Distinctio 39 Distinction 39 Cujus modi causa sit divina scientia How divine knowledge is the cause of what is known Divisio textus Division of the text Hic ostendit, cujus modi causa sit divina scientia; et dividitur in partes duas: in prima inquirit, utrum sit invariabilis; in secunda, utrum sit universalis, ibi: ei vero quod praedictum est . . . , videtur obviare quod ait Hieronymus. Here he shows in what manner the divine knowledge is the cause. And it is divided into two parts: in the first, he asks whether it is invariable; in the second, whether it is universal, at as to what was said above, . . . it seems to be contradicted by what Jerome says. Prima in duas: in prima movet quaestionem, et objicit contra veritatem; in secunda determinat, ibi: ad quod dicimus, quod Dei scientia omnino immutabilis est; et dividitur in duas: in prima determinat concedendo ea quae ponunt variationem ex parte scitorum, et non ex parte scientiae; in secunda determinat negando quae ex parte scientiae variationem important, ibi: hic opponitur a quibusdam ita. The first is divided into two: in the first, he presents the question, and objects against its veracity; in the second, he considers it, at to which we say that God’s knowledge is entirely unchangeable. And this latter is divided into two: in the first, he considers it by conceding the things that posit a variation on the side of the things known, and not on the side of the knowledge; in the second, he considers it by denying the things that indicate variation on the side of the knowledge, at here some make the following objection. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo negat ea quae simpliciter neganda sunt; secundo ponit opinionem quorumdam qui concedunt quasdam locutiones, quae variationem scientiae significare videntur, retorquentes tamen ad varietatem scitorum, ibi: item a quibusdam dicitur Deum posse plura scire quam sciat. And regarding this latter he does two things: first, he denies the things that simply speaking should be denied; second, he asserts the opinion of some who concede certain expressions that appear to signify a variation in his knowledge, yet they deflect them toward the variation of the things known, at also, it is said by some that God can know more things than he knows. Ei vero quod praedictum est . . . , videtur obviare quod ait Hieronymus. Hic inquirit, utrum praescientia vel providentia Dei sit universalis causa omnium; et circa hoc tria facit: primo ponit objectionem; secundo determinat eam, ibi: ex tali itaque sensu illud dictum esse noverimus; tertio recapitulat, ibi: simul itaque et immutabiliter scit Deus omnia. As to what was said above, . . . it seems to be contradicted by what Jerome says. Here he is asking whether God’s foreknowledge or providence is the universal cause of all things. And about this he does three things: first, he presents an objection; second, he considers it, at and we know that Jerome’s statement is made in the sense; third, he recapitulates, at and so God knows simultaneously and unchangeably all things. Hic est duplex quaestio: Here there are two questions: prima de invariabilitate scientiae divinae; first, about the invariability of the divine knowledge; secunda de universalitate providentiae ejusdem. second, about the universality of its providence. Quaestio 1 Question 1 De invariabilitate scientiae divinae The invariability of the divine knowledge Circa primum tria quaeruntur: As regards the first, three things are asked: primo utrum Deus possit non scire illud quod scit; first, whether God is able not to know what he knows; secundo utrum possit aliquid scire quod non scit, vel plura quam scit; second, whether he is able to know what he does not know, or more things than he does know; tertio utrum Deus sciat infinita. third, whether God knows an infinity of things. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum Deus possit non scire illud quod est scitum ab eo Whether God is able not to know what he does know Circa primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit non scire illud quod scitum est ab eo; As regards the first, we proceed as follows. It seems that God is not able not to know what he knows. Quia, secundum Augustinum, lib. 26 Contra Faustum, cap. 4; Hieronymum, Ad Eustoch., epist. 