Distinctio 38 Distinction 38 Utrum scientia Dei sit scitorum causa Whether divine knowledge is the cause of what is known Divisio textus Division of the text Ostenso quorum sit Dei scientia, hic determinat de scientia per comparationem ad ipsa scita; et dividitur in partes duas; in prima inquirit utrum scientia Dei sit scitorum causa; in secunda ostendit qualis causa sit, ibi, 39 dist.: praeterea solet quaeri, utrum scientia Dei possit augeri vel minui. Having made clear what things God’s knowledge is about, here he considers his knowledge through its relation to the very things known. This is divided into two parts: in the first, he asks whether God’s knowledge is the cause of the things known; in the second, he shows what sort of cause it is, at moreover, it is usual to ask whether God’s knowledge can be increased or diminished. Prima in duas: in prima inquirit de causalitate divinae scientiae; in secunda de infallibilitate ipsius, ibi: ad hoc autem quod supra dictum est . . . , solet a quibusdam sic opponi. The first is divided into two parts: in the first, he asks about the causality of the divine knowledge; in the second, he asks about its infallibility, at but against what has been said above, . . . it is usual for some to make the following objection. Prima in duas: in prima movet quaestionem; in secunda determinat eam, ibi: hanc igitur, quae videtur, repugnantiam de medio tollere cupientes, dicimus res futuras nullatenus causam esse praescientiae. The first of these is divided into two: in the first, he presents the question; in the second, he answers it, at and so, wishing to remove this apparent contradiction from our midst, we say that future things are not at all the cause of God’s foreknowledge. Circa primum tria facit: primo ostendit quod scientia Dei sit causa scitorum, ratione et auctoritate; secundo ostendit quod neque est causa eorum neque causata ab eis; quae duo duabus rationibus ostendit, ibi: quod si ita est, est ergo causa omnium malorum. Tertio ostendit auctoritate Origenis, scientiam Dei causatam esse a scitis, ibi: Origenes tamen . . . ait: non propterea aliquid erit, quia id scit Deus futurum. Regarding the first, he does three things: first, he shows by reason and by authority that God’s knowledge is the cause of the things known; second, he shows on the contrary that it is neither their cause nor is caused by them, which two he shows by two arguments at, but if this is so, then it is the cause of all evils; third, he shows, on the authority of Origin, that God’s knowledge is caused by the things known, at and yet Origin, . . . says: ‘It is not because a thing will be that God knows it will be.’ Ad hoc autem quod supra dictum est . . . , solet a quibusdam ita opponi. Hic inquirit de infallibilitate divinae scientiae; et supposito quod sit infallibilis ex praedictis, hic solvit objectiones in contrarium factas; unde dividitur in duas partes: in prima ponit objectionem et solvit eam; in secunda objicit contra solutionem, et iterum solvit, ibi: sed adhuc urgent quaestionem. But against what has been said above, . . . it is usual for some to make the following objection. Here he asks about the infallibility of the divine knowledge; and having supposed that it is infallible based on things said before, here he resolves objections made to the contrary. Whence it is divided into two parts: in the first, he presents an objection and answers it; in the second, he objects against the solution, and then resolves even that, at but they press their question further. Quaestio 1 Question 1 Utrum scientia Dei sit scitorum causa Whether divine knowledge is the cause of what is known Hic quinque quaeruntur: Here five things are asked: primo utrum scientia Dei sit causa rerum; first, whether God’s knowledge is the cause of the realities; secundo utrum omnia uniformiter cognoscat; second, whether he knows all things in a uniform way; tertio utrum sit enuntiabilium; third, whether his knowledge is of statements; quarto utrum eorum quae non sunt; fourth, whether it is of things that do not exist; quinto utrum sit contingentium. fifth, whether it is of contingent things. