Pruriginem, id est inordinatum desiderium nova audiendi, sicut pruritus concitatur ex calore inordinato. Sumitur ex 2 Tim. 4:3: erit tempus, cum . . . ad sua desideria coacervabunt sibi magistros, prurientes auribus. Inflicting upon others the itching of their own ears, that is, their inordinate desire for hearing novelties, as an itch is excited by an inordinate heat. This is drawn from 2 Timothy 4:3: for the time is coming when people . . . having itching ears they will accumulate for themselves teachers to suit their own likings. Dogmate, propter hoc quod ratio voluntatem sequitur: Contentioni, quae, secundum Ambrosium ad Rom., est impugnatio veritatis cum confidentia clamoris. He says, they corrupt the faith by the teaching of false doctrine, on account of their reason following their will; he says that they are eager for controversy, which Ambrose says on the letter to the Romans, is the assault on truth with confidence in praise. Veritas. 3 Esdr. 4:38: veritas manet, et invalescit in aeternum. He adds that the battle will not cease so long as truth remains firm, following 1 Esdras 4:38: the truth will endure and prevail into eternity. Horum igitur Deo odibilem ecclesiam evertere atque ora oppilare . . . volentes, in labore multo ac sudore hoc volumen, Deo praestante, compegimus. Hic reddit auditorem docilem, praelibando causas operis: Wishing to cast down the assembly of such people, which is hateful to God, and to stop up their mouths, . . . we have, with God’s aid, put together with much labor and sweat a volume. Here he renders the listener teachable by setting out the causes of the work. et primo ponit causam finalem quantum ad duas utilitates, scilicet destructionem erroris; unde dicit: odibilem ecclesiam: Ps. 25:5: odivi ecclesiam malignantium; ne virus, id est ne venenum, in alios effundere queant: First, he lays down the final cause as regards two uses: the one is the destruction of error. This is why he speaks of the hateful assembly, following Psalm 26 [25]:5: I hate the company of evildoers, and says, so that they may not be able to spread the poison, that is, their venom, . . . to others. et manifestationem veritatis; unde dicit: lucernam veritatis in candelabro exaltare volentes. Sumitur de Luc. 8:16: nemo accendit lucernam, et ponit eam sub modio. In candelabro, id est in aperto. The other is the manifestation of the truth. This is why he speaks of wanting to put the light of the truth on the lamp-stand; this is taken from Luke 8:16: no one after lighting a lamp covers it with a vessel, . . . but puts it on a stand, that those who enter may see the light. He says, on the lamp-stand, meaning out in the open. Secundo tangit causam efficientem, scilicet principalem, Deo praestante instrumentalem, compegimus: quia hoc opus est quasi compaginatum ex diversis auctoritatibus. Sudore, quocumque defectu corporali, qui sequitur laborem spiritualem. Second, he touches on its efficient cause, both the principal one, when he says with God’s aid, and the instrumental one, at we have . . . put together. For this work is, as it were, a compilation of diverse authorities. He adds, with . . . sweat, meaning with whatever bodily defect that follows upon a spiritual labor. Tertio ostendit causam materialem, ibi: ex testimoniis veritatis. Psalm. 118:152: Initio cognovi de testimoniis tuis. Third, he shows its material cause, at from the witnesses of truth, drawing on Psalm 119 [118]:152: long have I known from thy testimonies, that thou hast founded them for ever. Quarto causam formalem quantum ad distinctionem librorum: in quatuor libros; et quantum ad modum operis: in quo majorum exempla; quantum ad similitudines: doctrinam, quantum ad rationes, reperies. Fourth, he shows its formal cause, as regards the distinction of its books: and divided it in four books; as regards the mode of the work, you will find the precedents . . . of our ancestors, meaning their examples, and the teaching of our ancestors, meaning their reasons. Vipereae, haereticae: haeretici enim pariendo alios in sua haeresi, pereunt sicut vipera. We have denounced the falsehood of a poisonous doctrine. By poisonous he means heretical, for the heretics, by disposing others toward their heresy, kill like vipers. Prodidimus, reseravimus. Aditum viam. Complexi, amplexantes. Impiae, infidelis. Inter utrumque, scilicet, nec nimis alte, nec nimis humiliter: vel inter duos contrarios errores, sicut Sabellii et Arii. We have pursued, that is, opened, a moderate middle, indicating the path, embracing, that is, taking, an approach that does not result in impiety, that is, unbelief, a middle course between the two—that is, neither going too high, nor remaining with too much humility, or between two contrary errors, like that of Sabellius and that of Arius. Non a paternis discessit limitibus, secundum illud Prov. 22:28: non transferes terminos antiquos, quos posuerunt patres tui. And . . . our voice . . . has not transgressed the bounds set by our forefathers, following Proverbs 22:28: remove not the ancient landmark which your fathers have set. Non igitur debet hic labor cuiquam pigro, vel multum docto, videri superfluus. Hic reddit auditorem attentum: et primo ex utilitate operis, ibid.: brevi volumine complicans patrum sententias. Sententia, secundum Avicennam, est definitiva et certissima conceptio. And so this work should seem superfluous neither to the lazy, nor to the very learned. Here he renders the listener attentive, doing so first in virtue of the usefulness of the work, at in this brief volume, we have brought together the sentences of the Fathers. A sentence, according to Avicenna, is one’s