Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum mundus sit aeternus Whether the world is eternal Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mundus sit aeternus: et ad hoc possunt adduci rationes sumptae ex quattuor, scilicet ex substantia caeli, ex tempore, ex motu, et ex agente vel movente. To the fifth we proceed as follows. It seems that the world is eternal. In support of this, arguments can be taken from four sources: from the substance of the heavens, from time, from motion, and from agent or mover. Ex substantia caeli sic. Omne quod est ingenitum et incorruptibile, semper fuit et semper erit. Sed materia prima est ingenita et incorruptibilis; quia omne quod generatur, generatur ex subjecto, et quod corrumpitur, corrumpitur in subjectum; materiae autem primae non est aliquod subjectum. Ergo materia prima semper fuit et semper erit. Sed materia nunquam denudatur a forma. Ergo materia ab aeterno fuit perfecta formis suis, quibus species constituuntur; ergo universum ab aeterno fuit, cujus istae species sunt partes. Et haec est ratio Aristotelis, in 1 Physicor. Obj. 1: The argument from the substance of the heavens is as follows. Everything that is ungenerated and incorruptible always has been and always will be. But prime matter is ungenerated and incorruptible, since everything that is generated is generated from a subject and what is corrupted is corrupted into a subject, whereas there is not a subject of prime matter. Therefore, prime matter always has been and always will be. But matter is never divested of form. Therefore, matter from eternity was perfected by its forms, by which species are constituted. Therefore, the universe has been from eternity, since these species are its parts. And this is the argument of Aristotle in the Physics 1. Praeterea, quod non habet contrarium, non est corruptibile nec generabile; quia generatio est ex contrario, et corruptio in contrarium. Sed caelum non habet contrarium, cum motui ejus nihil contrarietur. Ergo caelum non est generabile nec corruptibile: ergo semper fuit et semper erit. Et haec est ratio Philosophi, in 1 De caeli et mundi. Obj. 2: Furthermore, what does not have a contrary is neither corruptible nor generable, since generation is from a contrary and corruption is into a contrary. But the heavens do not have a contrary, since nothing is contrary to its motion. Therefore, the heavens are neither generable nor corruptible. Therefore, it always has been and always will be. And this is the argument of the Philosopher in On the Heavens 1. Praeterea, secundum positionem fidei, substantia mundi ponitur incorruptibilis. Sed omne incorruptibile est ingenitum. Ergo mundus est ingenitus. Ergo fuit semper. Probatio mediae. Omne quod est incorruptibile, habet virtutem ut sit semper. Sed illud quod habet virtutem ut sit semper, non invenitur quandoque ens et quandoque non ens; quia sequeretur quod simul esset ens et non ens: toto enim tempore aliquid est ens ad quod virtus sua essendi determinatur; unde si habet virtutem ut sit in omni tempore, in omni tempore est et ita si ponatur aliquando non esse, sequitur quod simul sit et non sit. Ergo nullum incorruptibile est quandoque ens et quandoque non ens. Sed omne generabile est hujusmodi. Ergo, etc. Et haec est ratio Philosophi, in 1 De caelo et mundo. Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the faith’s position, the substance of the world is said to be incorruptible. But everything incorruptible is ungenerated. Therefore, the world is ungenerated. Therefore, it always has existed. Proof of the middle premise: everything that is incorruptible has the power to be always. But that which has the power to be always is not found to be at one time a being and at another time non-being, since it would follow that it would at the same time be a being and non-being. For something is a being during the entire time to which its power of being is determined. Hence if it has the power to be at every time, then at every time it is. And so, if we posit that it ever is not, it follows that at the same time it both is and is not. Therefore, nothing incorruptible is at one time a being and at another time non-being. But every generable thing is of this sort. Therefore, and so forth. And this is the Philosopher’s argument in On the Heavens 1. Praeterea, omne quod alicubi est ubi prius nihil erat, est in eo quod prius fuit vacuum: quia vacuum est in quo potest esse corpus, cum nihil sit ibi. Sed si est mundus factus ex nihilo; ubi nunc est mundus, prius nihil erat. Ergo ante mundum fuit vacuum. Sed vacuum esse est impossibile, ut probatur in 4 Physic., et ut multa experimenta sensitiva demonstrant in multis ingeniis quae per hoc fiunt quod natura non patitur vacuum. Ergo impossibile est mundum incepisse. Et haec ratio est Commentatoris in 1 De caelo et mundo. Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that is anywhere, where before there was nothing, is in that which before was a vacuum, since a vacuum is that in which there can be a body even though nothing is there. But if the world was made from nothing, then where the world is now there was nothing before. Therefore, before the world there was a vacuum. But a vacuum is impossible, as is proved in the Physics 4 and as the many experiences of the senses demonstrate in the many natural dispositions that arise from the fact that nature does not allow a vacuum. Therefore, it is impossible for the world to have begun. And this is the argument of the Commentator on On the Heavens 1. Idem potest argui ex parte temporis sic. Omne quod est semper in principio et fine sui, semper fuit et semper erit: quia post principium est aliquid, et ante finem. Sed tempus semper est in eo quod est principium temporis et finis, quia nihil est temporis nisi nunc, cujus definitio est quod sit finis praesteriti, et principium futuri. Ergo videtur quod semper fuit tempus, et semper erit; et ita motus, et mobile, et totus mundus. Et haec est ratio Philosophi in 8 Physic. Obj. 5: The same can be argued from the perspective of time, in this way: everything that is always at its beginning and end, always has been and always will be, since it is something after the beginning and before the end. But time is always in that which is the beginning of time and its end. For there is no time except now, the definition of which is that it is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore, it seems that there has always been time and always will be. Thus, there have always been and always will be motion, the movable, and the whole world. And this is the Philosopher’s argument in the Physics 8. Praeterea, omne id quod nunquam potest demonstrari ut stans, sed semper ut fluens, habet aliquid ante se a quo fluit. Sed nunc non potest demonstrari ut stans, sicut punctus, sed semper ut fluens; quia ratio tota temporis est in fluxu et successione. Ergo oportet ante quodlibet nunc ponere aliud nunc: ergo impossibile est imaginari tempus habuisse primum nunc: ergo tempus semper fuit, et ita ut prius. Et haec est ratio Commentatoris, ibidem. Obj. 6: Furthermore, everything that can never be represented as static but instead is always taken as fluid has something before itself from which it flows. But “now” cannot be represented as static, like a point, but instead always as fluid. For the whole account of time lies in flux and succession. Therefore, before any given “now,” we must posit another “now.” Therefore, it is impossible to imagine that time had a first “now.” Therefore, time has always been. And so it follows as before. And this is the argument of the Commentator on the same passage. Praeterea, Creator mundi aut praecedit mundum tantum natura, aut etiam duratione. Si natura tantum, sicut causa effectum; ergo quandocumque fuit Creator, fuit creatura; et ita mundus ab aeterno. Si autem duratione; prius autem et posterius in duratione causat rationem temporis: ergo ante totum mundum fuit tempus: et hoc est impossibile, quia tempus est accidens motus, nec est sine motu. Ergo impossibile est mundum non semper fuisse. Et haec est ratio Avicennae in sua Metaph., lib. 9, cap. 1. Obj. 7: Furthermore, the Creator of the world either preceded the world by nature alone or also by duration. If it is by nature alone, as a cause precedes its effect, then whenever the Creator was, the thing created was. Thus, the world is eternal. But if it is by duration, then, since “before” and “after” in duration cause the account of time, before the whole world there was time, and this is impossible, since time is an accident of motion and does not exist without motion. Therefore, it is impossible that the world has not always been. And this is the argument of Avicenna in his Metaphysics. Idem potest ostendi ex parte motus. Impossibile enim est novam relationem esse inter aliqua nisi aliqua mutatione facta circa alterum eorum, sicut patet in aequalitate; non enim aliqua fiunt de novo aequalia, nisi altero extremorum augmentato vel diminuto. Sed omnis motus importat relationem moventis ad motum, quae relative opponuntur. Ergo impossibile est motum esse novum, nisi praecedat aliqua mutatio vel in movente vel in moto: sicut quod unum approximetur ad alterum, vel aliquid aliud hujusmodi. Ergo ante omnem motum est motus; et sic motus est ab aeterno, et mobile, et mundus. Et haec est ratio Philosophi, in 8 Physic. Obj. 8: The same can be shown from the perspective of motion. For it is impossible that there be a new relation between things unless there has been a change regarding one of them, as is clear, for example, in equality. For things do not newly come to be equal unless one of the extremes was either augmented or diminished. But all motion implies a relation of the