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum scientia Dei sit causa rerum Whether God’s knowledge is the cause of realities Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit causa rerum. To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that God’s knowledge is not the cause of realities. Scientia enim Dei tam a sanctis quam a prophetis scientiae artificis comparatur. Sed scientia artificis causa est scitorum per artem producendorum. Ergo videtur quod scientia Dei sit causa rerum. Obj. 1: For God’s knowledge is compared, both by the saints and by the prophets, to the knowledge of an artisan. But an artisan’s knowledge is the cause of the things known as makeable through his art. Therefore it seems that God’s knowledge is the cause of the realities. Praeterea, cum similitudo sit quaedam unitas in forma, oportet quod in omni assimilatione vel unum similium sit causa alterius, vel utrumque ab una causa deducatur; quia unitas in effectu designat unitatem causae. Sed scientia est assimilatio quaedam. Ergo oportet semper quod scientia sit causa sciti, sicut est in scientia practica; vel scitum causa scientiae, sicut est in nostra scientia speculativa; vel utriusque sit causa una, sicut est in cognitione quam angeli de rebus habent; quia ab eodem, scilicet Deo, imprimuntur species rerum in mente angeli ad cognoscendum, et in materia ad essendum. Sed scientiae Dei, quae est ipse Deus, nihil est causa, neque scitum, neque aliquid. Relinquitur ergo quod ipsa scientia Dei sit causa sciti. Obj. 2: Furthermore, since a likeness is a certain unity in form, in every becoming like, either one of the like things must be the cause of the other, or each of them must be brought forth by one cause, since unity in effect is a sign of unity of the cause. But knowledge is a certain becoming like the thing known. Therefore either knowledge must always be the cause of the thing known, as is the case with practical knowledge; or the thing known must be the cause of the knowledge, as is the case in our speculative knowledge; or of each there must be one cause, as in the knowledge that angels have of realities. For from the same thing—that is, God—the species of realities are impressed both in the mind of the angel so that it might know them, and in matter so that they might exist. But there is no cause of God’s knowledge, which is God himself—not the thing known, nor anything else. Therefore what remains is that God’s knowledge is itself the cause of what is known. Praeterea, mensura semper habet rationem principii respectu mensurati, ut patet ex 10 Metaph. Quantitas enim mensuratur per principium quantitatis, ut substantiae omnes per principium substantiae. Sed scientia Dei mensura est rerum; unde dicit Anselmus, lib. De ver., c. 7, quod unaquaeque res veritatem habet quando implet illud ad quod in mente divina ordinata est. Ergo scientia Dei est causa scitorum. Obj. 3: Furthermore, a measure always has the account of a principle in relation to what is measured by it, as is clear from Metaphysics 10; for quantity is measured by the principle of quantity, and all substances by the principle of substance. But God’s knowledge is the measure of realities; this is why Anselm says that each reality holds the truth when it fulfills that to which it was ordained in the divine mind. Therefore God’s knowledge is the cause of things known. Praeterea, sicut voluntas Dei est ipse Deus, ita et scientia ejus. Sed voluntas Dei absolute dicitur causa omnium volitorum, et bonitas omnium bonorum. Ergo scientia ejus debet dici causa omnium scitorum. Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as God’s will is God himself, so is his knowledge. But God’s will is absolutely said to be the cause of all things he wills, and his goodness the cause of all good things. Therefore his knowledge ought to be called the cause of all things he knows. Sed contra, cujuscumque causa est Dei scientia, causa est Deus. Sed non omnium scitorum a Deo, causa est Deus; quia mala, quae sunt a Deo scita, non sunt ab ipso. Ergo nec scientia Dei causa est omnium scitorum. On the contrary (5), the cause of certain things is God’s knowledge. But God’s knowledge is not the cause of all things God knows, because evils, which are known by God, are not from him. Therefore neither is God’s knowledge the cause of all the things he knows. Praeterea, posita causa ponitur effectus. Sed scientia Dei fuit ab aeterno; res autem ab aeterno non fuerunt. Ergo scientia Dei non est causa rerum. Furthermore (6), when the cause is posited, the effect is posited. But God’s knowledge was from eternity, whereas realities have not existed from eternity. Therefore God’s knowledge is not the cause of the realities. Respondeo dicendum, quod loquendo de attributis divinis, attendenda est attributorum ratio quae, quia diversa est diversorum, ideo aliquid attribuitur uni quod non attribuitur alteri, quamvis omnia sint una res; et inde est quod bonitas divina dicitur causa bonorum, et vita causa viventium; et sic de aliis. Si ergo accipiamus diversas attributorum rationes, inveniuntur aliqua habere comparationem non tantum ad habentem, sed etiam ad aliquid sicut ad objectum, ut