Quaestio 1 Question 1 De invariabilitate scientiae divinae The invariability of the divine knowledge Circa primum tria quaeruntur: As regards the first, three things are asked: primo utrum Deus possit non scire illud quod scit; first, whether God is able not to know what he knows; secundo utrum possit aliquid scire quod non scit, vel plura quam scit; second, whether he is able to know what he does not know, or more things than he does know; tertio utrum Deus sciat infinita. third, whether God knows an infinity of things. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum Deus possit non scire illud quod est scitum ab eo Whether God is able not to know what he does know Circa primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit non scire illud quod scitum est ab eo; As regards the first, we proceed as follows. It seems that God is not able not to know what he knows. Quia, secundum Augustinum, lib. 26 Contra Faustum, cap. 4; Hieronymum, Ad Eustoch., epist. 22, de custod. virginitatis, et Philosophum in 6 Ethic., cap. 2, Deus non potest facere ut id quod est praeteritum, non fuerit. Sed cum dicitur: “hoc est scitum a Deo,” significatur ut praeteritum. Ergo non potest non esse scitum ab eo. Obj. 1: For according to Augustine, Jerome, and the Philosopher, God cannot make what is past not have been. But when one says, “this was known by God,” it is signified as past. Therefore it cannot be unknown to God. Si dicas, quod est praeteritum dependens a futuro, hoc nihil est, ut prius dictum est, quia non importatur in participio tantum ordo ad futurum, ut in hoc participio “futurum”; sed etiam actus quidam. Obj. 2: If you say that the past is dependent on the what-is-going-to-be, this is no help, as was said before, since in the participle “going-to-be” there is indicated not only an order to what-is-going-to-be, but also a certain act as well. Praeterea, omne quod est, necesse est esse dum est, ut dicit Philosophus, 1 Perih., cap. ult. Sed scire Dei non est nisi ut ens actu, cum mensuretur aeternitate, in qua nihil praeterit vel succedit. Ergo videtur quod non possit non esse; et ita Deus non possit non scire illud quod scit. Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything that is so is necessarily so when it is so, as the Philosopher says. But God’s knowing is only a being in act, since it is measured by eternity, wherein there is no past or succession. Therefore it seems that it is not able not to be, and thus, God is not able not to know what he does know. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum, in 2 De generat., omne aeternum est necessarium. Sed quodlibet scire Dei est aeternum. Ergo est necessarium; ergo ab aequipollenti non potest non esse. Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, everything eternal is necessary. But God’s knowing anything at all is eternal. Therefore it is necessary; and therefore, equivalently, it cannot not be. Scire ipsius est ipsum esse ejus. Sed ipse non potest non esse. Ergo non potest non scire id quod scit. Obj. 5: Furthermore, his knowing is his very existence. But the latter cannot not be. Therefore he cannot not know what he knows. Sed contra, quidquid Deus scit, operando operatur. Sed potest non operari quod operatur. Ergo potest non scire illud quod scit. On the contrary, whatever God knows he brings about by acting. But he is able to not-bring about what he does bring about. Therefore he is able not to know what he knows. Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut attributa divina differunt secundum proprias rationes, et sunt tamen una res, ita etiam actus attributorum sequuntur rationes eorum; et ideo alicui actui attribuitur quod alteri non convenit. Dicimus enim Deum scire quod non vult, vel quod non facit. Est ergo haec ratio voluntatis ut libere actum suum producat; quod enim fit voluntate, non fit necessitate, ut dicit Augustinus; unde potest velle et non velle. Sed hoc intelligendum est, dum actus est in egrediendo a voluntate: quia postquam transit, non subjacet facultati ejus; non enim potest non voluisse quod voluit. Similiter non subjacet facultati ejus ut utrumque simul producat; non enim potest simul velle et non velle. Et hoc non tantum intelligendum est de actu ipsius voluntatis immediato; sed de omnibus actibus imperatis a voluntate, sicut cogitare, loqui, et hujusmodi. I answer that just as the divine attributes differ according to their proper accounts, and yet are still one reality, so too the acts of the attributes follow on their accounts, and therefore to one act is attributed what does not befit another. For we say God does know a thing that he does not will, or that he does not do. Therefore this is the account of the will: that one freely bring forth his own act; for what comes to be voluntarily does not come to be necessarily, as Augustine says, so one can will and not will. But this should be understood as about the act when it is going out from the will, for after it does so it is no longer subject to the will’s agency—for one cannot not have willed what he has willed. Likewise, it is not subject to the will’s agency that it bring forth both at once, for one cannot will and not will at once. And this should be understood as not only about the immediate act of the will itself, but about all acts commanded by the will, like thinking, speaking, and such. Cum igitur actus divinae voluntatis semper sit in actu, et non pertransiens in futurum, semper est quasi in egrediendo a voluntate; et ideo manet libertas divinae voluntatis respectu ipsius. Unde potest dici, quod Deus potest non velle hoc; non tamen potest ut simul velit et non velit, vel ut nunc velit et postmodum non velit, accipiendo “post” et “nunc” ex parte voluntatis, quia mutabilis esse non potest. Et quia dictum est supra de actu divinae scientiae, secundum quod est causa operis ejus ut informans ipsum, quod est imperatus a voluntate; ideo potest