mover to the thing moved, which are opposed relationally. Therefore, it is impossible for a motion to be new unless some change either in the mover or in the thing moved precedes it, as, for example, if one is accommodated to the other or something else of this sort. Therefore, before each motion there is motion. And so, from eternity there is motion, the movable, and the world. And this is the Philosopher’s argument in the Physics 8. Praeterea, omne illud cujus motus quandoque est et quandoque quiescit, reducitur ad aliquem motum continuum, qui semper est: quia hujus successionis, quae est ex vicissitudine motus et quietis, non potest esse causa aliquid eodem modo se habens; quia idem eodem modo se habens semper facit idem. Ergo oportet quod causa hujus vicissitudinis sit aliquis motus qui, si non est semper, oportet quod habeat aliquem motum praecedentem: et cum non sit abire in infinitum, oportet devenire ad aliquem motum qui semper est; et sic idem quod prius. Et haec ratio est Commentatoris in 8 Physic. Idem potest etiam extrahi ex verbis Philosophi. Inducit etiam hanc rationem Commentator in 7 Metaph., ad ostendendum quod si mundus esset factus, oporteret quod hic mundus esset pars alterius mundi, cujus motu accideret variatio in mundo isto, sive in vicissitudine motus et quietis, sive in vicissitudine esse et non esse. Obj. 9: Furthermore, everything that is at one time in motion and at another time at rest is traced back to a continuous motion that always exists. For something that is always the same cannot be the cause of this succession, which results from the alternation of motion and rest, since something that is always the same always does the same thing. Therefore, the cause of this alternation must be a motion that, if it does not always exist, must have another preceding motion. And since we cannot go to infinity, it is necessary to arrive at some motion that always exists. And so, the same follows as before. And this is the argument of the Commentator on the Physics 8. The same can also be drawn from the words of the Philosopher. The Commentator, too, adduces the same argument in the Metaphysics 7 to show that if the world were made, it would have to be part of another world by whose motion a change in this world would come about, whether in the alternation of motion and rest or in the alternation of being and non-being. Praeterea, generatio unius est corruptio alterius. Sed nihil corrumpitur nisi generetur prius. Ergo ante omnem generationem est generatio, et ante omnem corruptionem corruptio. Sed haec non potuerunt esse, nisi mundo existente. Ergo mundus semper fuit. Et haec est ratio Philosophi, in 1 De generatione. Obj. 10: Furthermore, the generation of one thing is the corruption of another. But nothing is corrupted unless it was first generated. Therefore, before every generation there is generation, and before every corruption there is corruption. But this could not be if the world did not exist. Therefore, the world has always been. And this is the Philosopher’s argument in On Generation and Corruption 1. Idem potest ostendi ex parte ipsius moventis vel agentis. Omnis enim actio vel motus quae est ab agente vel movente non moto, oportet quod sit semper. Sed primum agens vel movens est omnino immobile. Ergo oportet quod actio ejus et motus ejus sit semper. Prima sic probatur. Omne quod agit vel movet postquam non agebat vel movebat, educitur de potentia in actum, quia unumquodque agit secundum id quod est in actu: unde si agit postquam non agebat, oportet quod sit aliquid in actu in eo quod prius erat in potentia. Sed omne quod educitur de potentia in actum movetur. Ergo omne quod agit postquam non agebat, movetur. Et haec ratio potest extrahi ex verbis Philosophi in 8 Physic. Obj. 11: The same can be shown from the perspective of mover or agent. For every action or motion from an agent or mover that is not moved must always be. But the first agent or mover is altogether immovable. Therefore, his action and his motion must always be. The first premise is proved as follows. Everything that acts or moves after not acting or moving is brought from potency into act, since each thing acts according as it is in act. Hence if it acts after not acting, something in it must be in act that was first in potency. But everything that is brought from potency into act is moved. Therefore, everything that acts after not acting is moved. And this argument can be drawn from the words of the Philosopher in the Physics 8. Praeterea, Deus aut est agens per voluntatem, aut per necessitatem naturae. Si per necessitatem naturae, cum talia sint determinata ad unum, oportet quod ab eo semper idem fiat: unde si ab eo mundus est aliquando factus, necesse est mundum esse aeternum. Si autem agens per voluntatem, omnis autem voluntas non incipit agere de novo nisi aliquis motus fiat in