potentia, et voluntas, et scientia. Quaedam autem ad habentem tantum, ut vita, bonitas et hujusmodi. Et haec omnia habent unum modum causalitatis communem scilicet per modum efficientis exemplaris, ut dicimus, quod a primo bono sunt omnia bona, et a primo vivente omnia viventia. Sed illa quae dicuntur per comparationem ad objectum, habent etiam alium modum causalitatis, respectu scilicet objectorum, ut voluntas respectu volitorum; et sic quaeritur hic de causalitate scientiae. I answer that when speaking about the divine attributes one should attend to the account of the attributes, which, because they are diverse, is of diverse things; therefore something is attributed to one that is not attributed to another, even though all of them are one reality. And so it is that the divine goodness is said to be the cause of good things, the divine life the cause of living things, and so on. Therefore if we take the accounts of the diverse attributes, certain attributes—like power, will, and knowledge—are found to have a relation not only to their possessor, but even to something as to their object. However, some are related only to their possessor, like life, goodness, and such. And all of these have one mode of causality, namely, through the common mode of an efficient exemplar, just as we say that all good things are from the first Good, and all living things are from the first Living thing. But the ones that are said through a relation to their object have also another mode of causality in reference to those objects, such as the will with reference to the things willed. And it is in this way that we are asking here about the causality of divine knowledge. Constat enim quod scientia sua est causa per modum efficientis et exemplaris omnium scientiarum; sed dubium est, utrum sit causa scitorum quae sunt objecta scientiae. Sciendum est ergo, quod scientia secundum rationem scientiae non dicit aliquam causalitatem, alias omnis scientia causa esset: sed inquantum est scientia artificis operantis res, sic habet rationem causae respectu rei operatae per artem. Unde sicut est causalitas artificis per artem suam, ita consideranda est causalitas divinae scientiae. For it is certain that his knowledge is a cause through the mode of efficient cause and exemplar of all knowledge, but the doubt is about whether it is also the cause of the things known that are the object of his knowledge. Therefore one must note that “knowledge,” according to the account of knowledge, does not signify any causality; otherwise all knowledge would be a cause. But insofar as it is the knowledge of an artisan bringing about a reality, in this way it does have the account of a cause relative to the reality brought about through the art. Whence, just as the causality of the artisan is through his art, in the same way one should consider the causality of the divine knowledge. Est ergo iste processus in productione artificiati. Primo scientia artificis ostendit finem; secundo voluntas ejus intendit finem illum; tertio voluntas imperat actum per quem educatur opus, circa quod opus scientia artificis ponit formam conceptam. Unde scientia se habet ut ostendens finem, et voluntas ut dirigens actum et informans opus operatum; et ideo constat quod quidquid accidit in effectu per defectum a forma artis, vel a fine, non reducitur in scientiam artificis sicut in causam. Patet etiam quod principalitas causalitatis consistit penes voluntatem quae imperat actum. Therefore there is the following progression in the production of a work of art: first, the artisan’s knowledge presents the end; second, his will intends that end; and third, the will commands the act through which the work is brought forth, upon which work the artisan’s knowledge places the conceived form. Whence the knowledge is related as presenting the end, the will as directing the act, and as forming the work brought about. And therefore it is certain that whatever happens in the effect due to a falling away from the form of the art or from the end is not traced back to the artisan’s knowledge as to a cause. It is also clear that the principal aspect of causality depends on the will, which commands the act. Unde patet quod malum, quod est deviatio a forma et a fine, non causatur per scientiam Dei; sed tantum causalitatem habet respectu bonorum, secundum quod consequuntur formam divinae artis et finem; non tamen ita quod respectu horum dicat perfectam rationem causalitatis, nisi secundum quod adjungitur voluntati; et ideo in littera dicitur, quod scientia beneplaciti est causa rerum. Et propter hoc etiam Avicenna, lib. De intellig., cap. 1, dicit, quod inquantum Deus cognoscit essentiam