Quaestio 2 Question 2 De divina providentia Divine providence Deinde quaeritur de divina providentia et circa; hoc duo quaeruntur: Next, we ask about divine providence. And regarding this, two things are asked: primo quid sit; first, what is it; secundo utrum sit omnium. second, whether it pertains to all things. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum providentia pertineat ad scientiam Whether providence pertains to knowledge Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod providentia pertineat ad scientiam. To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that providence pertains to his knowledge. Sicut enim dicit Boetius in 5 De consolatione, pros. 6, providentia Dei dicitur, quia porro videt quasi a specula aeternitatis. Sed videre pertinet ad scientiam. Ergo videtur quod et providentia. Obj. 1: For, as Boethius says, “providence” is said of God because he sees what is distant (porro videt), as though from the watchtower of eternity. But that seems to pertain to knowledge. Therefore it seems so does providence. Item, videtur quod ad omnipotentiam. Dicitur enim Sapient. 14:3: tu autem Pater gubernas omnia providentia. Sed gubernatio pertinet ad potentiam, ut habetur ad Hebr. 1:3: portansque omnia verbo virtutis suae. Videtur ergo quod et providentia. Obj. 2: Furthermore, it seems to pertain to omnipotence. For Wisdom 14:3 says, it is thy providence, O Father, that steers the course of all things. But steering pertains to power, as is noted in Hebrews 1:3, upholding the universe by his word of power. Therefore it seems also that providence pertains to omnipotence. Item, videtur quod ad voluntatem. Sicut enim dicit Damascenus, 2 Fid. orthod., cap. 29, providentia est divina voluntas secundum quam omnia in finem convenientem deductionem accipiunt; et ita videtur expresse quod ad voluntatem pertineat. Obj. 3: Furthermore, it seems to pertain to his will. For, as Damascene says, providence is the divine will according to which all things receive guidance to the fitting end. And such seems expressly to pertain to the will. Item, videtur quod sit idem quod dispositio. Sicut enim dicit Boetius, De consol., lib. 4, pros. 6, providentia est ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, per quam cuncta disponit. Sed disponere est dispositionis. Ergo videtur quod dispositio divina et providentia idem sint. Obj. 4: Furthermore, it seems the same as the plan. For, as Boethius says, providence is the reason or type established in the highest principle of all things whereby he plans out all things. But to plan things out belongs to a plan. Therefore it seems that the divine plan and divine providence are the same thing. Item, videtur quod sit idem quod fatum. Comparatio enim alicujus ad diversa non diversificat ejus essentiam. Sed fatum et providentia non differunt nisi secundum comparationem ad diversa: sicut enim dicit Boetius, ubi supra, modus quo res geruntur cum ad divinam cognitionem refertur providentia dicitur; cum vero ad res ipsas quae geruntur, fatum vocatur. Ergo videtur quod providentia et fatum non differant per essentiam. Obj. 5: Furthermore, it seems that it is the same thing as fate. For something’s relation to diverse things does not make its essence diverse. But fate and providence differ only in their relation to diverse things; for Boethius says that the manner in which realities are brought about is called “providence” when referred to the divine knowledge, but “fate” when referred to the very realities that are brought about. Therefore it seems that providence and fate are not essentially different things. Respondeo dicendum, quod ista tria, dispositio, scientia et providentia, se habent per additionem unius ad alterum. I answer that these three things—plan, knowledge, and providence—are related to each other by way of addition. Cum enim Deus de rebus creatis scientiam quasi practicam habeat, ad modum scientiae artificis ejus scientia consideranda est. Sciendum est ergo, quod artifex praeconcipiendo artificiatum suum considerat finem primo; et deinde considerat ordinem rei quam facere intendit, ad finem illum, et ordinem etiam partium ad invicem, sicut quod fundamentum sit sub pariete, et paries sub tecto; et iste ordo partium ad invicem ordinatur ulterius ad finem domus. Tertio oportet quod consideret ea quibus promoveatur ad consecutionem finis, et ut tollantur ea quae possunt impedire finem; unde excogitat sustentamenta domus per aliquas appendicias et fenestras, et hujusmodi, quibus domus sit apta ad habitationem. For because God has knowledge of created realities that is, as it were, practical, his knowledge should be considered according to the mode of the artisan’s knowledge. Therefore one must note that an artisan, by conceiving in advance his artwork, considers primarily the end; only then does he consider the order of the reality that he intends to make to that end, and also the order of the parts to each other, like that the foundation will be under the walls, and the walls under the roof; and this order of the parts to each other is further ordered to the end of the house. Third, he must consider things that promote the attainment of the end, even such that he might remove things that can impede the end; whence he thinks