exercet operationem; constat tunc quod C exercet operationem per virtutem suam; et quod per virtutem suam hoc possit, hoc est per virtutem B et ulterius per virtutem A. Unde si quaeritur quare C operatur, respondetur per virtutem suam; et quare per virtutem suam: propter virtutem B; et sic quousque reducatur in virtutem causae primae in quam docet Philosophus quaestiones resolvere in Posterior. analyt., lib. 2, et in 2 Physic. However, to the degree that an agent is more proximate and immediate, so too is its power mediated; and the power of the first agent is the most immediate. This is clear in its termini: let there be three ordered causes—A, B, and C, such that C is last—that exercise an activity. It is certain, then, that C exercises the activity through its own power; and the fact that it is able to do this through its own power is through the power of B, and further, through the power of A. Whence if one asks whence does C act?, one answers: through its own power; and if one asks, whence does C act through its own power?, one answers: through the power of B; and so on until one traces it back to the power of the first cause, into which one must resolve questions, as the Philosopher teaches in the Posterior Analytics and the Physics. Et ita patet quod cum Deus sit prima causa omnium, sua virtus est immediatissima omnibus. Sed quia ipsemet est sua virtus, ideo non tantum est immediatum principium operationis in omnibus, sed immediate in omnibus operans; quod in aliis causis non contingit, quamvis singulae res proprias operationes habeant quibus producunt suos effectus. And thus it is clear that, because God is the first cause of all things, his power is most immediate to all things. But because he himself is his own power, therefore he is not only the immediate principle of the activity in all things, but is immediately acting within all things; this does not occur in other causes, even though the individual realities have their own proper activities whereby they bring forth their effects. Ad quintum dicendum, quod non est concedendum simpliciter quod Deus sit in daemone, duabus de causis. Primo, quia daemon non nominat naturam tantum, sed naturam deformatam; cujus deformitatis Deus non est operator. Secundo, quia daemon nominat naturam intellectualem; unde cum dicitur, Deus est in daemone, intelligitur per modum quo natura intellectualis ejus est capax, scilicet per gratiam. Unde nec de homine peccatore simpliciter dicimus, Deus est in isto homine; nisi addatur, inquantum est creatura, vel per essentiam, et praesentiam, et potentiam; quo addito, dicitur etiam Deus in daemone esse. Reply Obj. 5: “God is in a demon” should not be granted simply speaking, due to two causes. The first is that “demon” names not only a nature, but a deformed nature, the deformity of which God is not the agent. The second is that “demon” names an intellectual nature, so when one says, “God is in a demon,” it is understood in the manner in which an intellectual nature has the capacity for him: that is, through grace. Whence too we do not say simply speaking, “God is in a sinful man,” unless one adds “insofar as he is created,” or “through God’s essence, presence, and power.” With such addition one can also say, “God is in a demon.” Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum Deus sit in omnibus per potentiam, praesentiam et essentiam; in sanctis per gratiam, in Christo per esse Whether God is in all things through power, presence, and essence; in the saints through grace; in Christ through existence Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur modi isti, quibus Deus in rebus esse dicitur. To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the modes wherein God is said to be in things is not fittingly assigned. Cum enim dicimus Deum esse in rebus, significamus qualiter Deus ad res se habeat. Sed Deus uno modo se habet ad omnia, quamvis non omnia uno modo ad ipsum se habeant, ut dicit Dionysius, 3 cap. De div. nom. Ergo videtur quod non debeat esse nisi unus modus existendi Deum in rebus. Obj. 1: For when we say God is in things, we are assigning how God relates to things. But God relates to all things in one way, even though they do not relate to him in one way, as Dionysius says. Therefore it seems that there should be only one mode of God being in things. Si dicas, quod isti modi diversificantur secundum diversas habitudines creaturae ad Deum. Obj. 2: You might say that these modes are divided according to the diverse relations the created has to God. Contra, quilibet effectus in creatura causat aliquam habitudinem creaturae ad Deum. Sed quasi infiniti sunt effectus Dei in creaturis. Ergo infinitis modis dicetur Deus esse in creaturis, et non quinque tantum. On the contrary, every effect in a created thing causes some relation of the created thing to God. But God’s effects in created things are, as it were, infinite. Therefore God will be said to be in created things in an infinity of ways, and not merely five. Praeterea, ea secundum quae diversimode creaturae ad Deum referuntur, non inveniuntur in omnibus creaturis. Sed quidam istorum modorum conveniunt omni creaturae, scilicet per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam. Ergo videtur quod modi isti non differant secundum diversam habitudinem creaturae ad Deum. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the aspects according to which created things are referred to God in diverse ways are not found in all created things. But some of these modes belong to everything created, that is, by essence, presence, and power. Therefore it seems that these modes do not differ according to diverse relations of the created thing to God. Si dicas, quod distinguuntur secundum diversas rationes attributorum. Obj. 4: You might say that the modes are distinguished according to the diverse accounts of the divine attributes. Contra, non plus differt potentia ab essentia, quam scientia et voluntas. Sed esse in rebus per essentiam et potentiam constituit duos modos. Ergo et similiter diversificabuntur secundum omnia attributa. On the contrary, his power does not differ from his essence any more than do his knowledge and will. But to be in things through essence and power constitute two of the modes. Therefore they will similarly also be divided according to all his attributes.