Ex hoc possumus habere duas conclusiones. Una est, quod ista scientia imperat omnibus aliis scientiis tamquam principalis; alia est, quod ipsa utitur in obsequium sui omnibus aliis scientiis quasi vassallis, sicut patet in omnibus artibus ordinatis, quarum finis unius est sub fine alterius, sicut finis pigmentariae artis, qui est confectio medicinarum, ordinatur ad finem medicinae, qui est sanitas: unde medicus imperat pigmentario et utitur pigmentis ab ipso factis, ad suum finem. Ita, cum finis totius philosophiae sit infra finem theologiae, et ordinatus ad ipsum, theologia debet omnibus aliis scientiis imperare et uti his quae in eis traduntur. From this we can draw two conclusions. One is that this science rules all the other sciences as the principal science. The other is that it itself makes use of all the other sciences in their compliance to it, as though they were its vassals. This is clear in all the ordered arts, where the end of one is subservient to the end of another. For example, the end of the art of ointments, which is the making of medicines, is ordered to the end of medicine, which is health; this is why the physician rules the ointment-maker and uses the ointments he makes for his own end. So too, since the end of the whole of philosophy is beneath the end of theology, and is ordered to it, theology ought to rule all the other sciences and use the things that are treated in them. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis philosophia determinet de existentibus secundum rationes a creaturis sumptas, oportet tamen esse aliam quae existentia consideret secundum rationes ex inspiratione divini luminis acceptas. Reply Obj. 1: Although philosophy considers existing things according to the accounts taken from created things, still there must be another doctrine that would consider existing things according to accounts received from the inspiration of the divine light. Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum: quia philosophia sufficit ad perfectionem intellectus secundum cognitionem naturalem, et affectus secundum virtutem acquisitam: et ideo oportet esse aliam scientiam per quam intellectus perficiatur quantum ad cognitionem infusam, et affectus quantum ad dilectionem gratuitam. Reply Obj. 2: The solution to this is clear, for philosophy suffices for the perfection of the intellect only according to natural knowledge, and that of the affections only according to acquired virtue. And this is why there must be another science whereby the intellect is perfected as regards infused knowledge and the affections as regards gratuitous love. Ad tertium dicendum, quod in his quae acquirunt aequalem bonitatem pro fine, tenet propositio inducta, scilicet, nobilius est eo quod per se consequi non potest. Sed illud quod acquirit bonitatem perfectam pluribus auxiliis et motibus, est nobilius eo quod imperfectam bonitatem acquirit paucioribus, vel per seipsum, sicut dicit Philosophus in 5 Caeli et mundi; et hoc modo se habet homo respectu aliarum creaturarum, qui factus est ad ipsius divinae gloriae participationem. Reply Obj. 3: In things that admit of equal goodness as regards their end, the proposition introduced above holds true—that is, that it is nobler than what cannot reach its end through itself. But what receives a perfect goodness by means of more aids and motions is nobler than what receives an imperfect goodness through fewer aids, or through itself, as the Philosopher himself says. And this is how man stands relative to other created things, he who was made for participation in the divine glory itself. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum tantum una doctrina debeat esse praeter physicas Whether there should be one doctrine only besides the natural disciplines Circa secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non una tantum doctrina debeat esse praeter physicas doctrinas, sed plures. As regards the second, we proceed as follows. It appears there should not be only one doctrine besides the natural doctrines. De omnibus enim de quibus instruitur homo per rationes creaturarum, potest instrui per rationes divinas. Sed scientiae procedentes per rationes creaturarum sunt plures, differentes genere et specie, sicut moralis, naturalis, etc. Ergo scientiae procedentes per rationes divinas debent plures esse. Obj. 1: For about all concerning which man is instructed through the accounts of created things, he can also be instructed through divine accounts. But there are many sciences based on the accounts of created things, sciences differing in both genus and species, such as moral science, natural science, and so on. Therefore, there should be many sciences based on divine accounts. Item, una scientia est unius generis, sicut dicit Philosophus in 1 Posteriorum. Sed Deus et creatura, de quibus in divina doctrina tractatur, non reducuntur in unum genus, neque univoce, neque analogice. Ergo divina scientia non est una. Probatio mediae. Quaecumque conveniunt in uno genere univoce vel analogice, participant aliquid idem, vel secundum prius et posterius, sicut substantia et accidens rationem entis, vel aequaliter, sicut equus et bos rationem animalis. Sed Deus et creatura non participant aliquid idem, quia illud esset simplicius et prius utroque. Ergo nullo modo reducuntur in idem genus. Obj. 2: Furthermore, one science is about one genus, as