suam, et amat vel vult eam, secundum quod est principium rerum, quarum vult se esse principium, fluunt res ab eo. Whence it is clear that evil, which is a deviation from the form and from the end, is not caused by God’s knowledge; rather, it has causality only in reference to good things, insofar as they attain the form of the divine art, and its end. Yet this is not such that in reference to these things the divine knowledge indicates the perfect account of causality, except insofar as it is joined to the will. This is why in the text it says that knowledge of one pleased by what he knows is the cause of realities. On account of this Avicenna also says that insofar as God knows his own essence, and loves and wills it as the principle of realities that he wills that he be the principle of, realities flow from him. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod scientia artificis non est causa defectus qui contingit in artificiato, quamvis etiam esset praescitus ab eo; nec etiam est completa causa artificiati, nisi addatur voluntas, ut dicit Philosophus in 9 Metaph.; et similiter est etiam de scientia Dei. Reply Obj. 1: An artisan’s knowledge is not the cause of a defect that arises in the artwork, even if it were to be foreknown by him; and neither is it even the complete cause of the artwork, unless one add the will, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 9. And so it is for the knowledge of God as well. Ad secundum dicendum, quod mala non cognoscuntur a Deo per similitudinem suam, sed per similitudinem bonorum, ut prius dictum est; et ideo non sequitur quod sit causa nisi bonorum. Reply Obj. 2: Evils are not known by God through their likeness, but through the likeness of good things, as was said before. And therefore it does not follow that he is the cause only of good things. Ad tertium dicendum, quod inquantum scientia Dei est sicut exemplar per modum artis rerum, sic dicitur mensura earum; unde mala sicut deficiunt a participatione formae artis, ita deficiunt a rectitudine mensurae; et propter hoc etiam malum definitur ab Augustino, lib. De natura boni, cap. 4 et seq., quod est privatio modi, inquantum deficit a mensura; speciei, inquantum deficit ab imitatione exemplaris; ordinis, inquantum deficit a fine. Reply Obj. 3: Insofar as God’s knowledge is as an exemplar of realities through the mode of an art, so it is said to be their measure. Whence just as evils fall away from participating in the form of the art, so too they fall away from the rectitude of the measure. And on account of this Augustine even defines evil as the privation of mode, insofar as it falls away from the measure, of species, insofar as it falls away from imitating the exemplar, and of order, insofar as it falls away from the end. Ad quartum dicendum, quod voluntas habet completam rationem causae, inquantum objectum ejus est finis secundum rationem boni, qui est causa causarum; unde et imperium super alias vires habet; et ideo absolute voluntas Dei causa rerum dicitur. De scientia autem non similiter se habet sicut de voluntate, ut dictum est; nec etiam ita comparatur scientia ad scitum sicut vita ad viventem; non enim scitum dicitur quod habet scientiam, sicut dicitur vivum quod habet vitam. Unde patet quod ratio non concludit. Reply Obj. 4: The will holds the complete account of the cause insofar as its object is the end according to the account of the good, which is the cause of causes. Whence too it holds the command over the other powers, and therefore the absolute will of God is said to be the cause of realities. However, the object does not stand to knowledge as it does to will, as was said in the body of the article, nor is knowledge related to the known as life is related to the living; for what has knowledge is not thereby called “known,” whereas what has life is thereby called “alive.” Whence it is clear that the argument does not conclude. Quintum concedimus. Reply Sed Contra 5: We concede the fifth argument. Ad sextum dicendum, quod sicut creaturae non exeunt a Deo per necessitatem naturae, vel potentiae naturalis, ita nec per necessitatem scientiae; sed per libertatem voluntatis in qua completur ratio causalitatis; et ideo non quandocumque scivit creavit, sed quandocumque voluit. Reply Sed Contra 6: Just as created things do not go out from God by a necessity of nature, or a natural power, so too neither do they do so by a necessity of knowledge. Rather, they do so through the freedom of his will, wherein the account of causality is completed. And therefore it is not the case that whenever he has known something, he created it, but whenever he has willed it. Articulus 2 Article 2