through things that supplement the house by the addition of certain shrubs, windows, and the like, by which the house is suitable for habitation. Ista ergo excogitatio nominatur nomine scientiae, ratione solius cognitionis et non ratione alicujus operationis. Unde est et finis, et eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sed ratione ordinis excogitati in re operanda, vocatur nomine dispositionis: quia dispositio ordinem quemdam significat; unde dispositio dicitur generationis ordinatio. Sed ratione eorum quae promovent in finem, dicitur providentia: providus enim dicitur qui bene conjectat de conferentibus in finem, et de his quae impedire possunt. This is why this thinking through is named with the name “knowledge,” by reason only of the cognition and not by reason of any activity. Whence also it belongs to the end and things ordered to the end. But by reason of the order thought out in the thing to be accomplished, it is given the name “plan.” For “plan” signifies a certain order, so the plan is said to be the ordination of the generation. But by reason of the things that promote the end it is called “providence”; for he is called “provident” who makes good conjectures about things that contribute to the end, and even about things that can impede it. Unde etiam in Deo scientia dicitur, secundum quod habet cognitionem et sui ipsius, et eorum quae facit. Sed dispositio dicitur ratione duplicis ordinis quem ponit in rebus; scilicet rei ad rem, secundum quod juvant se invicem ad consequendum finem ultimum; et iterum totius universi ad ipsum Deum: sicut etiam Philosophus ponit in 11 Metaph., ubi etiam ponit exemplum de ordine partium exercitus ad invicem, et ad bonum ducis. Providentia autem dicitur secundum quod rebus ita ordinatis attribuit ea quae ordinem conservant et propellit omnium inordinationem. Whence in God as well it is called “knowledge” insofar as he has cognition both of his very self and of the things that he does. But it is called the “plan” by reason of the double order that he places in realities—that of one reality to another reality, insofar as they help each other to attain the ultimate end, and also of the whole universe to God himself; this is as the Philosopher also asserts, where he even proposes an example of the order of the parts of an army both toward each other and to the good of the general. However, it is called “providence” insofar as to the realities so ordered he adds things that preserve the order, and repels disorder from all things. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod providentia et dispositio diversimode consideratae pertinent ad scientiam, voluntatem et potentiam: quod sic patet ex simili inducto. Potest enim aliquis artifex cognitionem habere de artificiatis speculative tantum, sine hoc quod operari intendat: et sic providentia et dispositio ejus pertinet tantum ad scientiam. Secundum autem quod ulterius ordinat in opus cum proposito exequendi, pertinet ad scientiam et voluntatem. Secundum autem quod exequitur in opere, sic pertinet ad scientiam, voluntatem et potentiam per quam operatur. Ita etiam in Deo est. Patet etiam quod primis duobus modis accepta sunt aeterna, sed tertio modo sunt ex tempore. Et ipsa executio providentiae, gubernatio dicitur. Reply Obj. 1: Providence and a plan considered in diverse ways pertain to knowledge, will, and power. This is clear as follows from the likeness mentioned. For any artisan can have a knowledge of artwork that is merely speculative, without intending to make it; and in this way his providence and plan pertain only to knowledge. However, insofar as he further orders it to the work with the design of executing it, it pertains to knowledge and will. Moreover, insofar as he executes the knowledge in the work, in this way it pertains to the knowledge, will, and power whereby it was brought about. So it is in God as well. It is also clear that, if taken in the first two modes, they are eternal, but taken in the third mode, they are from time. And the very execution of providence is called “governance.” Unde patet solutio ad secundum et tertium; et similiter ad quartum: quia providentia includit dispositionem et addit, et propter hoc etiam per providentiam disponere dicitur. Reply Obj. 2–4: Whereby the solution to these is clear. For providence includes a plan, and adds to it; on account of that he is even said to plan things through providence. Ad quintum dicendum, quod providentia et fatum differunt per essentiam: sicut enim forma domus est aliud per essentiam, secundum quod est in mente artificis ubi nomen artis habet, et secundum quod est in lapidibus et lignis ubi artificiatum dicitur; ita etiam ratio gubernationis rerum aliud esse habet in mente divina, ubi providentia dicitur, et aliud in causis secundis, quarum officio gubernatio divina expletur: ex quibus fatum dicitur a “for faris”; Reply Obj. 5: Providence and fate do differ essentially. For the form of a house is one thing insofar as it is in the artisan’s mind, where it has the name “art,” and essentially something else insofar as it is in the stones and wood, where it is called “artwork.” In just the same way the type of the governance of realities has one existence in the divine mind, where it is called “providence,” and a different one in the secondary causes to which belongs the duty of fulfilling the divine governance, due to which things it is called “fate,” from “I declare, you declare” (for, faris). vel quia est quoddam effatum divinae ordinationis, sicut verbum vocale est quoddam effatum interioris conceptus: vel ex eo quod ex harum consideratione causarum fari solebant antiquitus de rebus futuris, sicut ex consideratione motus caeli praecipue. Or it is so named because it is a certain utterance (effatum) of the divine ordination, just as a vocalized word is a certain utterance of an interior concept; or because due to a consideration of these causes, the ancients had a custom of making assertions (fari) about future realities, as was done especially from the consideration of the motions of the heavens. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum providentia sit omnium Whether providence is over all things Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnium sit providentia. To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that providence is not over all things. Ad providentiam enim pertinet remotio eorum quae impediunt a fine. Sed malum dicitur per deordinationem a fine. Cum igitur multa mala sint in universo, videtur quod non omnia providentiae divinae subjaceant. Obj. 1: For removing things that impede the end pertains to providence. But a thing is called evil through its deviation from order to the end. Therefore, since there are many evils in the universe, it seems that not all things are subject to divine providence. Praeterea, nihil quod casu fit, est provisum, quia casus dicitur inopinatus rei eventus, et secundum Philosophum, in 3 Physic., est in his quae aguntur propter aliquid, cum aliud contingat praeter id quod intendebatur. Sed multa fiunt casu in mundo, ut probat Philosophus in 6 Metaph., alias omnia ex necessitate contingerent, nisi causae aliquae deficerent ut in minori parte, quod casum inducit. Ergo non omnia sunt provisa a Deo. Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing that occurs by chance is provided for; for the unexpected outcome of a thing is called “chance,” and according to the Philosopher, it is among things that act for the sake of something, when it happens outside what was intended. But many things in the world occur by chance, as the Philosopher proves; otherwise all things would happen by necessity, unless certain causes were to fail on occasion, which brings in chance. Therefore not all things are provided for by God. Praeterea, omne quod est provisum, est ordinatum in unum. Sed liberum arbitrium non est ordinatum in unum, sed se habet ad utrumlibet. Ergo ea quae sunt a libero arbitrio, providentiae divinae non subjacent. Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything that is provided for is ordered to one thing. But free decision is not ordered to one thing; rather, it is open toward each option. Therefore things that are from free decision are not subject to divine providence. Praeterea, omne quod est provisum, consequitur finem ut in pluribus, nisi sit providentia errans. Sed malum invenitur ut in pluribus, quod est secundum exitum a fine. Ergo universum providentia non regitur. Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that is provided for attains its end for the most part, unless the providence makes a mistake. But evil, which occurs according to a deviation from the end, is found to occur for the most part. Therefore the universe is not ruled by providence. Praeterea, providentiae proprium est ordinare. Sed multa inordinate contingunt in universo tam in rebus naturalibus sicut quod aestates sunt pluviosae et hiemes siccae, quam etiam in hominibus, ut quod justi ab impiis puniuntur, qui prosperitatibus affluunt, et multa hujusmodi. Ergo videtur quod universum providentia non regatur. Obj. 5: Furthermore, ordering is proper to providence. But many things in the universe happen in a disordered way, both in natural things, as when summers are rainy and winters are dry, and among men, as when the just are punished by the wicked, who overflow with prosperity, and the like. Therefore it seems that the universe is not ruled by providence. Praeterea, Habac. 1:14, dicitur: numquid facies homines ut pisces maris? Et hoc dicit admirando ea quae videntur inordinate in hominibus contingere. Ergo videtur quod ad bruta non se extendat Dei providentia. Obj. 6: Habakkuk 1:14 says, you make men like the fish of the sea, like crawling things that have no ruler. And he says this while wondering about the things that appear to happen without order among men. Therefore it seems that God’s providence does not extend to the beasts. Sed contra est quod habetur Sap. 12:13, quod cura ei est de omnibus. Sed nomine curae vel solicitudinis, providentia signatur. Ergo providentia ejus ad omnia se extendit. On the contrary, it is said in Wisdom 12:13 that he has care over all things. But in the name “care” or “solicitude,” providence is being signified. Therefore his providence extends to all things. Respondeo dicendum, quod haec quaestio fere ab omnibus sapientibus ventilata est, et ideo oportet diversorum positiones videre, ut erroribus evitatis, viam veritatis teneamus. I answer that this question has