Ad secundum dicendum, quod secundum hoc quod aliquid est impossibile, reducitur in illud principium: unde quod est impossibile per se, includit illud principium in se: et tale impossibile non potest ipse Deus facere, ut ex dictis patet; et quod est impossibile alicui, includit dictum principium in ordine sui ad illud, sicut patet cum dicitur quod impossibile est mortuum reviviscere; vivere enim per se possibile est, sed in corpore mortuo non est potentia ad hunc effectum inducendum, et ex hoc est impossibile. Unde si poneretur posse vivere ex sua virtute, simul poneretur ejusdem rei habere potentiam et impotentiam; nec hoc facit Deus quando mortuum resuscitat, ut corpus per propriam potentiam vivendi vivat, sed per potentiam quam sibi confert. Reply Obj. 2: Insofar as something is impossible, it is traced back to that principle. Whence what is impossible through itself includes that principle within itself. And such an impossibility God himself cannot do, as is clear from things said in the body of the article. And what is impossible for anything includes the stated principle in its own order relative to that thing. This is clear when one says that it is impossible for the dead to rise; for to live is possible through itself, but there is no power in a dead body to be brought to this effect, and due to that it is impossible. Whence if a corpse were claimed to be able to live from its own power, one would be claiming the same reality has a power and lacks the power. Nor does God, when he raises the dead, do so such that the body lives through its own power for living; rather, it lives through a power that he bestows on it. Ad tertium dicendum, quod praeterita non fuisse, potest accipi ut impossibile per accidens, et ut impossibile per se. Si enim accipiatur ipsa res quae dicitur praeterita, ut cursus Socratis, non habet impossibilitatem nisi per accidens suum, quod est extra rationem ejus, scilicet praeteritionem: et ipsa res in se considerata non dicitur Deo impossibilis. Potest enim hanc rem facere, scilicet quod Socrates non currat. Si autem accipiatur secundum quod stat sub hoc accidente quod est praeteritio, sic est impossibile per se: et hoc dicitur Deus facere non posse; et simile est de hoc quod dicitur: Socratem non currere dum currit est impossibile: quia ratione adjuncti habet impossibilitatem per se. Reply Obj. 3: “The past not to have been” can be taken as impossible incidentally or as impossible through itself. For if one takes the very reality that is said to be past, like Socrates’ running, making it not to have been holds an impossibility only incidentally, its pastness being outside its account. And the very reality considered in itself is not said to be impossible for God, for he can do this, that is, make it that Socrates not run. However, if it is taken insofar as it stands under this incidental pastness, then it is impossible through itself, and God is said not to be able to do this. And this is similar for what is being spoken about: “Socrates not running while he runs” is impossible. For by reason of what is joined to it, it holds an impossibility through itself. Ad quartum dicendum, quod Deus materiae primae indidit duplices rationes, scilicet causales vel obedientiales, per quas omnes natae sunt obedire Deo, ut fiat ex eis quidquid ei placuerit. Indidit etiam rationes seminales, scilicet principia activa, per quae effectus naturales exercentur, et contra has aliquando dicitur facere in miraculis quae facit. Sed proprie loquendo tunc etiam contra eas non facit, sed praeter eas, vel super eas. Super eas, quando inducit effectum in quem natura nullo modo attingere potest, sicut forma gloriae corporibus gloriosis. Praeter eas facit, quando effectum quem natura inducere potest, sine officio causarum naturalium producit, ut quando aquam in vinum convertit, Joan. 2. Sed contra eas non facit; quia non facit ut causa naturalis activa manens eadem secundum speciem, effectum essentialem alium habeat, ut quod ignis manens ignis infrigidet; sicut non potest esse quod simul sit eadem et alia. Sed bene potest destruere unam naturam et facere aliam, abjicere unam formam a materia et inducere aliam: sic enim et contra naturam aeris facit ignis, quando ipsum corrumpit. Reply Obj. 4: God has implanted two accounts in the first matter, namely, causal or obediential principles whereby all things are naturally apt to obey God, such that whatever might please him would come to be from them. He has also implanted seedlike principles—that is, active principles whereby natural effects are brought about; and he is