volente, vel ab aliquo impediente, quod prius erat et postmodum cessat, vel ex eo quod excitatur nunc et non prius, aliquo inducente ad agendum quod prius non inducebat: cum ergo voluntas Dei immobiliter eadem maneat, videtur quod non incipiat de novo agere. Et ista ratio communiter est Philosophi, in 8 Physic., et Avicennae, 9 Metaph., cap. 1, et Commentatoris. Obj. 12: God is an agent either by his will or through a necessity of nature. If it is through a necessity of nature, since such things are determined to one thing, then from him the same thing must always arise. Hence if the world was ever made by him, then the world would have to be eternal. However, if he acts by his will, then every will only begins to act newly if some motion comes about in the will either from some impediment that was formerly there but later ceases. Or, it is due to the fact that the will is stirred up now but not before by something that induces it to act but did not induce it before. Therefore, since the will of God immovably remains the same, it seems that it does not begin to act newly. And this argument is common to the Philosopher in the Physics 8, to Avicenna, and to the Commentator. Praeterea, omnis volens quandoque agere et quandoque non agere, oportet quod imaginetur tempus post tempus discernendo tempus in quo vult agere, a tempore in quo non vult agere. Sed imaginari tempus post tempus, sequitur mutationem vel ipsius imaginationis, vel saltem imaginati, quia successio temporis causatur a successione motus, ut patet ex 4 Phys. Ergo impossibile est quod voluntas incipiat aliquem novum motum agere quem non praecedat alius motus. Et haec est ratio Commentatoris in 8 Physic. Obj. 13: Everyone who wills at one time to act and at another time not to act must imagine a time after a time, distinguishing the time in which he wills to act from the time in which he does not will to act. But to imagine a time after a time follows a change either of the imagination itself or at least of what is imagined, since the succession of time is caused by the succession of motion, as is clear from the Physics 4. Therefore, it is impossible for the will to begin a new motion not preceded by another motion. And this is the argument of the Commentator on the Physics 8. Praeterea, omnis voluntas efficiendi statim producit effectum, nisi desit aliquid illi volito quod sibi postmodum adveniat; sicut si modo habeam voluntatem faciendi ignem cras quando erit frigus, modo isti volito deest praesentia frigoris, qua adveniente, statim faciam ignem, si possum, nisi ad hoc aliquid aliud desit. Sed Deus habuit voluntatem aeternam faciendi mundum; alias esset mutabilis. Ergo impossibile est quod ab aeterno non fecerit mundum, nisi per hoc quod aliquid mundo deerat quod postmodum advenit. Sed non potuit advenire nisi per actionem aliquam. Ergo oportet quod ante hoc de novo factum praecedat aliqua actio mutationem faciens; et ita a voluntate aeterna nunquam procedat aliquid novum, nisi motu mediante aeterno. Ergo oportet mundum aeternum semper fuisse. Et haec est ratio Commentatoris, ibidem. Obj. 14: Every will to effect something produces its effect at once, unless something is lacking to what is willed that afterward comes to it. For example, if I now have the will of making a fire tomorrow when it will be cold, now the presence of cold is lacking to what is willed, but when it comes, I will make a fire at once, if I can, unless something else is lacking for this. But God had an eternal will to make the world. Otherwise, he would be changeable. Therefore, it is impossible that he has not made the world from eternity, unless through the fact that something had been lacking to the world that has later came to it. But it could not have come to it except through an action. Therefore, prior to something newly made, another action producing this change must precede. Thus, something of finite age never proceeds from an eternal will except by the mediation of an eternal motion. Therefore, the world must always have been. And this is the argument of the Commentator in the same place. Sed contra, Deus aut est causa substantiae mundi, aut non; sed motus ejus tantum. Si motus tantum, ergo ejus substantia non est creata: ergo est primum principium; et sic erunt plura prima principia et plura increata, quod supra improbatum est. Si autem est causa substantiae caeli, dans esse caelo; cum omne quod recipit esse ab aliquo, sequatur ipsum in duratione, videtur quod mundus non semper fuerit. On the contrary (15), God is either the cause of the substance of the world or he is not, being rather the cause of its motion only. If he is the cause of its motion only, then its substance is not created. Therefore, it is a first principle; and thus, there will be several first principles and several uncreated things, which was disproved above. But if he is the cause