definitive and most certain conception. Secundo ex profunditate materiae, ibid.: in hoc autem tractatu pium lectorem, qui secundum fidem intelligat, liberum correctorem, qui solum propter correctionem corrigat, desidero; liber enim, secundum Philosophum in prooem. Metaph., dicitur qui causa sui est; et non propter odium vel invidiam. Tertio ex ordinatione modi procedendi, ibid.: ut autem quod quaeritur facilius occurrat, titulos quibus singulorum librorum capitula distinguuntur, praemisimus. He does so, second, in virtue of the profundity of the matter, at I desire not only a pious reader, one who understands it according to the faith, but also a free corrector, who makes correction only for the sake of it being correct. For what is called free, according to the Philosopher, is for its own sake, not due to hatred or envy. And he shows its utility in a third way from the orderliness of the mode of proceeding, at and in order that one may more easily find what one seeks, we have set out the titles under which the chapters of each book are distinguished. Distinctio 1 Distinction 1 De uti et frui Enjoyment and use Divisio textus Division of the text Finito prooemio, hoc est initium praesentis operis in quo Magister divinorum nobis doctrinam tradere intendit quantum ad inquisitionem veritatis et destructionem erroris: unde et argumentativo modo procedit in toto opere: et praecipue argumentis ex auctoritatibus sumptis. Dividitur autem in duas partes: in quarum prima inquirit ea de quibus agendum est, et ordinem agendi; in secunda prosequitur suam intentionem: et in duas partes dividitur. Secunda ibi: hic considerandum est utrum virtutibus sit utendum, an fruendum. Having concluded the prologue, this is the beginning of the present work wherein the Master intends to hand on to us the doctrine of divine things, for the inquiry of truth and the destruction of error. This is also why in the entire work he proceeds in an argumentative way, and principally uses arguments from authority. Now, the text is divided into two parts: in the first, he inquires about those things to be dealt with and the order in which they should be treated; in the second, he carries out his intention. And this is divided into two parts, the second part beginning at here we must consider whether the virtues are to be used or enjoyed. Ea autem de quibus in hac doctrina considerandum est, cadunt in considerationem hujus doctrinae, secundum quod ad aliquid unum referuntur, scilicet Deum, a quo et ad quem sunt. Et ideo ea de quibus agendum est dividit per absolutum et relatum: unde dividitur in partes duas. In prima ponit divisionem eorum de quibus agendum est per absolutum et relatum secundum cognitionem, in secunda secundum desiderium, ibi: id ergo in rebus considerandum. However, those things that one should consider in this doctrine fall within this doctrine’s consideration insofar as they are referred to one thing—namely, to God, from whom and to whom they are. And therefore, he divides the things to be treated into absolute and relative; hence, it is divided into two parts. In the first, he presents the division of things to be treated into absolute and relative according to knowledge, in the second, according to desire, at in the case of things, we must consider. Circa primum duo facit. Concerning the first point he does two things. Primo ponit divisionem eorum de quibus agendum est, in res et signa, quae ad cognitionem rerum ducunt; First, he lays out the division of things to be treated into realities and signs, which latter lead to knowledge of the realities; secundo concludit ordinem agendi, ibi: cumque his intenderit theologorum speculatio studiosa atque modesta, divinam Scripturam formam praescriptam in doctrina tenere advertet. second, he concludes with their order, at and whenever the studious and modest speculation of theologians attend to these matters, it will note that divine Scripture observes the aforementioned form in its teaching. In primo tria facit. Primo ponit divisionem; secundo probat per auctoritatem, ibi: ut enim egregius doctor Augustinus ait; tertio ponit membrorum divisionis expositionem, ibi: proprie autem hic res appellantur quae non ad significandum aliquid adhibentur; ubi primo exponit quid sit res; secundo quid sit signum, ibi: signa vero quorum usus est in significando; tertio utriusque comparationem, ibi: omne igitur signum etiam res aliqua est. In the first, he does three things: first, he lays out the division; second, he proves it by authority, at for as the renowned teacher Augustine says; third, he presents the exposition of the division of the members, at ‘things’ here properly designates whatever is not used to designate something, where first he expounds what a thing is, and then what a sign is, at but ‘signs’ designates whatever is used in signifying; third, he presents a comparison of the two, at it follows that every sign is also a thing. Id ergo in rebus considerandum est. Hic, dimissis signis, subdividit res per absolutum et relatum ex parte desiderii, scilicet per fruibile, quod propter se desideratur, et utibile, cujus desiderium ad aliud refertur: et dividitur in partes duas. Primo ponit divisionem; secundo epilogat et concludit intentionem et ordinem, ibi: omnium igitur quae dicta sunt, ex quo de rebus specialiter tractavimus, haec summa est. In the case of things, we must consider. Here, setting aside signs, real things are subdivided into absolute and relative on the side of desire—that is, into enjoyable things, which are things desired for their own sakes, and useful things, the desire for which is referred to something else. And this