concedi quod Deus hoc modo potest non praescire. Non tamen potest esse ut simul praesciat et non praesciat, vel quod nunc praesciat et postmodum non praesciat, loquendo de praescientia ex parte scientiae tantum; ita quod non fiat vis de ratione futuri; quia quod modo est futurum, postea erit praesens, et tunc non erit praescitum, sed erit scitum. Therefore, since the act of the divine will is always in act, and not progressive into what is going to be but is always, as it were, coming forth from the will, therefore the divine will’s freedom with respect to its very act endures. Whence it can be said that God is able not to will this, yet it is not possible that he simultaneously have willed and have not willed it, or now he has willed it and later did not will it—taking “later” and “now” on the side of the will, because it is not able to be changeable. And because it was said earlier, regarding the act of the divine knowledge insofar as it is a cause of his activity as informing it, that it is commanded by the will, therefore it can be conceded that God in this way is able not to foreknow. Nevertheless it cannot be that he simultaneously foreknows and does not foreknow, or that he now foreknows and later does not foreknow—speaking of foreknowledge only on the side of the knowledge, such that the force of the account of the future would not come to pass; for what now is the future later will be the present, and then it will not be foreknown, but known. Et ideo dicendum est secundum distinctionem Magistri, quod si accipiatur conjunctim, Deus non potest non scire quod scitum est ab eo: si autem accipiatur divisim, sic est in potestate sua scire et non scire; et haec libertas demonstratur cum dicitur quod Deus potest hoc non scire. And therefore one should say that, following the Master’s distinction, if it is taken conjunctively, God is not able not to know what he does know; but if it is taken disjunctively, then in this way it is within his power to know and not to know, and this freedom is demonstrated when one says that God is able not to know this. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod actus scientiae divinae nunquam transit in praeteritum, sed semper est in actu: et ideo semper manet in libertate voluntatis. Reply Obj. 1: The act of the divine knowledge never passes into the past, but always remains in act. And therefore it always remains within the freedom of his will. Ad secundum dicendum, quod illa solutio nihil valet. Reply Obj. 2: The solution the objector refutes is indeed invalid. Ad tertium dicendum, quod illud quod est, necesse est esse dum est; absolute tamen loquendo, non necesse est esse. Ita et Deo scire necesse est dum scit; non tamen necesse est eum scire nisi necessitate immobilitatis, quae voluntatis libertatem non excludit; et haec libertas significatur cum dicitur, quod Deus potest hoc non scire vel non velle. Reply Obj. 3: What is so is necessarily so while it is so, but still absolutely speaking it is not necessarily so. And so too God’s knowing is necessary when he knows, but his knowing is not necessary except by a necessity of immobility, and this latter does not exclude the freedom of his will. And this freedom is what is being signified when one says that God is able not to know or not to will this thing. Ad quartum dicendum, quod omne aeternum est necessarium necessitate immobilitatis, quae libertatem voluntatis non excludit, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 4: Everything eternal is necessary by a necessity of immobility, which does not exclude the freedom of the will, as was said earlier. Ad quintum dicendum, quod licet esse et scire sint idem secundum rem, tamen scire sequitur voluntatem ut imperatum ab ipsa, esse autem non; et ideo esse suum non subjacet libertati voluntatis, sicut scire operativum creaturae. Reply Obj. 5: Although his to-be and his to-know are the same according to reality, still his knowing follows his will as commanded by it, but his being does not. And therefore his being is not subject to the freedom of his will, the way his knowing that brings about creation is. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum Deus possit scire aliquid quod nescit Whether God is able to know something that he does not know Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit scire aliquid quod nescit. To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that God is not able to know something he does not already know. Nihil enim existentium cognoscit Deus nisi per ideam. Sed non potest aliqua idea in ipso esse quae non sit: quia cum idea sit forma rei in Deo existens, non potest intelligi quod aliqua forma adveniat Deo sine mutatione ejus. Ergo non potest scire ea quae non scit. Obj. 1: For God knows existing things only through an idea. But there cannot be any idea in existence itself that does not exist; for, because an idea is the form of a reality existing within God, it cannot be understood that some form might accrue to God without a change in him. Therefore he is not able to know things he does not know. Praeterea, scientia realiter refertur ad scibile, et dependet ad ipsum. Sed mutato eo quod ad aliquid dependet, etiam ipsum mutatur. Ergo videtur quod si aliquid posset esse scitum a Deo quod non est modo scitum ab eo, scientia ejus possit mutari. Obj. 2: Furthermore, knowledge is really referred to the knowable, and it depends on it. But if that on which a thing depends changes, it too changes. Therefore it seems that if something could be known by God that is not now known by him, then his knowledge could change. Praeterea, quantitas scientiae attenditur secundum quantitatem scibilium, sicut quantitas virtutis secundum quantitatem objectorum. Ergo ad pluralitatem scibilium sequitur augmentum scientiae. Sed si posset scire aliquid quod non scit, posset plura scire quam sciat. Ergo posset augeri ejus scientia, quod est impossibile. Ergo