of the substance of heaven, giving being to heaven, then since everything that receives being from something comes after it in duration, it seems that the world has not always been. Praeterea, omne creatum est ex nihilo factum. Sed omne quod est ex nihilo factum est ens postquam fuit nihil, cum non sit simul ens et non ens. Ergo oportet quod caelum prius non fuerit et postmodum fuerit, et sic totus mundus. Furthermore (16), Every created thing was made from nothing. But everything that was made from nothing is a being after it was nothing, since it cannot at the same time be a being and non-being. Therefore, it is necessary that the heavens first was not and later was, and so also the whole world. Praeterea, si mundus fuit ab aeterno, ergo infiniti dies praecesserunt diem istum. Sed infinita non est transire. Ergo nunquam fuisset devenire ad hunc diem; quod falsum est. Ergo, etc. Furthermore (17), if the world has existed from eternity, then infinite days have preceded this day. But we cannot traverse infinities. Therefore, we never would have been able to arrive at this day, which is false. Therefore, and so on. Praeterea, cuicumque potest fieri additio, isto potest esse aliquid majus vel plus. Sed diebus qui praecesserunt, potest fieri dierum additio. Ergo tempus praeteritum potest esse majus quam sit. Sed infinito non est majus, nec potest esse. Ergo tempus praeteritum non est infinitum. Furthermore (18), anything to which an addition can be made can have something greater than or more than it. But to the days that have preceded, an addition of days can be made. Therefore, past time can be greater than it is. But there is nothing greater than the infinite, nor can there be. Therefore, past time is not infinite. Praeterea, si mundus fuit ab aeterno, ergo et generatio fuit ab aeterno tam hominum quam animalium. Sed omnis generatio habet generans et generatum; generans autem est causa efficiens generati; et sic in causis efficientibus est procedere in infinitum, quod est impossibile, ut probatur in 2 Metaph. Ergo impossibile est generationem semper fuisse et mundum. Furthermore (19), if the world has existed from eternity, then generation has also existed from eternity, both that of men and that of animals. But all generation has a generator and a generated. The generator is the efficient cause of the generated. And so, we proceed to infinity in efficient causes, which is impossible, as is proved in the Metaphysics 2. Therefore, it is impossible that generation and the world have always existed. Praeterea, si mundus semper fuit, homines semper fuerunt. Ergo infiniti homines sunt mortui ante nos. Sed homine moriente non moritur anima ejus, sed manet. Ergo modo sunt infinitae animae in actu a corporibus absolutae. Sed impossibile est infinitum esse in actu, ut in 3 Physic. probatur. Ergo impossibile est mundum semper fuisse. Furthermore (20), if the world has always existed, then there have always been men. Therefore, infinite men have died before us. But when a man dies, his soul does not die but remains. Therefore, there is now an actual infinity of souls separated from their bodies. But it is impossible for the infinite to be actual, as is proved in the Physics 3. Therefore, it is impossible that the world has always existed. Praeterea, impossibile est aliquid Deo aequiparari. Sed si mundus semper fuisset, aequipararetur Deo in duratione. Ergo hoc est impossibile. Furthermore (21), it is impossible for anything to be considered equal to God. But if the world has always existed, then it would be equal to God in duration. Therefore, this is impossible. Praeterea, nulla virtus finita est ad operationem infinitam. Sed virtus caeli est virtus finita, cum magnitudo ejus finita sit, et impossibile sit a magnitudine finita esse virtutem infinitam. Ergo impossibile est quod motus ejus fuerit in tempore infinito, et similiter impossibile est ut esse ejus tempore infinito duraverit, quia duratio rei non excedit virtutem quam habet ad esse: et sic incepit quandoque. Furthermore (22), no finite power is the power for an infinite activity. But the power of the heavens is a finite power, since its magnitude is finite and it is impossible for there to be an infinite power from a finite magnitude. Therefore, it is impossible for its motion to have existed over an infinite time, and likewise it is impossible for its being to have endured for an infinite time, since the duration of a thing does not exceed the power that it has for being. And so, at one time it had a beginning. Praeterea, nullus dubitat quin Deus natura praecedat mundum. Sed in Deo idem est natura et duratio sua. Ergo duratione Deus mundum praecedit. Ergo mundus non fuit ab aeterno. Furthermore (23), no one doubts that God precedes the world by nature. But in God, nature and duration are the same. Therefore, God precedes the world by