sometimes said to act contrary to these in the miracles that he performs. But properly speaking, even then he does not act contrary to them, but alongside them, or above them. He acts above them when he brings about an effect to which nature can in no way reach, like the form of glory for the glorified bodies. He acts alongside them when he produces without the service of natural causes an effect that nature can bring about, like when in John 2 he converts water into wine. But he does not act contrary to them, since he does not make it that an active natural cause, while remaining the same in species, has a different essential effect, such as that a fire, while remaining a fire, might cool something, just as it cannot simultaneously be the same thing and different. But he can indeed destroy one nature and make another, remove one form from matter and induce another; for in this way fire acts contrary to the nature of air when it corrupts it. Ad quintum dicendum, quod sub distributione omnium non potest accipi nisi ens vel non ens. Sed ea quae diximus Deum non posse, neque sunt entia simpliciter, neque non entia. Reply Sed Contra 5: Under the scope of “all” one can only take being or non-being. But the things that we have said God is not capable of are neither beings simply speaking nor non-beings. Ad sextum dicendum, quod dicta impossibilia quamvis ore proferri possint, tamen corde concipi non possunt, ut probat Philosophus in 5 Metaph.; unde non proprie et perfecte sunt verba. Reply Sed Contra 6: The stated impossibilities, even though they can be uttered with the mouth, still cannot be conceived by the heart, as the Philosopher proves in Metaphysics 5. Whence they are not properly and perfectly words. Ad septimum dicendum, quod Deus non conjunxit humanam naturam divinae, ita quod esset eadem natura, vel quod una persona secundum idem esset Deus et homo, sed secundum aliud et aliud; et sic non est dubium quod contraria in eodem conjungere potest, quia et natura hoc facit. Reply Sed Contra 7: God did not join the human nature to a divine such that they might be the same nature, or that one person would be God and man in reference to the same thing, but in reference to different things. And thus there is no doubt that he can join contraries in the same thing, since even nature does this. Ad octavum dicendum, quod non est simile. Quia caecitas est privatio ipsius visus, unde includit in se negationem ejus: unde non potest facere Deus quod simul sit caecus et videns. Sed in ratione virginitatis non includitur negatio maternitatis, sed negatio conjunctionis ad virum; et ideo ratio non procedit. Reply Sed Contra 8: There is no likeness here. For blindness is the privation of sight itself, so it includes its negation within itself; whence God cannot make something be simultaneously blind and sighted. But the negation of motherhood is not included in the account of virginity; rather, the negation of sexual coupling with a man is. And therefore the argument does not follow. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum aliquid sit judicandum impossibile secundum causas inferiores Whether something should be judged impossible in reference to lower causes Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid non sit judicandum impossibile simpliciter secundum causas inferiores. To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that a thing should not be judged impossible simply speaking in reference to lower causes. Super illud 1 ad Cor. 1:20: stultam fecit Deus sapientiam hujus mundi, ita dicit Glossa: sapientiam hujus mundi, Deus stultitiam fecit, ostendens possibile quod ipsa impossibile judicabat. Sed sapientia hujus mundi judicat aliquid impossibile esse secundum causas inferiores. Ergo videtur quod hoc stultum sit dicere. Obj. 1: For in 1 Corinthians 1:20, which says, has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?, a Gloss says: God has made the wisdom of this world into foolishness, showing that what it judged to be impossible is possible. But the wisdom of this world judges something impossible in reference to lower causes. Therefore it seems that it is foolish to say this. Praeterea, constat quod causa inferior impium justificare non potest. Sed tamen non dicimus hoc esse impossibile, et similiter nec mundum fore antequam esset, quem natura facere non potest. Ergo videtur quod non sit aliquid dicendum impossibile ex eo quod causae inferiori est impossibile. Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is certain that a lower cause cannot justify the impious, but we nonetheless do not say this justification is impossible; and likewise before the world existed we do not say it was impossible for it to be going to exist, though nature cannot make it happen. Therefore it seems that something should not be called impossible by the fact that it is impossible for a lower cause. Praeterea, constat quod illuminare caecum et dare virgini conceptum naturae est impossibile; et tamen ista fieri potuerunt, et facta sunt. Ergo videtur quod secundum causas inferiores aliquid impossibile judicandum non sit. Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is certain that to illuminate the blind and to give conception to a virgin are impossible for nature, and yet they were able to occur, and did occur. Therefore it seems that something should not be judged impossible in reference to lower causes. Sed contra, nihil Deo est impossibile, ut dicitur Luc. 1. Si ergo secundum causam superiorem tantum aliquid impossibile diceretur et possibile, nihil impossibile foret. Ergo videtur quod sit judicandum de impossibilitate secundum causas inferiores. On the contrary, nothing is impossible for God, as is said in Luke 1:37. Therefore, if something were called impossible and possible only in reference to higher causes, then nothing would be impossible. Therefore it seems that one should judge impossibility in reference to lower causes. Praeterea, necessarium et impossibile sunt contraria. Sed aliquid non dicitur necessarium propter necessitatem causae primae, ut supra dictum est, quia sic omnia essent necessaria. Ergo nec possibile et impossibile judicandum est secundum superiores causas. Furthermore, the necessary and the impossible are contraries. But something is not called “necessary” on account of the necessity of the first cause, as was said earlier, since then all things would be necessary. Therefore neither should the possible and the impossible be judged in reference to higher causes. Respondeo dicendum, quod impossibile est dupliciter. Aliquid enim est ex se impossibile, sicut dictum est, de his quae contradictionem includunt; et haec judicantur impossibilia absolute, non per respectum ad causas superiores vel inferiores. Aliquid autem est impossibile, quod quantum in se est non habet rationem impossibilis, sed in ordine ad aliquid; et in istis distinguendum est, quia possibile potest dici secundum potentiam activam et passivam, et utroque modo dicitur aliquid possibile et impossibile simpliciter per comparationem ad suam causam proximam activam vel materialem, cujus conditiones effectus sequitur, ut prius dictum est. Verbi gratia: materia statuae remota est terra et aqua, materia proxima cuprum et lignum. Dicimus autem ex cupro posse fieri statuam, non autem ex terra: hoc enim solum dicimus esse in potentia in aliquo absolute, quod potest educi de materia uno motore ut in 9 Metaph. dicitur. I answer that the impossible is of two sorts. For something is impossible from itself, as was said in the previous article, when it is among things that include a contradiction; and these things are judged impossible in an absolute sense, not in reference to higher or lower causes. However, something is impossible that, although in and of itself it does not have the account of the impossible, does have it in its order to something. And one should also make a distinction among these latter, for it can be called “possible” in reference to an active potency and to a passive potency; and in each way something is called “possible” and “impossible” simply speaking, through reference to its own proximate active cause or material cause, the conditions of which the effect follows, as was said before. For example, the remote matter of a statue is earth and water, its proximate matter copper and wood. But we say a statue can be made from copper, but not from earth, for only what can be brought out of the matter by one mover do we say is in potency in a thing in an absolute sense, as is said in Metaphysics 9. Dicendum est ergo, quod omnes effectus qui sunt immediate ipsius Dei, non per causam secundam mediam, ut creatio mundi, creatio animae, et glorificatio animae, et hujusmodi, judicandi sunt possibiles vel impossibiles secundum causam superiorem divinam. Possunt nihilominus aliqui eorum judicari possibiles secundum causas passivas inferiores qui causas receptivas habent in inferioribus sicut ad animam se habet corpus praeparatum ad operationem naturae, et ad gratiam liberum arbitrium. Sed illi effectus qui nati sunt ex causis esse inferioribus proximis activis et passivis, judicandi sunt possibiles vel impossibiles secundum