Ad tertium dicendum, quod puritas intenditur per recessum a contrario: et ideo potest aliquid creatum inveniri quo nihil purius esse potest in rebus creatis, si nulla contagione peccati inquinatum sit; et talis fuit puritas beatae Virginis, quae a peccato originali et actuali immunis fuit, tamen sub Deo, inquantum erat in ea potentia ad peccandum. Sed bonitas intenditur per accessum ad terminum quod in infinitum distat, scilicet summum bonum. Unde quolibet finito bono potest aliquid melius fieri. Reply Obj. 3: Purity is intensified through a withdrawal from its contrary. And therefore something created can be found than which nothing purer can exist in created realities, if it is not stained by any contagion of sin. And such a purity was there of the Blessed Virgin, who was unmarked by original and actual sin. Yet this was beneath God, insofar as the power to sin was in her. But goodness is intensified through an approach to a terminus that is infinitely distant, that is, the highest good. Whence something better can come to be than any finite good. Ad quartum dicendum, quod inter angelos et Deum est infinita distantia; unde posset Deus facere multos intermedios gradus bonitatis: et ideo quamvis beata Virgo sit exaltata super angelos, quia tamen non usque ad aequalitatem Dei, manet adhuc infinita distantia; et potest adhuc aliquid melius esse. Reply Obj. 4: There is an infinite distance between angels and God, so God could make many intermediate grades of goodness. And therefore, even though the Blessed Virgin is exalted above the angels, still, because she is not exalted all the way to equality with God, she yet remains infinitely distant. And therefore something yet better can exist. Ad quintum dicendum, quod beatitudo creata habet quamdam infinitatem ex eo quod conjungit infinito bono: in se enim considerata comprehendit omnia bona participabilia homini. Unde si naturae capacitas major esset, major esset participatio et perfectior beatitudo, sicut beatitudo unius sancti praeponitur beatitudini alterius. Tamen sciendum, quod Boetius vult, 3 De consolatione, quod haec definitio essentialiter beatitudini increatae conveniat; aliis autem per participationem. Reply Obj. 5: Created beatitude has a certain infinity because it joins one to the infinite good. For considered in itself it comprehends all goods in which man can participate. Whence, if the capacity of the nature were greater, the participation would be greater, and the beatitude more perfect; for example, the beatitude of one saint is placed before the beatitude of another. Nonetheless one should note that Boethius intends this definition to belong to uncreated beatitude essentially, and to the others by participation. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum Deus possit facere omne quod olim potuit Whether God is able to do everything that he was once able to do Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit facere omne quod olim potuit. To the fourth we proceed as follows. It seems that God cannot do everything that he once was able to do. Potentia enim Dei non se extendit tantum ad species, sed etiam ad individua: quia ipse facit et formam et materiam. Sed antequam Socrates esset, potuit Socratem facere. Ergo, et Socrate existente, potest Socratem facere. Hoc autem falsum est, quia sic substantia rei esset bis, quod est impossibile. Ergo non quidquid potuit, potest. Obj. 1: For God’s power extends not only to species but even to individuals, for he makes both form and matter. But before Socrates existed, he was able to make Socrates. Therefore even while Socrates is existing he can make Socrates. But this is false, because then a reality’s substance might exist twice, which is impossible. Therefore not everything that he was able to do, is he able to do. Praeterea, olim potuit Deus non incarnari. Sed modo non posset non incarnatus esse, sicut nec aliquod praeteritum non fuisse. Ergo non quidquid olim potuit, modo potest. Obj. 2: Furthermore, God was once able not to become incarnate. But now he is not able not to be incarnate, nor can he make something past not have been. Therefore not everything that he was once able to do can he do now. Si dicas, quod sicut potuit olim facere aliquid, ita potest modo fecisse illud, et hoc est unum et idem posse; Obj. 3: You might say that just as he was once able to do something, so he is now able to have done it, and this is one and the same ability. contra: quia similiter ille qui excaecatus est, potest modo vidisse, cum prius videre potuerit; et tamen non dicimus quod quidquid potuerit, possit. Ergo videtur quod nec de Deo dicendum sit. On the contrary, similarly, he who has become blind is now able to have seen, since before he was able to see, and yet we do not say that whatever he was able to do he is able to do. Therefore