the Philosopher says. But God and what is created, which are treated in divine doctrine, are not traced back to one genus, whether one univocally or analogically. Therefore the divine science is not one. Here is proof of the middle premise: whatever things agree in one genus, whether univocally or analogically, participate in the same thing, either as prior and posterior, just as substance and accidents do in the account of being, or as equals, as horse and cow do in the account of animal. But God and what is created do not participate in any same thing, since then that thing would be simpler and prior to both of them. Therefore in no way are they traced back to the same genus. Item, ea quae sunt ab opere nostro, sicut opera virtutum et quae sunt ab opere naturae, non reducuntur ad eamdem scientiam; sed unum pertinet ad moralem, alterum ad naturalem. Sed divina scientia determinat de his quae sunt ab opere nostro, tractando de virtutibus et praeceptis: tractat etiam de his quae non sunt ab opere nostro, sicut de angelis et aliis creaturis. Ergo videtur quod non sit una scientia. Obj. 3: Furthermore, things that arise from our activity, like the works of the virtues, and things that come from the work of nature are not traced back to the same science. Rather, the one pertains to moral science and the other to natural science. Yet the divine science, by treating the virtues and commandments, considers things that arise from our activity, but it also treats things that do not come from our activity, like the angels and other created things. Therefore it seems not to be one science. Contra, quaecumque conveniunt in ratione una possunt ad unam scientiam pertinere: unde etiam omnia, inquantum conveniunt in ratione entis, pertinent ad metaphysicam. Sed divina scientia determinat de rebus per rationem divinam quae omnia complectitur: omnia enim et ab ipso et ad ipsum sunt. Ergo ipsa una existens potest de diversis esse. On the contrary, whatever things agree in one account can pertain to one science; this is also why all things pertain to metaphysics, insofar as they agree in the account of being. But the divine science considers things through the divine account, which embraces all things, for all things are from him and for him. Therefore being one, it can be about diverse things. Praeterea, quae sunt diversarum scientiarum, distinctim et in diversis libris determinantur. Sed in Sacra Scriptura permixtim in eodem libro quandoque determinatur de moribus, quandoque de Creatore, quandoque de creaturis, sicut patet fere in omnibus libris. Ergo ex hoc non diversificatur scientia. Furthermore, things that belong to diverse sciences are considered distinctly and in different books. But in Sacred Scripture one finds mixed together in one book sometimes consideration of moral action, sometimes consideration of the Creator, and sometimes of created things, as is quite clear in all its books. Therefore this does not diversify the science. Respondeo. Ad hoc notandum est, quod aliqua cognitio quanto altior est, tanto est magis unita et ad plura se extendit: unde intellectus Dei, qui est altissimus, per unum quod est ipse Deus, omnium rerum cognitionem habet distincte. Ita et cum ista scientia sit altissima et per ipsum lumen inspirationis divinae efficaciam habens, ipsa unita manens, non multiplicata, diversarum rerum considerationem habet, nec tantum in communi, sicut metaphysica, quae considerat omnia inquantum sunt entia, non descendens ad propriam cognitionem moralium, vel naturalium. Ratio enim entis, cum sit diversificata in diversis, non est sufficiens ad specialem rerum cognitionem; ad quarum manifestationem divinum lumen in se unum manens, secundum beatum Dionysium in principio Caelestis hierarchiae, efficaciam habet. I answer that one should note that insofar as knowledge is higher, to that degree is it more united and it extends to many; this is why God’s understanding, which is the highest, holds knowledge of all things distinctly through one, which is God himself. And so too, since this science is the highest, and has its efficacy through the very light of divine inspiration, remaining one and not many, holds a consideration of diverse things. And it does not do this merely with a common consideration, like metaphysics, which considers all things insofar as they are beings, without descending to the proper knowledge of moral matters or natural things—for the account of being, since it becomes diverse in diverse things, is not sufficient for the specific knowledge of things. But the divine light, while remaining one itself, has efficacy to make such things manifest, as blessed Dionysius says. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod divinum lumen, ex cujus certitudine procedit haec scientia, est efficax ad manifestationem plurium quae in diversis scientiis in philosophia traduntur, ex eorum rationibus in eorum cognitionem procedentibus; et ideo non oportet scientiam istam multiplicare. Reply Obj. 1: The divine light, from which the certainty of this science arises, is capable of manifesting the many things that are treated in the diverse sciences within philosophy, which sciences proceed from the accounts of those things to the knowledge of those things. And, therefore, it is not necessary that this science be multiplied. Ad secundum dicendum, quod Creator et creatura reducuntur in unum, non communitate univocationis sed analogiae. Talis autem communitas potest esse duplex. Aut ex eo quod aliqua participant aliquid unum secundum prius et posterius, sicut potentia et actus rationem entis, et similiter substantia et accidens; aut ex eo quod unum esse et rationem ab altero recipit; et talis est analogia creaturae ad Creatorem: creatura enim non habet esse nisi secundum quod a primo ente descendit, nec nominatur ens nisi inquantum ens primum imitatur; et similiter est de sapientia et de omnibus aliis quae de creatura dicuntur. Reply Obj. 2: The Creator and the created are traced back to something one not with a community of univocation, but one with a community of analogy. Now, such a community can occur in two ways: either due to certain things participating in something, one as prior and posterior, as potency and act participate in the account of being, and likewise substance and accident; or due to one thing receiving its existence and account from the other, and this is the analogy of what is created with its Creator. For what is created has existence only insofar as it comes from the first being, which is why it is called a being only insofar as it is an imitation of the first being. And so it is with wisdom and all other things that are said of what is created. Ad tertium dicendum, quod ea quae sunt ab opere nostro et ea quae sunt ab opere naturae, considerata secundum proprias rationes, non cadunt in eamdem doctrinam. Una tamen scientia utrumque potest considerare, quae per lumen divinum certitudinem habet, quod est efficax ad cognitionem utriusque. Potest tamen aliter dici, quod virtus quam theologus considerat, non est ab opere nostro: immo eam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur, secundum Augustinum, 2 De lib. arbitr., cap. 19. Reply Obj. 3: The things that come from our own actions and those that come from nature, considered according to their own proper accounts, do not fall in the same doctrine. Nonetheless, a single science can consider both, which has its certitude through the divine light that is capable of knowing both. Yet it can be said that the virtue that the theologian considers does not come from our own activity; rather, God works it in us without us, according to Augustine. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum ista doctrina sit practica; utrum sit scientia; utrum sit sapientia Whether this doctrine is practical or speculative; whether it is science; whether it is wisdom Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Circa tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ista doctrina sit practica. We proceed to the third as follows. It appears that this doctrine is practical. Finis enim practicae est opus, secundum Philosophum in 2 Metaph. Sed ista doctrina, quae fidei est, principaliter est ad bene operandum; unde Jacob 2:26: fides sine operibus mortua est; et Psalm. 110:10: intellectus bonus omnibus facientibus eum. Ergo videtur quod sit practica. Obj. 1: For the end of a practical doctrine is some activity, according to the Philosopher. But this doctrine, which belongs to faith, is principally for the sake of acting well; this is why James 2:26 says, faith apart from works is dead, and Psalm 111 [110]:10, fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom; a good understanding have all those who practice it. Therefore it appears that it is practical. Contra, in princip. Metaph., in prooem., dicit Philosophus, quod nobilissima scientiarum est sui gratia. Practicae autem non sunt sui gratia, immo propter opus. Ergo, cum ista nobilissima sit scientiarum, non erit practica. On the contrary, the Philosopher says that the noblest of the sciences is for its own sake. Now, the practical sciences are not for their own sakes, but rather are for the sake of an activity. Therefore, since this is noblest of the sciences, it will not be practical. Praeterea, practica scientia determinat tantum ea quae sunt ab opere nostro. Haec autem doctrina considerat angelos et alias creaturas, quae non sunt ab opere nostro. Ergo non est practica, sed speculativa. Furthermore, a practical science considers only the things that arise from our activity. But this doctrine considers the angels and other created things that are not the result of our actions. Therefore it is not practical but speculative. Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius quaeritur, utrum sit scientia; et videtur quod non. Further, one asks whether it is a science, and it appears that it is not. Nulla enim scientia est de particularibus, secundum Philosophum, 1 Post. Sed in Sacra Scriptura gesta traduntur particularium hominum, sicut Abraham, Isaac, etc. Ergo non est scientia. Obj. 1: For no science is about particular things, according to the Philosopher. But Sacred Scripture treats the deeds of particular men, like Abraham, Isaac, and the others. Therefore it is not a science. Praeterea, omnis scientia procedit ex principiis per se notis, quae cuilibet sunt manifesta. Haec autem scientia procedit ex credibilibus, quae non ab omnibus conceduntur. Ergo non est scientia. Obj. 2: Furthermore, every science proceeds from principles known through themselves that are manifest to anyone. Now, this science proceeds from things that can be believed but which are not conceded by all. Therefore it is not a science. Praeterea, in omni scientia