causas inferiores: sicut in visione caeci et in resurrectione mortui, et hujusmodi: vita enim et visio sunt effectus immediati causarum inferiorum, scilicet formarum unitarum corpori. Therefore one should say that all effects that are immediately from God himself, not through any intermediate secondary cause—for example, the creation of the world, the creation of the human soul, the glorification of the soul, and the like—should be judged possible or impossible in reference to the divine higher cause. Nonetheless some of the effects can be judged to be possible in reference to lower passive causes, the effects that have receptive causes among lower things; for example, the body stands to the soul as prepared for nature’s activity, and free decision to grace. But those effects that are naturally apt to occur due to active and passive proximate lower causes should be judged possible or impossible in reference to lower causes, as is the case with the sight of the blind and the resurrection of the dead and such. For life and sight are immediate effects of lower causes, that is, of forms united to the body. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sapientia mundi in hoc stulta reputata est, quia judicavit haec impossibilia naturae, ita esse impossibilia, quod etiam Deus ea facere non posset. Aliquid tamen potest dici simpliciter impossibile quod alicui est possibile; sicut aliquid dicitur simpliciter album, quod secundum aliquid sui non est album. Reply Obj. 1: The wisdom of the world is reputed foolish because it judged things that are impossible for nature to be so impossible that not even God could do them. Yet something can be called impossible simply speaking that is possible for something, just as something is called white simply speaking that is not white in reference to some part of it. Et per hoc patet responsio ad alia. Reply Obj. 2–3: And through this, the response to the other objections is clear. Expositio textus Exposition of the text Potuit Deus simul cuncta facere. Non solum ita quod conderet omnes species, sed etiam omnia individua specierum, quae in toto tempore fiunt. Sed ratio prohibuit, non quidem per contrarietatem, sed per incompossibilitatem; non enim potest esse quod Deus aliquid faciat, et illud rationale non sit; unde ratio se habet sicut determinans opus, et potentia sicut exequens. ‘God could do all things at once, but reason,’ that is, his will, ‘forbade it.’ Not only such that he might establish all species, but even all the individuals of these species that occur in the whole of time. But reason forbade this, not because of the contrariety among the species, but because of their incompatibility. For it cannot be that God would do anything and that that would be irrational. Whence reason is oriented as determining the work, and the power as executing it. Quia non esset hoc potentiae, sed infirmitatis. Et hoc etiam dicit Dionysius in 8 cap. De div. nom., et ponit exemplum, sicut cum aliquid dicitur esse non ens: hoc enim ipsum esse est non esse; ita et posse deficere ab eo quod est perfecte possibile, non est posse simpliciter. This would not be a matter of power, but of weakness. Dionysius says this as well, and presents an example when something is said to be a non-being; for this very thing is and is not. So too to be able to fall short from what is possible in a perfect way is not to be able to do something, simply speaking. Homo autem vel angelus, quantumcumque beatus est, non est potens ex se vel per se. Sciendum quod homo ex se vel a se nihil boni potest facere: quia istae praepositiones “de,” et “ab” denotant causam efficientem; unde dicitur homo posse facere aliquid ab eo a quo potentiam habet; constat enim quod quidquid boni habet, ab alio habet. Sed “per” denotat causam formalem; unde quaedam potest facere per se, scilicet quae complentur principiis naturalibus, quaedam autem non per se, sicut ea quae fiunt per virtutem divinam, ut miracula, et hujusmodi: et inde etiam est quod Filius dicitur omnia agere per se, sed non a se. But a man or Angel, however blessed, is not powerful from himself and through himself. Note that a man from himself, or due to himself, can do nothing good, for these prepositions “from” and “due to” denote an efficient cause. Whence a man is said to be able to do something due to that due to which he has the power, for it is certain that whatever a man has of the good, he has due to another. But “through” denotes a formal cause; this is why he can do certain things through himself—that is, things that are completed by means of natural principles—but