22, de custod. virginitatis, et Philosophum in 6 Ethic., cap. 2, Deus non potest facere ut id quod est praeteritum, non fuerit. Sed cum dicitur: “hoc est scitum a Deo,” significatur ut praeteritum. Ergo non potest non esse scitum ab eo. Obj. 1: For according to Augustine, Jerome, and the Philosopher, God cannot make what is past not have been. But when one says, “this was known by God,” it is signified as past. Therefore it cannot be unknown to God. Si dicas, quod est praeteritum dependens a futuro, hoc nihil est, ut prius dictum est, quia non importatur in participio tantum ordo ad futurum, ut in hoc participio “futurum”; sed etiam actus quidam. Obj. 2: If you say that the past is dependent on the what-is-going-to-be, this is no help, as was said before, since in the participle “going-to-be” there is indicated not only an order to what-is-going-to-be, but also a certain act as well. Praeterea, omne quod est, necesse est esse dum est, ut dicit Philosophus, 1 Perih., cap. ult. Sed scire Dei non est nisi ut ens actu, cum mensuretur aeternitate, in qua nihil praeterit vel succedit. Ergo videtur quod non possit non esse; et ita Deus non possit non scire illud quod scit. Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything that is so is necessarily so when it is so, as the Philosopher says. But God’s knowing is only a being in act, since it is measured by eternity, wherein there is no past or succession. Therefore it seems that it is not able not to be, and thus, God is not able not to know what he does know. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum, in 2 De generat., omne aeternum est necessarium. Sed quodlibet scire Dei est aeternum. Ergo est necessarium; ergo ab aequipollenti non potest non esse. Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, everything eternal is necessary. But God’s knowing anything at all is eternal. Therefore it is necessary; and therefore, equivalently, it cannot not be. Scire ipsius est ipsum esse ejus. Sed ipse non potest non esse. Ergo non potest non scire id quod scit. Obj. 5: Furthermore, his knowing is his very existence. But the latter cannot not be. Therefore he cannot not know what he knows. Sed contra, quidquid Deus scit, operando operatur. Sed potest non operari quod operatur. Ergo potest non scire illud quod scit. On the contrary, whatever God knows he brings about by acting. But he is able to not-bring about what he does bring about. Therefore he is able not to know what he knows. Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut attributa divina differunt secundum proprias rationes, et sunt tamen una res, ita etiam actus attributorum sequuntur rationes eorum; et ideo alicui actui attribuitur quod alteri non convenit. Dicimus enim Deum scire quod non vult, vel quod non facit. Est ergo haec ratio voluntatis ut libere actum suum producat; quod enim fit voluntate, non fit necessitate, ut dicit Augustinus; unde potest velle et non velle. Sed hoc intelligendum est, dum actus est in egrediendo a voluntate: quia postquam transit, non subjacet facultati ejus; non enim potest non voluisse quod voluit. Similiter non subjacet facultati ejus ut utrumque simul producat; non enim potest simul velle et non velle. Et hoc non tantum intelligendum est de actu ipsius voluntatis immediato; sed de omnibus actibus imperatis a voluntate, sicut cogitare, loqui, et hujusmodi. I answer that just as the divine attributes differ according to their proper accounts, and yet are still one reality, so too the acts of the attributes follow on their accounts, and therefore to one act is attributed what does not befit another. For we say God does know a thing that he does not will, or that he does not do. Therefore this is the account of the will: that one freely bring forth his own act; for what comes to be voluntarily does not come to be necessarily, as Augustine says, so one can will and not will. But this should be understood as about the act when it is going out from the will, for after it does so it is no longer subject to the will’s agency—for one cannot not have willed what he has willed. Likewise, it is not subject to the will’s agency that it bring forth both at once, for one cannot will and not will at once. And this should be understood as not only about the immediate act of the will itself, but about all acts commanded by the will, like thinking, speaking, and such. Cum igitur actus divinae voluntatis semper sit in actu, et non pertransiens in futurum, semper est quasi in egrediendo a voluntate; et ideo manet libertas divinae voluntatis respectu ipsius. Unde potest dici, quod Deus potest non velle hoc; non tamen potest ut simul velit et non velit, vel ut nunc velit et postmodum non velit, accipiendo “post” et “nunc” ex parte voluntatis, quia mutabilis esse non potest. Et quia dictum est supra de actu divinae scientiae, secundum