been blown about by all the wise, and therefore one must see the positions of the diverse thinkers, so that one might avoid the errors, and so that we might hold to the path of truth. Sciendum est ergo primo, quod quidam posuerunt nullius rei esse providentiam, sed omnia casu contingere: et ista fuit positio Democriti, et quasi omnium antiquorum naturalium, qui negaverunt causam agentem, et posuerunt tantum causam materialem. Sed haec positio satis efficaciter improbata est etiam ab ipsis philosophis. Therefore one should note first that some have asserted that there is providence over no reality, but all things happen by chance. This was the position of Democritus and almost all the ancient natural scientists, who denied agent causality and posited only material causality. But this position has been quite effectively disproved even by the philosophers themselves. Alii posuerunt providentiam esse quarumdam rerum et non omnium, et hi dividuntur in duas vias. Quaedam enim positio est, quod providentia Dei non se extendit nisi ad species, et non ad individua, nisi quae necessaria sunt; eo quod ponebant, illud quod exit cursum suum, providentiae legibus non subjacere; et ideo ea quae frequenter deficiunt a cursu ordinato, non sunt provisa, sicut particularia corruptibilia et generabilia; et ista opinio imponitur Aristoteli: quamvis ex verbis suis expresse haberi non possit, sed Commentator suus expresse ponit eam in 11 Metaph. Dicit enim, quod non est fas divinae bonitati habere sollicitudinem de singularibus nisi secundum quod habent communicationem in natura communi, sicut quod aranea sciat facere telam, et hujusmodi. Sed haec opinio expresse tollit judicium Dei de operibus hominum. Others have asserted that providence is over certain realities, but not over all. And this is divided into two paths. For there is a certain position that God’s providence extends only to species, and not to individuals, except ones that are necessary. They asserted that what deviates from its own course is not subject to the laws of providence, and therefore things that frequently fall away from the ordered course are not provided for, things like corruptible and generable particulars. And this opinion is imposed on Aristotle, even though it cannot be held expressly from his own words; but his Commentator expressly asserts this opinion in Metaphysics 11. For he says that it is not appropriate that the divine goodness have care over individuals, except insofar as they share in a common nature, like how a spider knows how to make a web, and the like. But this opinion expressly takes away God’s judgment over the deeds of men. Et ideo alia positio fuit, quod Deus providentiam habet de omnibus quae dicta sunt, et ulterius de individuis hominum, non tantum secundum quod communicant in specie, sed etiam secundum particulares actus eorum; et hanc ponit Rabbi Moyses, lib. 3, cap. 18, et rationem assignat ex eo quod in homine etiam particulari invenitur natura intellectualis, per quam comprehendit intellectu suo formam speciei, inquantum est species: quia intellectus attribuit intentionem universalitatis naturae apprehensae, quam non habet in rebus extra animam; et ideo individuum hominis etiam non deseritur a providentia quae est specierum, et praecipue quia communicat cum substantiis perpetuis, quarum etiam est per se providentia et secundum individua, et hoc quantum ad nobiliorem partem ejus, quae est intellectus. This is why there was another position, that God has providence over all the things mentioned, and even over individual men not merely insofar as they share in a species, but even according to their particular acts. Rabbi Moses asserts this, and assigns as a reason that the intellectual nature is found even in a particular man; through it he comprehends in his own intellect the form of the species as species. For the intellect attributes the intention of universality to the apprehended nature, which intention the nature does not have outside the soul in the realities themselves. And this is why the individual man is not abandoned by the providence that is over the species—and especially because he has something in common with the enduring substances, which providence also stands over through itself and according to the individuals; this is as regards the nobler part of man, which is his intellect. Sed quia divina cognitio aequaliter est singularium et universalium, ut supra habitum est, et ejus qui summe bonus est, est ordinare omnia ad finem, secundum quod nata sunt: non videtur conveniens non omnium etiam singularium providentiam esse. Et praeterea hoc est expresse contra sententiam Domini, Matth. 10, dicentis, quod unus ex passeribus non cadit in terram sine Patre caelesti, id est sine providentia ejus. But because the divine knowledge is equally of singulars and universals, as was said earlier, and it belongs to the one who is most of all good to order all things to the end insofar as their natures are apt for it, it does not seem fitting that providence not be over all individual things as well. And further, this is explicitly opposed to the Lord’s statement in Matthew 10:29, when he says not one sparrow falls to the earth without the heavenly Father’s consent, that is, without his providence.