et primum. Obj. 3: Furthermore, quantity of knowledge is viewed according to the quantity of the things it knows, as the quantity of a power is viewed according to the quantity of its objects. Therefore a growth of knowledge follows on a plurality of knowable things. But if he could know something that he does not know, he could know more things than he does know. Therefore his knowledge could grow—which is impossible. Therefore the same thing follows. Praeterea, supra dictum est, quod Deus non tantum scit ea quae sunt, sed et ea quae non sunt. Ab his autem nihil potest aliud esse, cum nihil sit medium inter ens et non ens. Ergo non potest aliquid aliud scire ab illis quae scit. Obj. 4: Furthermore, above it was said that God knows not only the things that are, but also things that are not. Now, besides these there can be nothing else, since there is no middle between being and non-being. Therefore he is not able to know anything other than the things he knows. Sed contra, Deus potest operari quod non operatur. Sed quidquid operatur, operatur per suam scientiam. Ergo potest scire aliquid aliud ab his quae scit. On the contrary, God is able to bring about what he does not bring about. But whatever he brings about he brings about through his own knowledge. Therefore he is able to know something other than the things he knows. Respondeo dicendum, quod Deus dicitur scire aliquid dupliciter; vel scientia visionis, secundum quod videt res quae sunt vel erunt vel fuerunt non solum in potentia causarum suarum, sed etiam in esse proprio; vel scientia simplicis intelligentiae, secundum quod scit ea quae nullo tempore sunt, esse in potentia causarum suarum. De hac igitur loquendo, Deus non potest scire aliquid aliud ab his quae scit; quia nihil potest esse aliud ab his quae sunt et quae possunt esse. Loquendo autem de scientia visionis de qua hic Magister loquitur, sic potest aliquid aliud videre ab his quae videt, secundum quod potest ei quod habet esse in potentia sua tantum, dare esse in propria natura. I answer that God is said to know something in two ways: either with a knowledge of vision, insofar as he sees realities that are or will be or were, not only in the power of their causes, but even in their own proper existence; or with a knowledge of simple understanding, insofar as he knows things that at no time exist as being in the power of their causes. Therefore, in speaking about this latter, God is not able to know anything other than the things that he does know; for nothing is able to exist other than the things that exist and can exist. However, in speaking of his knowledge of vision—which is what the Master is talking about—in this way he is able to see something other than the things he sees, insofar as he is able to give existence in its proper nature to a thing that has existence only within his power. Si tamen hoc in esse produceret, ab aeterno ab eo esset praescitum; et ideo distinguendum est hoc etiam sicut et supra. Si enim intelligatur conjunctim, sic Deus non potest scire quod non scit: quia ista duo sunt incompossibilia, quod Deus sciat aliquid quod ab aeterno nescivit. Si autem intelligatur divisim, sic est verum, et designatur potestas libertatis, ut supra dictum est, et non mutabilitas scientiae vel voluntatis. Nevertheless, if he were to bring this thing into existence, he would have foreknown it from eternity. And therefore one should make the same distinction as before in the previous article. For if it is understood conjunctively, then God is not able to know what he does not know, since these two things—that God might know something that he did not know from eternity—cannot be put together. However, if it is understood disjunctively, then it is true, and the power of his freedom is being designated, as was said in the previous article, and not the changeability of his knowledge or will. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod idea secundum essentiam est una, et non distinguitur nisi per respectum ad diversa. Unde si poneretur aliqua alia res, non fieret additio alicujus formae, sed respectus tantum. Reply Obj. 1: The idea whereby God knows is according to its essence one, and is distinguished only through its reference to diverse things. Whence were some other reality posited, there would not be any addition of form, but only of reference. Vel dicendum melius, quod sicut ipsum scire est subjectum libertati voluntatis, ita et idea, secundum quod ad ipsam terminatur actus divinae scientiae, sicut scientia artificis ad formam artificiati quam excogitat: et ideo similis est ratio de idea et de actu sciendi. Sicut enim non potest poni quod actus sciendi sit in eo, et quod non fuerit; ita non potest designari quod idea sit in eo et non fuerit; tamen respectu utriusque potest designari libertas voluntatis. Or it could be said, and better, that just as he knows his very knowing as subject to the freedom of his will, so too he knows his idea insofar as the act of divine knowledge is completed at it; this is like how the knowledge of the artisan is completed at the form of the artwork that he thinks out. And therefore the account of the idea is like that of the act of knowing. For just as one cannot assert that there be an act of knowing in him and that it did not exist before, so too it cannot be designated that there be an idea in him and that it did not exist before. Yet relative to both, the freedom of his will can be designated. Ad secundum dicendum, quod scientia nostra dependet a scibili, sed scibile dependet a scientia Dei; unde sicut scientia nostra variatur, scibili immobili permanente; ita scibile mutatur, scientia Dei non mutata. Reply Obj. 2: Our knowledge depends on what is knowable, whereas the knowable depends on God’s knowledge. Whence, just as our knowledge varies even though the knowable remains immobile, so the knowable changes even though God’s knowledge does not change.