it seems that neither should this be said of God. Praeterea, Deus ab aeterno potuit non praedestinare Petrum, quem voluntarie praedestinavit. Sed modo non potest eum non praedestinare: quia non potest esse quod aliquis sit prius praedestinatus et postea non praedestinatus. Ergo non quidquid potuit, potest. Obj. 4: Furthermore, God was able from eternity not to predestine Peter, whom he did predestine voluntarily. But now he is not able not to predestine him, since it cannot be that someone be predestined before and later not be predestined. Therefore he is not able to do anything he was able to do. Sed contra, quantitas potentiae attenditur secundum multitudinem objectorum: quia virtualis quantitas dividitur secundum objecta. Sed potentia Dei diminui non potest. Ergo videtur quod quidquid Deus olim potuit, et modo possit. On the contrary (5), the quantity of a power follows the multitude of its objects, since a virtual quantity is divided according to its objects. But God’s power cannot be diminished. Therefore it seems that whatever God was able to do once, he is able to do now. Respondeo dicendum, quod hoc quod negetur aliquem posse aliquid potest contingere ex duobus: vel ex defectu potentiae, sicut qui non habet potentiam visivam, dicitur non posse videre; aut ex parte objecti, quod non habet rationem possibilis, sicut habens visum dicitur non posse videre sonum, qui non est visibilis. Et primo modo nihil dicitur Deus non posse, cum sua potentia sit perfectissima; sed secundo modo dicitur non posse quaedam, sicut quod idem simul sit et non sit. Unde magis proprie diceretur ista non posse fieri quam Deum ista facere non posse. I answer that to deny someone’s being able to do something can happen due to two sources: either due to a lack of power, as one who does not have the power of sight is said not to be able to see; or due the object’s part, which does not have the account of the possible, as one who has sight is said not to see sound, which is not visible. And in the first way, there is nothing that God is not able to do, since his power is the most perfect; but in the second way, he is said not to be able to do certain things, such as making the same thing be and not be at the same time. Whence it would be more properly said that such things are not able to occur, than that God is not able to do such things. Similiter dicendum est, quod hoc quod aliquis non possit quidquid potuit, potest contingere ex duobus: vel quia amittit aliquam potentiam quam habebat, et sic Deo non competit, immo hoc modo procedit solutio Magistri in littera; vel ex mutatione objecti, quod amittit rationem possibilis, quam prius habebat; potentia enim activa est respectu alicujus operandi. Unde quando aliquid est jam determinatum ut sit praesens in actu, vel in praeteritum transiit, possibilis rationem amittit; et ideo dicitur quod Deus illud facere non potest quod quidem est eadem res, sed diversis enuntiabilibus significata propter temporum diversitatem. Likewise one should say that someone not being capable of what he was capable of can occur due to two sources: either because he loses a certain power that he had—and this does not befit God, and in fact this is how the Master’s solution proceeds in the text; or due to a change in the object, such that it loses the account of the possible that it had before. For an active power is relative to something that is to be done. Whence when something has already been made determinate such that it is present in act, or passes into the past, it loses the account of the possible. And therefore it is said that God is not able to do that which is indeed the same reality, though it is signified by statements diverse only because of a diversity of tense. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quando jam est existens actu, amittit rationem possibilis fieri. Reply Obj. 1: When a thing is already actually existing, it loses the account of the possible as regards coming to exist. Et similiter dicendum est ad secundum, quod procedebat de praeterito. Reply Obj. 2: Likewise as regards this objection, which followed based on the past. Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum dicitur, aliquis potest fecisse hoc vel illud, potest dupliciter intelligi: vel ita quod praeteritum se teneat ex parte possibilis, et sic nihil est dictu, quia quod praeteritum est, possibilis rationem amittit; vel quod intelligatur circa exitum possibilis a potentia, et sic dicitur, Deus potest fecisse hoc vel illud, quia habet potentiam qua hoc fecit. Sed hoc caeco non convenit: non enim habet potentiam qua quandoque vidit; unde nullo modo verum est quod caecus possit vidisse. Reply Obj. 3: When one says, “someone is able to have done this or that,” it can be understood in two ways: either such that the past stands on the side of the possible—and then the statement amounts to nothing, since what is past loses the account of the possible; or it is understood as being about its possibility for coming from that power. And in this sense, one says, “God is able to have done this or that,” because he has the power whereby he did this. But this does not fit the blind man example, for he does not have the power whereby he at one time saw; whence in no way is it true that the blind man is able to have seen. Ad quartum dicendum, quod actus praedestinationis aeternitate mensuratur, et non in praeteritum transit: et ideo semper eodem modo possibilis rationem habet, inquantum est ex liberalitate voluntatis divinae; sed ex parte effectus in praeteritum transit, et secundum hoc possibilis rationem amittit. Reply Obj. 4: The act of predestination is measured by eternity, and does not pass over into the past. And therefore it always has the account of the possible in the same way, insofar as it is from the liberality of the divine will. But on the side of the effect, it passes over into the past, and in this respect it loses the account of the possible. Ad quintum etiam patet responsio ex dictis. Reply Sed Contra 5: This too is clear from things said in the body of the article. Expositio textus Exposition of the text Licet non possit modo incarnari. Videtur hoc esse falsum: quia sicut Filius carnem assumpsit, ita et Pater potuit et potest carnem assumere, ut in 3 dicitur. Ergo videtur quod etiam possit nunc incarnari. Although he cannot now become incarnate. This seems to be false. For just as the Son has assumed flesh, so too the Father was able, and is able to assume flesh, as will be said in Book III. Therefore it seems that even now he could become incarnate. Ad quod dicendum, quod Magister intelligit de eadem numero incarnatione quae olim facta est. Si enim modo incarnaretur, non esset idem incarnari numero, sed alia incarnatio. To which one should say that the Master is understanding numerically the same incarnation that was brought about at one time. For if he were now to become incarnate, it would not be numerically the same incarnation, but another incarnation. Distinctio 45 Distinction 45 De voluntate Dei The Will of God Divisio textus Division of the text Postquam determinavit Magister de scientia et omnipotentia Dei hic tertio determinat de voluntate ipsius; et dividitur in partes duas: in prima determinat de Dei voluntate; in secunda de conformitate voluntatis nostrae ad voluntatem ejus 48 distinct., ibi: sciendum quoque est quod aliquando mala est voluntas hominis idem volentis quod Deus vult fieri. After the Master has considered the knowledge and omnipotence of God, now he third considers his will. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers God’s will; in the second he considers the conformity of our will with his will, at it is also to be known that at times the will of a man who wills the same as what God wills to be done is evil. Prima in duas: in prima determinat de voluntate Dei quid sit et quot modis dicatur; in secunda inquirit de efficacia ejus, 46 dist., ibi: hic oritur quaestio. The first part is divided into two: in the first, he considers what God’s will is, and in how many ways it is spoken of; in the second, he inquires about its efficacy, at here a question arises. Prima dividitur in tres: in prima determinat de voluntate secundum ipsius quidditatem; in secunda determinat causalitatem ejus, ibi: haec itaque summe bona voluntas causa est omnium quae naturaliter fiunt; in tertia assignat voluntatis multiplicitatem, quantum ad acceptionem nominis, ibi: hic non est praetereundum nobis quod Sacra Scriptura de voluntate Dei variis modis loqui consuevit. The first of these is divided into three: in the first, he considers the will as regards what it is; in the second, he considers its causality, at and so this most highly good will is the cause of all things which naturally are; in the third, he designates the multiplicity of his will, as regards the ways of taking the word, at here, we must not pass over the fact that Sacred Scripture was accustomed to speak of God’s will in various ways. Prima in duas: in prima ostendit quod voluntas Dei sit sua essentia; in secunda ponit objectionem in contrarium, et solvit, ibi: et licet idem sit Deo velle quod esse, non tamen dicendum est Deum esse omnia quae vult. The first is divided into two: in the first, he shows that God’s will is his own essence; in the second, he presents a contrary objection, and answers it, at and although it is the same for God to will to be, yet it is not to be said that God is all things which he wills. Haec itaque summe bona voluntas causa est omnium quae naturaliter fiunt. Hic ostendit quod voluntas Dei est prima causa rerum; et circa hoc duo facit: primo proponit intentum; secundo probat propositum, ibi: qui enim causam ejus quaerit, aliquid majus ea quaerit. Probat autem duo quae pertinent ad rationem primae causae: primo quod voluntatis Dei non sit alia causa; secundo quod ipsa sit omnium rerum causa, ibi: voluntas igitur Dei (...) prima et summa causa est omnium specierum atque motionum. And so this most highly good will is the cause of all things which naturally are. Here he shows that God’s will is the first cause of things. And in reference to this he does two things: first, he presents his intention; second, he proves what he proposes, at for one who seeks its cause seeks something which is greater than it. Moreover, he proves the two things that pertain to the account of a first cause: first, that there is no other cause of God’s will; second, that it is the cause of all things, at and so the will of God . . . is the first and highest cause of all species and motions. Hic non est praetereundum nobis, quod Sacra Scriptura de voluntate Dei variis modis loqui consuevit. Hic ostendit quod nomen voluntatis multipliciter accipiatur, quamvis sit tantum una Dei voluntas; et dividitur in partes tres: in prima ponit principalem significationem et propriam, secundum quod Dei voluntas dicitur ejus beneplacitum; in secunda ponit significationem figurativam, secundum quod signum voluntatis voluntas dicitur, ibi: aliquando vero secundum quamdam figuram dicendi voluntas Dei vocatur quod secundum proprietatem non est voluntas ejus. In tertia comparat voluntatem signi ad voluntatem beneplaciti, ibi: quinque igitur supra posita sunt, quae dicuntur secundum tropum Dei voluntas. Here, we must not pass over the fact that Sacred Scripture was accustomed to speak of God’s will in various ways. Here he shows that the noun “will” is taken in many ways, even though there is only one will of God. And this is divided into three parts: in the first, he presents the principal and proper signification of it, according to which his good pleasure is called “God’s will”; in the second, he presents its figurative signification, according to which a sign of his will is called his “will,” at but at times, according to some figure of speech, that is called God’s will which is not his will properly speaking; and in the third, he compares the will that is a sign with the will of good pleasure, or being well pleased, at therefore five things are set out above which are called ‘the will of God’ according to a figure of speech. Circa secundam partem duo facit: primo ostendit voluntatem signi multipliciter dici; secundo prosequitur diversa voluntatis signa, quae voluntas Dei dicuntur, ibi: ideo autem praeceptio, prohibitio atque consilium, cum sint tria, dicitur tamen unumquodque eorum Dei voluntas, quia ista sunt signa divinae voluntatis. As regards the second of these, he does two things: first, he shows that the will that is a sign is spoken of in many ways; second, he treats the diverse signs of his will that are called “God’s will,” at but although precept and prohibition and counsel are three things, yet each of them is called ‘the will of God’ because they are signs of the divine will. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo prosequitur de tribus signis quae pertinent ad faciendum vel non faciendum; secundo prosequitur de aliis duobus, quae pertinent ad id quod in praesenti fit, ibi: permissio quoque Dei et operatio voluntas Dei appellantur. And as regards this latter, he does two things: first, he treats the three signs that pertain to doing or not doing; second, he treats of the other two, which pertain to what occurs in the present, at God’s permission and operation are also called God’s will. Circa primum tria facit: primo assignat rationem quare haec signa voluntatis dici voluntas possunt; secundo confirmat per auctoritatem, quod voluntates dicantur, ibi: pro praecepto Dei atque consilio potest accipi voluntas; tertio ostendit distantiam inter haec signa et beneplaciti voluntatem, ibi: et si illa tria dicuntur Dei voluntas, ideo quia signa sunt divinae voluntatis, non est tamen intelligendum, Deum omne illud fieri velle quod cuicumque praecepit vel non fieri quod prohibuit. In reference to the first of these, he does three things: first, he designates the reason why these signs of the will can be called his “will”; second, he confirms that they are called his “wills,” based on an authority, at the will can be taken for God’s precept and counsel; third, he shows the distance between these signs and his will of good pleasure, at although those three are called God’s will by virtue of the fact that they are signs of the divine will, yet it is not to be understood that God wills all to be done which he commanded to any man, or that all he prohibited not be done. Quaestio 1 Question 1 De voluntate Dei quid sit What the will of God is