acquiritur aliquis habitus per rationes inductas. Sed in hac doctrina non acquiritur aliquis habitus: quia fides, cui tota doctrina haec innititur, non est habitus acquisitus, sed infusus. Ergo non est scientia. Obj. 3: Furthermore, in every science a certain habit is acquired through induced accounts. But in this doctrine no habit is acquired, since faith, on which this entire doctrine reposes, is not an acquired habit; rather, it is an infused habit. Therefore it is not a science. Contra, Augustinus, De Trinit., lib. 14: theologia est scientia de rebus quae ad salutem hominis pertinent. Ergo est scientia. On the contrary, according to Augustine, theology is the science about things that pertain to man’s salvation. Therefore it is a science. Quaestiuncula 3 Quaestiuncula 3 Ulterius quaeritur, utrum sit sapientia; et videtur quod non. Moreover, one asks whether it is wisdom, and it seems that it is not. Quia, sicut dicit Philosophus in princ. Metaph., sapiens debet esse certissimus causarum. Sed in ista doctrina non est aliquis certissimus; quia fides, cui haec doctrina innititur, est infra scientiam et supra opinionem. Ergo non est sapientia. Obj. 1: For, as the Philosopher says, the wise man should be the most certain about the causes. But in this doctrine there is no one who is most certain, since faith, on which this doctrine rests, is less than science and more than opinion. Therefore it is not wisdom. Contra, 1 Corinth. 2:6: sapientiam loquimur inter perfectos. Cum ergo hanc doctrinam ipse docuerit et de ipsa loquatur, videtur quod ipsa sit sapientia. On the contrary, among the mature we do impart wisdom (1 Cor 2:6). Therefore, since he himself taught this doctrine and is speaking about it, it appears that it is wisdom. Solutio 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum, quod ista scientia, quamvis sit una, tamen perfecta est et sufficiens ad omnem humanam perfectionem, propter efficaciam divini luminis, ut ex praedictis patet. Unde perficit hominem et in operatione recta et quantum ad contemplationem veritatis: unde quantum ad quid practica est et etiam speculativa. Sed quia scientia omnis principaliter pensanda est ex fine, finis autem ultimus istius doctrinae est contemplatio primae veritatis in patria, ideo principaliter speculativa est. Et, cum habitus speculativi sint tres, secundum Philosophum, 6 Ethic., cap. 7, scilicet sapientia, scientia et intellectus; dicimus quod est sapientia, eo quod altissimas causas considerat et est sicut caput et principalis et ordinatrix omnium scientiarum: et est etiam magis dicenda sapientia quam metaphysica, quia causas altissimas considerat per modum ipsarum causarum, quia per inspirationem a Deo immediate acceptam; metaphysica autem considerat causas altissimas per rationes ex creaturis assumptas. Unde ista doctrina magis etiam divina dicenda est quam metaphysica: quia est divina quantum ad subjectum et quantum ad modum accipiendi; metaphysica autem quantum ad subjectum tantum. Sed sapientia, ut dicit Philosophus in 6 Ethic., cap. 8, vel 7, considerat conclusiones et principia; et ideo sapientia est scientia et intellectus; cum scientia sit de conclusionibus et intellectus de principiis. I answer that this science, although it is one, is nevertheless perfect and even sufficient for every human perfection, on account of the efficacy of the divine light, as is clear from things said before. Whence it perfects man both in right activity and as regards contemplation of truth, and this is why in a certain respect it is practical and also speculative. Now, because every science should be weighed principally from its end, but the ultimate end of this doctrine is the contemplation of the first truth in the heavenly fatherland, it is therefore principally speculative. And since there are three habits of the speculative intellect—namely, wisdom, science, and understanding—we say that it is wisdom, because it considers the highest causes and is as the head, and chief, and what orders all the sciences. And it more than even metaphysics should be called wisdom, since it considers the highest causes through the mode of the causes themselves; for it does so through an inspiration immediately received from God, whereas metaphysics considers the highest causes through accounts taken from created things. Whence this doctrine even more than metaphysics should be called divine, since it is divine both as regards its subject and as regards its mode of receiving it, whereas metaphysics is called divine only as regards its subject. But wisdom, as the Philosopher says, considers both conclusions and principles, and therefore wisdom is science and understanding, since science is about conclusions and understanding is about principles. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod opus non est ultimum intentum in hac scientia, immo potius contemplatio primae veritatis in patria, ad quam deputati ex bonis operibus pervenimus, sicut dicitur Matth. 5:8: beati mundo corde; et ideo principalius est speculativa quam practica. Reply Obj. 1: Activity is not the ultimate thing intended in this science, but rather more the contemplation of the first truth in the heavenly fatherland, which contemplation we, when purified, attain due to our good actions: blessed are the pure in heart (Matt 5:8). And therefore it is more fundamentally speculative than practical.