Quaestio 2 Question 2 Quomodo ubique sit How God is everywhere Deinde quaeritur, quomodo Deus ubique esse dicatur; et circa hoc tria quaeruntur: Next it is asked how God is wherever he is said to be. And about this, three things are asked: primo utrum Deus sit ubique; first, whether God is everywhere; secundo utrum hoc sibi soli conveniat; second, whether this belongs to him alone; tertio utrum conveniat sibi ab aeterno. third, whether this belongs to him from eternity. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum Deus sit ubique Whether God is everywhere Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit ubique. To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that God is not everywhere. Esse enim ubique significat in omni loco esse. Sed, sicut dicit Anselmus, Monol., cap. 22, si usus admitteret, magis dicendus esset: Deus cum omni loco quam in omni loco. Ergo videtur quod Deus non proprie dicatur ubique esse. Obj. 1: For to be everywhere signifies being in every place. But, as Anselm says, if usage were to allow it, it would be more appropriate to say that God is with every place, rather than in every place. Therefore it seems that “God is everywhere” is not said properly. Praeterea, sicut tempus nominat mensuram quamdam, sic et locus. Sed secundum Philosophum, in 4 Physic., esse in tempore est quadam parte temporis mensurari. Ergo esse in loco significat loco mensurari. Sed Deus est immensus. Ergo non est in loco. Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as “time” names a certain measure, so does “place.” But, according to the Philosopher, to be in time is to be measured by a certain part of time. Therefore to be in place signifies to be measured by place. But God is without measure. Therefore he is not in place. Item, potest objici ex auctoritate Anselmi, ubi supra, qui dicit, quod omne quod est in loco et tempore sequitur leges loci et temporis. Obj. 3: Furthermore, one can object based on the authority of Anselm, who says that everything in place and time follows the laws of place and time. Praeterea, sicut se habent successiva ad tempus, ita se habent permanentia ad locum. Sed in successivis unum indivisibile et una indivisibilis operatio non potest esse diversis temporibus. Ergo nec unum indivisibile permanens potest esse in diversis locis. Sed Deus est indivisibilis: ergo non est ubique. Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as successive things stand to time, so do enduring things stand to place. But in successive things, one indivisible, and one indivisible activity, cannot be at diverse times. Therefore neither can one enduring indivisible thing be in diverse places. But God is indivisible. Therefore he is not everywhere. Praeterea, nulla conditio corporalis Deo potest convenire nisi metaphorice. Sed esse in loco est conditio corporis naturalis, adeo quod etiam corporibus mathematicis non datur locus nisi similitudinarie, ut 1 De generatione, dicit Philosophus. Ergo multo fortius Deo non convenit nisi metaphorice in loco esse vel ubique. Obj. 5: Furthermore, no bodily condition can belong to God, except metaphorically. But to be in a place is a condition of a natural body, so much so that place is not given even to mathematical bodies, except by way of likeness, as the Philosopher says. Therefore much more so does being in a place, or being everywhere, not befit God, except metaphorically. Sed contra, Deus est in omnibus rebus, ut supra dictum est. Sed locus quilibet res aliqua est. Ergo Deus in omni loco est: ergo ubique. On the contrary, God is in all realities, as was said in a previous article. But every place is a certain reality. Therefore God is in every place, and therefore everywhere. Respondeo dicendum, quod esse in aliquo diversimode convenit spiritualibus et corporalibus: quia corpus est in aliquo ut contentum, sicut vinum est in vase; sed spiritualis substantia est in aliquo ut continens et conservans. Cujus ratio est, quia corporale per essentiam suam, quae circumlimitata est quantitatis terminis, determinatum est ad locum, et per consequens virtus et operatio ejus in loco est; sed spiritualis substantia quae omnino absoluta a situ et quantitate est, habet essentiam non omnino circumlimitatam loco. Unde non est in loco nisi per operationem, et per consequens virtus et essentia ejus in loco est. I answer that to be “in” something belongs to spiritual and bodily things in diverse ways. For a body is in something as contained, the way wine is in a vessel, whereas a spiritual substance is in something as containing and conserving it. The reason for this is that by its own essence the bodily, which is limited on all sides by the boundaries of quantity, is determined to a place, and consequently its power and activity is in a place. But a spiritual substance, which is altogether free from position and quantity, has an essence that is not altogether limited by a place. Whence it is in place only through its activity, and as a consequence its power and essence is in a place. Dicendum est ergo, quod si esse in hoc loco sumatur secundum quod corpus in loco esse dicitur; sic non convenit Deo esse ubique nisi metaphorice; quia implet locum sicut corpus locatum, non quidem distantia dimensionum, sed causalitate effectuum. Si autem accipiatur esse in loco per modum quo substantia spiritualis in aliquo esse dicitur; sic propriissime Deo in loco esse convenit, et ubique et non quidem ut mensuratum loco, sed ut dans loco naturam locandi et continendi; sicut dicitur esse in homine inquantum dat homini naturam humanitatis: et in qualibet re esse dicitur inquantum dat rebus proprium esse et naturam. Therefore one should say that, if “to be in this place” is being taken according to how a body is said to be in a place, then being everywhere does not belong to God, except metaphorically. For he fills a place, as does a body in a place, yet not by an interval of dimensions, but by the causality of his effects. However, if “to be in a place” is taken through the mode wherein a spiritual substance is said to be in a place, then to be in a place belongs to God most properly—and not, of course, as being measured by the place, but as giving the place the nature of locating and containing things; this is just as he is said to be in a man insofar as he gives the nature of humanity to a man. And he is said to be in every reality insofar as he gives the realities their proper existence and nature. Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo prima et ad auctoritatem Anselmi, et etiam ad quintum, quae procedunt secundum modum quo corpus in loco esse dicitur. Reply Obj. 1–3, 5: The responses are clear for the first two and for the authority of Anselm, and even for the fifth, which objections all proceed according to the manner in which a body is said to be in a place. Ad quartum dicendum, quod indivisibile secundum successionem dicitur dupliciter. Vel illud quod omnino absolutum est a successione, ut indivisibile negative sumatur, sicut aeternitas: et tale indivisibile potest esse in diversis temporibus, immo in omni tempore; quia “nunc” aeternitatis invariatum adest omnibus partibus temporis. Vel illud quod est successionis terminus, ut instans temporis, et quidquid per illud instans mensuratur; et hoc non potest esse in pluribus temporibus. Similiter indivisibile secundum dimensionem dicitur dupliciter. Vel illud quod omnino absolutum est a dimensione, sicut substantia spiritualis; et hoc non est inconveniens in omnibus vel pluribus locis esse. Vel quod est terminus dimensionis, ut punctus: et hoc, quia determinatum est ad situm, non potest in pluribus locis esse; et ideo, relicta imaginatione, indivisibilitas substantiae incorporeae, ut Dei, vel angeli, vel animae, vel etiam materiae, sicut indivisibilitas puncti non cogitetur: quia, ut dicit Boetius, lib. 1 De Trinit., c. 2, oportet in intellectualibus non deduci ad imaginationem. Reply Obj. 4: The indivisible of succession is spoken of in two ways. Either it is what is wholly free from succession, so that “indivisible” is taken negatively, like “eternity”; and such an indivisible can be in diverse times, indeed it is in all time. For the unvaried “now” of eternity is present to all parts of time. Or it is the terminus of a succession, like an instant of time and whatever is measured by that instant. And this cannot be in several times. Likewise, the indivisible of dimension is spoken of in two ways. Either it is what is wholly free from dimension, like a spiritual substance; and being in all or several places is not unfitting for such. Or it is the terminus of a dimension, like a point; and because such is determined to a site, it cannot be in several places. And therefore, setting aside the imagination, let us not think of the indivisibility of an incorporeal substance—like God or an angel or the soul, or even that of matter—as like the indivisibility of a point. For, as Boethius says, in intellectual things one must not be led to the imagination. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum esse ubique soli Deo conveniat Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse ubique non soli Deo conveniat. To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that being everywhere does not belong to God alone. Ponere enim materiam primam esse Deum, vel etiam ens universale, ut quidam posuerunt, est haereticum. Sed universale est ubique et semper, secundum Philosophum, et similiter materia prima, quae est in omni corpore, quo omnis locus impletur, cum nihil sit vacuum, ut philosophi probant, 4 Physic. Ergo esse ubique non tantum Deo convenit. Obj. 1: For it is heretical to assert that first matter is God, or that God is universal being, as some do assert. But the universal is everywhere and always, according to the Philosopher, and so is first matter, which is in every body, whereby every place is filled, since nothing is empty, as the philosophers prove. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. Praeterea, in omnibus numeratis est aliquis numerus. Sed omnes partes universi sunt numeratae. Ergo numerus collectus est in toto universo, et ita est ubique. Obj. 2: Furthermore, there is certain number in all the things numbered. But all the parts of the universe are numbered. Therefore a collective number is in the whole universe, and thus it is everywhere. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, De immort. animae, cap. 16, anima tota est in singulis partibus. Sed potuisset Deus tantum creare unum corpus animatum. Ergo anima ejus ubique esset. Sed quod soli Deo convenit, nulli creaturae communicatur. Ergo esse ubique non convenit soli Deo. Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Augustine, the entire soul is in each of the parts of the body. But God had been able to create only one ensouled body. Therefore its soul would have been everywhere. But what belongs to God alone is shared with nothing created. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. Sed contra, Ambrosius, in littera, probat Spiritum Sanctum esse Deum quia ubique est. Sed probatio nihil valeret, nisi esse ubique soli Deo conveniret. Ergo esse ubique soli Deo convenit. On the contrary, in the text Ambrose proves that the Holy Spirit is God because he is everywhere. But this proof would be worthless unless being everywhere belongs to God alone. Therefore to be everywhere belongs to God alone. Respondeo dicendum, quod esse ubique si per se sumatur, soli Deo convenit nec alicui creaturae communicabile est; sed per accidens potest alicui convenire. I answer that to be everywhere, if it be taken through itself, belongs to God alone, nor is it communicable to anything created; but in an incidental way it can belong to something created. Hoc autem accidens potest dupliciter considerari: vel ex parte ejus quod in loco est; vel ex parte loci. Si ex parte ejus quod in loco est, sic cum per accidens vel per posterius conveniat toti quod attribuitur sibi ratione suae partis, constat quod illud quod secundum diversas suas partes est in diversis locis, non primo et per se est in illis; immo est in uno loco tantum. Unde si esset unum corpus infinitum, illud esset ubique per accidens, secundum quod diceretur esse ubi sunt suae partes et non per se, quia ipsum non esset per se ubi est sua pars. Now, this incidental being-everywhere can be considered in two ways: either on the side of what is in the place, or on the side of the place. If considered on the side of what is in the place, then, because what is attributed to a thing by reason of its parts belongs to the whole incidentally or in a posterior way, it is certain that what is in diverse places according to its diverse parts is not primarily and through itself in those places; rather, it is in only one place. Whence, if there were an infinite body, it would be everywhere in an incidental way, insofar as it will be said to be where its parts are, and not through itself, since it itself would not be, through itself, where its part is. Si ex parte loci, tunc accidit alicui ubique esse, eo quod non est alius locus quam ille in quo est; sed si fuerint multa alia loca, non esset ubique; sicut si ponatur unus tantum locus in quo unus homo est. Deo autem per se convenit ubique esse: quia ipse totus est in quolibet loco; et infinitis aliis locis existentibus, in omnibus esset; et hoc non est communicabile alicui creaturae nisi communicaretur sibi esse virtutis infinitae. If it be considered on the side of the place, then something can incidentally be everywhere in that there is no place that the thing is not in, but if there were many other places, it would not be everywhere; for example, if it were given that there were only one place in the universe, and one man in it. However, to be everywhere belongs to God through himself, since he himself as a whole is in each and every place, and were there an infinity of other places in existence, he would be in all of them. And this is not communicable to anything created unless being of infinite power could be communicated to it. Et per hoc patet responsio ad ea quae objecta sunt; quia omnibus illis convenit esse ubique per accidens, vel quia secundum diversas partes sunt, vel quia plura loca non sunt, vel quia secundum unum esse non sunt in pluribus, sicut universale et ima materia, quae secundum aliud et aliud esse sunt in diversis. Numerus vero per se non est in loco; et tamen secundum quod in loco est, non est totus in uno loco, sed in diversis secundum diversas partes. Reply Obj. 1–3: The response to all the objections is clear. For to be everywhere belongs to all those things incidentally, either because they are so according to their diverse parts, or because there are not more places, or because they are not in many things according to one existence, like the universal and lowest matter, which is in diverse things according to different ways of existing. Of course, a number is not in place through itself, and yet, according to what is in place, a number is not wholly in one place; rather, it is in diverse places according to its diverse parts. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum esse ubique conveniat Deo ab aeterno Whether to be everywhere belongs to God from eternity Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse ubique ab aeterno Deo conveniat. To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that to be everywhere belongs to God from eternity. Primo per hoc quod in littera dicitur ab Ambrosio, quia in omnibus et ubique semper est, quod est divinitatis proprium. Sed quod est semper, est aeternum. Ergo esse ubique Deo ab aeterno convenit. Obj. 1: This is first because of what Ambrose says, in the text: that he is in all things and everywhere always, which is proper to the divinity. But what is always is eternal. Therefore to be everywhere belongs to God from eternity. Praeterea, sicut “ubique” est distributivum loci, ita “semper” est distributivum temporis. Sed Deus ab aeterno est semper, etiam temporibus non existentibus. Ergo et ab aeterno est ubique, etiam locis non existentibus. Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as “everywhere” is distributed over place, so too “always” is distributed over time. But God is always from eternity, even without times existing. Therefore he is also everywhere from eternity, even without any places existing. Praeterea, esse Deum in rebus coordinatur hic a Magistro ei quod est esse res in Deo. Sed res ab aeterno fuerunt in Deo, qui aeternam scientiam de rebus habet. Ergo et Deus ab aeterno est in rebus, et ubique. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Master here orders God’s existence in things in parallel with the existence of the things in God. But things were in God from eternity, for he has an eternal knowledge of things. Therefore so too God is in things, and everywhere, from eternity.