duration. Therefore, the world has not existed from eternity. Respondeo dicendum, quod circa hanc quaestionem est triplex positio. Prima est philosophorum, qui dixerunt quod non solum Deus est ab aeterno, sed etiam aliae res; sed differenter: quia quidam ante Aristotelem posuerunt quod mundus est generabilis et corruptibilis, et quod ita est de toto universo sicut de aliquo particulari alicujus speciei, cujus unum individuum corrumpitur, et aliud generatur. Et haec fuit opinio Empedoclis. I answer that concerning this question there are three positions. The first position is that of the philosophers who said that not only is God from eternity but also other things, though in different ways. For certain philosophers before Aristotle posited that the world is generable and corruptible and that the whole universe is like a particular thing of a species, of which one individual is corrupted and another generated. And this was the opinion of Empedocles. Alii dixerunt, quod res fuerunt quiescentes tempore infinito, et per intellectum coeperunt moveri, extrahentem et segregantem unum ab alio. Et haec fuit opinio Anaxagorae. Others said that things were at rest for infinite time, and that through an intellect extracting and separating one thing from another they began to be moved. And this was the opinion of Anaxagoras. Alii dixerunt quod res ab aeterno movebantur motu inordinato, et postea reductae sunt ad ordinem, vel casu, sicut ponit Democritus, quod corpora indivisibilia ex se mobilia casu adunata sunt ad invicem, vel a creatore, et hoc ponit Plato, ut dicitur in 3 Caeli et mundi. Others said that from eternity things were moved with an unordered motion and then were reduced to an order either by chance, as Democritus posits that indivisible movable bodies were united to one another by chance, or by a creator, as Plato posits, recorded in On the Heavens 3. Alii dixerunt quod res fuerunt ab aeterno secundum illum ordinem quo modo sunt; et ista est opinio Aristotelis, et omnium philosophorum sequentium ipsum; et haec opinio inter praedictas probabilior est: tamen omnes sunt falsae et haereticae. Others said that things have existed from eternity in the order in which they are now. And this is the opinion of Aristotle and of all the philosophers who came after him. And this opinion is the more probable among the aforementioned. Nevertheless, all these opinions are false and heretical. Secunda positio est dicentium, quod mundus incepit esse postquam non fuerat, et similiter omne quod est praeter Deum, et quod Deus non potuit mundum ab aeterno facere, non ex impotentia ejus, sed quia mundus ab aeterno fieri non potuit, cum sit creatus; volunt etiam quod mundum incepisse, non solum fide teneatur, sed etiam demonstratione probetur. The second position is of those who say that the world began to be after it had not been and likewise everything that is other than God, and that God could not have made the world from eternity, not owing to any lack in his power, but rather because the world could not be made from eternity, since it is created. They also hold that the fact that the world had a beginning is not only held by faith, but also proved by demonstration. Tertia positio est dicentium quod omne quod est praeter Deum incepit esse; sed tamen Deus potuit ab aeterno res produxisse, et quod mundum incepisse non potuit demonstrari, sed per revelationem divinam esse habitum et creditum. Et haec positio innititur auctoritati Gregorii, 1 Hom. sup. Ezech., qui dicit quod quaedam prophetia est de praeterito, sicut Moyses prophetizavit cum dixit Gen. 1:1: in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. The third position is of those who say that everything besides God began to be, but that God nevertheless could have produced things from eternity. Thus, it could not be demonstrated that the world had a beginning, and this rather has been held and believed by divine revelation. This position is supported by the authority of Gregory who says that some prophecy concerns the past, as, for example, when Moses prophesied saying: in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth (Gen 1:1). Et huic positioni consentio: quia non credo, quod a nobis possit sumi ratio demonstrativa ad hoc; sicut nec ad Trinitatem, quamvis Trinitatem non esse sit impossibile; et hoc ostendit debilitas rationum quae ad hoc inducuntur pro demonstrationibus, quae omnes a philosophis tenentibus aeternitatem mundi positae sunt et solutae: et ideo potius in derisionem quam in confirmationem fidei vertuntur si quis talibus rationibus innixus contra philosophos novitatem mundi probare intenderet. And I agree with this position. For I do not believe a demonstrative argument to this effect can be made by us, just as we cannot do so with regard to the Trinity, even though it is impossible for the Trinity not to be. This shows the