certain things not through himself—that is, things that occur through the divine power, like miracles and such. And this is also why the Son is said to do all things through himself but not from himself. Distinctio 43 Distinction 43 Utrum Dei potentia limitetur ad res quae fiunt Whether the power of God is limited to realities that occur Divisio textus Division of the text Hic Magister excludit errorem quorumdam contra praedeterminata, qui Dei potentiam limitabant, dicentes non simpliciter omnium esse Dei potentiam; et dividitur in partes duas: in prima improbat errorem eorum, inquantum limitabant Dei potentiam ad res quae fiunt; in secunda inquantum limitabant ad qualitatem earum; dicebant enim nec alia nec meliora posse Deum facere quam quae facit, 44 dist., ibi: nunc illud restat discutiendum utrum melius aliquid possit facere quam facit. Here the Master excludes the error of certain ones who, opposed to the things determined above, limited God’s power, saying God’s power is not simply speaking over all things. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he disproves their error insofar as it limited God’s power with respect to the realities that occur; in the second, he does this insofar as they limited it with respect to their qualities, for they said God was not able to do different things nor better things than he did, at now it remains to be discussed whether God can do anything better than he does. Prima in tres: in prima narrat eorum positionem; in secunda ponit probationes eorum, et solvit eas, ibi: istamque primam suam opinionem verisimilibus argumentis, causisque commentitiis, nec non et sacrarum auctoritatum testimoniis munire conantur; in tertia inducit auctoritates ad veritatem probandam, ibi: fateamur ergo Deum plura posse facere quae non vult, et posse dimittere quae facit. The first part is divided into three: in the first, he reports their position; in the second, he presents their proofs, and answers them, at they strive to fortify this opinion of theirs with plausible arguments and imagined causes and even by the witnesses of sacred authorities; in the third, he brings in authorities to prove the truth, at and so let us profess that God can do many things which he does not will, and can leave undone many things which he does. Istamque suam primam opinionem verisimilibus argumentis . . . munire conantur. Hic ponit probationes eorum; et dividitur in partes tres: in prima ponit quaedam probabilia argumenta quae habebant; in secunda ponit quasdam causas quas adinveniebant, ibi: addunt quoque et alia; in tertia ponit quasdam auctoritates quas inducebant ad suae opinionis confirmationem, ibi: his autem illi scrutatores qui defecerunt scrutantes scrutinia, sanctorum annectunt testimonia. Probationes autem et responsiones patent in littera. They strive to fortify this opinion of theirs with plausible arguments and imagined causes and even by the witnesses of sacred authorities. Here he presents their proofs. And it is divided into three parts: in the first, he presents certain probable arguments that they held; in the second, he presents certain causes that they discovered, at they also add some other things; in the third, he presents certain authorities that they brought in to confirm their opinion, at but these searchers, who ‘undid their searches by their searching,’ put forth the testimonies of the Saints. But the proofs and his responses are clear in the text. Circa hanc opinionem oportet duo quaerere, secundum quod duo ponebant. One must ask two things regarding this opinion, insofar as they asserted two things. Primo ponebant, quod non potest facere aliquid eorum quae non facit: et in hoc negabant infinitatem divinae potentiae. Unde prima quaestio sit de infinitate divinae potentiae. First, they asserted that he cannot do any of the things he does not do; and in this they denied the infinity of the divine power. Whence the first question is about the infinity of the divine power. Secundo ponebant Deum non posse non facere ea quae facit, et in hoc inducebant Deum agere ex necessitate; et ideo secunda quaestio erit, utrum Deus agat ex necessitate. Second, they asserted that God cannot not do what he does do; and in this they conclude that God acts from necessity. And therefore the second question will be whether God acts from necessity. Quaestio 1 Question 1 De infinitate divinae potentiae The infinity of the divine power Circa primum quaeruntur duo: As regards the first question, two things are asked: primo utrum potentia Dei sit infinita; first, whether God’s power is infinite;