quod est causa operis ejus ut informans ipsum, quod est imperatus a voluntate; ideo potest concedi quod Deus hoc modo potest non praescire. Non tamen potest esse ut simul praesciat et non praesciat, vel quod nunc praesciat et postmodum non praesciat, loquendo de praescientia ex parte scientiae tantum; ita quod non fiat vis de ratione futuri; quia quod modo est futurum, postea erit praesens, et tunc non erit praescitum, sed erit scitum. Therefore, since the act of the divine will is always in act, and not progressive into what is going to be but is always, as it were, coming forth from the will, therefore the divine will’s freedom with respect to its very act endures. Whence it can be said that God is able not to will this, yet it is not possible that he simultaneously have willed and have not willed it, or now he has willed it and later did not will it—taking “later” and “now” on the side of the will, because it is not able to be changeable. And because it was said earlier, regarding the act of the divine knowledge insofar as it is a cause of his activity as informing it, that it is commanded by the will, therefore it can be conceded that God in this way is able not to foreknow. Nevertheless it cannot be that he simultaneously foreknows and does not foreknow, or that he now foreknows and later does not foreknow—speaking of foreknowledge only on the side of the knowledge, such that the force of the account of the future would not come to pass; for what now is the future later will be the present, and then it will not be foreknown, but known. Et ideo dicendum est secundum distinctionem Magistri, quod si accipiatur conjunctim, Deus non potest non scire quod scitum est ab eo: si autem accipiatur divisim, sic est in potestate sua scire et non scire; et haec libertas demonstratur cum dicitur quod Deus potest hoc non scire. And therefore one should say that, following the Master’s distinction, if it is taken conjunctively, God is not able not to know what he does know; but if it is taken disjunctively, then in this way it is within his power to know and not to know, and this freedom is demonstrated when one says that God is able not to know this. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod actus scientiae divinae nunquam transit in praeteritum, sed semper est in actu: et ideo semper manet in libertate voluntatis. Reply Obj. 1: The act of the divine knowledge never passes into the past, but always remains in act. And therefore it always remains within the freedom of his will. Ad secundum dicendum, quod illa solutio nihil valet. Reply Obj. 2: The solution the objector refutes is indeed invalid. Ad tertium dicendum, quod illud quod est, necesse est esse dum est; absolute tamen loquendo, non necesse est esse. Ita et Deo scire necesse est dum scit; non tamen necesse est eum scire nisi necessitate immobilitatis, quae voluntatis libertatem non excludit; et haec libertas significatur cum dicitur, quod Deus potest hoc non scire vel non velle. Reply Obj. 3: What is so is necessarily so while it is so, but still absolutely speaking it is not necessarily so. And so too God’s knowing is necessary when he knows, but his knowing is not necessary except by a necessity of immobility, and this latter does not exclude the freedom of his will. And this freedom is what is being signified when one says that God is able not to know or not to will this thing. Ad quartum dicendum, quod omne aeternum est necessarium necessitate immobilitatis, quae libertatem voluntatis non excludit, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 4: Everything eternal is necessary by a necessity of immobility, which does not exclude the freedom of the will, as was said earlier. Ad quintum dicendum, quod licet esse et scire sint idem secundum rem, tamen scire sequitur voluntatem ut imperatum ab ipsa, esse autem non; et ideo esse suum non subjacet libertati voluntatis, sicut scire operativum creaturae. Reply Obj. 5: Although his to-be and his to-know are the same according to reality, still his knowing follows his will as commanded by it, but his being does not. And therefore his being is not subject to the freedom of his will, the way his knowing that brings about creation is. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum Deus possit scire aliquid quod nescit Whether God is able to know something that he does not know Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit scire aliquid quod nescit. To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that God is not able to know something he does not already know.