weakness of the arguments that are adduced as demonstrations to this effect, all of which have been set out and resolved by philosophers who maintain the eternity of the world. Thus, they are turned more into a mockery of the faith than a confirmation of it, if anyone intends to prove against the philosophers the finite age of the world by resting on such arguments. Dico ergo quod ad neutram partem quaestionis sunt demonstrationes, sed probabiles vel sophisticae rationes ad utrumque. Et hoc significant verba Philosophi dicentis, 1 Top., cap. 7, quod sunt quaedam problemata de quibus rationem non habemus, ut utrum mundus sit aeternus; unde hoc ipse demonstrare nunquam intendit: quod patet ex suo modo procedendi; quia ubicumque hanc quaestionem pertractat, semper adjungit aliquam persuasionem vel ex opinione plurium, vel approbatione rationum, quod nullo modo ad demonstratorem pertinet. Therefore, I say that there are no demonstrations of the question on either side, but rather probable or sophistic arguments on both sides. This is what the words of the Philosopher signify when he says that there are certain problems concerning which we do not have an argument, such as whether the world is eternal. Hence he never intended to demonstrate this, which is clear from his manner of proceeding, since wherever he treats of this question, he always adds an appeal either from the majority opinion or from arguments being approved, which in no way pertains to one who is giving a demonstration. Causa autem quare demonstrari non potest est ista, quia natura rei variatur secundum quod est in esse perfecto, et secundum quod est in primo suo fieri, secundum quod exit a causa; sicut alia natura est hominis jam nati, et ejus secundum quod est adhuc in materno utero. Unde si quis ex conditionibus hominis nati et perfecti vellet argumentari de conditionibus ejus secundum quod est imperfectus in utero matris existens, deciperetur; sicut narrat Rabbi Moyses, lib. 1 De perplexis Veteris Testamenti, cap. 18, de quodam puero, qui mortua matre cum esset paucorum mensium, et nutritus fuisset in quadam insula solitaria, perveniens ad annos discretionis, quaesivit a quodam, an homines essent facti, et quomodo; cui cum exponerent ordinem nativitatis humanae, objecit puer hoc esse impossibile, asserens, quia homo nisi respiret et comedat, et superflua expellat, nec per unum diem vivere potest; unde nec in utero matris per novem menses vivere potuit. Similiter errant qui ex modo fiendi res in mundo jam perfecto volunt necessitatem vel impossibilitatem inceptionis mundi ostendere: quia quod nunc incipit esse, incipit per motum; unde oportet quod movens praecedat duratione: oportet etiam quod praecedat natura, et quod sint contrarietates, et haec omnia non sunt necessaria in progressu universi esse a Deo. However, the reason why it cannot be demonstrated is as follows. The nature of a thing varies depending on whether it is in complete being or is in its first coming to be, as proceeding from its cause. So, for example, the nature of man already born is different from his nature when still in his mother’s womb. Hence if someone wished from the conditions of a complete man after birth to argue concerning his conditions as incomplete in his mother’s womb, he would be deceived. Thus, Rabbi Moses tells of a certain boy who, after his mother died when he was a few months old, had been brought up on a deserted island. He reached the age of discretion and asked someone whether men were made and how. When they explained the process of human birth to him, the boy objected that it was impossible, asserting that man cannot live a single day unless he breathes and eats and expels waste and that therefore he could not live in the womb of his mother for nine months. They err in like manner who, from the manner in which things come to be in an already complete world, wish to show the necessity or the impossibility of the world’s having a beginning, since now what begins to be begins through motion. Hence they say that what moves it must precede it in duration and that it must precede it also by nature and that there must be contrarieties. And all these things are not necessary in the procession of the being of the universe from God. Ad primum ergo dicendum est, quod materia est ingenita et incorruptibilis, non tamen sequitur quod semper fuerit: quia incepit esse, non per generationem ex aliquo, sed omnino ex nihilo; et similiter posset deficere si Deus vellet, cujus voluntate materiae et toti mundo esse communicatur. Reply Obj. 1: Matter is ungenerated and incorruptible, but it does not therefore follow that it has always existed. For it began to be not through generation from something else but altogether from nothing. It could likewise cease to be if God so willed, since by his will being is communicated to matter and to the whole world.