is divided into two parts: first, he presents the division; second, he summarizes and concludes the intention and the order, at of all that has been said since we began our discussion of things, this is the summation. Prima in tres. Primo ponit divisionem; secundo partium manifestationem, ibi: illa quibus fruendum est, nos beatos faciunt; tertio movet dubitationes, ibi: cum autem homines, qui fruuntur et utuntur aliis rebus, res aliquae sint, quaeritur utrum se frui debeant, an uti, an utrumque. In secunda duo facit. Primo manifestat divisionem; secundo ponit quamdam contrarietatem et solvit, ibi: notandum vero, quod idem Augustinus . . . , sic dicit. The first part is divided into three: first, he presents the division; second, he presents a manifestation of its parts, at those things which are to be enjoyed make us blessed; third, he presents doubts, at since human beings, who enjoy and use other things, are things of some sort, the question arises ‘whether they are to enjoy or to use themselves, or both.’ In the second, he does two things: first, he manifests the division; second, he presents a problem and resolves it, at but it is to be noted that the same Augustine . . . says as follows. Circa primum duo facit. Primo manifestat partes divisionis per definitiones; secundo quantum ad supposita, ibi: res igitur quibus fruendum est, sunt Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus. Regarding the first point he does two things: first, he manifests the parts of the subdivision by means of definitions; second, he does so in reference to the supposits, at the things which are to be enjoyed are the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Circa primum quatuor facit. Primo definit fruibilia per effectum; secundo utibilia, ibi: istis quibus utendum est, tendentes ad beatitudinem adjuvamur; tertio definit utentia et fruentia, ibi: res vero quae fruuntur et utuntur, nos sumus; quarto definit uti et frui ad probationem totius: frui autem est amore alicui rei inhaerere propter se ipsam. Et eodem ordine procedit manifestando secundum supposita. About the first point he does four things: first, he defines enjoyable things by means of their effect; second, he defines usable things, at those things which are to be used help and, as it were support us in our effects toward blessedness; third, he defines the things that use and enjoy, at we are the things that enjoy and use; fourth, he defines “to use” and “to enjoy” in order to prove the whole thing: to enjoy is to adhere in love to something for its own sake. And with the same order, he proceeds to manifest them according to the supposits. Notandum vero, quod idem Augustinus . . . aliter quam supra accipiens frui et uti, sic dicit. Hic opponit contrarietatem et ad hoc tria facit: primo ponit diversam assignationem uti et frui; secundo concludit contrarietatem ad praedicta, ibi: et attende, quod videtur Augustinus dicere illos frui tantum qui in re gaudent; tertio ponit solutionem, ibi: haec ergo quae sibi contradicere videntur, sic determinamus. Et primo solvit per divisionem; secundo per interemptionem, ibi: potest etiam dici, quod qui fruitur etiam in hac vita non tantum habet gaudium spei, sed etiam rei. But note that the same Augustine . . . taking use and enjoyment in another sense from the above, says as follows. Here he presents an objection regarding these three things: first, he assigns different meanings to “to use” and “to enjoy”; second, he concludes to the opposition of the things said, at and note that Augustine seems to say that only they enjoy who rejoice in the thing; third, he presents a solution, at we determine this apparent contradiction. And first he resolves it by division, second, by elimination, at it may also be said that one who already enjoys in this life not only has the joy of hope, but also of the thing itself. Cum autem homines, qui fruuntur et utuntur aliis rebus, res aliquae sint, quaeritur, utrum se frui debeant, an uti, an utrumque. Hic movet dubitationes de habitudine partium ad invicem: et primo quaerit de utentibus et fruentibus, an sint utibilia vel fruibilia; secundo de fruibilibus, scilicet de Deo, utrum sit utens nobis vel fruens, ibi: sed cum Deus diligat nos . . . , quaerit Augustinus quomodo diligat, an ut utens, an ut fruens; tertio de quibusdam utilibus, utrum sint fruibilia, ibi: hic considerandum est, utrum virtutibus sit utendum, an fruendum. Quaelibet harum partium dividitur in quaestionem et solutionem. Since human beings, who enjoy and use other things, are things of some sort, the question arises ‘whether they are to enjoy or to use themselves, or both.’ Here he presents objections about the relation of the parts to one another. And first he asks about those who use and those who enjoy, whether they themselves are useful or enjoyable; second, about enjoyable things—that is, about God, whether he uses us or enjoys us, at since God loves us, . . . Augustine asks how God loves us, whether by use or by enjoyment; third, as regards useful things, whether they can also be enjoyed, at here we must consider whether the virtues are to be used or enjoyed. Each of these parts is divided into question and solution. Hic quaeruntur tria: Here, three questions are posed: primo, de uti et frui. first, about using and enjoying; Secundo, de utibilibus et fruibilibus. second, about the things that can be used and things that can be enjoyed; Tertio, de utentibus et fruentibus. third, about those who use and enjoy. Quaestio 1 Question 1 Quid sit frui et quid sit uti What enjoyment and use are Circa primum quaeruntur duo: Concerning the first, two things are asked: